By  J.  Holland  Rose,  LittD. 


The  Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic  Era 
17894815 

The  Personality  of  Napoleon 

(The  Lowell  Lectures,  Spring,  1912) 

The  Development  of  the  European  Nations 
1870-1900 


The  Personality  of 
Napoleon 


By 

J.  Holland  Rose,  Litt.D. 

Reader  in  Modern  History,  the  University  of  Cambridge 


The  Lowell  Lectures  for  1912 


"T  is  your  thoughts  that  now  must  deck  our  kings, 
Carry  them  here  and  there;  jumping  o'er  times, 
Turning  the  accomplishment  of  many  years 
Into  an  hour-glass." 

SHAKESPEARE,  King  Henry   V,  Act  I,   Chorus 


G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons 
New  York  and  London 

fmicfccrbocfeer    press 
1912 


COPYRIGHT,  1912 

BY 
J.  HOLLAND  ROSE 


HIST.  I 


Hew 


CONTENTS 


I. 

PAGE 
...                .            1 

IT. 

THE  JACOBIN    .        . 

.    45 

III. 

THE  WARRIOR  .        • 

.    83 

IV. 

THE  LAWGIVER 

.  138 

V. 

THE  EMPEROR  . 

.  184 

VI. 

THE  THINKER  . 

.  236 

VII. 

THE  WORLD-RULER   . 

.        .        .  278 

VIII. 

THE  EXILE 

.  324 

INDEX 

.  373 

111 


LIST  OF  MAPS 

PACK 

MAP  OF  NORTHERN  ITALY 96 

MAP  OF  THE  UPPER  DANUBE       ....  102 
PLAN  OF  THE  BATTLE  OF  AUSTERLITZ        .        .  116 


The 
Personality  of  Napoleon 


THE  MAN 

"  I  confess,  I  have  no  notion  of  a  truly  great  man  that 
could  not  be  all  sorts  of  men." — CARLYLE,  Heroes. 

|N  these  lectures  I  propose  briefly  to  estimate 
the  value  of  the  personal  factor  in  the  Napo- 
leonic era.  In  no  sense  do  they  claim  to  be  an 
exhaustive  analysis  of  character.  The  materials 
for  such  an  examination  probably  do  not  exist; 
for,  though  the  number  of  the  extant  letters  of 
Napoleon  exceeds  32,000,  yet  by  far  the  larger 
number  deal  solely  with  facts;  and  even  the  im- 
posing mass  of  the  official  Correspondence  de 
Napoleon  (with  additions  by  Lecestre  and  Bro- 
tonne)  does  not  explain  the  variations  and  con- 
tradictions which  invest  his  being  with  a  charm 
sometimes  almost  Shakespearian  in  its  elusive- 


2  Personality  of  Napoleon 

ness.  Even  at  St.  Helena,  when  lie  claimed  that 
misfortune  showed  him  to  the  world  naked  as 
he  was,  the  aureole  of  legend  was  beginning  to 
gild  his  brows.  The  truest  estimate,  then,  will 
be  that  which  duly  assesses  the  influences  mould- 
ing his  early  years,  and  traces  the  manifold 
activities,  which,  while  shaping  the  fortunes  of 
France  and  Europe,  also  helped  to  fashion  his 
being.  Restful  natures  can  be  examined  micro- 
scopically. On  Napoleon  the  analyst  would  ex- 
haust his  powers  as  vainly  as  a  painter  who, 
from  a  stuffed  specimen  in  a  glass  case,  should 
seek  to  depict  the  flight  of  the  eagle. 

Even  in  the  case  of  a  king  of  men  the  habitat 
counts  for  much ;  and,  in  part  at  least,  Napoleon 
owed  his  soaring,  strenuous  nature  to  his  native 
land,  Corsica.  There  Nature  bestows  her  boons 
full  shrewdly,  withholding  so  much  as  to  spur 
men  to  some  form  of  activity,  and  so  far  reward- 
ing their  efforts  as  to  yield  a  sufficiency,  with 
something  of  that  leisure  superadded  which 
makes  life  a  delight,  not  a  drudgery.  On  the 
shores  of  the  Mediterranean  mankind  first 
lived  a  complete  life,  in  some  parts  develop- 
ing the  arts  and  sciences,  in  others  sinking 
into  luxury  and  sloth,  or  in  the  more  rugged 
lands  keeping  up  the  primeval  habits  of  war 


The  Man  3 

and  adventure  thinly  covered  by  a  veneer  of 
culture. 

These  last  were  the  conditions  that  obtained 
in  Corsica.  It  is  to  Italy  what  Ithaca  is  to 
Greece,  echoing  faintly  the  rapturous  music  of 
the  mainland,  but  adding  the  warlike  or  wailing 
undertone  of  the  Highlander.  The  unrest  of  the 
sea,  the  awesomeness  of  the  mountains,  are  bal- 
anced by  no  glad  and  careless  life  in  fertile 
plains.  The  crag,  the  forest,  the  sea  dominate 
Corsica.  Like  Itha'ca,  she  is  "  rugged,  a  good 
nurse  of  heroes."  The  wonder  is  that  she  has 
so  rarely  fulfilled  the  prophecy  of  Kousseau,  that 
she  would  some  day  astonish  the  world.  ^For  her 
sons  have  been  hardened  by  constant  strife  and 
energised  by  frequent  admixtures  of  conquering 
races.  All  the  peoples  that  swept  over  the  Medi- 
terranean, from  the  times  of  the  Phoenicians  and 
Greeks  down  to  those  of  the  Vandals  and  Arabs, 
have  left  their  mark  upon  the  islanders.  Prob- 
ably the  stem  is  in  the  main  Italian;  but  the 
many  grafts  have  made  of  it  a  tougher  tree,  less 
fertile  in  fruit  and  more  so  in  thorns.  How 
should  it  be  otherwise?  A  small  people,  exposed 
on  all  sides  to  raids,  must  think  first  of  defence, 
or,  if  that  fails,  of  flight  to  the  forest  and  moun- 
tain, trusting  by  prowess  or  guile  to  worst  or 


4  Personality  of  Napoleon 

tire  out  the  invaders.  To  the  Corsicans  the  sea 
was  perhaps  more  an  enemy  than  a  friend.  If 
it  yielded  fish  and  helped  on  the  petty  traders, 
it  also  brought  the  Barbary  rovers,  who,  if  suc- 
cessful, swept  off  fishermen,  traders,  and  their 
families  into  slavery.  We  are  apt  to  forget  that- 
less  than  a  century  has  elapsed  since  Lord  Ex- 
mouth  burnt  out  Algiers,  that  wasps'  nest  of  the 
Mediterranean.  But  the  records  of  Corsica  and 
her  many  martello  towers  (so  called  from  the 
hammer  struck  on  a  bell  to  warn  the  country  at 
the  approach  of  pirates)  remind  us  of  that  dark 
shadow  hanging  over  her  life  and  that  of  all 
Mediterranean  peoples. 

In  such  a  state  of  things  self-defence  is  always 
the  first  thought.  Every  Corsican  of  standing 
went  about  armed.  Many  of  them  wore  the 
trophies  of  the  chase;  and,  in  default  of  lawful 
game,  would  turn  their  arms  against  neighbours 
with  whom  they  were  at  feud.  What  the  joust 
or  tourney  was  to  the  barons  of  the  mainland, 
that  the  blood-feud,  or  vendetta,  was  to  the 
caporaM,  or  chieftains,  of  Corsica.  An  injury, 
an  insult,  even  a  haughty  look,  might  provoke  a 
feud  which  could  be  ended  only  with  blood.  The 
islanders  recked  little  of  public  law.  For  gen- 
erations they  had  known  nothing  but  the  decrees 


of  Genoa ;  and  them  they  loathed  as  the  behests 
of  their  would-be  tyrants.  Boswell,  in  his  inter- 
esting Account  of  Corsica,  ascribes  the  habit  of 
private  vengeance  solely  to  this  cause,  and  says 
that  the  Corsican  champion,  Paoli,  succeeded  in 
stamping  out  the  vicious  custom.  Both  asser- 
tions are  exaggerated.  The  vendetta  was  far 
older  than  Genoese  rule  in  Corsica,  and  it  has 
survived  to  some  extent  to  our  own  days.  Bos- 
well  is  far  nearer  the  truth  when  he  ascribes  the 
vendetta  to  the  violent  passions  of  the  islanders, 
resulting  from  the  heat  of  the  climate,  "  which 
forms  the  human  frame  to  an  exquisite  degree 
of  sensibility.  .  .  .  They  are  people  of  strong 
passions  as  well  as  of  lively  and  vigorous  minds. 
These  are  the  materials  of  which  men  are  to  be 
formed,  either  good  or  bad,  in  a  superior  de- 
gree." *  The  influence  of  the  vendetta  on  the 
character  of  the  islanders  was  profound.  It 
made  them  a  silent,  suspicious,  proud,  and  vin- 
dictive race.  In  the  virtual  absence  of  national 
law,  the  honour  of  the  clan  and  the  family  was 
always  the  first  consideration.  War,  the  chase, 

*J.  Boswell,  Account  of  Corsica  (1769),  160,  161, 
241.  So,  too,  Napoleon  (Corresp.,  ii.,  163)  said  that  the 
imagination  and  the  passions  of  the  Corsicans  were 
very  lively,  and  that  they  were  extremely  difficult  to 
understand. 


6  Personality  of  Napoleon 

and  the  advancement  or  preservation  of  the  kin 
were  the  governing  factors  in  life. 

The  Corsicans  displayed  the  virtues  as  well  as 
the  defects  of  the  clan  system.  If  they  were 
factious  and  difficult  to  rule,  they  clave  stead- 
fastly to  their  chieftain.  To  desert  him  was  the 
depth  of  dishonour.  On  one  occasion  a  youth 
ventured  to  do  so.  His  father,  meeting  him  at 
the  gate  of  the  town,  shot  him  dead;  and  public 
opinion  approved  the  deed.  To  die  for  the  chief 
was  a  glorious  act,  and  this  chivalrous  feeling 
nerved  the  islanders  to  deeds  of  endurance  and 
daring  astonishing  to  more  civilised  peoples. 
They  had  no  regular  troops;  for  as  Paoli  said 
to  Boswell,  "  We  should  then  have  the  bravery 
of  this  and  that  regiment.  At  present,  every 
single  man  is  a  regiment  himself.  Should  the 
Corsicans  be  formed  into  regular  troops,  we 
should  lose  that  personal  bravery  which  has  pro- 
duced such  actions  among  us."  1  On  the  other 
hand  their  moods  were  as  fickle  as  their  sea,  and 
savage  as  their  mountains.  No  one  has  ever  suc- 
ceeded in  thoroughly  taming  the  people  of  the 
interior.  The  Genoese  failed,  as  the  French  after 
them  failed. 

Into  this  primitive  community  Napoleon  Bona- 

1  Boswell,  p.  320. 


The  Man  7 

parte  was  born  at  Ajaccio,  on  15th  August,  1769. 
It  was  a  time  of  exceptional  strain  and  stress. 
The  islanders  were  struggling  to  throw  off  the 
yoke  of  the  French,  who  had  taken  over  Corsica 
from  the  nerveless  hands  of  the  Genoese.  The 
first  associations  of  the  child  were  therefore 
those  of  hatred  against  the  people  whom  he  after- 
wards raised  to  heights  of  glory;  and  up  to  his 
twentieth  year  he  was  at  heart  a  rebel  against 
the  French  connection.  Thus,  in  that  formative 
period  all  the  faculties  that  make  for  opposition 
received  abnormal  development.  His  whole  life 
was  to  be  a  struggle.  In  truth,  the  struggle  be- 
gan before  his  birth.  His  father  and  mother 
had  to  flee  from  their  home  during  the  strife 
against  the  French;  and  Napoleon  himself, 
when,  as  ruler  of  France,  he  set  himself  against 
effeminacy,  once  declared  with  his  usual  energy, 
"  Before  my  birth,  my  mother  was  running  about 
over  all  the  mountains  of  Corsica."  Perhaps 
the  hardships  of  those  months  made  him  the 
slim  youth,  whose  aquiline  sharpness  of  face  and 
figure  aroused  wonder  and  pity.  But  his  con- 
stitution was  sound;  his  nerves  were  of  steel; 
and  that  resolute  will  hardened  under  the  cease- 
less pressure  of  danger.  The  life  of  a  man,  as 
of  a  nation,  is  the  stronger  for  encountering 


8  Personality  of  Napoleon 

privation  in  the  early  days.  The  Spaniards  in 
their  age-long  contests  with  the  Moors,  the  Scots 
in  the  fight  with  Nature  and  with  England, 
gained  the  grit  which  spread  them  over  the 
world  as  conquerors  and  leaders.  Modern  Italy 
was  made  by  her  virile  sons  of  the  north;  and 
Napoleon  would  not  have  gone  so  far  had  he 
not  early  been  inured  to  war  and  hardship. 
Italy  supplied  his  brain  power;  Corsica  made 
him  a  warrior. 

To  speculate  on  the  family  ingredients  that  go 
to  make  up  the  character  of  a  child  is  a  fallacious 
task.  Even  the  ordinary  product  of  a  one-room 
family  sometimes  sets  at  defiance  the  laws  of 
heredity;  and  he  who  should  seek  to  reconstruct 
a  great  genius  on  biological  principles  would 
assuredly  bring  forth  only  a  dummy.  No:  the 
World  Spirit  now  and  again  visits  the  earth, 
and  in  the  being  of  some  child  enfolds  influences 
of  wonder-working  potency.  In  other  years  that 
same  cradle  may  hold  a  doll,  a  mere  libertine. 
On  this  occasion,  in  August,  1769,  it  enshrines 
Napoleon;  for  some  incalculable  influence  has 
raised  to  the  n?th  power  all  the  family  char- 
acteristics that  make  for  greatness. 

Nevertheless,  Napoleon  is  a  Corsican,  an  Ital- 


The  Man  9 

ian.1  In  his  character,  abounding  in  strongly 
marked  features,  the  nature  of  his  father,  a  rest- 
less, intriguing  man,  fond  of  literature  and  philo- 
sophy, appears  on  what  may  be  termed  the  civil 
side  of  his  faculties.  Charles  Marie  de  Bona- 
parte, though  he  fought  under  Paoli's  banner, 
was  not  fitted  to  be  a  soldier.  He  was  essen- 
tially a  schemer;  but  he  lacked  the  toughness 
and  persistent  energy  which  might  have  carried 
some  of  his  many  schemes  to  a  successful  issue; 
and  he  finally  went  over  to  the  French  side  in 
an  eminently  un-Corsican  manner,  which  earned 
the  contempt  of  Napoleon.  Still,  Charles  was  a 
clever  man,  with  varied  tastes  and  a  veneer  of 
academic  culture  which  sufficed  for  the  muni- 
cipal and  legal  honours  at  which  he  aimed.  He 
was  an  attorney,  and  in  pursuit  of  places  and 
profits  at  Ajaccio  showed  untiring  zeal  and  con- 
siderable powers  of  intrigue.  These,  added  to 
the  influence  of  his  family,  and  that  of  his  wife, 
brought  him  to  the  front;  and  he  might  have 
prospered  but  for  restlessness  and  constant  wire- 
pulling. Finally  his  requests  for  patronage  seem 
to  have  disgusted  the  French  officials  and  tired 
out  his  friends,  with  the  result  that  he  finished 

1  See  the  family  pedigree  in  Masson,  Napoleon  Inconnu, 
i.,  ab  init. 


io  Personality  of  Napoleon 

his  days  in  failure.  He  began  life  poor,  and  he 
ended  it  virtually  a  bankrupt.  At  the  time  of 
his  marriage  with  Letizia  Ramolino,  a  girl  of 
fifteen,  the  young  couple  had  between  them 
property  amounting  to  less  than  14,000  francs 
in  value.  Their  children  came  fast,  and  for 
each  child  he  wove  new  schemes  and  intrigues, 
most  of  which  overshot  the  mark,  the  result 
being  that  his  income  rarely  met  his  needs. 

These  ceaseless  embarrassments,  which  would 
have  broken  down  most  women,  only  called  forth 
the  wifely  devotion  and  resolute  thrift  of  Letizia. 
She  came  of  a  hardy  stock,  which  like  the  Bona- 
partes  had  won  distinction  in  mediaeval  Italy, 
but  had  migrated  from  Genoa  to  Corsica  at  the 
end  of  the  fifteenth  century.  There  the  Ramo- 
lini  had  intermarried  with  other  families  of 
Italian  origin  for  the  most  part,  though  in 
Letizia  there  was  a  slight  strain  of  Greek  blood.1 
Her  mother  was  of  the  Pietra-Santa  family, 
which  sprang  from  the  warlike  clans  of  the  in- 
terior; and  Letizia  herself  developed  a  firm, 
proud,  masculine  character,  destined  to  have  a 
great  influence  on  that  of  Napoleon.  In  him 

1  There  seems  to  be  no  truth  in  Madame  Junot's  story 
that  the  ancestor  of  Bonaparte,  who  came  from  Tuscany, 


was     a     Greek     named    /caXo/xfyos.     Duchesse     d'Abrantes, 
.y  i.,  ch.  ii. 


The  Man  11 

the  restless  scheming  disposition  of  the  father 
was  partly,  not  wholly,  balanced  by  the  hard, 
matter-of-fact  nature  of  the  mother.  She  brought 
up  her  children  frugally,  as  there  was  need, 
tenderly,  as  her  heart  prompted,  but  with  the 
Spartan  severity  which  their  headstrong  char- 
acter demanded.  They  loved  her  none  the  less, 
and  respected  her  all  the  more,  because  she  did 
not  spare  the  rod.  Apparently  the  only  time 
when  Napoleon  received  bodily  chastisement  was 
in  his  seventeenth  year,  when  he  was  guilty  of 
mimicking  the  limping  gait  of  his  grandmother. 
The  quick  eye  of  Letizia  detected  the  offence; 
and  in  due  course  the  young  lieutenant  had  to 
submit  to  a  sound  birching.  The  tactical  skill 
of  Letizia  on  this  occasion  equalled  her  firmness 
of  mind  and  of  arm.  She  notified  him  that 
he  should  go  upstairs  to  dress  for  some  social 
function,  and  then  with  the  cane  pounced  upon 
him  while  disrobed.  In  the  shrewdness  of  the 
mother  on  this  occasion  may  we  not  see  a  homely 
forecast  of  the  manoeuvres  at  Castiglione  and 
Austerlitz? 

All  the  children  of  this  quick-eyed,  strong- 
minded  woman  displayed  average  ability.  Jo- 
seph, the  eldest  surviving  child,  became  a  skilful 
diplomatist,  and  might  have  figured  as  a  fairly 


12  Personality  of  Napoleon 

competent  ruler  in  ordinary  times.  Lucien  and 
Elisa  showed  intellectual  ability  and  administra- 
tive capacity.  Louis  was  clever  but  crabbed. 
Pauline  lived  a  butterfly  life  with  easy  Italian 
grace;  and  the  youngest  children,  Caroline  and 
Jerome,  almost  rivalled  her  in  the  number  of  their 
amours.  Self-will,  obstinacy,  voluptuousness, 
figure  in  all  the  children;  ability  in  the  first 
four;  genius  only  in  Napoleon. 

He  resembled  the  Corsicans  in  his  short  stat- 
ure (he  stood  about  5  ft.  5  in.1),  in  the  hardness 
of  his  nature,  which  scorned  danger  and  de- 
spised wealth,  above  all  in  his  family  pride, 
which  later  on  raised  his  mother  to  the  position 
of  first  lady  in  France  and  his  brothers  to  the 
thrones  of  neighbouring  lands.  He  himself  once 
described  the  Corsicans  as  "  harsh,  but  at  bottom 
just";  and  again  in  those  words  he  described 
himself.  Benefits  he  ever  remembered  and  gen- 
erously rewarded.  He  had  a  keen  eye  for  wrongs 
or  slights,  and  generally  meted  out  revenge;  but 
he  raised  his  old  friends,  for  instance  Junot,  to 
a  position  far  above  their  deserts;  and  many  of 
his  difficulties  late  in  life  arose  from  having 

1  Bausset,  Cour  de  Napoleon,  ch.  xxxix.  The  height  has 
also  been  given  as  5  ft.  7  in.;  but  Bausset,  Napoleon's 
chamberlain,  is  the  most  credible  authority. 


The  Man  13 

placed  his  brothers  and  old  comrades  in  sta- 
tions which  demanded  real  capacity.  This  was 
a  defect  in  a  great  ruler,  but  one  for  which  he 
is  to  be  honoured  as  a  man.  He  often  behaved 
to  humbler  dependents  with  the  hauteur  of  a 
chief;  but  he  knew  the  infinite  worth  of  fidelity 
and  rewarded  those  who  showed  it.  Specially 
noteworthy  is  his  treatment  of  the  son  of  Nicola 
Frate,  who  had  bravely  defended  him  during  the 
civil  strifes  of  Corsica  in  the  spring  of  1793.  At 
that  time  the  future  world-conqueror  was  fain 
to  flee  from  Ajaccio  on  foot  in  order  to  escape 
the  violence  of  the  opposing  and  triumphant 
Paolists.  Nicola  Frate  guided  him  on  foot  by 
secret  paths  and  helped  him  to  escape  from  a 
position  of  extreme  peril.  Napoleon  ever  re- 
membered this,  and  in  his  will  left  10,000  francs 
to  the  son  of  his  faithful  guide. 

The  same  document  contains  a  curious  proof 
of  his  rancour.  He  bequeathed  10,000  francs  to 
a  French  officer,  Cantillon,  who  had  sought  to 
murder  Wellington.  The  generosity  and  the 
rancour  are  both  of  them  Corsican  traits, 
strongly  marked  in  his  character.  Time  after 
time  he  astonished  the  world  by  the  splendour 
of  his  gifts  and  the  terror  of  his  vengeance.  At 
the  time  of  his  execution  of  the  Due  d'Enghien 


14  Personality  of  Napoleon 

an  aide-de-camp  ventured  on  the  true  but  risky 
comment,  that  the  First  Consul  was  returning 
to  the  customs  of  his  native  isle.  Five  years 
later  the  Spanish  Bourbons  were  to  feel  the  fatal 
sword-thrust  which  their  challenge  to  him  dur- 
ing the  Jena  campaign  had  seemed  to  court. 
Skilled  in  hiding  his  resentment,  he  bided  his 
time,  and  in  1808  overwhelmed  that  dynasty  in 
apparently  irretrievable  ruin.  It  is  highly  prob- 
able that  he  all  along  intended  to  avenge  the 
affront * ;  and  the  means  of  executing  it  were 
characteristic  of  the  man  and  of  his  race.  The 
self-suppression,  the  secret  waiting,  the  intrigues 
to  divide  the  House  of  Bourbon,  and  then  the 
final  feline  spring,  are  like  an  episode  of  Floren- 
tine history.  The  French  nature  is  more  open, 
sunny,  and  careless,  which  goes  far  to  explain 
the  almost  invariable  failure  of  their  con- 
spiracies. Certainly  the  survivors  of  the  French 
Revolution,  a  sad,  weary,  disillusionised  group, 
were  mere  schoolboys  in  the  hand  of  this  silent, 
determined,  resourceful  Italian. 

More  than  once,  with  the  frankness  which  is 
his  most  engaging  feature,  he  expressed  his  con- 
tempt of  the  French,  especially  of  the  Parisians. 
To  Metternich  in  the  spring  of  1812  he  uttered 

1Metternich,  Mems.  (Eng.  edit.),  ii.,  291. 


The  Man  15 

these  surprising  words :  "  In  France  talent  is 
common  enough;  but  it  is  only  talent;  there  is 
nothing  beneath  it  which  resembles  character, 
and,  still  less,  principle.  Every  one  runs  after 
applause,  whether  it  comes  from  above  or  below, 
no  matter:  they  want  to  be  noticed  and  ap- 
plauded." *  So,  too,  at  St.  Helena,  he  remarked 
to  General  Gourgaud :  "  In  France  there  will 
never  be  a  lack  of  clever  scheming  people;  but 
there  will  always  be  a  lack  of  men  of  great 
character  and  vigour,  in  fine,  of  men  dowered 
with  the  sacred  fire."  2 

1  believe  that  he  ascribed  those  supreme  gifts 
only  to  the  ancient  Romans.     For  them  he  had 
a  profound  admiration.     Though  Alexander  the 
Great  winged  his  fancies  eastwards,  the  first  two 
Caesars  were  his  models  in  war   and  politics. 
From  Julius  Caesar  he  first  learnt  the  lesson 
that  decisive  triumphs  in  war  are  the  fruit  of 
singleness  of  aim  and  concentration  both  of  pur- 
pose and  of  forces.     From  Caesar  Augustus  he 
borrowed  largely  in  statecraft,  but  his  debt  to 
Julius  is  greater.     The  close  connection  between 
the  brilliant  conquest  of  Gaul  and  the  founda- 
tion of  autocracy  at  Home  evidently  inspired 

iMetternich,  Mems.   (Eng.  edit.),  i.,  151. 

2  Gourgaud,  Journal,  i.,  299. 


1 6  Personality  of  Napoleon 

Bonaparte's  far-reaching  plans  of  the  years 
1797-9;  and  the  clemency  of  the  great  Roman 
may  have  strengthened  the  resolve  of  the  First 
Consul  to  rally  all  parties  to  the  cause  of  po- 
litical moderation  which  he  made  emphatically 
his  own.  In  all  this,  and  in  the  carrying  out  of 
great  public  works,  Napoleon  figured  as  a  second 
Julius  Caesar.  Strange  destiny  of  mankind,  that 
the  political  powers  of  a  whole  people,  dormant 
during  nearly  eighteen  centuries  of  fallow,  should 
now  rise  up  in  an  island-scion  of  the  race. 

The  four-square  self -sufficiency  characteristic 
of  the  old  Roman  nature  appears  early  in  the 
nature  of  Napoleon  Bonaparte.  His  mental 
training  was  that  which  he  himself  absorbed, 
not  what  others  sought  to  instil.  He  had  a 
poor  opinion  of  the  education  given  him  by  the 
monks  at  Brienne,  and  by  the  authorities  at  the 
Ecole  Militaire  at  Paris;  but  probably  he  would 
have  disliked  any  French  school.  At  that  time, 
and  up  to  1790,  his  feelings  were  strongly  Corsi- 
can.  He  hated  the  French,  as  the  conquerors 
of  his  country;  and  at  the  Paris  seminary  he 
scorned  the  sons  of  nobles  who  formed  a  large 
part  of  the  pupils.  Further,  he  longed  to  free 
Corsica  from  the  French;  and  this  explains  the 
arduous  studies  in  history  and  in  the  art  of 


The  Man  17 

war,  which  he  undertook  during  his  time  in 
garrison  at  Valence  and  Auxonne  during  the 
greater  part  of  the  years  1787-90.  Very  remark- 
able is  the  concentration  of  thought  and  effort 
which  enable  this  poor  lieutenant  to  amass  a  most 
unusual  amount  of  information  on  modern  his- 
tory and  some  of  the  sciences.  Like  most  care- 
ful and  persevering  students,  he  made  his  own 
summaries,  thereby  working  the  material  into 
the  fibre  of  his  own  brain;  and  the  note-books 
which  have  survived  reveal  that  methodising 
faculty,  that  resolve  to  arrange  and  master  facts, 
which  is  one  of  the  secrets  of  success  in  organisa- 
tion. His  was  no  ordinary  brain,  content  with 
languidly  surveying  the  facts  of  life  at  a  dis- 
tance, or  sated,  perhaps,  with  the  instruction 
imparted  by  others.  He  was  more  or  less  a 
rebel  at  school;  but,  when  his  mind  had  once 
awakened,  it  became  a  powerful  machine,  grind- 
ing all  the  materials  that  came  within  reach, 
appropriating  them  and  sorting  them  in  com- 
partments ready  for  the  time  of  use.  All  this 
was  done  before  or  after  the  work  of  drill,  and 
amidst  conditions  of  health  and  poverty  far 
from  favourable  to  prolonged  study.  Yet  the 
written  results  of  those  studies  of  about  two 
years  are  portentous.  They  extend  to  368  large 


1 8  Personality  of  Napoleon 

pages  of  print  in  M.  Masson's  work,  Napoleon 
Inoonnu.  That  is,  they  would  make  an  average- 
sized  book  of  these  days. 

The  quality  and  variety  of  the  work  is  as  re- 
markable as  its  extent.  Bonaparte  draws  up  a 
new  constitution  for  a  regimental  club  (la 
Calotte),  which  may  be  called  his  first  adminis- 
trative effort.  He  writes  four  long  memoranda 
on  artillery.  Turning  to  the  classics,  he  sum- 
marises the  first  part  of  Tlie  Republic  of  Plato, 
and  writes  notes  on  the  government  of  the 
ancient  Persians,  of  Sparta  and  Athens,  and  on 
the  geography  of  ancient  Greece.  He  also  epi- 
tomises Greek  and  Egyptian  history.  Carthage 
and  Assyria  attract  him.  RaynaPs  book  on  the 
two  Indies  first  turns  his  thoughts  to  the  colonial 
and  imperial  questions  which  are  to  dominate 
his  policy  during  the  Empire;  and  perhaps  it  is 
the  collision  of  England  and  France  in  that 
sphere  which  leads  him  on  to  a  surprisingly 
careful  study  of  English  history  down  to  the 
year  1688. 

He  goes  even  farther  afield.  He  studies  the 
history  of  the  Arabs  and  the  government  of 
Venice,  doubtless  because  of  their  influence  on 
the  Levant.  To  the  history  of  France  he  pays 
less  attention,  either  because  he  has  been  well 


The  Man  19 

drilled  in  it  at  school,  or  from  lack  of  special 
interest.  On  the  other  hand,  natural  science, 
in  the  domains  of  geography  and  biology,  holds 
a  prominent  place  in  his  thoughts,  which  play 
inquisitively  around  the  mysterious  phenomena 
of  generation.  Altogether  what  a  programme 
of  self -culture  is  in  these  notes. 

Side  by  side  with  this  resolve  to  master  the 
facts  of  life  are  signs  of  an  introspective  brood- 
ing which  develops  into  melancholy ;  witness  this 
extract  from  a  monologue  on  suicide  which  he 
wrote  probably  in  May,  1786,  while  second 
lieutenant  at  Valence  (set  17)  : 

Always  alone  even  in  the  midst  of  men,  I  come 
back  to  my  room  to  dreain  with  myself,  and  to 
surrender  myself  to  all  the  vivacity  of  my  melan- 
choly. In  which  direction  does  it  tend  to-day? 
Towards  death.  Being  in  the  dawn  of  my  days,  I 
can  still  hope  to  live  a  long  time.  I  have  been  away 
from  my  country  for  about  six  or  seven  years.  What 
pleasures  will  be  mine,  when  in  four  months'  time  I 
once  again  see  my  countrymen  and  my  relatives. 
From  the  tender  sensations  with  which  the  recollec- 
tions of  the  pleasures  of  my  childhood  now  fill  me, 
may  I  not  infer  that  my  happines  will  be  complete? 
What  madness,  then,  leads  me  to  wish  for  death? 
Doubtless  the  thought — "  What  is  there  to  do  in 
this  world?  "  Since  I  must  die,  is  it  not  just  as  well 
that  I  should  kill  myself?  If  I  had  already  passed 
my  60th  year,  I  should  respect  the  prejudices  of 


20  Personality  of  Napoleon 

my  contemporaries,  and  wait  patiently  until  nature 
had  finished  with  me;  but,  since  I  begin  to  experi- 
ence misfortune,  and  since  nothing  is  a  pleasure  to 
me,  why  should  I  support  a  life,  in  which  nothing 
turns  out  well  for  me?  How  far  men  are  removed 
from  nature!  How  cowardly  they  are,  how  abject, 
how  servile!  What  spectacle  shall  I  behold  in  my 
country?  My  compatriots  loaded  with  chains,  while 
they  tremblingly  kiss  the  hand  that  oppresses  them. 
They  are  no  longer  Corsicans  whom  a  hero  animated 
by  his  virtues, — enemies  to  tyrants,  luxury,  and  vile 
courtiers.  .  .  -1 

The  rest  of  the  effusion  is  in  the  same  pas- 
sionate, almost  idyllic  strain.  We  feel  in  it  the 
pulsations  of  a  proud  and  sensitive  nature,  with 
here  and  there  a  syncopated  note  of  egotism. 
His  sense  of  duty  to  Corsica  is  not  the  dominant 
thought.  To  him  life  is  not,  as  it  was  to  Maz- 
zini,  a  mission,  but  a  career;  and  because  he 
finds  the  Corsicans  of  his  time  unequal  to  those 
of  the  great  days  of  Paoli,  he  thinks  of  ending 
his  tedious  existence.  We  know  not  what  were 
the  misfortunes,  other  than  poverty,  which  then 
beset  him.  Perhaps  the  impossibility  of  doing 
much  fretted  his  restless  spirit;  or  the  failure 
of  some  scheme  for  arousing  the  Corsicans 
against  the  French  may  have  bred  disgust  of 

1  Masson,  i.,  J45. 


The  Man  21 

life.  What  turned  the  current  of  his  thoughts 
outwards  and  upwards  is  matter  for  con- 
jecture; but,  as  at  St.  Helena,  he  refused  to 
commit  suicide,  declaring  it  to  be  the  act  of 
a  coward.1 

Was  it  the  deep  fund  of  constancy  of  Bona- 
parte's nature  that  repelled  the  unmanly  thought ; 
or  was  it  the  incoming  of  a  sweet  spring  idyll 
into  his  life?  In  those  months  spent  at  Valence 
he  fell  in  love  with  Mile.  Colombier,  the  daughter 
of  his  hostess.  At  St.  Helena  he  said  to  Las 
Cases :  "  We  could  not  have  behaved  more  in- 
nocently. We  arranged  little  meetings.  I  still 
remember  one  in  the  middle  of  summer  at  day- 
break. You  will  scarcely  believe  it;  but  all  our 
happiness  consisted  in  eating  cherries  together."  2 
We  can  picture  the  youth  of  seventeen,  with 
olive  cheeks  wan  with  study,  feasting  his  eyes 
on  the  face  of  the  Provencal  maiden,  lit  up  by 
the  all-pervading  glow  of  sunrise.  I  wonder  that 
no  artist  has  depicted  the  scene.  Doubtless 
those  were  among  the  happiest  moments  of  his 
life.  How  could  he  think  of  suicide  while  this 
nymph  of  the  cherry-trees  was  near?  But  she 

1  Nap.  Corresp.,  xxxi.,  485. 

2  Las   Cases,  Memorial,  i.,   167    (27th  to  31st   August, 
1815). 


22  Personality  of  Napoleon 

soon  passed  out  of  his  life,  which  she  might  have 
kept  joyous  and  pure.1 

We  are  apt  to  think  of  Napoleon  as  hard, 
stern,  inflexible;  and  undoubtedly  he  became  so 
in  later  years.  It  will  be  my  aim  in  these  lec- 
tures to  try  to  explain  this  transformation.  For 
the  present,  notice  that  in  youth  his  being  was 
rich  in  emotion;  and,  had  he  developed  on 
normal  lines  in  an  age  happier  than  that  of  the 
French  Kevolution,  his  nature  might  have  be- 
come finely  balanced.  Vigour  in  action  would 
have  accompanied  sensitiveness  to  higher  im- 
pressions ;  firm  to  control  others,  he  would  have 
led  them  on  to  the  brighter  future  which  then 
began  to  dawn.  Nature  seemed  to  fit  him  at 
nearly  all  points  for  a  career  rich  both  in  glory 
and  beneficence.  He  was  of  those  who  saw 
visions;  and  possibly  he  might  have  brought 
them  near  to  accomplishment,  if  all  had  gone 
well. 

But  all  did  not  go  well,  either  with  Corsica, 
or  with  France,  or  with  him.  Disappointments 
fell  thick  upon  him  after  the  proclamation  of 
the  French  Republic  in  September,  1792.  His 
career  as  Jacobin  will  concern  us  in  the  next 

1  Later  on  she  became  lady  in  waiting  to  Napoleon's 
mother. 


The  Man  23 

lecture.  Therefore  I  need  only  mention  here  the 
first  mental  shocks  that  befell  him.  After  bat- 
tling hard  for  French  democracy  in  Corsica 
during  nine  months  (September,  1792- June, 
1793),  he  was  obliged  to  flee  from  the  island. 
Taking  refuge  in  Provence  with  his  family,  he 
was  finally  treated  no  better  by  the  Thermi- 
dorian  party  which  seized  on  power  at  Paris  in 
July,  1794.  On  a  frivolous  charge  they  flung 
him  into  prison;  and,  not  long  after  his  release, 
he  was  suddenly  ordered  to  take  an  infantry 
command  in  the  Vende"an  campaign  waged 
against  the  royalist  peasants.  He  refused  to 
take  up  this  task;  and  a  sign  of  his  mental  un- 
rest in  the  late  summer  of  1795  was  his  desire 
to  go  to  Constantinople  to  reorganise  the  artil- 
lery of  the  Sultan.  By  this  time,  then,  he  is  at 
heart  a  free-lance.  At  twenty-six  years  of  age 
he  is  that  pathetic  personage,  a  disillusionised 
enthusiast. 

Of  the  emotions  formerly  so  rich  in  his  nature, 
there  is  only  one  which  has  not  found  full  ex- 
pression. Love  has  not  yet  laid  hold  of  him. 
Already  he  has  sullied  this  side  of  his  nature — 
so  we  may  judge  from  his  own  description  of 
his  first  connection  with  a  courtesan  in  the 
Palais  Royal,  at  Paris,  in  1787.  The  narrative 


24  Personality  of  Napoleon 

is  very  lifelike;  and  this  characteristic  tells 
against  the  attempt  that  has  been  made  to  ex- 
plain it  away  as  a  mere  exercise  in  composition, 
in  no  way  derogatory  to  "  the  principles  of  vir- 
tuous conduct  which  he  both  taught  and  prac- 
tised at  this  period."  Would  a  young  man  of 
virtuous  conduct  choose  such  a  theme  in  order 
to  improve  his  style? 

Another  episode,  of  the  year  1794,  is  far  worse. 
While  in  command  of  the  artillery  of  the  French 
army  operating  in  the  Maritime  Alps,  a  passing 
passion  for  Mme.  Thurreau,  the  wife  of  one  of  the 
representatives  on  mission  to  that  army,  led  him 
to  adopt  the  following  device  in  order  to  please 
her.  I  give  the  incident  in  his  own  words: 

"  Taking  her  out  for  a  walk  one  day  in  the  midst 
of  our  positions  near  the  Col  di  Tenda,  the  idea 
suddenly  came  to  me  to  give  her  a  sight  of  a 
little  engagement;  and  I  ordered  the  outposts  to 
attack.  We  were  victors,  it  is  true,  but  obviously 
it  could  lead  to  no  result.  The  attack  was  purely 
my  fancy,  and  yet  some  men  remained  stretched  out 
on  the  ground.  Therefore,  later  on,  every  time  that 
the  memory  of  it  has  occurred  to  me,  I  have  strongly 
reproached  myself  for  it.1 

From  sensuous   habits   he   might  have  been 
saved  by  a  pure  and  enduring  passion.     Here 
1  Las  Cases,  Memorial,  L,  202. 


The  Man  25 

Fortune  failed  him.  Not  until  his  twenty-sixth 
year  did  lie  fall  in  love.  His  captor  was  Mme. 
de  Beauharnais,  a  beautiful  Creole,  more  than 
six  years  his  senior,  whose  intellectual  gifts  by 
no  means  equalled  her  external  charms.  Men 
of  strongly  marked  character  are  often  cap- 
tivated by  their  mental  and  physical  opposites. 
This  was  so  with  Bonaparte.  Her  languorous 
charms  called  forth  his  ecstasies.  During  the 
Italian  campaign  of  1796  his  letters  to  her  re- 
veal the  intensity  of  his  passion.  These  extracts 
must  suffice: 

PORT  MAURICE,  April  3  [1796]. 

.  .  .  My  unique  Josephine,  away  from  thee  there 
is  no  more  joy:  away  from  thee  the  world  is  a 
wilderness  in  which  I  stand  alone,  and  without 
experiencing  the  bliss  of  unburdening  my  soul. 
You  have  robbed  me  of  more  than  my  soul;  you 
are  the  one  only  thought  of  my  life.  When  I  am 
weary  of  the  worries  of  my  profession,  when  I  mis- 
trust the  issue,  when  men  disgust  me,  when  I  am 
ready  to  curse  my  life,  I  put  my  hand  on  my  heart 
where  your  portrait  beats  in  unison.  I  look  at  it, 
and  love  is  for  me  complete  happiness;  and  every- 
thing laughs  for  joy,  except  the  time  during  which 
T  find  myself  absent  from  my  beloved.  .  .  .  Ah! 
my  winsome  wife,  I  know  not  what  fate  awaits  me ; 
but  if  it  keeps  me  much  longer  from  you,  it  will 
be  unbearable ;  my  strength  will  not  last  out.  There 
was  a  time  in  which  I  prided  myself  on  my  strength ; 


26  Personality  of  Napoleon 

and  sometimes,  when  casting  my  eyes  on  the  ills 
which  men  might  do  me,  on  the  fate  which  destiny 
might  have  in  store  for  me,  I  have  gazed  stead- 
fastly on  the  most  incredible  misfortunes  without 
a  wrinkle  on  my  brow  or  a  vestige  of  surprise;  but 
to-day  the  thought  that  my  Josephine  might »be  ill; 
and  above  all,  the  cruel,  fatal  thought  that  she 
might  love  me  less,  blights  my  soul,  stops  my  blood, 
makes  me  wretched  and  dejected,  without  even  leav- 
ing me  the  courage  of  fury  and  despair.  I  often 
used  to  say  that  men  have  no  power  over  him  who 
dies  without  regrets ;  but  to-day  to  die  without  your 
love,  to  die  in  uncertainty  of  that,  is  the  torment 
of  hell;  it  is  a  lifelike  and  terrifying  figure  of 
absolute  annihilation.  I  feel  passion  strangling  me. 

Josephine,  on  the  contrary,  showed  the  shal- 
lowness  and  frivolity  of  her  nature  by  almost 
forgetting  the  hero  amidst  the  distractions  of 
Paris.  Her  letters  were  few  and  cold.  At  Tor- 
tona  he  writes,  on  17th  June,  1796,  in  acute 
concern  at  her  silence :  "  I  have  always  been 
fortunate;  never  has  my  destiny  resisted  my 
will;  and  to-day  I  am  hurt  in  what  touches  me 
in  a  unique  degree.  Josephine,  how  can  you  re- 
main so  long  without  writing  to  me?  Your  last 
laconic  letter  is  dated  May  22d.  Moreover  it  is 
a  distressing  one  for  me;  but  I  always  keep  it 
in  my  pocket;  your  portrait  and  letters  are  per- 
petually before  my  eyes."  Again,  at  Verona  he 


The  Man  27 

writes  (17th  September,  1796) :  "I  write  very 
often  and  you  seldom.  You  are  naughty  and 
imdutiful;  very  undutiful,  as  well  as  thoughtless. 
It  is  disloyal  to  deceive  a  poor  husband,  an 
affectionate  lover."  So,  too,  a  month  later,  at 
Modena : 

Your  letters  are  as  cold  as  if  you  were  fifty.  We 
might  have  been  married  fifteen  years.  One  finds 
in  them  the  friendship  and  feelings  of  that  winter 
of  life.  Fie!  Josephine!  It  is  very  naughty,  very 
unkind,  very  undutiful  of  you.  What  more  can  you 
do  to  make  me  indeed  an  object  of  compassion? 
Love  me  no  longer?  Eh;  that  is  already  accom- 
plished! Hate  me?  Well,  I  prefer  that!  Every- 
thing grows  stale,  except  ill-will;  but  indifference, 
with  its  marble  pulse,  its  rigid  stare,  its  monotonous 
demeanour !  .  .  .  A  thousand,  thousand  very  heart- 
felt kisses. 

And  yet,  at  St.  Helena  in  his  forty-eighth  year, 
he  declared  to  Gourgaud :  "  At  fifty  one  can 
no  longer  love.  Berthier  was  always  in  love; 
but  my  heart  is  bronzed  over.  I  have  never  been 
thoroughly  in  love,  except  perhaps  with  Jose- 
phine a  little,  and,  again,  because  I  was  twenty- 
seven  years  old  when  I  knew  her.  I  felt  much 
friendliness  towards  Marie  Louise."  x  This  utter- 
ance is  very  remarkable.  Mountain  torrents 

1  Gourgaud,  Journal,  ii.,  8. 


28  Personality  of  Napoleon 

foam  and  boil  in  time  of  storm,  drying  up  as 
quickly  in  drought;  but  I  doubt  whether  there 
is  any  other  instance  of  a  man  who  had  loved 
as  Bonaparte  once  loved  Josephine,  afterwards 
denying  that  it  was  anything  more  than  a  pass- 
ing incident  of  youth.  True,  his  heart  was 
"  bronzed  "  by  war  and  failure.  But  the  mem- 
ory of  that  bliss  ought  to  have  survived,  despite 
the  flightiness  and  shallowness  of  Josephine. 
Was  there  not  something  in  Napoleon's  nature, 
as  in  that  of  many  men  of  action,  which  en- 
circled him  in  the  present?  While  he  adores 
Josephine  he  is  a  different  being  from  the  mor- 
bidly self-centred  youth  of  the  months  spent  in 
Paris.  In  Italy,  amidst  the  fond  yearnings  of 
unsated  love,  he  is  at  the  height  of  his  mental 
powers.  The  gradual  clouding  over  of  that 
vision  darkens  his  outlook  on  life.  His  tenderer 
feelings  are  blighted,  and  when  he  hears  of  her 
misconduct  during  his  absence  in  Egypt,  his 
heart  is  seared,  so  that,  twenty  years  later,  even 
before  "  the  winter  of  life  "  has  come,  he  doubts 
whether  he  ever  knew  the  full  force  of  love. 
What  a  mental  tragedy,  comparable  almost  with 
the  political  cataclysm!  Perhaps  his  failure  to 
meet  with  a  worthy  consort  was  partly  account- 
able for  that  downfall.  A  woman,  both  loving 


The  Man  29 

and  strong,  would  have  guided  him  aright  at 
several  crises  in  his  career,  toning  down  his 
anger,  softening  his  resentments,  and  surround- 
ing him  with  the  invincible  rampart  of  a  na- 
tion's devotion.  Josephine  sometimes  tried  to 
effect  this;  but  she  early  lost  the  power  over 
him  which  she  ought  to  have  wielded  to  the  end. 

Even  in  Italy  his  conduct  was  irregular,  and 
at  St.  Helena  he  admitted  having  had  seven  mis- 
tresses. Only  in  the  case  of  the  Polish  Countess 
Walewska  did  they  inspire  in  him  any  real  affec- 
tion ;  and  the  way  in  which  he  afterwards  talked 
about  them  was  coarse  and  brutal.  At  St. 
Helena  his  conversations  were  sometimes  of  a 
low  moral  tone.  He  declared  in  favour  of  poly- 
gamy and  concubinage,  adding  to  this  the  natu- 
ral conclusion,  that  woman  ought  to  be  subject 
to  man.  In  the  West  women  were  treated  too 
much  as  equals :  the  eastern  peoples  put  them  in 
their  right  position  as  inferiors.1  On  the  whole 
there  is  much  of  reason  in  the  conclusion  reached 
by  Emerson  and  John  Codman  Ropes,  that 
Napoleon  was  not  a  gentleman.2 

Pleas  in  extenuation  may,  however,  be  urged. 

1  Las  Cases,  Memorial,  iv.,  137-139;  Gourgaud,  Journal, 
i.,  81,  211;  ii.,  53,  305,  390. 

2  Emerson,  Representative  Men    (Napoleon)  ;  Memorial 
of  J.  C.  Ropes,  p.  18. 


30  Personality  of  Napoleon 

Italians  and  Corsicans  believed  in  tlie  inferiority 
of  woman.  The  men  smoked,  grumbled,  or 
plotted,  while  the  women  figured  as  dolls  or 
drudges,  generally  the  latter.  Boswell  during 
his  tour  in  Corsica  was  amused  to  hear  the  men 
shout  out  "  Le  donne,"  "  le  donne,"  to  come  and 
carry  his  baggage  when  he  was  about  to  set  out.1 
In  France  it  was  not  much  better,  until  the 
Revolution.  Then,  indeed,  women  began  to  as- 
sert their  rights ;  but  their  conduct  displayed 
far  more  vehemence  than  wisdom.  Mme.  de 
Stael,  Mme.  Roland,  Charlotte  Corday,  are  in- 
teresting and  pathetic  figures;  but  their  en- 
thusiasm on  the  whole  did  more  harm  than  good. 
Women  also  made  no  effective  protest  against 
the  scandalous  facilities  for  divorce  which  crept 
in  under  the  cloak  of  Liberty;  and  Napoleon, 
incisively  commenting  on  the  conduct  of  their 
sex  during  the  Revolution,  had  some  excuse  for 
saying  that  in  the  interests  of  order  they  had 
to  be  repressed  and  put  back  in  the  old  ruts. 
The  history  of  the  feminist  movement  at  that 
time  needs  to  be  studied;  for  its  follies  entailed 
a  grievous  setback  to  the  cause  of  social  pro- 
gress.2 Napoleon  came  to  the  front  at  the  time 

1  J.  Boswell,  An  Account  of  Corsica,  p.  301. 

2  See  articles  by  Professor  Aulard,  in  the  Revue  bleue 


The  Man  31 

when  women  themselves  had  provoked  a  reaction 
in  favour  of  the  old  Roman  ideas.  He  became 
the  champion  of  that  reaction;  and  we  can 
partly  sympathise  with  his  incisive  declaration: 
k-  \Vomen  shall  have  no  influence  at  my  Court. 
They  may  dislike  me;  but  I  on  my  side  shall 
have  peace  and  quietness."  The  most  singular 
thing  remains  to  be  noted.  This  high-handed 
treatment  completely  succeeded,  except  in  the 
case  of  a  few  feminine  stalwarts;  and  then,  as 
now,  women  often  ranged  themselves  among  his 
blind  devotees. 

To  resume,  then,  we  find  that  the  events  of 
the  years  1793-9  blighted  the  hopes  and  aspira- 
tions of  a  nature  which  was  singularly  full  of 
promise.  First  Corsica,  then  the  French  Revo- 
lution, then  Josephine  disappointed  him.  Think 
what  that  implies.  Native  land,  political  creed, 
wife,  were  not  what  they  should  have  been.  In 
most  men  the  disillusionment  would  have  dulled 
every  feeling  and  paralysed  action  at  its  source, 
the  will.  It  enhances  our  sense  of  the  majesty 
of  Napoleon's  powers,  that,  nevertheless,  he  con- 
centrated them  the  more  upon  the  world  around 
him,  and  became  the  greatest  man  of  action  since 

(16th  March,  1898),  and  Lady  Grant  Duff,  in  the  Nine- 
teenth Century  and  After  (May,  1912). 


32  Personality  of  Napoleon 

Julius  Caesar.  And  that  is  not  all.  Amidst  the 
distractions  of  his  niany-sided  career  he  figured 
as  one  of  the  best  of  sons,  one  of  the  kindest 
of  brothers. 

He  treated  Letizia  Bonaparte  with  great  affec- 
tion. He  called  her  "  a  worthy  woman,"  and  at 
every  rise  in  the  early  part  of  his  career  he  sent 
her  money  in  order  to  maintain  her  and  the 
family  in  comfort.  On  becoming  First  Consul, 
he  awarded  to  her  the  title  Madame  Mere  and 
bade  her  keep  up  becoming  state.  Here  they 
differed.  The  "  worthy  woman "  could  never 
bring  herself  to  believe  that  the  splendour  of 
the  Consulate  and  Empire  would  be  lasting. 
She  did  her  best  to  save  money ;  and  many  were 
the  tales  of  her  parsimony  in  respect  to  candles 
and  butter.  To  the  remonstrances  of  Napoleon 
Letizia  would  quaintly  reply :  "  If  ever  all  of 
you  fall  on  my  hands  again,  you  will  thank  me 
for  what  I  am  now  doing."  The  words  reveal 
a  canny  nature  which  Napoleon  could  not  under- 
stand. Nevertheless,  she  was  right.  Her  old- 
world  thrift  served  to  help  the  family  long  after 
his  death.  Despite  their  differences  respecting 
candles  and  butter,  she  retained  her  hold  over 
him.  Whenever  he  cheated  at  cards,  she  alone 
dared  to  remonstrate.  On  such  occasions  she 


The  Man  33 

called  out :  "  Napol&m,  vous  vous  trompez."  l 
It  would  be  interesting  to  know  whether  he 
revoked. 

His  behaviour  towards  his  brothers  and  sisters 
is  a  voluminous  topic,  varying  with  the  moods 
and  whims  of  an  essentially  southern  race.  One 
thing  is  certain,  that  dulness  dwelt  not  in  the 
Bonaparte  household.  On  the  eight  children 
nature  had  bestowed  lively  imaginations,  fervid 
longings  for  power,  voluptuous  desires,  and  tart 
tongues.  The  sudden  rise  of  such  a  family  from 
poverty  to  splendour  owing  to  the  genius  of  the 
second  brother  supplies  all  the  elements  of  al- 
most farcical  comedy;  and  the  world  has  never 
ceased  to  laugh  or  weep  at  their  plots,  their 
quarrels,  their  amours,  their  treacheries.  On 
the  whole,  Joseph,  Napoleon,  and  Louis  come 
out  the  best  from  this  "  School  for  Scandal."  If 
the  powerful  brother  rated  the  others  harshly, 
they  generally  deserved  it.  They  owed  everything 
to  him;  yet,  with  the  exception  of  Joseph  and 
Louis,  they  often  behave  most  ungratefully.2 
The  youngest,  Caroline  and  Jerome,  were  to 
some  extent  responsible  for  the  collapse  of  his 

1  S.  Girardin,  Journal,  ii.,  327;  Peyrusse,  Memorial,  p. 
239. 

2  Louis    was    far   less    ambitious    and   voluptuous.     He 
ruled  Holland  well. 


34  Personality  of  Napoleon 

power  in  Italy  and  Germany;  and  the  others, 
except  Pauline,  took  pleasure  in  thwarting  his 
will  at  important  crises.  Joseph  was  a  kindly 
man,  quite  unequal  to  the  position  to  which  he 
was  raised  at  Madrid.  In  fact,  Napoleon  sought 
to  make  all  his  brothers  eagles;  but  they  re- 
mained ordinary  fowl,  intent  on  strutting  and 
crowing  before  their  harems.  His  irritation  at 
their  incompetence  told  fatally  both  on  his  do- 
mestic relations  and  foreign  policy.  The  fam- 
ily and  the  imperial  ideals  constantly  clashed; 
so  that,  adapting  Macaulay's  dictum  about 
Charles  L,  we  may  say  that  Napoleon  would 
have  been  a  better  ruler  if  he  had  been  a  worse 
brother.  In  1810  he  exclaimed  bitterly  to 
Metternich :  "  My  relatives  have  done  me  more 
harm  than  I  have  done  them  good;  and  if  I  had 
to  begin  again,  my  brothers  and  sisters  should 
have  nothing  more  than  a  palace  in  Paris  and 
a  few  million  [francs]  to  spend  in  idleness. 
The  fine  arts  and  charity  should  be  their 
domains,  and  not  kingdoms,  which  some  do  not 
know  how  to  guide,  while  others  compromise 
me  by  carrying  their  imitation  to  the  point  of 
parody."  1 

1  Metternich,  Mems.,  i.,  312.    The  last  phrase  refers  to 
Jerome  at  Cassel. 


The  Man  35 

To  his  sisters  Napoleon  also  accorded  most 
generous  treatment,  which  both  Elisa  and  Caro- 
line finally  recompensed  by  the  basest  ingratitude 
and  treachery.  Pauline  behaved  far  better;  she 
never  worried  him  for  crowns  or  money.  On 
one  occasion  she  said :  "  I  do  not  care  for 
crowns;  if  I  had  wished  for  one,  I  should  have 
had  it ;  but  I  left  that  taste  to  my  relatives."  l 
Her  goddess  was  Venus.  Canova's  statue  of 
her  in  the  Borghese  Villa  at  Rome  recalls  her 
sensuous  beauty.  Nevertheless,  she  was  a 
good  sister,  and,  with  her  mother,  accompanied 
Napoleon  to  Elba. 

We  may  conclude,  then,  that  Napoleon's  con- 
duct as  brother  is  highly  creditable.  No  other 
founder  of  a  dynasty  has  done  so  much  for  his 
relatives.  As  a  rule,  new  men  huddle  them 
away  into  comfortable  or  comfortless  obscurity. 
Napoleon  alone  raised  his  mother,  brothers, 
sisters,  and  uncle  to  heights  of  splendour.  He, 
who  gave  a  new  lease  of  life  to  monarchy  in 
a  time  of  decadence,  also  did  much  by  his  ex- 
ample to  strengthen  the  institution  of  the  family 
when  impaired  by  the  license  of  the  Jacobins. 

The  quarrels  of  the  Bonapartes  resulted  from 
the  impetuosity  of  their  natures.  In  Joseph  and 

1  Metternich,  Mews.,  i.,  310. 


36  Personality  of  Napoleon 

Pauline  alone  was  there  a  placid  strain;  and 
what  they  lacked  in  eagerness  was  fully  made 
up  to  Napoleon  and  the  rest  of  them.  Prone- 
ness  to  take  sides  is  an  Italian  characteristic. 
How  else  could  the  almost  unintelligible  feuds 
of  Guelfs  and  Ghibellines  have  for  ages  deluged 
the  Peninsula  with  blood?  The  same  peculiarity 
finds  expression  in  the  career  of  an  Italian,  who 
fought  fourteen  duels  to  make  good  his  claim 
that  Ariosto  was  a  finer  poet  than  Tasso,  and 
finally  on  his  death-bed  confessed  that  he  had 
never  read  a  line  of  either  of  them.  It  would 
not  be  surprising  to  find  that  he  was  a  connec- 
tion of  the  Bonaparte  family;  so  keen  was  their 
partisanship  on  all  questions.  Pelet,  a  Coun- 
cillor of  State,  who  studied  Napoleon  closely, 
noted  impetuosity  and  trickery  as  prominent 
traits  in  his  character.1 

I  find  far  more  of  impetuosity  than  trickery. 
True,  there  were  many  occasions  when  he  re- 
sorted to  falsehood  and  deception.  His  policy 
towards  the  Spanish  dynasty  in  the  spring  of 
1808  is  an  example  of  insidious  intrigue  worthy 
of  the  Medici  of  Florence;  and  the  final  cause 
of  his  fall  in  the  spring  of  1814  was  the  inter- 
ception of  a  letter  dictated  to  Caulaincourt, 

3  Pelet,  Napoleon  in  Council  (Eng.  ed.),  p.  17. 


The  Man  37 

which  proved  his  lack  of  sincerity  during  the 
negotiations  for  peace  then  proceeding  at  Ch&til- 
lon.1  Napoleon  was  not  ashamed  of  such  con- 
duct. He  always  meant  to  win  at  all  costs,  and 
on  one  occasion  said  complacently,  "  I  know 
when  to  exchange  the  lion-skin  for  that  of  the 
fox."  2 

In  the  main,  however,  he  decidedly  preferred 
the  lion's  part.  The  feline  ease  of  his  moves 
would  generally  have  captured  the  prey  had  he 
used  less  energy  and  force;  but,  as  his  enemies 
soon  perceived,  impetuosity  often  dictated  his 
actions ;  and  these  qualities  increased  in  propor- 
tion to  the  strength  of  the  opposition.  Here 
was  his  weak  point.  His  powers  were  not  held 
in  check  by  moderation  and  common-sense. 
During  his  Egyptian  expedition  he  talked  wildly 
about  carrying  his  little  force  in  Syria  either 
towards  the  Euphrates  and  India,  or  else  to- 
wards Constantinople,  whence  he  would  "  take 
Europe  in  the  rear."  So,  too,  during  his  inter- 
vention in  Spain  in  1808,  which  proved  to  be 
the  beginning  of  the  end,  he  penned  the  follow- 
ing words :  "  I  may  find  the  Pillars  of  Hercules 
in  Spain,  but  I  shall  not  find  the  limits  of  my 

1  A.  Fournier,  Der  Congress  von  Chdtillon,  pp.  231,  232. 

2  Pelet,  p.  277. 


38  Personality  of  Napoleon 

power.  Ever  since  I  have  been  in  the  service  I 
have  seen  nothing  so  cowardly  as  these  Spanish 
mobs  and  troops."  1  This  was  written  shortly 
before  the  arrival  of  news  of  the  surrender  of 
22,000  French  troops  to  an  approximately  equal 
number  of  Spaniards  at  Baylen — a  fit  retort  to 
this  senseless  boast. 

Yet  this  overweening  and  passionate  temper 
was  generally  held  under  the  control  of  a  firm 
will.  Local  tradition  at  Boulogne  has  preserved 
an  example  of  this.  In  July,  1804,  during  Napo- 
leon's sojourn  at  that  town  to  prepare  for  the 
invasion  of  England,  he  chanced  to  order  a  re- 
view of  the  flotilla  on  a  morning  when  the  com- 
mander, Admiral  Bruix,  observed  signs  of  a 
coming  gale.  As  responsible  for  the  safety  of 
the  flotilla  in  the  roadstead,  he  reported  that  it 
would  be  impossible  to  hold  the  review.  Napo- 
leon at  once  rode  to  the  Admiral's  quarters,  his 
eyes  blazing  with  passion  at  this  unexpected 
disobedience.  In  vain  did  Bruix  assure  him 
that  a  storm  was  brewing.  The  Emperor  re- 
plied, "  The  consequence  is  my  affair,  and  mine 
only.  Obey  at  once."  "  Sire,"  came  the  reply, 
"  I  will  not  obey."  At  once  Napoleon  stepped 
forward,  and  raised  his  riding-whip  as  if  to 

1  Lecestre,  Lettres  inedites  de  Nap.,  i.,  226. 


The  Man  39 

strike  Bruix.  Nothing  daunted,  the  Admiral 
laid  his  hand  on  his  sword,  exclaiming,  "  Sire, 
beware."  For  some  seconds  the  men  stood  glar- 
ing at  one  another;  then  Napoleon  flung  down 
the  whip  and  Bruix  let  go  the  sword-handle. 
They  parted.  Magon,  the  second  in  command, 
gave  the  order  for  the  review,  which  resulted 
in  the  loss  of  some  scores  of  men  by  drowning.1 

Another  case,  in  which  the  Emperor  mastered 
his  temper  more  completely,  occurred  early  in 
the  Russian  campaign  of  1812.  In  his  anxiety 
to  surprise  the  Russian  rearguard  in  Vilna,  he 
ordered  the  famous  cavalry  general,  Montbrun, 
to  push  on  with  his  corps  and  seize  the  maga- 
zines. Etiquette  required  that  the  order  should 
come  from  Murat,  commander-in-chief  of  the 
cavalry.  He,  therefore,  on  seeing  Montbrun's 
advance,  angrily  bade  him  retire,  and,  despite 
Montbrun's  explanation  of  the  affair,  persisted 
in  this  punctilio,  sent  forward  another  cavalry 
corps,  and  lost  the  prize  at  Vilna.  Napoleon, 
rightly  indignant  at  Montbrun's  retirement, 
vehemently  reproached  him  in  presence  of 
Murat.  In  vain  did  Montbrun  glance  appeal- 
ingly  at  Murat  to  exculpate  him.  Le  beau 
sabreur  remained  sheepishly  silent.  At  last, 

1  F.  Nicolay,  Napoleon  at  the  Boulogne  Camp,  ch.  ix. 


4-O  Personality  of  Napoleon 

unable  to  endure  Napoleon's  reprimand,  Mont- 
brun  drew  his  sword  and  whirled  it  high  in  the 
air,  and  galloped  off,  exclaiming,  "  You  may  go 
to  the  devil,  all  of  you.7'  Napoleon  remained 
speechless  with  rage;  but,  to  the  surprise  of 
his  staff,  he  turned  his  horse  and  rode  away, 
issuing  no  order  for  Montbrun's  arrest.  On 
the  way  back  Murat  explained  the  incident ;  and 
neither  Murat  nor  Montbrun  incurred  a  further 
reprimand. 

These  two  incidents  reveal  the  controlling 
power  of  will  over  impetuous  passion;  and 
herein  lay  the  terror  of  Napoleon's  wrath,  that 
in  the  highest  transports  it  never  escaped  the 
grip  of  mind  and  will.  Men  who  for  the  time 
become  wild  beasts,  like  Paul  I.  of  Russia,  are  less 
to  be  feared  than  they  who  can  at  need  master 
the  outbreak  and  make  it  subserve  the  dictates 
of  policy.  During  the  famous  scene  with  Lord 
Whitworth  at  the  Tuileries  on  13th  March,  1813, 
Napoleon  never  lost  his  self-possession.  He  did 
not  (as  was  reported)  strike  the  British  am- 
bassador, or  even  prepare  to  do  so;  he  reserved 
the  latter  form  of  argument  for  the  ambassador 
of  Portugal.1 

1  Mr.  Oscar  Browning,  England  and  Napoleon,  pp.  104, 
116. 


The  Man  41 

Though  he  generally  mastered  his  feelings,  it 
was  only  by  an  effort;  for  by  nature  he  was 
quick-tempered.  Nervous  energy  appeared  in 
his  terse  comments,  the  twitching  of  his  muscles, 
the  frown  that  quickly  clouded  his  brow,  his 
rapid  pacing  up  and  down  the  room  while  dic- 
tating letters,  and,  in  the  winter,  his  habit  of 
standing  before  the  fire  and  kicking  the  logs 
with  his  heel.1  But  the  rapid  intuitions  of  a 
calculating  brain  and  the  control  of  a  sovereign 
will  endowed  him  with  the  strong  qualities 
characteristic  of  all  dispositions. 

In  dwelling  thus  briefly  on  incidents  that  re- 
veal character,  one  is  apt  to  exaggerate  the 
salient  points  and  leave  unnoticed  the  ordinary 
outlines.  Let  us,  then,  remember  that  for  the 
most  part  the  bearing  of  Napoleon  was  cheery 
and  unaffected,  pleasing  yet  dignified.  There 
was  something  in  that  short  figure  which  over- 
awed the  giants,  Alexander  of  Kussia  and  Fred- 
erick William  of  Prussia.  Yet  in  the  presence 
of  those  to  whom  he  granted  his  friendship  he, 
for  the  most  part,  maintained  an  easy  familiar- 
ity, while  his  suggestive  and  incisive  remarks 
opened  up  new  vistas  of  thought  or  lit  up  hack- 

1  Mems.  de  Gaudin,  Due  de  Gaete,  i.,  331. 


42  Personality  of  Napoleon 

neyed  themes.  At  Erfurt,  in  1808,  while  the 
elegant  dancing  of  the  Czar  Alexander  drew 
much  attention,  the  chief  centre  of  attraction 
was  the  dispute  of  the  little  Corsican  with  Wie- 
land  on  the  merits  and  demerits  of  Tacitus.  He 
could  transact  complex  affairs  of  State,  and  yet 
devote  mental  energy  to  an  interview  with 
Goethe,  which  charmed  that  monarch  of  the 
realms  of  thought.  Such  a  union  of  powers  had 
not  been  seen  in  the  modern  world;  for  Fred- 
erick the  Great's  patronage  of  literature  and  the 
arts  was  stilted  and  artificial  when  compared 
with  the  living  interest  of  Napoleon  in  great 
themes.  In  truth  his  supremacy  rested  largely 
on  his  natural  powers  and  on  the  range  of  his 
studies  in  youth,  which  his  marvellous  memory 
enabled  him  to  utilise  through  a  long  career. 

Here  again  he  was  well  equipped  for  the 
struggle  of  life.  He  thought  clearly,  sorted  his 
facts  in  the  compartments  of  his  brain,  and  had 
the  mental  energy  and  tact  which  brought  them 
out  for  use  at  the  right  moment.  At  St.  Helena 
he  said  to  Gourgaud :  "  In  part  I  owe  the  good 
measures  that  I  adopted  to  my  knowledge  of 
mathematics  and  my  clear  ideas  on  everything. 
My  memory  is  singular.  In  youth  I  knew  the 
logarithms  for  more  than  thirty  or  forty  num- 


The  Man  43 

bers.  In  France  I  knew  not  only  the  names  of 
the  officers  of  all  the  regiments,  but  the  places 
where  they  were  recruited;  I  even  knew  the  spirit 
animating  them."  *  This  was  no  idle  boast.  On 
his  return  from  Boulogne  to  Paris  in  September, 
1805,  he  met  a  detachment  of  troops  wandering, 
uncertain  of  the  whereabouts  of  the  main  body. 
He  inquired  the  number  of  the  regiment,  and, 
calculating  by  the  date  of  its  departure  from 
the  coast,  and  the  route  he  had  prescribed, 
named  the  place  where  it  ought  to  be.2  Further, 
as  will  appear  in  Lecture  III,  if  he  did  not 
know  what  he  needed  to  know,  he  was  not  de- 
terred by  silly  nervousness  or  pompous  self- 
sufficiency  from  asking  questions.  To  all  about 
him  he  communicated  the  passion  for  thorough- 
ness which  is  the  first  condition  of  success. 

Above  all,  there  burnt  in  him  the  flame  of 
genius.  It  defies  analysis ;  it  baffles  description ; 
but  generals  and  troops  felt  the  spell.  Civilians 
who  sought  to  control  the  young  warrior  found 
themselves  in  the  meshes  of  an  all-controling  will 
— why,  they  knew  not;  but  one  after  another 
they  succumbed.  Animal  magnetism  is  perhaps 
a  necessary  concomitant  to  genius,  which  may 

1  Gourgaud,  Journal,  ii.,  109. 

2  Lavalette,  Mems.,  ch.  xxiv. 


44  Personality  of  Napoleon 

be  the  effluence  of  exceptional  and  superabun- 
dant vitality.  In  any  case,  he  who  has  it  not 
will  not  go  far  in  time  of  turmoil.  He  who  has 
it  will  control  the  ductile  mass.  The  elder  Pitt 
possessed  the  resplendent  charm,  which  flickered 
feebly  in  his  son.  Lafayette  utterly  lacked  it, 
while  to  Mirabeau  it  was  vouchsafed  in  full 
measure.  At  times  Danton's  being  throbbed 
with  masterful  power,  though  from  insouciance 
he  fell  at  the  supreme  crisis.  We  go  far  to  ex- 
plain the  fortunes  of  France  when  we  duly 
assess  the  magnetic  influence  of  Mirabeau, 
Danton,  Bonaparte. 

We  have  now  surveyed  some  of  the  characteris- 
tics which  enabled  the  great  Corsican  to  charm, 
conquer,  and  control.  At  all  points  he  out- 
stripped all  competitors;  and,  marvellous  as 
were  his  exploits,  he  himself  transcended  them. 
It  is  said  that  one  of  the  charms  of  the  oratory 
of  the  Earl  of  Chatham  lay  in  the  indefinable 
superiority  of  the  man  himself  over  his  orations, 
even  at  the  height  of  their  power.  So,  too,  we 
may  assert  that,  able  though  Napoleon  was  in 
the  Cabinet  and  on  the  battle-field,  he  was  far 
more  than  an  astute  diplomatist,  a  discerning 
lawgiver,  a  triumphant  warrior,  a  great  Em- 
peror. He  was  greatest  of  all  as  man. 


II 

THE  JACOBIN 

"  The  person  who  really  commands  the  army  is  your 
master,  the  master  of  your  Assembly,  the  master  of 
your  whole  Republic." — BURKE,  Reflections  on  the  French 
Revolution. 

T  N  the  political  realm  revolutions  bring  about 
*  results  not  unlike  those  produced  by  earth- 
quakes in  the  physical  sphere.  The  upheaval 
breaks  up  tlie  old  order  and  jostles  together  in- 
dividuals, classes,  and  nations  in  the  most 
surprising  way,  the  outcome  finally  being  the 
initiation  of  new  and  potent  energies,  though  at 
the  cost  of  great  suffering  in  the  present.  States 
are  often  the  stronger  for  these  trying  experi- 
ences. Even  civil  strifes  sometimes  set  free 
great  and  unsuspected  powers,  as  appears  in  the 
records  of  Greece  and  mediaeval  Italy.  England 
was  never  so  powerful  as  after  the  Civil  War, 
in  which  she  discovered  Cromwell;  and  France, 
as  Pitt  prophesied  in  February,  1790,  speedily 
recovered  from  the  time  of  anarchy,  and  stood 

45 


46  Personality  of  Napoleon 

forth  as  the  greatest  of  European  Powers. 
One  condition  of  recovery  was  that  she  should 
find  her  Cromwell,  and  she  found  a  greater 
than  he. 

Here  again  it  was  the  Eevolution  which 
brought  them  together  by  a  combination  seem- 
ingly impossible.  But  for  that  event  Bonaparte 
would  probably  have  figured  in  history  as  a 
greater  Paoli,  the  liberator  of  Corsica  from  the 
French  yoke.  As  to  the  sequel,  imagination  may 
soar  far  and  wide.  Certainly  Corsica  was  too 
small  a  sphere  for  his  energies;  and  the  task  of 
revolutionising  Italy,  or  of  setting  the  East  to 
rights,  Would  have  appealed  to  his  daring  fancy 
and  ardent  temperament.  But  it  is  scarcely 
possible  to  picture  him  espousing  the  cause  of 
France  under  the  ancien  regime.  Though  edu- 
cated at  Brienne  and  Paris,  and  trained  for  her 
army,  he  was  a  foreigner  at  heart  down  to  the 
year  1790. 

His  note-books  supply  proof  of  this.  In  a 
note,  written  at  Paris  in  November,  1787,  prob- 
ably as  preface  to  a  projected  work  on  Corsica, 
he  reminds  his  countrymen  that  they  are  sub- 
jects of  a  great  monarchy,  only  the  defects  of 
which  are  felt  by  them;  and,  he  adds,  they  will 
perhaps  find  a  cure  for  these  evils  only  in  the 


The  Jacobin  47 

course  of  centuries.1  It  is  almost  certain  that 
he  set  about  his  early  studies  in  the  hope  of 
liberating  Corsica  from  Prance.  As  we  saw  in 
the  last  lecture,  his  nature  thrilled  responsive 
to  the  sentiment  of  the  age.  The  hard,  matter- 
of-fact  side  of  his  being,  which  was  ultimately 
to  prevail  amidst  the  turmoil  of  life,  had  not  as 
yet  overshadowed  the  tenderer  instincts.  He 
loved  the  country;  and  romance,  music,  and 
poetry  stirred  him.  He  wrote  exciting  little 
tales  of  adventure.  His  prose  seethed  up  in 
almost  volcanic  fervour,  boiling  over  with  ap- 
peals to  the  heart,  to  virtue,  to  all  the  virtues: 
"  O  Rousseau,"  he  exclaims,  in  the  "  Discours  de 
Lyons "(1791),  "why  had  it  to  be  that  you  should 
live  only  sixty  years !  In  the  interests  of  virtue 
you  ought  to  have  been  immortal;  but,  had  you 
composed  only  '  le  Devin  du  Village,'  this  alone 
would  be  much  for  the  happiness  of  those  like 
thee,  and  would  deserve  a  statue,  to  be  erected 
by  all  who  have  sensibility."  Several  other  pas- 
sages could  be  quoted,  passages  which  at  the 
time  call  the  blush  of  pride  to  the  cheek  of 
the  composer,  and  a  flush  of  a  very  different 
feeling  when  they  are  quoted  against  him  ten 
years  later.  Assuredly  Bonaparte  is  more  lov- 
1  P.  Masson,  Napoleon  Inconnu,  i.,  184. 


48  Personality  of  Napoleon 

able  because  lie  once  wore  his  heart  on  his 
sleeve  as  became  a  disciple  of  Eousseau;  and 
I  question  whether,  even  during  the  heyday  of 
the  Empire,  he  was  happier  than  when,  in  his 
garret  at  Valence  or  Auxonne,  he  was  apos- 
trophising the  virtues  with  the  fervour  of  a 
devotee. 

But  Rousseau,  who  called  forth  the  Sorrows 
of  Werther  was  also  the  man  who  nerved  the 
Jacobins  to  their  forceful  schemes  of  social  re- 
generation. There  is  the  curious  anomaly  of 
the  man  and  of  the  age.  Under  the  silken  glove 
was  the  grip  of  iron.  Roseate  sentimentalism 
faded  into  the  glare  of  the  Jacqueries;  for  those 
who  went  to  the  romances  of  Rousseau  to  re- 
fresh their  jaded  feelings,  often  became  zealots 
of  his  political  gospel.  It  was  so  with  Bona- 
parte: or,  rather,  he  went  to  him  as  the  cham- 
pion of  the  Swiss  and  the  Corsicans.  The  potent 
influence  of  the  Genevese  thinker  is  easy  to 
explain.  His  great  work,  the  Social  Contract, 
was  the  gospel  of  the  young  democracy.  It  in- 
spired Frenchmen  with  faith  in  an  age  when 
religious  faith  had  waned.  He  declares  the  will 
of  the  people  to  be  the  only  source  of  law, 
treaties  and  rights  acquired  by  conquest  or  pur- 
chase (like  that  of  France  over  Corsica)  being 


The  Jacobin  49 

null  and  void  by  virtue  of  the  primal  compact 
whereby  a  people  becomes  a  people.  Civilisa- 
tion, says  Rousseau,  corrupts  men.  Only  in  the 
natural  instincts  and  primitive  rights  will  you 
find  the  healthy  rules  of  conduct  for  the  indi- 
vidual and  State.  Back  to  the  Golden  Age, 
he  exclaims;  and  the  cry  inspires  his  young 
admirer  to  many  an  outburst  against  the  de- 
gradation of  the  present,  the  grandeur  of  the 
heroic  past. 

In  his  first  controversial  essay,  of  the  year 
1786,  Bonaparte  champions  Kousseau  against  a 
Genevese  pastor  named  Roustan,  who  had  pro- 
tested against  the  attacks  on  Christianity  con- 
tained in  the  Social  Contract  (Book  IV.,  chapter 
viii.).  Rousseau,  intent  on  proving  the  uni- 
versal scope  of  the  general  will  of  the  people, 
had  declared  that  Christianity  impaired  its 
power.  These  are  his  words :  "  Jesus  came  to 
establish  on  earth  a  spiritual  religion,  which, 
separating  the  religious  from  the  political  sys- 
tem, destroyed  the  unity  of  the  State  and  caused 
the  intestine  divisions  which  have  never  ceased 
to  agitate  Christian  nations."  Here  Bonaparte 
stoutly  defended  Rousseau.  He  declared  that 
Roman  Catholicism  broke  up  the  unity  of  the 
State.  "  As  to  the  Roman  religion  [sic]  there  is 


50  Personality  of  Napoleon 

convincing  evidence  to  prove  that  by  it  the  unity 
of  the  State  is  broken."  The  words  are  signifi- 
cant in  view  of  his  later  efforts  to  subject  the 
Koman  Catholic  Church  to  his  will,  as  repre- 
senting "  the  general  will."  But,  of  course,  the 
great  part  of  his  youthful  thesis  deals  with  the 
arguments  of  Roustan  in  defence  of  the  Reformed 
Church. 

Bonaparte  does  not  argue  much.  He  contents 
himself  mainly  with  dogmatically  repeating  the 
dicta  of  Rousseau.  According  to  Bonaparte, 
Christians  are  always  thinking  about  the  future 
life,  and  therefore  care  little  for  poverty  and 
injustice  in  the  present.  If  the  State  tries  to 
redress  the  balance,  the  Christian  will  reply  that 
the  question  is  unimportant,  since  he  looks  for- 
ward to  the  verdict  of  the  Supreme  Judge,  who 
will  make  good  the  inequalities  of  this  fleeting 
existence.  This  uncivic  aloofness,  says  Bona- 
parte, settles  the  question.  The  Christian  is  not 
of  this  world;  therefore  he  cannot  be  a  citizen. 
He  next  accuses  Christianity  of  setting  up  a 
special  body,  which  divides  the  allegiance  of  the 
citizen,  and  may  even  oppose  the  Government. 
True,  Christianity  tends  to  make  men  happy; 
but  so  does  the  Government;  and  the  two  pro- 
cesses may  clash.  Now,  we  must  admit  that 


The  Jacobin  51 

certain  tendencies  of  the  present  age  justify  his 
.  forecast;  for  the  modern  State  seeks  to  regulate 
domains  of  life  which  formerly  pertained  solely 
to  the  Church.  His  prophecy  is  therefore  very 
remarkable.  Nevertheless,  the  essay  as  a  whole 
bears  so  many  signs  of  haste  and  rhapsodic  zeal 
that  it  need  not  be  taken  very  seriously,  espe- 
cially the  endeavour  to  overwhelm  the  Protestant 
pastor  by  the  assertion  that  Christianity  destroys 
the  unity  of  the  State  because  it  has  produced 
the  Order  of  the  Jesuits. 

It  would  be  interesting  to  find  out  how  Bona- 
parte framed  his  notions  of  these  other-worldly 
Christians,  who  meekly  endured  all  manner  of 
injustice  here  in  view  of  the  Last  Judgment; 
whose  quiet  obstinacy  somehow  defeated  the 
beneficent  activities  of  the  Government  from 
which  they  held  so  culpably  alool  Apart  from 
a  few  groups  of  white-robed,  star-gazing  sec- 
taries, these  beings  are  not  known  to  history, 
which  in  the  main  has  found  Protestants  to  be 
made  of  far  other  stuff.  It  is  well  to  remember 
that  this  essay  belongs  to  Bonaparte's  seven- 
teenth year,  the  time  of  his  sojourn  at  Valence, 
which  also  produced  the  monologue  on  suicide. 
Valence  is  not  far  from  the  Cevennes  Moun- 
tains, which  bred  Greathearts,  not  unworldly 


52  Personality  of  Napoleon 

dreamers.  But  the  trend  of  the  essay  was  doubt- 
less determined  by  the  fact  that  Bonaparte  had 
hitherto  read  much  of  Rousseau,  and  little 
history  to  balance  it. 

Nevertheless,  this  juvenile  effort  reveals  one 
mental  trait  which  was  destined  to  persist, 
namely,  his  resolve'  to  make  the  State  the  em- 
bodiment of  the  general  will.  Thus,  in  theory, 
he  is  a  Jacobin,  a  thorough  Revolutionist,  three 
years  before  the  beginning  of  the  Revolution. 
During  the  course  of  that  great  event  the 
Jacobins  came  more  and  more  to  uphold  the 
programme  of  Rousseau.  Belief  in  his  theories 
hurried  France  along  in  the  quest  for  a  social 
millennium.  War  with  neighbouring  Powers  in- 
finitely complicated  the  problem;  so  that  by  the 
end  of  1793  affairs  tended  strongly  towards  the 
dictatorship  which  Rousseau  declared  to  be  es- 
sential in  the  last  resort  for  the  safeguard  of 
popular  liberty.  Never  has  a  philosopher  better 
befriended  a  great  soldier.  A  magnetic  attrac- 
tion drew  Rousseau  towards  Corsica,  and 
Bonaparte  towards  Rousseau.  The  French 
Revolution  completed  the  circuit;  and  hence 
that  flash  of  cosmic  energy,  the  Napoleonic 
Empire. 

It  is  in  vain  that  we  seek  to  discover  Bona- 


The  Jacobin  53 

parte's  opinion  concerning  the  early  events  of 
the  Revolution;  for  no  account  survives.  He 
was  then  in  garrison  at  Auxonne,  a  small  fort- 
ress on  the  River  Saone.  It  is  an  uninteresting 
little  town;  and  he  was  oppressed  by  ill-health 
and  poverty  to  such  an  extent  as  to  give  up  meat. 
Such  is  the  rumour.  The  only  external  events 
of  his  first  sojourn  at  Auxonne  (June,  1788- 
September,  1789),  are  a  narrow  escape  from 
drowning  in  the  river  owing  to  cramp,  and  an 
expedition  to  a  neighbouring  town,  Seurre,  to 
repress  one  of  the  many  riots  which  took  place 
on  the  news  of  the  capture  of  the  Bastille.  He 
acted  with  great  firmness,  ordering  his  men  to 
load,  and  then  crying  out,  "  Let  all  honest  peo- 
ple go  home;  I  fire  only  on  the  rabble  (la 
canaille)."  Thus,  he  drew  the  line  between 
liberty  and  license;  his  fraternity  stopped  short 
of  rowdies  and  plunderers.  For  them  the  bullet 
and  the  bayonet  were  his  argument;  and  it  is 
probable  that,  if  all  in  authority  had  acted  with 
the  same  decision,  France  would  not  have  sunk 
into  anarchy. 

At  this  critical  time  there  is  only  one  of  his 
writings  which  refers  to  the  state  of  France. 
It  is  a  careful  and  detailed  summary  of  the  Re- 
port on  French  Finance  presented  by  decker  to 


54  Personality  of  Napoleon 

the  States-General  on  5th  May,  1789.  It  showed 
an  annual  deficit  of  more  than  56,000,000  francs, 
and  of  nearly  triple  that  sum  for  the  previous 
year.  The  youth  goes  over  all  the  suggested 
economies,  and  notes  that  Corsica  and  some  out- 
lying districts  have  no  deputies.  Three  months 
later,  while  in  Corsica,  he  adds  a  note  that  a 
State  loan  offered  at  Paris  at  4%  per  cent,  has 
been  a  complete  failure.1  We  may  conclude 
from  these  notes,  and  from  his  anxiety  to  return 
to  Corsica  in  August,  1789,  that  he  saw  in  the 
difficulties  of  France  the  opportunity  of  freeing 
his  native  land.2  Bankruptcy  at  Paris  would 
bring  freedom  to  Ajaccio. 

It  would  be  wearisome  to  attempt  a  recital  of 
Napoleon's  efforts  in  Corsica  during  the  long 
furlough,  September,  1789-February,  1791.  The 
salient  points  are  as  follows:  Soon  after  his 
arrival  he  seeks  to  found  a  democratic  club  at 
Ajaccio,  and  even  to  form  a  National  Guard. 
Both  efforts  are  crushed  by  the  French  Gov- 
ernor. Napoleon  protests  against  this  high- 
handed action  and  journeys  to  Bastia,  the  official 
capital,  to  make  good  his  protest.  He  prevails, 
and  is  able  to  reconstitute  the  Guard  at  Ajaccio. 

1  Masson,  Napoleon  Inconnu,  ii.,  54-59. 

2Chuquet,  La  Jeunesse  de  Napoleon  (Brienne),  p.  359. 


The  Jacobin  55 

His  action  thus  far  has  been  against  the  royal 
Governor,  rather  than  against  France,  where, 
indeed,  the  King's  authority  has  virtually  lapsed. 
The  French  National  Assembly  now  alters  the 
relations  of  Corsica  to  France:  they  have  been 
those  of  the  conquered  to  the  conqueror;  they 
now  become  those  of  fraternity.  The  Corsican 
exiles  are  allowed  to  return,  Paoli  among  them, 
and  the  island  becomes  a  Department,  sharing 
in  the  privileges  of  the  Departmental  System 
established  early  in  the  year  1790.  This  is  an 
unlooked-for  boon.  Only  four  years  previously 
Napoleon  had  opined  that  centuries  might  elapse 
before  Corsica  won  her  independence:  now  she 
gained  that  boon  in  all  but  name.  Is  it  surpris- 
ing that  his  being  thrilled  with  joy  and  grati- 
tude; or  that  he  looked  with  disfavour  on  the 
English  leanings  of  Paoli?  Long  residence  in 
England  has  given  the  old  man  views  very  dif- 
ferent from  those  now  held  by  his  former  ad- 
mirer. Disagreement  between  two  men  so 
energetic  and  masterful  was  inevitable.  Bos- 
well  had  noted  the  proneness  of  Paoli  to  sus- 
picion ;  and  now,  as  an  old  man,  long  exiled  by 
France,  the  robber  of  his  country's  independence, 
he  could  not  but  look  with  reserve  on  the  ardent 
young  Bonaparte,  the  founder  of  a  French  club 


56  Personality  of  Napoleon 

and  of  National  Guards  who  flaunted  the  tri- 
colour cockade.  Thus  by  degrees  there  began 
an  estrangement,  the  Bonapartes  heading  the 
French  or  democratic  party  which  had  its  chief 
strength  among  the  younger  men  in  the  towns. 
The  interior  held  to  Paoli. 

In  February,  1791,  Napoleon  returned  to  take 
up  his  military  duties  at  Auxorne.  On  his  way 
up  the  Rhone  Valley  he  wrote  to  his  uncle, 
Fesch,  the  future  Cardinal : 

SERVE,  8  February,  1791.1 

I  am  in  the  hut  of  a  poor  man,  where  I  take 
pleasure  in  writing  to  you  after  long  conversations 
with  these  brave  fellows.  .  .  .  Everywhere  I  have 
found  the  peasants  very  firm  in  their  opinions,  espe- 
cially in  Dauphine;  they  are  all  resolved  to  uphold 
the  constitution  or  die.  At  Valence  I  found  the 
people  resolute,  the  soldiers  patriots,  and  the  officers 
aristocrats.  .  .  .  What  is  called  good  society  is 
three-fourths  aristocratic,  that  is,  they  cover  them- 
selves under  the  mask  of  partisans  of  the  English 
constitution. 

The  same  tactics  were  employed  by  Paoli. 
To  Bonaparte  this  conduct  was  abhorrent;  and 
the  breach  between  him  and  the  old  hero  became 
pronounced  when  the  latter  poured  cold  water 

1  Masson,  Napoleon  Inconnu,  ii.,  195. 


The  Jacobin  57 

on  his  fiery  epistle  to  Count  Buttafoco,  and  re- 
pelled his  request  for  further  documents  need- 
ful for  a  projected  history  of  Corsica  with  the 
cutting  addition  that  history  ought  not  to  be 
written  in  tender  years.1  This  heartless  reply 
blighted  Bonaparte's  Corsican  aspirations,  and 
turned  them  more  and  more  towards  France. 

In  these  weeks  of  poverty  spent  at  Auxonne 
he  worked  hard  at  an  essay  in  competition  for 
a  prize  offered  by  the  Academy  of  Lyons,  on 
the  question,  "  What  Sentiments  ought  most  to 
be  Inculcated  on  Men  for  their  Happiness? " 
His  thesis  is  very  curious.  Religion  does  not 
figure  at  all  prominently  in  his  reply,  which  is 
permeated  by  the  crude  materialism  of  the  school 
of  Raynal.  The  young  enthusiast  declares  that 
man  is  born  to  be  happy,  nature  having  dow- 
ered him  with  all  the  necessary  faculties.  On 
the  physical  side  the  following  are  necessaries: 
food,  a  hut,  clothing,  a  wife.  Turning  to  the 
mental  side,  he  says  we  must  feel  and  reason; 
and  these  two  faculties  are  the  attribute  of  man. 
He  thus  sums  up  the  question.  "Accordingly, 
we  must  eat,  sleep,  beget  children,  feel,  and  rea- 
son, in  order  to  live  our  lives,  therefore  to  be 
happy."  The  life  of  the  Spartans  is  his  ideal; 

1  Masson,  ii.,  201. 


58  Personality  of  Napoleon 

for  they  laid  so  much  stress  on  strength  and 
virtue.  "  Virtue  [he  adds]  consists  in  courage 
and  force.  Energy  is  the  life  of  the  soul,  the 
mainspring  of  the  reason.  The  excitements  of 
the  Spartan  were  those  of  the  strong  man;  and 
the  strong  man  is  good ;  only  the  weak  is  wicked." 

After  this  glorification  of  strength,  worthy  to 
rank  with  that  of  Thrasymachus  in  the  Republic 
of  Plato,  the  essayist  faces  the  question  of  in- 
equality, and  asks  up  to  what  point  we  may 
preach  to  men,  and  inspire  in  them  the  hope  of 
an  equality  of  opportunity.  He  pictures  the 
case  of  a  young  and  vigorous  peasant,  marrying 
a  wife,  looking  about  him  with  disgust  at  the 
superfluities  of  the  idle  rich,  and  going  to  the 
priest  for  advice.  "  Man,"  replies  the  priest, 
"never  reflect  about  the  order  of  society.  God 
arranges  everything.  Resign  yourself  to  His 
providence.  This  life  is  only  a  journey,  during 
which  events  are  wrought  by  a  justice  whose 
decrees  we  must  not  seek  to  fathom.  Believe, 
obey,  never  reason,  and  work.  Those  are  your 
duties." 1  Bonaparte  then  turns  with  equal 
scorn  on  the  notary  who  decides  these  problems 
by  musty  parchments.  But  his  revolt  against 
conventions  stops  short  of  the  institution  of 

i  Masson,  i.,  293-296. 


The  Jacobin  59 

property.  He  does  not  gird  at  the  rich,  but 
claims  that  at  the  other  end  of  the  social  scale 
shall  be  freeholders,  artisans  or  small  trades- 
men, able  to  live  out  their  lives  in  comfort.  In 
this  essay  is  seen  Bonaparte's  philosophy  of  life 
and  Napoleon's  title  to  power.  He  made  no 
war  on  the  rich,  but  was  resolved  to  level  up 
the  poor  to  the  standard  which  ensured  at  least 
a  modicum  of  enjoyment.  As  to  education,  he 
lays  stress  on  geometry  and  history.  He  calls 
history :  "  This  basis  of  the  Moral  Sciences, 
this  torch  of  truth,  this  destroyer  of  prejudices." 
—Mathematics  and  history  will  enable  the  gov- 
ernors of  the  future  ideal  State  to  perfect  their 
logic  and  guide  peoples  in  the  search  for  truth.1 
To  the  weeks  following  on  the  attempt  of 
Louis  XVI.  to  escape  to  the  German  frontier, 
we  may  assign  an  interesting  little  fragment 
bearing  on  the  question  of  Republic  or  Monarchy. 
It  deserves  translating  in  full : 

For  a  long  time  my  tastes  have  led  me  to  take 
interest  in  public  affairs.  If  an  unprejudiced  pub- 
licist could  entertain  doubts  as  to  the  preference 
which  he  ought  to  accord  to  republicanism  or  mon- 
archy, I  think  that  to-day  his  doubts  ought  to 
vanish.  The  Kepublicans  are  insulted,  calumnied, 

1  Masson,  i.,  321. 


6o  Personality  of  Napoleon 

threatened,  and  then  as  sole  reason  it  is  urged  that 
republicanism  is  impossible  in  France.  In  truth 
the  monarchical  orators  have  done  much  for  the 
fall  of  monarchy;  for,  after  having  spent  all  their 
breath  in  vain  analyses,  they  always  say  that  the 
republican  Government  is  impossible  because  it  is 
impossible.  I  have  read  all  the  speeches  of  the 
monarchical  orators,  and  have  seen  in  them  great 
efforts  to  sustain  a  bad  cause.  They  wander  off  into 
assertions  which  they  do  not  prove.  In  truth,  if 
I  had  had  doubts,  the  reading  of  their  speeches 
would  have  dispelled  them.  Twenty-five  million 
people,  say  they,  cannot  exist  as  a  Republic.  With- 
out morals,  no  Republic.  A  great  nation  must 
have  a  centre  of  union.  That  twenty-five  million 
people  cannot  exist  as  a  Republic,  is  an  impolitic 
saying.  .  .  . 

There  ends  this  fragment.  It  is  all  the  more 
remarkable  because  six  years  later,  at  the  end 
of  his  Italian  campaign,  he  quoted  with  gusto 
the  assertion  which  he  formerly  derided.  "  What 
an  idea/'  he  said  to  Melzi  and  Miot.  "  A  Re- 
public of  30,000,000  men,  and  with  our  man- 
ners, our  vices!  How  is  it  possible?  That  is 
a  fancy  of  which  the  French  are  at  present  full, 
but  it  will  pass  away  like  all  the  others."  x  To 
explain  this  entire  change  of  opinion  is  my  aim 
in  this  lecture. 

.  de  Miot  de  Melito,  i.,  ch.  vi. 


The  Jacobin  61 

Firstly,  we  notice  that  his  democratic  beliefs 
sprang  from  a  narrow  experience  and  a  partial 
study  of  life.  In  Rousseau  his  clear-cut,  ardent 
nature  found  that  mingling  of  opposites  which 
for  the  time  satisfied  his  reason  and  fired  his 
fancy.  The  symmetry  and  dogmatism  of  the 
Genevese  thinker  appealed  to  the  Latin  peoples 
in  a  way  that  Anglo-Saxons  cannot  understand. 
The  Romance  nations  revelled  in  his  sentimen- 
talism;  but  they  also  delighted  in  a  political 
geometry  which  advanced  from  definitions  to 
postulates,  from  axioms  to  propositions,  seem- 
ingly with  the  triumphant  certainty  of  Euclid; 
so  that  when  the  convert  closed  the  book  he 
could  exclaim — "  Q.  E.  F."  For  it  was  no  ab- 
stract proposition ;  it  was  a  problem  of  political 
construction,  which  Rousseau  so  confidently  es- 
sayed; and  until  the  student  looked  away  from 
that  symmetrical  structure  to  the  world  of  fact, 
the  effect  was  irresistible. 

We  must  further  remember  that  Rousseau 
wrote  the  Social  Contract  with  a  Swiss  canton, 
not  France,  in  view.  He  expressly  stated  that 
his  pattern  Republic  could  not  be  realised  in  a 
great  country  like  France;  and  the  French 
Jacobins  committed  an  unpardonable  crime  alike 
against  Rousseau  and  common-sense  in  their 


62  Personality  of  Napoleon 

persistent  effort  to  apply  the  principles  of  his 
work  to  a  great  State  and  a  social  fabric  founded 
on  Feudalism,  unified  by  the  monarchy,  and  ex- 
tended by  war.  Now,  Bonaparte  never  was 
guilty  of  this  absurd  blunder,  so  fatal  to  Robes- 
pierre, St.  Just,  and  the  country  which  they 
dreamed  of  perfecting.  In  his  studies  of  Rous- 
seau the  young  Corsican  doubtless  kept  in  view 
his  native  island,  the  very  land  which  the 
theorist  of  Geneva  had  declared  to  be  worthy 
of  an  ideal  constitution  drawn  up  by  himself. 
Corsica  herself,  however,  rejected  the  democratic 
ideals  of  Rousseau.  Bonaparte  during  his  last 
furlough  in  Corsica  battled  bravely  for  the 
French  cause;  but  the  islanders  clave  to  Paoli 
as  monarchist  dictator;  and  the  Bonaparte 
family  had  to  flee  to  France  (June,  1793). 

In  reality  nothing  was  more  favourable  to  his 
ultimate  advancement  than  this  last  furlough  in 
Corsica.  I  agree  with  M.  Masson  in  thinking 
that  he  had  quitted  Paris  before  the  September 
massacres.  Certainly  he  was  absent  at  the  time 
of  the  execution  of  Louis  and  subsequent  events. 
He  also  remained  in  the  South  of  France  during 
the  first  part  of  the  Reign  of  Terror,  and  he 
therefore  came  to  the  front  with  hands  clean, 
while  so  many  generals  and  Carnot  himself,  "  the 


The  Jacobin  63 

organiser  of  victory,"  were  stained  with  blood. 
The  Corsican  Caporale  can  have  caught  only  dis- 
tant echoes  of  these  outrages :  but  they  must  have 
produced  in  him  feelings  of  loathing  such  as  all 
true  patriots  felt.  Civil  strifes  always  dull 
civic  sentiment;  and  I  question  whether  he 
afterwards  felt  absolute  confidence  in  French 
democracy.  It  is  true  that  on  his  arrival  in 
Provence  he  sided  with  the  Jacobins;  but  the 
choice  probably  resulted  from  necessity  quite  as 
much  as  conviction.  For,  firstly,  he  could  not 
without  gross  inconsistency  oppose  in  Provence 
the  cause  he  had  championed  in  Corsica;  and 
secondly,  the  Jacobins,  now  in  power,  were  be- 
ginning to  organise  the  national  defence  with 
splendid  energy.  The  patriotic  instinct,  nay,  the 
sense  of  self-preservation,  bade  Frenchmen  sup- 
port any  government  which  bade  fair  to  expel 
the  invaders.  However  irregular  the  overthrow 
of  the  Girondins  at  Paris  on  2d  June,  the  trium- 
phant Jacobins  showed  far  greater  capacity 
than  they.  "  Rally  round  the  Republic,  one  and 
indivisible " — such  was  the  battle-cry.  "  No 
quarter  to  Royalists,  to  Federalists,  to  those 
who  impair  the  striking  power  of  France."  The 
cry  appealed  both  to  advocates  of  Rousseau  and 
believers  in  common-sense.  To  drive  out  the 


64  Personality  of  Napoleon 

foreigners  and  crush  malcontents  was  the  first 
and  most  obvious  of  duties. 

This  is  the  burden  of  Bonaparte's  pamphlet, 
Le  Souper  de  Beaucaire,  which  he  wrote  at  or 
near  that  town,  probably  early  in  August,  1793. 
Possibly  the  theme  was  suggested  by  an  actual 
conversation  with  royalist  sympathisers  whom 
he  may  have  met  there  or  at  Avignon.  Under 
the  thin  disguise  of  "  a  Soldier,"  he  warns  two 
royalist  merchants  of  Marseilles  that  their  cause 
is  doomed  to  fail  before  the  well-appointed 
Jacobin  force.  The  risings  of  Caen,  Lyons,1 
Bordeaux,  Grenoble,  and  Avignon  having  col- 
lapsed, the  men  of  the  seaboard  must  accept 
the  new  Jacobin  Constitution.  Kich  Marseilles 
must  not  jeopardise  her  existence  for  what  is 
now  a  dream.  The  Marseilles  merchant  contests 
this  and  claims  that  all  Provence  will  rise  against 
the  Jacobins,  who  are  detestable  assassins;  Mar- 
seilles is  not  like  la  Vendee,  which  wants  a  king; 
she  wants  a  true  republic ;  she  fights,  not  under 
the  fleur-de-lys,  but  under  the  tricolour.  Bona- 
parte replies  that  Paoli  had  hoisted  the  tricolour 

1  This  must  refer  to  some  Republican  success  at  Lyons : 
but  the  city  did  not  surrender  until  9th  October.  Avignon 
surrendered  on  26th  July,  and  Bonaparte  entered  Beau- 
caire on  the  29th.  Admiral  Hood  occupied  Toulon  on  28th 
August.  These  facts  fix  the  date  of  the  pamphlet. 


The  Jacobin  65 

in  Corsica,  but  only  in  order  to  deceive  the  peo- 
ple. Facts  soon  showed  him  in  his  true  colours ; 
and,  whatever  pretexts  are  put  forward  at  Mar- 
seilles, that  town  will  be  fighting  for  Spain  and 
Austria  if  it  resists  the  Republic.  A  citizen  ol 
Niines  and  a  manufacturer  of  Montpellier  drive 
home  the  same  truth,  that,  whatever  the  Mar- 
seillais  may  call  themselves,  they  are  in  effect 
enemies  of  France.  The  retort  comes  back  that 
the  Jacobins  are  guilty  of  assassination  and 
other  horrors,  and  Marseilles  will  call  in  the 
Spanish  fleet  rather  than  admit  them.  At  this 
Bonaparte  fires  up.  He  warns  the  Marseillais 
that  such  an  act  of  treachery  to  the  nation  will 
brand  their  city  with  infamy:  within  a  week 
sixty  thousand  patriots  will  fly  at  them  if  they 
are  guilty  of  treason.  Do  they  not  now  see  the 
extent  of  their  error?  Will  they  not  throw  off 
the  yoke  of  the  small  minority  of  traitors  and 
regain  the  town  for  the  Republic — "  You  have 
been  misled,"  he  exclaims,  "  it  is  no  new  thing 
for  the  people  to  be  led  astray  by  a  handful  of  con- 
spirators and  intriguers.  From  all  time  the  good 
nature  and  ignorance  of  the  multitude  have  been 
the  cause  of  most  of  the  civil  wars. . . .  Marseilles 
will  always  be  the  centre  of  Liberty,  tearing  only 
a  leaf  or  two  out  of  the  book  of  its  history." 


66  Personality  of  Napoleon 

___  Such  is  the  end  of  this  interesting  brochure. 
Its  tone  is  opportunist  rather  than  Jacobinical. 
The  instinct  in  favour  of  national  unity  counts 
for  more  than  any  political  theory.  Bonaparte 
admits  that  the  Marseillais  may  at  heart  be  good 
republicans;  but  their  actions  are  those  of  bad 
patriots.  His  censures  are  less  bitter  than  those 
of  the  citizens  of  Nimes  and  Montpellier.  May 
we  not  see  in  this  his  aloofness  from  these  civil 
broils  and  a  desire  to  end  them,  if  possible,  by 
peaceable  means?  On  the  whole,  the  pamphlet 
is  a  very  creditable  production.  The  dialogue 
is  well  sustained;  and  the  conclusion  is  such  as 
every  friend  of  France  and  of  progress  could 
endorse. 

The  incident  has  been  skilfully  visualised  by 
a  French  artist.  Amidst  the  homely  surround- 
ings of  an  inn  at  Beaucaire,  lit  up  by  a  strong 
side-light,  the  group  eagerly  discusses  this  great 
question.  The  four  civilians  are  seated  at  the 
supper-table  and  gaze  fixedly  at  the  thin  figure 
of  the  lieutenant,  who  stands  erect,  almost  de- 
fiant, at  the  end  of  the  board.  His  thin,  sallow 
features  are  aglow  with  enthusiasm  as  he  dilates 
on  the  crime  of  resisting  the  Republic  and  help- 
ing its  enemies.  The  sleek  merchants  of  Mar- 
seilles lean  back  aghast  as  they  foresee  doom 


The  Jacobin  67 

written  plainly  on  their  efforts;  while  the  men 
of  Mmes  and  Montpellier  look  up  with  wonder 
and  admiration  at  this  indomitable  champion. 
The  picture  is  a  spirited  embodiment  of  Bona- 
parte's thoughts,  which  worthily  interpreted  the 
instincts  of  self-preservation  throbbing  through 
the  French  nation. 

The  forecast  of  the  young  officer  was  sin- 
gularly correct.  The  Jacobins  of  Marseilles, 
helped  by  the  army  of  Carteaux,  soon  restored 
the  authority  of  the  Convention,  thereby  fore- 
stalling an  Anglo-Spanish  occupation  of  the 
town.  But  on  28th  August,  at  the  invitation 
of  the  Moderates  and  Royalists  of  Toulon,  Ad- 
miral Hood  occupied  that  stronghold,  thus  set- 
ting in  motion  events  which  served  to  bring 
Bonaparte  to  the  front.  As  is  well  known  he 
was  hastily  summoned  to  take  command  of  the 
artillery  of  the  Republicans.1  After  the  re- 
capture of  Toulon  he  took  no  part  in  the  fell 
work  of  guillotining.  He  left  that  to  Feron  and 
other  creatures  of  the  Convention.  In  a  short  time 
(6th  February,  1794)  he  was  named  Brigadier- 
General,  commanding  the  artillery  of  the  Army 
of  Italy,  whose  headquarters  were  at  Nice. 

1  See  Colin,  L' 'Education  Militaire  de  Napoleon,  pp.  181- 
186;  Masson,  ii.,  478. 


68  Personality  of  Napoleon 

His  duties  now  brought  him  into  contact  with 
the  younger  Robespierre,  who,  along  with  Sali- 
ceti,  had  recommended  that  promotion.  The  two 
young  men  saw  much  of  each  other,  and  Augus- 
tin  Robespierre  thought  highly  of  Bonaparte's 
abilities;  for  in  his  letter  of  5th  April,  1794,  to 
his  brother,  he  names  him  among  other  patriotic 
officers  as  a  man  of  transcendent  merit.  But  he 
adds  these  curious  words :  "  He  is  a  Corsican : 
he  offers  only  the  guarantee  of  a  man  of  that 
nation  who  has  resisted  the  caresses  of  Paoli, 
and  whose  estates  have  been  ravaged  by  that 
traitor."  An  undertone  of  suspicion  may  be 
heard  under  these  phrases.  The  Corsicans  were 
noted  intriguers;  and  young  Robespierre  doubt- 
less felt  that  he  had  little  or  no  hold  over 
Bonaparte.  Suspicion,  however,  pervaded  all  the 
relations  of  life  in  that  time  of  the  Terror;  and 
it  may  be  that  the  two  were  on  friendly  terms, 
so  long  as  their  words  and  acts  were  those  of 
good  Jacobins.  As  to  Bonaparte's  inmost  sym- 
pathies at  this  time  we  know  very  little.  On 
hearing  of  the  death  of  young  Robespierre  he 
wrote :  "  I  was  somewhat  affected  by  his  catas- 
trophe; for  I  was  fond  of  him,  and  looked  on 
him  as  pure;  but,  had  he  been  my  father,  I 
would  have  slain  him  had  he  aspired  to  tyranny." 


The  Jacobin  69 

Robespierre's  sister,  who  saw  Bonaparte  at  Nice, 
describes  him  as  not  only  a  Republican,  but  a 
Montagnard,  that  is,  a  convinced  follower  of  her 
brother.  She  calls  him  "a  partisan  of  liberty 
in  the  widest  sense,  and  of  equality  in  the  truest 
sense."  As  is  well  known,  Bonaparte,  during  the 
Consulate,  awarded  to  her  a  pension  of  3600 
francs,  a  fact  which  proves  his  general  sympathy 
with  the  younger  Robespierres.  Whether  he  was 
a  thoroughly  convinced  follower  of  the  dictator 
is  open  to  question.  I  believe  that  Bonaparte's 
good  sense  would  have  revolted  against  the  effort 
to  crush  France  into  the  mould  of  the  Social 
Contract  of  Rousseau. 

Not  long  after  the  execution  of  the  Robes- 
pierres at  Paris  he  fell  into  great  danger.  He 
was  officially  denounced  as  a  hypocritical  in- 
triguer, the  contriver  of  plans  for  the  Robes- 
pierres, the  betrayer  of  the  plans  of  campaign 
to  the  enemy,  and  guilty  of  acts  of  treachery 
during  a  recent  mission  to  the  city  of  Genoa. 
These  reckless  charges  could  not  be  sustained 
even  in  those  mad  days,  when  politics  became 
the  art  of  guillotining  your  neighbours  before 
they  guillotined  you.  The  one  thing  needful  was 
to  be  highly  useful  to  the  State;  and  this  prob- 
ably saved  Bonaparte.  The  Army  of  Italy  badly 


70  Personality  of  Napoleon 

needed  his  technical  and  topographical  know- 
ledge; and  on  these  grounds  alone  the  Commis- 
sion ordered  his  release,  but  without  reinstating 
him  in  his  rank  of  general  (20th  August).  The 
chief  interest  of  this  incident  lies  in  the  proof 
which  it  reveals  of  Bonaparte's  calm  and  serenity 
in  presence  of  imminent  danger.  While  in 
prison  at  Fort  Carre  at  Antibes  (hard  by  the 
scene  of  his  triumphant  return  from  Elba  in 
1814)  he  wrote  these  words:  "The  feelings  of 
my  conscience  keep  my  spirit  calm ;  but  those  of 
my  heart  are  in  turmoil,  and  I  feel  that,  with 
a  brain  cool,  but  a  heart  on  fire,  one  cannot 
make  up  one's  mind  to  live  long  under  sus- 
picion." Also  to  his  aide-de-camp,  Junot,  he 
wrote :  "  Men  may  be  unjust  to  me,  my  dear 
Junot,  but  it  is  enough  to  be  innocent:  my  con- 
science is  the  tribunal  before  which  I  arraign 
my  conduct.  My  conscience  is  calm  when  I 
question  it.  Therefore  do  nothing  about  me; 
you  would  only  compromise  me."  This  calm  of 
conscious  innocence  bespeaks  a  great  man.  At 
no  time  in  his  career  does  Napoleon  rise  to  a 
loftier  moral  height  than  during  those  eleven 
days  of  imprisonment  at  Antibes. 

His  fortitude  was  to  be  still  further  tried. 
An  expedition  for  the  recovery  of  Corsica,  in 


The  Jacobin  71 

which  he  served  as  general  in  command  of  the 
artillery,  was  a  total  failure.  It  fell  in  with 
the  British  fleet,  lost  two  vessels,  and  the  re- 
mainder with  great  difficulty  succeeded  in  reach- 
ing Toulon  (March,  1795).  Shortly  after  his 
return  to  that  seaport  he  received  an  order  from 
the  Minister  of  War  to  betake  himself  to  the  Army 
of  the  West  as  general  of  infantry.  This  was  a 
serious  rebuff.  While  cherishing  a  hope  to  share 
in  the  forthcoming  invasion  of  Italy,  he  is  to 
be  sent  off  to  hunt  the  Chouans  in  the  forests  of 
la  Vendee,  a  service  which  he  detested  and  in 
a  capacity  inferior  to  that  of  general  of  artil- 
lery.1 In  the  hope  of  seeing  this  order  changed 
in  one  of  the  many  political  changes  of  the  time, 
he  at  once  set  out  for  Paris,  taking  with  him 
Marmout,  Junot,  and  Louis  Bonaparte. 

Unfortunately,  the  chief  account  of  him  at 
that  interesting  time  of  mental  transition  is  that 
of  Mme.  Junot.  As  a  rule,  the  interest  of 
French  Memoirs  rises  in  proportion  to  their 
mendacity;  and  certainly  those  of  the  future 
Duchesse  d'Abrantes  are  interesting.  She,  how- 
ever, brings  Bonaparte  to  Paris  nine  months 
before  the  actual  time  of  arrival,  which  some- 
what tells  against  her  account  of  his  sharp  fea- 

J  Colin,  p.  328. 


72  Personality  of  Napoleon 

tures,  his  yellow  and  emaciated  cheeks,  his 
slovenly  appearance,  enhanced  by  ill-combed,  ill- 
powdered  hair,  hanging  down  over  his  grey 
overcoat;  she  also  dwells  on  his  lack  of  gloves 
(a  useless  luxury  he  deemed  them),  and  badly 
fitting  and  ill-blackened  boots.  It  is  the  exter- 
nal which  always  attracts  her  notice.  But  there 
is  one  anecdote  which  seems  lifelike.  On  her 
mother,  Mme.  Permon,  naming  Saliceti  to  him, 
a  smile  passed  rapidly  over  his  lips,  and  he  said : 
"  Ah !  he  wanted  to  ruin  me ;  but  my  star  pre- 
vented him.  However,  I  must  not  boast  of  my 
star;  for  who  knows  what  may  be  my  fate?" 
Another  story  of  Mme.  Junot  is  that  Bonaparte 
came  to  their  house  at  the  close  of  that  day  of 
riot  and  outrage,  1  Prairial  (20th  May),  asking 
for  hospitality,  as  he  had  been  unable  to  pro- 
cure food  while  wandering  about  the  central 
districts;  that  he  had  been  in  the  Convention 
while  the  mob  terrorised  the  deputies  of  France, 
cutting  off  the  head  of  Feraud,  who  sought  to 
protect  the  President,  and  holding  it  up  on  a 
pike  before  him.  In  describing  the  scene  Bona- 
parte exclaimed :  "  Truly,  if  we  continue  thus 
to  sully  our  Revolution,  it  will  be  a  disgrace  to 
be  a  Frenchman."  Unfortunately  for  the  story, 
Bonaparte  was  at  Chatillon,  about  one  hundred 


The  Jacobin  73 

miles  away  from  Paris,  at  the  time  of  these 
tragic  occurrences.1  But  he  arrived  at  the 
capital  seven  or  eight  days  afterwards,  and  he 
may  have  spoken  the  words  last  cited;  for 
they  certainly  express  his  contempt  for  mob 
rule. 

In  fact,  all  thinking  men  saw  the  urgent  need 
of  repressing  the  disorderly  elements  of  the 
populace.  Such  a  time  comes  in  the  course  of 
every  Revolution;  and  happy  is  the  State  which 
finds  a  leader  strong  enough  to  restore  order 
and  disinterested  enough  to  preserve  liberty. 

That  good  fortune  was  not  the  lot  either  of 
ancient  Rome  or  of  modern  Paris.  The  popu- 
lace at  Rome  cared  little  about  political  free- 
dom if  they  had  bread  and  circus  games;  and 
Tiberius  took  care  to  give  them  both,  even 
after  bad  harvests.2  Napoleon  also,  as  ruler  of 
France,  always  sought  to  "  make  work  "  in  time 
of  depression,  and  expressed  fear  of  the  people 
when  embittered  by  privations.  As  for  merely 
political  discontent,  he  held  it  cheap.3  Bona- 
parte's destiny  brought  him  to  Paris  at  the  time 
when  the  forces  of  order  triumphed.  That  city 

1  Masson,  Nap.  et  sa  Famille,  i.,  108. 

2  Tacitus,  Annals,  bk.  iv.,  ch.  vi. 

3  Chaptal,  Souvenirs,  pp.  287,  291. 


74  Personality  of  Napoleon 

was  gyrating  in  the  vicious  circle  which  has 
more  than  once  enclosed  her.  A  great  pleasure 
resort  is  apt  to  beget  both  revolution  and  re- 
action. The  contrast  between  the  ostentatious 
wealth  of  the  few  and  the  poverty  of  the  many 
breeds  discontent  more  quickly  than  elsewhere; 
and  if,  as  in  the  year  1789,  events  lead  to  an 
explosion,  the  ruin  of  the  various  trades  de- 
pendent on  the  rich  tends  sooner  or  later  to 
promote  a  reaction.  The  events  of  1789-95,  no 
less  than  those  of  1848-9  and  1870-1  bear  wit- 
ness to  the  strength  of  the  opposing  tendencies 
which  have  operated  at  Paris  in  times  of  strain. 
There,  as  also  at  Vienna  in  1848-9,  violent  out- 
breaks have  been  followed,  almost  automatic- 
ally, by  reaction  and  repression.  A  pleasure-city 
exercises  a  harmful  unsettling  influence  on  the 
government  located  in  its  midst. 

]^ow,  Bonaparte  came  to  Paris  when  the  star 
of  Liberty  was  paling  before  those  of  Mercury, 
Mars,  and  Venus.  He  soon  felt  their  charm. 
In  July,  1795,  he  describes  in  glowing  terms  the 
increase  of  diversion  and  display : 

Luxury,  pleasure,  and  the  arts  are  reviving  in  a 
surprising  manner.  Libraries  [sic],  courses  on 
History,  Chemistry,  Botany,  Astronomy,  come  in 
succession.  Everything  is  accumulated  here  to  dis- 


The  Jacobin  75 

tract  and  make  life  agreeable.  One  is  withdrawn 
from  one's  thoughts.  And  what  means  are  there 
of  taking  a  dark  view  of  this  mental  activity  and 
this  social  whirlpool?  Women  are  everywhere,  at 
the  play,  at  the  theatre,  on  the  promenade,  in  the 
library.  In  the  savant's  study  you  meet  with  very 
pretty  women.  ...  A  woman  needs  only  six 
months  of  Paris  to  know  what  is  due  to  her  and 
what  is  her  empire. 

Thus,  Bonaparte  is  a  devotee  of  Paris,  the 
centre  of  the  arts  and  of  social  life,  the  city 
of  the  jeunesse  doree,  which  has  chased  back  the 
Jacobins  to  the  outer  slums.  As  for  politics,  his 
chief  desire  is  for  a  government  strong  enough 
to  repress  disorder,  to  keep  a  tight  hand  on  the 
Royalists,  and  to  carry  on  the  war  to  a  trium- 
phant issue.  This  explains  why,  after  the  con- 
clusion of  the  peace  with  Spain,  he  draws  up 
plans  for  transferring  30,000  troops  from  the 
Pyrenees  to  the  Maritime  Alps  to  batter  in  the 
Austro-Sardinian  defence.  Here  is  the  secret 
motive  which  holds  him  to  Paris,  outstaying  the 
time  of  furlough  before  he  takes  up  his  duties 
in  la  Vendee.  For  the  time  his  disobedience 
leads  to  degradation  from  the  rank  of  general. 
But  fortune  repairs  his  error,  if  error  it  be. 
The  rising  of  the  malcontents  of  Paris  on  13 
Vendemiaire  (5th  October)  gives  him  his  chance; 


76  Personality  of  Napoleon 

and  lie  sides  with  the  French  Convention  in 
crushing  a  movement,  which,  if  not  definitely 
royalist,  would  certainly  have  become  so. 

There  is  a  story  to  the  effect  that  at  first  he 
doubted  whether  to  take  the  side  of  the  Repub- 
lican Government  or  of  the  then  malcontent 
majority.  I  do  not  believe  that  he  hesitated  for 
one  moment.  His  earlier  letters  show  that  he 
hoped  much  from  the  new  constitution;  he 
wanted,  not  a  Jacobinical  government,  but  a 
strong  government,  prompt  to  seize  the  oppor- 
tunity and  overwhelm  Austria  in  North  Italy. 
It  was  naught  to  him  that  the  franchise  was 
narrowed  and  other  reactionary  changes  came  in. 
The  new  regime,  the  Directory,  promised  to  be 
vigorous;  that  was  all  to  him. 

Thenceforth  the  conquest  of  Italy  filled  his 
thoughts,  to  the  exclusion  of  the  civic  feelings 
once  so  strong.  In  his  proclamation  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  campaign  he  addressed  his  men 
as  soldiers,  not  as  citizens,  the  noble  appellation 
hitherto  always  used;  and  the  incentive  to  action 
is  the  hope  of  glory  and  booty,  not  of  spreading 
the  bounds  of  freedom.  True,  in  the  month  of 
May,  he  informed  the  Italians  that  the  French 
were  coming  to  break  their  chains;  but  at  the 
same  time  he  wrote  to  the  Directory,  "  We  will 


The  Jacobin  77 

levy  20,000,000  francs  in  exactions  from  this 
country :  it  is  one  of  the  richest  in  the  world, 
but  -entirely  exhausted  by  five  years  of  war."  l 
Of  the  Italians  themselves  he  spoke  in  terms  of 
utter  contempt,  even  for  the  volunteers  who 
came  forth  to  follow  his  standards.  At  the  end 
of  the  campaign  occurred  the  betrayal  of  Venice, 
the  pretext  being  the  rising  at  Verona,  which 
resulted  from  the  exactions  of  the  French  troops. 
As  is  well  known,  by  means  of  guile  Bonaparte 
secured  the  unopposed  entry  of  the  French  into 
Venice  and  the  seizure  of  the  fleet  and  arsenal. 
On  the  26th  May,  1797,  he  assured  the  new  demo- 
cratic municipality  of  Venice  that  he  would  do 
all  in  his  power  to  consolidate  its  liberties,  and 
to  place  Italy  once  more  among  the  free  and  in- 
dependent nations  of  the  world.  But  at  the  very 
same  time  he  offered  to  the  Hapsburg  Court  the 
city  of  Venice  and  the  eastern  half  of  her  pos- 
sessions, excusing  this  conduct  by  the  following 
words  to  the  French  Directory :  "  That  popu- 
lace, foolish,  cowardly,  in  no  wise  fitted  for 
liberty,  without  land,  without  waters,  should 
naturally  be  left  to  those  to  whom  we  assign 


1  By  the  end  of  Frimaire,  An  VI.  (20th  December,  1797), 
he  levied  39,418,000  francs  from  Italy  (Nap.  Corresp.,  iii., 
71). 


78  Personality  of  Napoleon 

the  mainland  (I.  e.,  to  the  Austrians).  We 
will  take  all  their  ships,  we  will  despoil  the 
arsenal,  take  away  all  the  cannon,  destroy  the 
Bank,  and  keep  Corfu  and  Ancona  for  our- 
selves." 

The  words  Ancona,  Corfu  are  sign-posts  point- 
ing to  the  East.  There  was  to  be  his  next  great 
enterprise.  We  are  apt  to  be  dazzled  by  the 
brilliance  of  his  exploits.  In  conception  and 
performance  they  remind  us  of  Alexander  the 
Great  and  Coeur  de  Lion.  But  the  medal  has 
a  reverse.  The  seizure  of  Egypt  was  an  act  of 
unprovoked  aggression  against  a  friendly  Power, 
Turkey.  It  therefore  opened  the  cycle  of  wars 
of  conquest  and  aggrandisement.  The  principles 
'of  the  French  Revolution,  dulled  in  Italy,  were 
forgotten  in  the  Levant.  War  there  appeared  in 
its  most  barbarous  guise.  Incidents,  such  as  the 
emptying  of  sackloads  of  heads  of  rebels  in  the 
great  square  at  Cairo,  in  order  to  cow  the  rebel- 
lious populace,  and  the  slaughter  in  cold  blood  of 
2500  Turkish  prisoners  on  the  seashore  at  Jaffa, 
brutalised  the  French  troops  and  their  com- 
mander. The  East  has  always  exerted  a  subtle 
influence  on  its  invaders.  In  one  of  his  noblest 
quatrains,  Matthew  Arnold  sang  of  her  quiet 
invincibility : 


The  Jacobin  79 

The  East  bowed  low  before  the  blast 

In  patient  deep  disdain; 
She  let  the  legions  thunder  past 

And  plunged  in  thought  again.1 

But  the  captured  East  has  often  prevailed  over 
its  would-be  captors.  The  decay  of  Athenian 
democracy  dates  from  the  campaigns  in  Asia 
Minor.  Rome  underwent  a  similar  decadence 
largely  from  the  like  cause;  and  French  de- 
mocracy, already  compromised  in  1797-8  by  the 
spoliation  of  Italy  and  Switzerland,  was  to  be 
hopelessly  warped  by  the  contest  with  the  semi- 
barbarous  hordes  of  Egypt  and  Syria.  A  re- 
public which  seeks  to  hold  down  Eastern  fanatics 
must,  to  some  extent,  use  Eastern  methods;  and 
generals,  administrators,  and  soldiers  employed 
in  that  work  imbibe  crudely  professional  notions 
which  tell  against  citizenship.  Twenty  years 
earlier,  contact  with  the  soldiers  of  Washington 
had  helped  to  win  the  French  army  for  the  Revo- 
lution ;  now  the  fights  with  Mamelukes  and  Turks 
served  to  make  its  officers  the  instruments  of 
political  reaction. 

I  have  now  sought  to  trace  in  outline  the  de- 
velopment  of   Bonaparte's   character   from   his 

1  M.  Arnold,  "  Obermann  once  more." 


8o  Personality  of  Napoleon 

eighteenth  to  thirtieth  year.  The  usual  mistake 
is  to  regard  that  character  as  fixed  and  solid. 
True,  it  became  so  in  later  life;  but  his  youth- 
ful nature  was  emotional,  impressionable,  almost 
fluid.  Of  the  many  indiscretions  to  which  such 
a  being  is  prone,  I  believe  there  is  only  one  to 
which  he  did  not  succumb;  he  never  wrote  a 
line  of  poetry.  But  he  ran  through  nearly  the 
whole  gamut  of  emotions  of  the  Rousseau  cult, 
probably  with  the  result  of  wearying  his  nerves 
before  the  strain  of  the  political  game  into  which 
he  plunged  in  1790.  As  we  have  seen,  he  then 
gave  his  heart  to  French  democracy,  but,  I  be- 
lieve, with  the  reservations  prescribed  by  insight 
and  good  sense.  Failing  to  win  Corsica  for  that 
cause,  he  sought  to  serve  it  in  France;  but  dur- 
ing the  Reign  of  Terror  there  is  no  proof  that 
he  sympathised  either  with  the  more  visionary 
of  Robespierre's  aims  or  the  sanguinary  methods 
adopted  to  enforce  them.  At  this  time  he  sided 
with  the  Jacobins,  not  as  Terrorists,  but  as  un- 
flinching champions  of  national  unity. 

Nevertheless,  these  horrible  strifes  left  their 
mark  on  him.  As  a  Corsican,  he  was  early  in- 
ured to  scenes  of  blood.  The  wholesale  guillotin- 
ings  at  Toulon  and  elsewhere  early  in  1794  made 
him  even  more  callous ;  and  to  the  spring  of  1794 


The  Jacobin  81 

belongs  that  reckless  incident  at  the  Col  di  Tenda, 
described  in  the  last  lecture,  when  he  flung  away 
the  lives  of  a  few  soldiers  so  as  to  give  his  mis- 
tress the  sight  of  a  skirmish.  His  unjust  im- 
prisonment which  soon  followed  must  have 
aroused  disgust  of  Parisian  rule;  and  by  the 
year  1795  he  figures  as  a  man  of  pleasure,  en- 
amoured of  Paris,  less  so  of  the  Republic,  but 
ready  to  fight  for  any  strong  government  which 
will  put  down  the  Royalists  and  push  on  the  war 
with  vigour.  For  by  the  summer  of  1795  the 
vision  of  the  conquest  of  Italy  has  enthralled 
him.  He  realises  it  to  the  full;  and  then  the 
East  beckons  him.  In  the  sphere  of  character 
the  result  is  that  in  1799  he  comes  back  to  the 
western  world,  not  a  Cincinnatus,  but  a  Csesar. 

In  August,  1800,  as  First  Consul,  he  paid  a 
visit  in  company  with  Girardin  to  Ermenonville, 
the  last  residence  of  Rousseau.  On  entering 
the  death-chamber,  he  uttered  these  remarkable 
words :  "  He  is  a  fool,  your  Rousseau :  it  is  he 
who  has  brought  us  to  our  present  condition." 
"  Well !  "  replied  Girardin,  "  we  are  not  so  badly 
off."  Napoleon  said  no  more  at  the  time;  but, 
as  was  his  wont,  he  developed  the  thought  with 
even  greater  emphasis  on  visiting  the  tomb  of 
Rousseau  in  the  Isle  of  Poplars,  hard  by.  Gazing 


82  Personality  of  Napoleon 

at  it,  he  said:  "It  would  have  been  better  for 
the  repose  of  France  that  this  man  had  never 
been  born." — "Why  so,  Citizen  Consul?"  asked 
Girardin. — "  It  is  he  who  prepared  the  French 
Revolution." — "  I  should  have  thought,  Citizen 
Consul,  that  it  was  not  for  you  to  complain  of 
the  Revolution."— "Well,"  replied  Napoleon,  "the 
future  will  discover  whether  it  was  not  better, 
for  the  repose  of  the  world,  that  neither  Rous- 
seau nor  I  had  ever  been  born." — In  those  words, 
which  sound  the  death-knell  of  Jacobinism,  we 
hear  the  first  clarion  of  advancing  Imperialism. 


Ill 

THE  WARRIOR 

"  Les  principes  de  Cesar  ont  ete  les  memes  que  ceux 
d'Alexandre  et  d'Annibal;  tenir  ses  forces  reunies,  n'etre 
vulnerable  sur  aucun  point,  se  porter  avec  rapidite  sur 
les  points  importants,  s'en  rapporter  aux  moyens  moraux, 
a  la  reputation  de  ses  armes,  a  la  crainte  qu'il  inspirait, 
et  aussi  aux  moyens  politiques  pour  maintenir  dans  la 
fidelite  ses  allies." — NAPOLEON,  Notes  sur  VArt  de  Guerre. 

THE  term  warrior  may  be  taken  to  include 
the  more  special  words — fighter,  inspirer 
of  armies,  commander-in-chief,  strategist,  and 
tactician.  It  is  the  widest  of  appellations;  and 
I  apply  it  to  Napoleon  because  his  genius  for 
war  was  the  most  universal  known  to  authentic 
history.  For  us  he  is  the  real  Wodin,  the  western 
Alexander  the  Great,  the  modern  Caesar. 

The  fighting  instinct  throbbed  in  his  blood 
during  his  tender  years,  witness  that  curious 
piece  of  self -revel  at  ion  imparted  to  Antom- 
marchi  at  St.  Helena.  When  teased  by  his  com- 
panions for  his  fondness  of  a  little  girl,  he  would 

83 


84  Personality  of  Napoleon 

pick  up  sticks  or  stones,  and  pelt  or  rush  at 
his  tormentors,  without  thinking  of  their  size  or 
number.  What  is  bred  in  the  bone,  comes  out 
through  life;  and  this  extraordinary  hardiness 
and  pugnacity,  inherited  seemingly  from  the 
Pietra-Santa  family,  distinguished  him  from 
first  to  last,  from  the  first  charge  at  Montenotte 
to  the  onset  of  the  Imperial  Guard  at  Waterloo. 
In  this  combative  instinct  lies  the  secret  of  his 
power  over  the  soldiery.  Men  will  do  anything 
and  go  anywhere  for  a  fighting  general,  provided 
that  he  cares  for  their  interests  and  touches  their 
imagination. 

Here  again  he  was  an  ideal  leader.  To  his 
generals  he  for  the  most  part  turned  the  colder 
side  of  his  nature,  exacting  instant  and  unques- 
tioning obedience,  giving  them  abundant  oppor- 
tunities to  enrich  themselves  at  the  expense  of 
the  liberated  peoples,  and  finally  dowering  them 
with  immense  domains.  Sometimes,  however, 
he  fired  them  with  burning  words,  as  in  the  part- 
ing injunctions  to  General  Lauriston,  to  whom 
he  entrusted  the  command  of  the  troops  on  Ville- 
neuve's  fleet  designed  for  a  landing  in  England : 
"  If  you  experience  reverses,  always  remember 
these  three  things — union  of  your  forces,  activity, 
and  a  firm  resolve  to  die  with  glory.  These  are 


The  Warrior  85 

the  three  great  principles  of  the  military  art, 
which  have  made  Fortune  favour  me  in  all  my 
operations.  Death  is  nothing;  but  to  live  van- 
quished and  without  glory  is  to  die  every  day.  "l 

His  proclamations  to  the  soldiers  pulsate  with 
national  pride.  Never  has  a  man  of  different 
race  so  profoundly  stirred  great  armies.  From 
the  time  of  his  first  appeal,  in  the  spring  of 
1796,  to  march  onward  and  conquer  Italy,  to 
the  last  proclamation,  five  days  before  Water- 
loo, urging  every  Frenchman  to  conquer  or  die, 
he  showed  a  supreme  art  in  kindling  the  passion 
for  glory  in  the  rank  and  file;  and  when  that 
flame  burns  brightly  in  Celts  they  will  do  any- 
thing. As  Napoleon  said,  love  of  glory  is  with 
Frenchmen  a  sixth  sense.  He  set  himself  to 
develop  it,  often  treating  his  men  with  the  old 
republican  camaraderie.  In  times  of  exceptional 
strain,  as  on  the  night  before  Jena,  he  encour- 
aged the  engineers  and  artillerymen  by  appear- 
ing at  their  side,  watching  their  toil,  and 
speaking  the  words  that  change  men  into  Titans. 
Or  again,  he  would  go  over  the  battlefield,  feeling 
the  pulse  or  the  heart  of  the  recumbent  forms, 
and  showing  genuine  satisfaction  when  he  dis- 
covered signs  of  life  that  had  not  before  been 

1  Nap.  Corresp.,  x.,  69. 


86  Personality  of  Napoleon 

observed.  Especially  he  loved  to  talk  with  his 
Old  Guard,  asking  them  how  long  and  where 
they  had  served,  the  number  of  their  wounds,  and 
so  forth.  He  it  was  who  nicknamed  them  les 
grognards,  the  very  best  means,  surely,  of  keeping 
grumbling  within  bounds. 

What  wonder  that  Wellington  calculated  the 
presence  of  Napoleon  on  a  battlefield  to  be  worth 
40,000  troops,  not  only  because  his  moves  were 
skilful,  his  blows  telling,  but  because  his  very 
presence  nerved  the  men  to  do  their  utmost,  and 
gave  them  supreme  confidence  in  the  result. 
Thi£bault  relates  that  early  in  1797,  when  the 
French  were  about  to  invade  Austria  through 
the  Carnic  Alps,  the  humblest  privates  spoke 
confidently  of  entering  Vienna.  They  did  not 
trouble  as  to  how  it  would  come  to  pass. 
Enough  for  them  that  Napoleon  was  at  their 
head.1  This  explains  the  marvels  of  the  years 
1796-1814.  They  were  due  to  the  influence  of 
one  who  excelled  both  as  a  strategist,  a  tactician, 
and  an  inspirer  of  men. 

In  the  year  1796  the  opportunity  was  unique. 
The  First  Coalition  of  the  Powers  against  France 
was  fast  crumbling  to  pieces.  Tuscany,  Prus- 
sia, and  Spain  had  come  to  terms  with  France, 

iThiebault,  Mems.,  i.,  305  (Eng.  edit.). 


The  Warrior  87 

and  Spain  was  on  the  point  of  making  war  on 
England.  In  four  campaigns  the  raw  levies  of 
the  French  Republic  had  hewn  their  way  to 
victory.  "With  bread  and  iron  you  can  reach 
China  " — such  was  the  cry  of  one  of  the  early 
leaders.  Victory  or  the  guillotine  was  the  alter- 
native before  the  generals  of  the  Republic;  and 
this  drastic  working  of  the  law  of  the  survival 
of  the  fittest,  thinning  out  misfits  who  elsewhere 
would  have  gained  promotion,  made  the  French 
forces  a  pre-Darwinian  proof  of  the  strength  of 
that  salutary  principle.  Nearly  all  armies  have 
good  stuff  in  them ;  but  in  those  of  the  monarch- 
ist league  it  was  kept  under  by  customs  of 
seniority  or  court  favouritism;  and  only  after 
long  years  of  failure  did  it  come  to  the  top. 
Ultimately  the  forces  of  the  Great  Powers  at- 
tained to  nearly  the  same  degree  of  efficiency, 
thanks  to  the  severe  lessons  taught  by  France. 
But  in  all  the  campaigns  up  to  1813  Napoleon 
displayed  his  superiority,  uniting  in  his  own 
person  the  tactical  skill  of  the  Archduke  Charles, 
Wellington's  power  of  sustaining  a  prolonged 
defensive,  and  the  eager  pugnacity  of  Blticher. 

First  among  the  essentials  of  a  great  leader 
are  clearness  of  insight  and  firmness  of  purpose. 
Bonaparte  early  gave  proof  of  these  valuable 


88  Personality  of  Napoleon 

gifts.  At  Toulon  in  September,  1793,  he  saw 
the  importance  of  the  English  battery,  called 
Fort  Mulgrave,  situated  on  the  height  which 
commanded  both  the  inner  and  the  outer  har- 
bours. True,  the  Commissioners  of  the  Conven- 
tion had  already  determined  to  fire  on  the  British 
and  Spanish  fleets  with  red-hot  balls;  and  that 
could  be  done  effectively  only  from  that  point, 
the  importance  of  w^hich  both  Royalists  and  Re- 
publicans alike  saw.  Early  in  the  defence, 
namely  on  21st  September,  the  British  and 
Spaniards  seized  that  commanding  point  and 
began  to  erect  a  battery;  but,  owing  to  lack  of 
skilled  engineers,  it  was  far  too  weak  to  resist 
the  continued  bombardment  and  final  assault. 
Moreover,  the  garrison,  in  large  part  Spaniards, 
offered  no  very  firm  resistance.  Its  capture, 
therefore,  was  a  task  of  little  difficulty;  and  it 
is  clear  that  Bonaparte's  name  remained  un- 
known at  the  French  War  Office.1  The  incident 
revealed  his  insight  into  a  problem  and  his 
persistent  energy,  nothing  more. 

On  a  far  higher  plane  are  his  plans  of  July, 
1795,  for  driving  the  Austrians  from  Italy.  As 
will  soon  appear,  they  traced  out  exactly  the 
course  of  events  in  the  year  1796;  and  hardly 

1  Colin,  UEducation  Militaire  de  Napoleon,  p.  337. 


The  Warrior  89 

less  remarkable  is  the  tenacity  of  his  resolve  to 
carry  out  those  designs.  He  outstays  his  time 
of  furlough  in  order  to  compass  his  aim;  he 
risks  expulsion  from  the  French  army  in  order 
that  he  may  become  its  most  triumphant  leader. 
He  fears  not  to  "  put  his  fortune  to  the  touch," 
and  at  last  Fortune  gives  him  all. 

A  sign  of  a  strong  nature  is  the  resolve  to 
master  every  fact  that  is  essential  to  success. 
Where  a  weak  or  nervous  man  pretends  that  he 
knows,  the  strong  and  able  man  will  make  sure 
that  he  knows.  Soon  after  13  Vendemiaire, 
1795,  when  Bonaparte  was  appointed  to  a  com- 
mand in  the  Army  of  the  Interior,  he  was  ill 
acquainted  with  infantry  and  cavalry,  not  to 
speak  of  the  myriad  details  of  camp  life.  At 
once  he  began  to  ask  the  necessary  questions. 
Thiebault  graphically  describes  the  incident : 

T  can  still  see  his  little  hat,  surmounted  by  a 
chance  plume  badly  fastened  on,  his  tricolour  sash 
very  carelessly  tied,  his  coat  cut  anyhow,  and  a 
sword,  which,  in  truth,  did  not  seem  the  sort  of 
weapon  with  which  to  make  his  fortune.  Flinging 
his  hat  on  a  large  table  in  the  middle  of  the  room, 
he  went  up  to  an  old  general  named  Krieg,  a  man 
with  a  wonderful  knowledge  of  detail  and  the  author 
of  a  very  good  soldier's  manual.  He  made  him  take 
a  seat  beside  him  at  the  table,  and  began  question- 


90  Personality  of  Napoleon 

ing  him,  pen  in  hand,  about  a  host  of  facts 
connected  with  the  service  and  discipline.  Some 
of  his  questions  showed  such  a  complete  ignorance  of 
some  of  the  most  ordinary  things  that  several  of 
my  comrades  smiled.  I  was  myself  struck  by  the 
number  of  his  questions,  their  order,  and  their 
rapidity,  no  less  than  by  the  way  in  which  the 
answers  were  caught  up,  and  often  found  to  resolve 
other  questions,  which  he  deduced  as  consequences 
from  them.  But  what  struck  me  still  more  was 
the  sight  of  a  Commander-in-Chief  perfectly  indif- 
ferent about  showing  his  subordinates  how  com- 
pletely ignorant  he  was  of  various  points  of  the 
business  which  the  junior  of  them  was  supposed  to 
know  perfectly;  and  this  raised  him  a  hundred 
cubits  in  my  eyes.1 

Another  quality  needful  for  the  warrior  is 
perfect  self-confidence,  even  after  a  great  re- 
verse. This  Bonaparte  displayed  in  Egypt  after 
Nelson's  triumph  at  the  Battle  of  the  Nile.  To 
keep  up  the  spirits  of  the  men  he  instituted  races, 
concerts,  and  all  kinds  of  distractions,  besides 
stimulating  the  manufacture  of  gunpowder  and 
the  many  necessaries  with  which  the  army  in 
Egypt  now  had  to  supply  itself.  What  can  be  finer 
than  his  words  written  to  Kleber  on  21st  August, 
1798 :  "  If  the  English  relieve  this  squadron  by 
another,  and  continue  to  overrun  the  Mediterra- 

iThiebault,  Mems.,  i.,  267-8  (Eng.  edit). 


The  Warrior  91 

nean,  they  will  perhaps  compel  us  to  do  greater 
things  than  we  intended  "?  Equally  remarkable 
are  his  letters  to  Bear- Admirals  Villeneuve  and 
Ganteaume,  stating  that  the  British  cannot  keep 
up  the  blockade  of  Alexandria,  because  they  must 
convoy  the  French  prizes  to  some  place  of  safety. 
During  their  absence,  the  Rear-Admirals  must 
rally  all  the  French,  Venetian,  and  Maltese  ves- 
sels in  the  Mediterranean,  thus  forming  a  naval 
force  of  eleven  sail-of-the-line  and  five  frigates 
for  the  assistance  of  the  army  in  its  further 
operations.  In  his  view,  then,  Nelson's  triumph 
was  an  inconvenient,  but  only  temporary  check. 
Contrast  this  shrewd  discernment  of  Nelson's 
difficulties,  this  superb  confidence  in  the  ultimate 
result,  with  the  craven  tone  of  a  letter  of  Tallien 
after  witnessing  the  naval  disaster.  "  Placed  on 
an  eminence  near  the  sea  we  witness  this  terri- 
ble sight.  ...  If  ever  I  have  the  good  luck  to 
land  once  more  on  my  native  soil,  nothing  shall 
induce  me  to  quit  it  again.  Of  the  40,000  French- 
men now  in  Egypt  there  are  not  more  than  four 
who  do  not  share  my  feelings."  Bonaparte, 
however,  was  one  of  the  four;  and  therefore  the 
opinion  of  the  mass  was  of  little  consequence. 

The  personality  of  Napoleon  never  stood  forth 
so  grandly  as  after  a  defeat.     The  most  serious 


92  Personality  of  Napoleon 

blow  in  the  middle  part  of  his  career  was  that 
dealt  him  by  the  Archduke  Charles  at  Aspern- 
Essling,  north-east  of  Vienna  (21st-22d  May, 
1809).  True,  the  Austrians  were  nearly  double 
the  strength  of  the  French,  and  the  breaking  of 
the  bridges  over  the  Danube  in  Napoleon's  rear 
seriously  hampered  his  operations;  but  it  was 
difficult,  even  by  all  the  arts  of  bulletin-making, 
to  represent  that  battle  as  anything  else  than  a 
terrible  reverse.  The  gravity  of  the  situation 
weighed  down  his  spirits,  an  additional  cause  of 
dejection  being  the  death  of  Marshal  Lannes. 
Assembling  his  generals,  he  asked  their  advice. 
Their  opinion  in  the  main  was  for  retreat;  but 
this  seems  to  have  awakened  his  combative  in- 
stinct, and  he  replied,  in  effect,  that  if  they  be- 
gan to  retire  they  would  have  to  shelter  behind 
the  Rhine;  whereas  if  they  remained  and  threat- 
ened the  enemy,  it  would  hold  him  to  that  spot 
and  hinder  a  severe  blow  at  their  communica- 
tions. He  would  therefore  occupy  the  Lobau 
Island  and  Vienna,  so  as  to  resume  the  offensive 
at  the  earliest  possible  time. 

The  ensuing  six  weeks  rank  among  the  most 
glorious  of  his  military  career.  He  called  up 
troops  from  all  quarters,  even  including  North 
Tyrol,  where  Hofer  pressed  the  French  hard;  he 


The  Warrior  93 

spurred  on  to  greater  exertions  Eugene  and  the 
French  Army  of  Italy,  now  invading  Hungary; 
he  defied  the  efforts  of  German  patriotic  bands, 
like  those  of  Schill  and  the  Duke  of  Brunswick- 
Gels  ;  and  he  amused  the  Archduke  Charles  with 
rumours  of  peace,  while  all  the  time  he  prepared 
to  deal  a  heavy  blow  across  the  Danube  at  his 
almost  unguarded  left  flank.  The  excessive  cau- 
tion of  the  Archduke,  the  immobility  of  Prussia, 
the  delay  of  the  British  Government  in  striking 
at  Antwerp,  stand  in  glaring  contrast  to  the 
wonderful  resourcefulness  of  Napoleon,  who, 
while  held  at  bay  in  the  heart  of  a  hostile 
country,  and  threatened  by  a  rising  of  German 
patriots  in  his  rear,  triumphantly  crossed  the 
Danube  and  drove  his  enemy  from  Wagram.  In 
that  battle,  it  is  true,  he  showed  no  exceptional 
skill.  Wagram  was  a  day  of  mere  bludgeon 
work;  but  the  preparations  for  crossing  the 
Danube,  and  the  superb  and  triumphant  defiance 
to  the  threats  of  half  of  the  Continent,  evince 
the  loftiest  and  most  indomitable  spirit.  As  he 
foresaw  after  Aspern,  a  bold  front  would  in- 
timidate the  Archduke  Charles;  and  the  threat 
of  crossing  the  Danube  in  force  might  be  ex- 
pected to  hinder  the  Austrians  from  striking  at 
the  French  communications.  His  forecast  was 


94  Personality  of  Napoleon 

justified.  Genius  paralysed  talent.  The  Em- 
peror retained  the  initiative,  even  while  acting 
on  the  defensive,  and  thus  succeeded  in  keeping 
open  his  communications  with  France.  The 
nervousness  and  comparative  inactivity  of  the 
Archduke  at  this  time  deprive  him,  in  my  judg- 
ment, of  all  claim  to  be  ranked  among  the 
world's  great  commanders. 

In  a  single  lecture  it  is  impossible  to  do  more 
than  illustrate  the  outstanding  features  of  Napo- 
leonic warfare.  They  may  be  summarised  as 
follows : 

In  strategy :  prompt  advance  in  as  great  force 
as  possible  along  the  best  line  of  operations;  or, 
in  other  words,  the  adoption  of  a  strategic  of- 
fensive in  the  swiftest  and  most  effective  manner. 
In  tactics:  concentration  of  masses  against  the 
enemy's  weak  point. 

Strategy,  that  is,  the  conduct  of  war  in  its 
large  outlines,  and  especially  the  choice  of  a  line 
of  operations,  determines  the  whole  course  of 
a  campaign.  It  is  therefore  more  important 
than  tactics,  the  art  of  arranging  and  handling 
troops  on  the  battlefield.1  Many  commanders, 

1  See  Jomini,  Precis  de  I' Art  de  Guerre,  pp.  220-4,  for 
suggestive  remarks  on  this. 


The  Warrior  95 

for  instance,  Ney  and  Blucher,  have  fought 
battles  well  on  the  ordinary  lines,  but  have 
lacked  the  imagination,  the  grip  on  the  prin- 
ciples of  war,  the  topographical  instinct,  needed 
by  the  strategist.  His  brain  must,  as  it  were, 
mirror  the  scene  of  the  campaign  and  the  posi- 
tions of  his  own  and  of  the  enemy's  forces,  so 
far  as  he  knows  the  latter.  As  Napoleon  said: 
"  A  general's  mind  must  in  respect  of  lucidity 
and  clearness  resemble  the  lens  of  a  telescope 
and  never  create  any  mirage."  Further,  the  com- 
mander needs  to  estimate  at  their  true  value  the 
obstacles  in  the  way  of  either  army,  seeking  how 
he  may  avoid  them  and  make  them  a  danger  to 
his  opponents.  The  fertility  or  otherwise  of  the 
country  along  his  line  of  advance,  and  the  temper 
of  the  inhabitants  must  also  engage  his  attention ; 
and  last,  but  not  least,  the  opportunities  for  form- 
ing and  utilising  depots,  or  magazines,  for  the 
supply  of  his  army  will  be  his  constant  care. 
It  follows  that  a  faulty  choice  of  a  line  of  opera- 
tions at  the  outset  vitiates  the  whole  campaign. 
A  piece  or  two  may  be  taken ;  but  the  opposing 
king  will  not  be  checkmated. 

The  most  surprising,  perhaps  even  the  finest, 
example  of  Napoleon's  grasp  of  the  principles  of 
strategy  is  his  first  campaign,  that  of  1796.  The 


96  Personality  of  Napoleon 

conclusion  of  peace  with  Spain  made  it  possible 
to  open  the  campaign  in  North  Italy  with 
the  vigorous  offensive  at  which  he  always  aimed. 
The  discords  between  the  Austrians  and  Sar- 
dinians, their  weariness  of  war,  the  discontent  of 
the  Italians  with  Hapsburg  rule,  the  fertility  of 
the  North  Italian  plain,  the  difficulty  of  main- 
taining a  tame  defensive  on  the  war-swept  Italian 
Riviera,  and  the  impossibility  of  Austria  speed- 
ily succouring  her  forces  in  Italy,  all  these  con- 
siderations entered  into  his  decision.  Holding 
that  Riviera  as  far  east  as  Savona,  he  planned 
an  invasion  of  Piedmont  through  the  pass  north 
of  that  town,  because  there  he  could,  as  it  were, 
strike  off  the  point  of  the  capital  letter  V  which 
represented  the  positions  and  lines  of  communi- 
cation of  the  Allies.  The  Sardinians  held  the 
road  leading  north-west  towards  their  capital, 
Turin:  the  Austrians,  that  leading  north-east 
down  the  valley  of  the  Bormida  towards  Milan 
and  Mantua,  their  sources  of  supply.  In  Sep- 
tember, 1794,  at  the  battle  of  Dego,  experience 
had  shown  that  the  Sardinians  would  not  move 
away  eastwards  across  the  intervening  hump  of 
mountains  to  help  their  allies  beaten  in  the 
valley  of  the  Bormida.  It  was  fairly  certain 
that  in  a  parallel  case  the  Austrians  would  be 


The  Warrior  97 

equally  unchivalrous.  Disunion,  and  therefore 
disaster,  must  be  the  result;  and  Bonaparte, 
mastering  the  problem  in  some  lodging  at  Paris, 
clearly  foresaw  the  surrender  of  Sardinia  and 
the  ruin  of  Austria  in  her  Italian  domains. 
Nothing  is  more  remarkable  in  all  his  career 
than  the  foresight  with  which  he  discerned  the 
advantages  of  the  French  invaders,  the  disad- 
vantages of  the  Austrian  defenders,  so  soon  as 
the  point  of  the  allied  wedge  was  struck  off. 
Quite  correctly  he  saw  that  Austria  could  not 
stem  the  tide  of  invasion  save  under  the  walls 
of  Mantua.  That  stronghold  blockaded,  the 
French  could  hew  their  way  through  to  Tyrol, 
provided  that  their  comrades  in  Swabia  showed 
the  same  masterful  energy. 

This  plan  was  not  a  mere  brilliant  improvisa- 
tion. In  part,  at  least,  it  rested  on  a  study  of 
the  movements  of  the  French  marshal,  de  Maille- 
bois,  on  the  same  theatre  of  war  in  1745;  and 
he  took  with  him  Pezay's  account  of  that  cam- 
paign. But  he  improved  on  his  original.1  For, 
starting  from  the  Riviera,  Maillebois  divided  his 
forces,  invading  the  basin  of  the  Po  in  two 

1 1  cannot  agree  with  Pierron's  article  in  the  Journal 
des  Sciences  Militaires  (November,  1888),  and  agree  with 
the  reply  to  him  in  the  month  of  March,  1889. 


98  Personality  of  Napoleon 

columns  some  seventy  miles  apart,  and,  far  from 
separating  the  Austro-Sardinian  forces,  caused 
them  to  unite.  The  dispersion  of  the  attacking 
columns  over  so  great  an  extent  of  country, 
especially  mountainous  country,  was  a  radical 
defect,  which  no  tactical  successes  could  cure; 
and  Maillebois  effected  little,  even  against  a 
weak  defensive.  On  the  other  hand,  Bonaparte 
acted  on  the  maxim  that  "  an  army  ought  to 
have  but  one  line  of  operation,  which  should  be 
carefully  preserved,  and  abandoned  only  as  the 
result  of  weightier  and  overbearing  considera- 
tions." By  massing  his  forces  in  the  pass  north 
of  Savona  and  promptly  advancing,  he  defeated 
the  Allies  in  detail,  drove  them  back  along 
divergent  lines  of  retreat,  and  speedily  com- 
pelled Sardinia  to  sue  for  peace. 

This  advantage  enabled  him  to  gain  posses- 
sion of  Coni  and  secure  a  shorter  line  of  com- 
munication with  France,  namely,  that  over  the 
Col  di  Tenda,  which  was  free  from  the  harassing 
attacks  of  Nelson's  cruisers.  Thus,  in  sixteen 
days  he  crushed  Sardinia,  rendered  Britain's  sea 
power  almost  useless  in  that  quarter,  and  left 
Austria  no  great  stronghold  but  Mantua  for  the 
defence  of  her  Italian  domains.  It  is  worth 
noting  that  the  attainment  of  these  brilliant  re- 


The  Warrior  99 

suits  depended  on  speed  at  the  outset.  If  Bona- 
parte had  been  a  week  later  in  meeting  the 
Allies,  they  could  have  united  at  the  point  of 
the  V,  that  is,  in  the  pass  above  Savona;  and, 
with  the  advantages  both  of  number  and  posi- 
tion on  their  side,  might  well  have  pushed  him 
back  into  that  narrow  strip  of  coast,  where  Nel- 
son would  have  harassed  his  flank  and  cut  off 
supplies.  Promptitude  brought  victory;  slack- 
ness involved  disaster.  One  of  Napoleon's  Saxon 
admirers,  Colonel  von  Odeleben,  described  his 
military  science  in  these  words :  "  For  the  exe- 
cution of  a  plan  which  he  had  conceived  on  an 
extensive  scale,  and  which  he  had  carefully 
weighed,  he  chose  with  a  firm  and  inflexible  will 
the  means  which  should  conduct  him  in  the 
quickest  and  most  vigorous  manner  to  his 
aim."  x  There  is  no  example  better  than  this 
first  campaign.  At  St.  Helena  he  commented 
on  the  fact  that  Caesar  was  at  his  best  even  in 
his  first  recorded  battle;  and  the  same  may  be 
said  of  Napoleon. 

Of  the  strategic  combinations  of  his  middle 
years  that  which  led  to  the  Austrian  disaster  at 
Ulm  is  the  most  striking.  The  problem  con- 
fronting him  was  as  follows.  In  the  early  days 

1  Von  Odeleben,  Campaign  in  Saxony  (Eng.  edit.),  p.  41. 


ioo          Personality  of  Napoleon 

of  August,  1805,  he  still  contemplated  the  pos- 
sibility of  invading  England  with  the  splendid 
army  concentrated  near  Boulogne;  but,  finding 
his  naval  schemes  miscarry,  he  defined  more 
clearly  an  alternative  plan,  which  must  for  some 
little  time  have  been  in  his  thoughts.1  Austria 
and  Russia,  angered  by  his  annexation  of  Genoa, 
were  entering  the  field  as  allies  of  Great  Britain. 
A  large  Austrian  army,  under  the  Archduke 
Ferdinand  and  General  Mack,  crossed  the  River 
Inn  on  8th  September  and  invaded  Bavaria, 
hoping  to  surprise  the  Bavarians,  now  the 
avowed  friends  of  France.  Failing  in  this, 
Mack  occupied  Ulm  on  the  Upper  Danube,  and 
Memmingen  farther  south,  on  the  River  Iller 
(23d  September).  There  he  awaited  the  arrival 
of  55,000  Russians,  who  were  not  due  to  arrive 
at  the  River  Inn,  some  140  English  miles  farther 
east,  until  20th  October.  In  point  of  fact,  the 
Archduke  Charles,  who  drew  up  the  plan  of 
campaign,  designed  to  strike  the  chief  blows  in 
Italy,  Ferdinand  and  Mack  remaining  on  the 
defensive  in  Swabia  until  the  Russians  came  up. 
Evidently  Charles  counted  on  the  continued 
quiescence  of  the  French  at  Boulogne;  and  up 

1  See  Rose,  Pitt  and  Napoleon:  Essays  and  Letters,  pp. 
142-144. 


The  Warrior  101 

to  nearly  the  end  of  August  his  hopes  seemed 
justified.  But  clearly  the  position  was  one  of 
peril  if  Napoleon  should  resolve  to  strike  a  blow 
at  the  Austrians  on  the  Upper  Danube;  and  no 
campaign  shows  more  clearly  the  danger  of 
framing  a  faulty  plan  of  operations,  and  mistak- 
ing wishes  for  facts.  In  warfare,  as  in  all 
spheres  of  action,  imagination  is  a  useful  ser- 
vant, but  it  must  always  be  held  in  subordination 
to  reason;  and  reason  should  ever  be  at  work 
on  all  the  facts  available. 

In  those  days,  of  course,  the  acquisition  of 
news  was  slow  and  difficult.  Even  the  sema- 
phore telegraph  worked  slowly;  but  Napoleon 
had  the  advantage  of  it  both  at  Boulogne  and 
Paris,  while  the  Austrians  in  hostile  Bavaria 
were  without  good  means  of  getting  news.  Even 
so,  if  Ferdinand  and  Mack  had  scouted  vigor- 
ously in  all  directions  and  kept  their  minds  free 
from  the  dominating  assumption  just  named, 
they  would  have  escaped  disaster. 

Herein  lay  the  difference  between  them  and 
Napoleon.  In  1805,  as  in  all  his  best  cam- 
paigns, the  Emperor  kept  his  mind  open  to  every 
fragment  of  evidence.  He  had  before  him  one 
general  conception,  that  of  beating  the  Austrians 
before  the  Eussians  came  up.  But  the  assertion 


iO2  Personality  of  Napoleon 

that,  even  at  Boulogne,  he  resolved  on  all  the 
stages  of  the  grand  march  from  that  seaport  to 
Ulm,  where  Mack  was  to  be  swallowed  up,  is 
sheer  nonsense.  The  report  was  widely  circu- 
lated by  indiscreet  devotees,  and  deceived  Thiers,1 
but  Napoleon's  Correspondence  shows  that  not 
until  13th  September,  that  is,  fourteen  days  after 
breaking  up  his  camp  at  Boulogne,  did  he  know 
for  certain  whether  the  Austrians  had  crossed 
the  River  Inn.  Only  after  receipt  of  advices 
from  all  his  corps  leaders — and  they  were  urged 
to  send  them  twice  or  thrice  a  day  in  critical 
times — did  he  call  for  maps,  and,  lying  down, 
measure  distances  with  compasses,  insert  pins, 
and  then  deduce  new  calculations.  Thus  his 
plans  developed  only  in  proportion  as  he  knew 
the  circumstances  of  the  case.  At  this  period 
his  masterful  will  worked  within  the  ever-widen- 
ing circle  of  ascertainable  fact. 

1  Thiers  says  that,  turning  from  the  ocean  to  the  Con- 
tinent, "  he  dictated  during  several  hours,  with  extraor- 
dinary coolness  and  precision,  the  plan  .  .-.  of  the  immortal 
campaign  of  1805."  Dupin  (Voyages  dans  la  Grande  Bre- 
tagne,  vol.  i.,  p.  244)  says  that  Napoleon,  while  still  in 
a  violent  rage,  "  unhesitatingly,  without  a  pause,  dictated 
the  whole  of  the  campaign  of  Austerlitz,"  foreseeing  every- 
thing, so  that  the  plan  was  followed  exactly  as  far  as 
Munich;  and  even  beyond  "the  time  alone  underwent 
some  alteration."  Meneval  (Mems,  i.,  408)  distrusted  the 
story. 


The  Warrior  103 

Up  to  16th  or  17th  September  his  chief  aim 
was  to  hurry  on  all  his  corps  into  Swabia  in 
order  to  rescue  the  South  German  forces  from 
the  grip  of  Austria.  On  the  17th  he  ordered  the 
corps  of  Ney  and  Lannes  to  march  by  lengthy 
stages,  arriving  at  Ulm  on  9th  October;  for  he 
did  not  as  yet  know  that  Mack  was  nearing  that 
very  city.  News  to  that  effect  did  not  reach 
him  at  St.  Cloud  until  20th  September;  but  at 
once  he  issued  revised  orders,  which  clearly  had 
in  view  a  great  turning  movement.  Two  or  three 
days  later,  in  a  hasty  note,  he  outlined  the  stages 
by  which  his  six  corps  were  by  17th  October  to 
occupy  Ratisbon,  Dietfurt,  Ingolstadt,  and  Neu- 
burg.  This  was  merely  a  general  sketch,  based 
on  the  assumption  that  Mack  would  retreat ;  but 
when  he  found  him  to  be  lingering  at  Ulm,  he 
proceeded  to  draw  in  his  nets  more  closely  and 
on  the  27th  expressed  to  Bernadotte  the  hope 
that  the  turning  movements  entrusted  to  him 
and  Marmont  would  lead  to  Mack's  destruction. 

This  confidence  was  not  excessive;  for  he  knew 
Mack  to  be  a  vain  and  over-confident  commander, 
who  with  insufficient  forces  had  plunged  deep 
into  hostile  territory  and  was  now  out  of  reach 
of  help  from  the  Russians.  The  river  valleys 
favoured  the  movements  of  the  French  and 


104          Personality  of  Napoleon 

brought  them  easily  to  the  enemy's  rear.  Finally 
the  French  army  numbered  187,000  men,  and, 
when  joined  by  28,000  South  Germans,  was 
nearly  three  times  the  strength  of  the  Austrians. 
Having  this  enormous  superiority  of  force,  he 
could  venture  on  the  final  enveloping  moves, 
sending  round  his  men  in  masses  behind  a  mov- 
ing screen  of  cavalry.  In  no  campaign  have 
horsemen  done  more  efficient  work;  and  it  is 
worth  noting  that  this  was  the  first  of  Napo- 
leon's campaigns  in  which  he  made  the  best  pos- 
sible use  of  cavalry.  An  artilleryman  in  1793, 
he  mastered  infantry  tactics  in  Italy,  and  now 
in  Swabia  showed  the  like  ability  with  cavalry, 
Murat  being  a  brilliant  executant.  Perplexing 
the  enemy  in  front,  flank,  and  rear,  the  French 
horse  left  Mack  in  doubt  where  the  chief  blow 
would  fall;  and  to  them  the  final  triumph  may 
in  large  measure  be  ascribed. 

Up  to  10th  October  it  was  possible  that  Mack 
would  draw  off  southwards  from  Ulm  to  Mem- 
mingen  and  thence  escape  to  Tyrol  by  the  valley 
of  the  Iller.  That  was  by  far  the  safest  course; 
but  Mack  knew  so  little  of  the  French  move- 
ments that  he  attempted  to  break  away  down 
the  Danube  to  the  north-east.  He  gained  a 
small  success,  but  Napoleon  hurried  up  Ney's 


The  Warrior  105 

corps,  which  by  a  daring  and  successful  attack 
on  Elchingen  completed  the  ring  now  closing  in 
on  the  doomed  army.  On  the  same  day  (14th 
October)  Soult  captured  Memmingen;  and  all 
the  French,  except  those  told  off  to  oppose  the 
Russians,  advanced  on  Ulm,  thereby  compelling 
nearly  the  whole  of  Mack's  army  to  surrender 
(17th  to  20th  October).  With  comparatively 
small  losses  Napoleon  engulfed  an  army  of  some 
70,000  men. 

This  astonishing  result  was  due  to  the  incisive 
strategy  of  Napoleon,  the  defective  plan  of  cam- 
paign of  his  enemies,  and  to  Mack's  inability  to 
weigh  evidence.  Only  on  this  occasion  did  the 
Emperor  attempt  the  widely  enveloping  moves  so 
often  attempted  by  the  Austrians  in  1796;  and 
now,  only  because  he  rightly  judged  Mack  to 
be  a  man  on  whom  he  could  safely  perform  this 
otherwise  risky  experiment.  The  disparity  of 
forces,  the  lie  of  the  land,  which  favoured  an 
incursion  from  the  north-west,  the  character  of 
the  Austrian  commander,  and  the  magnitude  of 
the  prize  within  reach,  justified  this  daring 
strategy,  which  ranks  as  the  most  brilliant  and 
triumphant  effort  of  Napoleon's  genius. 

Not  the  least  remarkable  proof  of  his  confi- 
dence in  the  final  result  is  found  in  the  bulletin, 


io6          Personality  of  Napoleon 

issued  at  Noerdlingen  on  7th  October,  ten  days 
before  the  triumphant  finale.  In  it  he  pointed 
out  to  his  troops  that  by  their  grand  turning 
movement  they  had  avoided  the  barrier  of  the 
Black  Forest,  and  all  possible  attacks  from  the 
side  of  Tyrol,  and  were  now  in  the  rear  of 
the  enemy,  who  had  no  time  to  lose  if  he  was  to 
escape  utter  ruin.  If  the  date  of  this  bulletin 
be  correct,  it  supplies  a  curious  proof  of  Napo- 
leon's desire  to  inspire  his  men  to  the  highest 
degree  of  hardihood.  The  troops  had  to  endure 
long  marches,  often  amidst  heavy  rains,  and 
with  entire  uncertainty  as  to  food  at  the  end 
of  the  day.  In  reply  to  Marmont's  complaints 
on  this  last  score  Berthier  made  these  significant 
remarks :  "  In  all  his  letters  General  Marmont 
is  always  referring  to  the  commissariat.  I  re- 
peat that  in  the  war  of  invasion  and  of  rapid 
movement  which  the  Emperor  is  waging  there 
can  be  no  depots;  and  the  commanding  generals 
have  themselves  to  see  to  it  that  they  procure 
the  necessary  supplies  from  the  countries  which 
they  traverse."  Herein  lay  one  cause  of  Napo- 
leon's triumph  at  Ulm.  On  urgent  occasions  he 
neglected  the  salutary  and  almost  essential  rule 
of  providing  depots  of  stores,  and  compelled  his 
men  to  live  from  hand  to  mouth.  Of  course  this 


The  Warrior  107 

involved  a  terrible  strain  on  the  troops,  and  led 
to  marauding  habits  which  ultimately  turned 
the  peoples  of  Europe  against  Napoleon.  But, 
for  the  present,  the  speed  which  he  gained  dur- 
ing the  critical  days  of  October,  1805,  assured 
the  ruin  of  Austria  and  of  the  Third  Coalition. 

As  an  example  of  tactical  successes  due  to  a 
masterly  strategic  conception,  Napoleon's  move- 
ments on  the  Upper  Danube,  near  Ratisbon, 
deserve  careful  study.  He  himself  was  very 
proud  of  this  episode  in  his  career,  referring  to 
the  battle  of  Eckmiihl  (22d  April,  1809)  as  the 
finest  of  his  efforts.  This  is  somewhat  curious; 
for  it  was  an  exceedingly  confused  conflict;  the 
number  of  the  enemy  actually  engaged  did  not 
equal  that  of  the  French;  while  the  material 
results  were  by  no  means  great.  Probably  Napo- 
leon singled  it  out  as  the  most  prominent  in- 
cident in  the  five  days  of  fighting  (19th-23d 
April),  and  intended  to  refer  to  them  as  a  whole. 
Indeed,  they  illustrate  in  a  striking  way  a  prob- 
lem which  he  declared  to  be  one  of  the  most 
difficult  of  the  warrior's  art,  the  passing  from 
the  defensive  to  the  offensive.  Equally  note- 
worthy are  they  as  revealing  the  close  connection 
between  strategy  and  tactics  in  the  conception 


io8          Personality  of  Napoleon 

of  one  who  was  a  master  of  both.  Finally 
they  show  the  supreme  importance  of  securing 
the  initiative  early  in  a  campaign  and  of  keeping 
it,  thereby  compelling  the  enemy  to  fight  where 
and  how  you  will,  not  as  he  wills. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  campaign  of  1809,  the 
Austrians,  as  in  1805,  invaded  the  territory  of 
Napoleon's  ally,  Bavaria,  somewhat  earlier  than 
he  expected.  They  therefore  gained  initial  ad- 
vantages, at  and  near  Batisbon,  which  might 
have  been  far  greater  had  the  Archduke  Charles 
made  use  of  the  shorter  line  of  advance,  that 
from  the  mountains  of  Bohemia.  Owing  to  a 
lack  of  determination  that  blighted  an  otherwise 
brilliant  career,  Charles  finally  advanced  by  the 
longer  route  south  of  the  Danube  and  thus 
failed  to  gain  a  decisive  success  over  the  widely 
scattered  forces  of  the  French.  At  that  time, 
early  in  April,  Berthier,  commanding  in  the 
temporary  absence  of  the  Emperor,  proved  him- 
self unequal  to  the  emergency.  Misunderstand- 
ing the  instructions  from  Paris,  and  confused  by 
the  Austrian  onset,  he  left  the  French  corps  so 
far  isolated  as  to  court  disaster.  It  is,  indeed, 
most  curious  that,  after  being  at  Napoleon's  right 
hand  since  1796,  he  should  not  have  mastered 
the  art  of  concentrating  an  army  at  the  most 


The  Warrior  109 

important  point,  or  along  the  line  most  suited 
for  advance.  Jomini  passes  judgment  that  "  in 
his  twenty  campaigns  he  (Berthier)  had  failed 
to  grasp  the  very  first  principles  of  strategy." 
These  vacillations  and  mistakes  probably  re- 
sulted from  loss  of  nerve.  Berthier's  aide-de- 
camp, Lejeune,  describes  him  as  trembling  and 
bending  under  the  weight  of  responsibility,  and 
during  four  days  and  nights  riding  to  and  fro 
along  the  triangle,  Augsburg,  Ingolstadt,  Donau- 
worth.  He  might  well  tremble.  He  had  ordered 
Davout  with  the  strongest  corps  to  hold  Ratis- 
bon,  though  a  large  part  of  the  French  army  was 
left  scattered  about  Augsburg  nearly  eighty 
miles  away,  and  while  the  Archduke  with  90,000 
men  was  marching  on  Landshut,  $  town  on  the 
Kiver  Isar,  north-east  of  Munich.  Thus,  Ber- 
thier had  left  an  immense  gap  between  Davout 
and  the  French  corps  disseminated  over  and  be- 
yond the  large  triangular  space  named  above. 
Charles,  by  persevering  with  his  western  forward 
movement,  could  easily  thrust  a  wedge  into  the 
gap,  and,  turning  on  the  enemy's  corps,  beat 
them  in  detail. 

Such  was  the  position  on  17th  April  when 
Napoleon,  hurrying  to  the  front,  arrived  at 
Donauworth.  He  at  once  saw  the  urgency  of 


1 10          Personality  of  Napoleon 

the  crisis  and  took  steps  to  call  together  his 
scattered  troops,  ordering  Davout  to  fall  back 
at  once  towards  Ingolstadt,  and  the  other  French 
corps  to  advance  with  the  utmost  possible  speed, 
so  as  to  form  a  united  body  near  that  town  and 
along  the  little  Kiver  Ilm  south  of  it.  Again 
the  quickness  of  the  French  and  the  slowness  of 
the  enemy  soon  altered  the  situation.  In  the 
middle  of  April  the  Archduke  Charles,  could  he 
have  known  it,  had  the  game  in  his  hands;  but 
he  lost  his  opportunity.  Napoleon,  hurrying  up 
Massena  from  the  south-west  with  that  immortal 
message :  Activite,  activite,  vitesse,  je  me  recom- 
mande  a  vous — was  able  to  attack  with  every 
advantage  of  position  on  his  side.  For  mean- 
while the  Archduke  Charles  had  decided  to 
diverge  northwards  from  Landshut  in  order  to 
seize  Eatisbon,  a  move  which  assured  his  con- 
nections with  Bohemia  and  secured  the  support 
of  two  corps  marching  from  that  quarter.  For 
these  reasons  the  plan  had  much  to  commend 
it,  especially  if  he  could  catch  Davout;  but  it 
had  the  disadvantage  of  losing  him  the  initia- 
tive on  his  front  and  of  exposing  his  flank 
to  Napoleon.  On  hearing  this  glad  news,  the 
Emperor  drew  himself  up,  and  with  flashing 
eve  exclaimed :  "  Then  I  have  them.  Their 


The  Warrior  in 

army  is  lost.  We  shall  be  at  Vienna  in  a 
month."  * 

Napoleon  now  promptly  seized  the  initiative 
which  is  of  decisive  importance  in  war.  Mean- 
while the  Austrians,  spread  out  on  an  outer  arc, 
were  executing  that  perilous  movement,  a  flank 
march  in  front  of  an  unbeaten  and  rapidly  con- 
centrating enemy.  If  the  Archduke  had  post- 
poned that  operation  until  he  had  beaten  the 
enemy's  corps  to  the  west,  he  might  have  at- 
tained his  end  with  little  risk.  As  it  was,  he 
lost  all  his  earlier  advantages  of  position,  which 
Napoleon  promptly  secured.  Even  on  20th  April 
the  French  and  their  allies  were  inferior  to  the 
enemy  by  about  110,000  to  140,000;  but  their 
concentration  and  the  dissemination  of  the  Aus- 
trians virtually  decided  the  campaign.  Moving 
on  interior  and  therefore  shorter  lines  (as  in 
1814  in  the  series  of  battles  begun  at  Mont- 
mirail)  the  Emperor  overpowered  the  enemy  in 
detail;  and  only  by  the  speedy  capture  of  Eatis- 
bon  from  its  small  garrison  did  Charles  save 
himself  from  destruction. 

Admiration  of  Napoleon's  skill  need  not  be 
much  lessened  by  a  perception  of  the  mistakes 
of  the  Archduke  Charles;  for  the  greatest  gen- 
1  Segur,  Histoires  et  Memoires,  iii.,  321. 


ii2          Personality  of  Napoleon 

eral  is  he  who  quickly  detects  and  as  quickly 
punishes  his  antagonist  when  committed  to 
faulty  courses.  It  is  also  fair  to  remember  that 
Berthier's  rash  order  to  Davout  to  occupy  Batis- 
bon  was  one  cause  of  the  Archduke's  divergence 
northwards,  and  therefore  of  his  exposing  him- 
self to  the  prompt  punishment  inflicted  by  Napo- 
leon. Possibly  this  was  the  reason  why  the 
Emperor  treated  his  Chief-of-Staff  with  all  pos- 
sible lenience.  Berthier  was  not  only  an  excellent 
foil  to  Napoleon;  but  his  chief  blunder  had 
contributed  to  his  master's  crowning  triumph. 

Defects  have  been  pointed  out  in  Napoleon's 
movements  during  these  critical  days.  The  French 
general,  Bonnal,1  accuses  him  of  letting  slip  at 
the  outset  a  great  opportunity  of  destroying  the 
Austrians  owing  to  obsession  by  the  overmaster- 
ing idea  of  cutting  off  their  communications  with 
Vienna  at  Landshut.  Much  can  be  said  in  sup- 
port of  this  charge.  It  is  also  true  that,  over- 
rating his  successes  in  front  of  Katisbon,  he 
failed  to  order  a  final  advance  of  his  wearied 
troops  which  would  have  driven  the  enemy  into 
the  Danube.  The  Archduke  was  therefore  able 
to  draw  off  his  troops  across  the  river  and  re- 
treat safely  towards  Bohemia.  But,  even  allow- 

1  Bonnal,  La  Manoeuvre  de  Landshut. 


The  Warrior  113 

ing  that  these  five  days  of  fighting  were  not 
perfect,  they  completely  altered  the  situation, 
rescuing  scattered  forces  from  great  danger,  and 
transforming  them  into  a  solid  mass,  which 
drove  aside  a  hitherto  successful  army,  and 
gained  control  over  the  most  practicable  road 
to  Vienna.  The  five  victories  and  the  undis- 
puted march  on  the  enemy's  capital  were  in  the 
last  resort  the  outcome  of  superior  strategy  and 
unflinching  confidence. 

Passing  from  strategy  to  tactics,  we  are  con- 
fronted by  a  bewildering  wealth  of  examples. 
Austerlitz  is  the  most  perfect  of  the  Napoleonic 
battles;  and,  though  it  has  been  so  often  de- 
scribed, I  can  find  no  other  which  outlines  so 
clearly  the  conceptions  of  the  master.  The  posi- 
tion on  the  1st  December,  1805,  the  eve  of  the 
battle,  was  as  follows: — Napoleon,  realising  the 
danger  of  his  position,  800  miles  away  from 
France,  opposed  by  the  hitherto  unbeaten  forces 
of  Russia  and  the  relics  of  those  of  Austria, 
resolved  to  bring  the  campaign  to  a  decisive 
issue  before  Prussia  declared  against  him  and 
cut  his  communications.  He  had  therefore 
assumed  an  unusual  tone  of  moderation,  and 
sent  proposals  for  peace  to  the  Czar  Alexander, 

8 


H4          Personality  of  Napoleon 

which  led  to  no  result  except  to  inspire  that 
impressionable  young  ruler  with  undue  confi- 
dence. The  French,  falling  back  before  the 
allied  advance,  occupied  gently  rising  ground 
behind  the  Goldbach  and  in  front  of  the  town 
of  Brtinn.  Thither  Napoleon  called  up  all 
available  troops,  in  accordance  with  his  maxim: 
"  Before  a  battle  concentrate  all  your  forces ; 
neglect  none;  one  battalion  often  decides  the 
day."  One  small  corps,  that  of  Davout,  may 
be  said  to  have  decided  Austerlitz.  Napoleon 
called  it  up  from  Vienna;  and,  after  covering 
ninety  miles  in  forty-eight  hours,  the  11,000 
heroes  of  Davout  arrived  on  the  eve  of  the 
battle,  prolonging  the  French  line  to  the  right, 
or  south,  at  the  point  where  the  hardest  fight- 
ing was  to  take  place. 

Napoleon,  carefully  surveying  the  field,  dis- 
cerned by  an  intuition  of  genius  the  plan  which 
his  over-confident  enemies  would  almost  cer- 
tainly adopt,  that  of  cutting  him  off  from  his 
immediate  base  of  supplies,  Vienna.  True,  he 
had  another  and  shorter  way  of  communicating 
with  France,  namely,  through  Brtinn,  Klattau, 
and  Katisbon;  but  he  rightly  judged  that  the 
Allies  would  seek  to  turn  his  right  wing  so  as 
to  edge  him  off  into  the  hills  on  the  north  where 


The  Warrior  115 

the  Prussian  advance  would  complete  his  dis- 
comfiture. The  Allies  should  have  been  wary  of 
attempting  this  turning  movement;  for  it  brought 
their  left  wing  before  two  artificial  lakes,  those 
of  Satschan  and  Monitz;  and  three  villages  would 
have  to  be  carried  before  the  hoped-for  result 
was  attained.  AVeyrother,  the  originator  of  this 
perilous  scheme,  underestimated  alike  the  genius 
of  Napoleon,  the  strength  of  the  French,  and  the 
danger  of  the  move.  The  plan  was  drawn  up  be- 
fore the  arrival  of  Davout  nearly  equalised  the 
two  armies.  Napoleon  now  had  some  70,000  men 
as  against  about  80,000  of  the  Allies.  His  plan  of 
battle,  which  consisted  in  a  defensive  on  his  left 
and  right  wings  and  an  offensive  at  the  centre, 
enabled  him  to  mass  his  men.  The  more  he 
"  refused  "  with  his  right  wing,  the  more  he  con- 
centrated on  interior  lines.  The  more  the  Allies 
gained  ground  on  that  side,  the  more  they  ex- 
tended their  array  along  an  outer  arc,  thereby 
weakening  the  centre.  Thus,  in  tactics  Napo- 
leon followed  the  same  general  law  which  guided 
his  strategic  combinations.  He  knew  that  Da- 
vout's  wearied  men  would  fight  a  losing  game 
stubbornly,  while  the  French  centre,  comprising 
the  corps  of  Soult  and  Bernadotte,  stormed  the 
crest  of  the  Pratzenberg,  the  plateau  occupied 


n6          Personality  of  Napoleon 

by  the  allied  centre.  Here,  obviously,  was  the 
key  of  the  Austro-Russian  position ;  but  the  Allies 
were  so  intent  on  working  round  Napoleon's  left 
flank  as  to  despatch  in  all  about  40,000  men 
against  less  than  12,000  under  Davout.  Conse- 
quently, at  the  centre,  the  Eussian  General 
Kutusoff  had  no  more  than  17,000  infantry,  with 
a  large  corps  of  Austrians  under  Liechtenstein 
supporting  him  on  the  north.  The  crest  of  the 
plateau  should  have  been  strongly  defended  by 
artillery  to  beat  off  a  French  attack;  but  the 
Allies  made  little  use  of  their  superiority  in  this 
arm.  Jomini  assigns  to  them  330  cannon;  but 
certainly  far  fewer  came  into  action,  perhaps 
because  of  the  large  number  sent  with  the  dense 
column  attacking  Napoleon's  right.  There  in 
that  marshy  ground  they  were  of  little  use,  and 
were  easily  captured  at  the  end  of  the  day. 

So  soon  as  we  realise  the  faulty  dispositions 
of  the  Allies,  and  the  resolve  of  Napoleon  to 
profit  by  them  to  the  utmost,  the  course  of  events 
can  be  seen  as  by  a  bird's-eye.  Imagination  pic- 
tures the  gaps  in  the  allied  line,  especially  at 
the  centre,  the  wheeling  forward  at  dawn  of  its 
left  wing  from  the  central  hump  of  the  Pratzen- 
berg,  the  stout  resistance  of  Davout  in  and 
about  the  villages  of  Telnitz  and  Sokelnitz; 


I  is 


The  Warrior  117 

while  farther  north  at  the  French  centre,  the 
serried  masses  of  two  whole  corps  move  against 
the  slopes  of  the  Pratzenberg,  breast  them  with 
comparatively  little  opposition,  and  at  the  sum- 
mit find  only  about  half  their  number  of  de- 
fenders. Father  north  on  the  lower  ground, 
Lannes  and  Bagration  fight  throughout  the  day 
an  almost  equal  conflict.  First  on  the  Pratzen- 
berg do  the  French  win  a  decisive  success. 
Despite  the  strenuous  efforts  of  brave  old 
Kutusoff,  Soult  and  Bernadotte  push  back  the 
defenders.  The  counter-attacks  of  the  Eussians 
are  stoutly  repelled.  A  last  desperate  effort  by 
the  Grand  Duke  Constantine  at  the  head  of  the 
Russian  Guards  fails  to  retrieve  matters.  The 
arrival  of  the  French  Imperial  Guards  assures 
a  complete  triumph  on  the  Pratzenberg;  and  a 
headlong  charge  by  Marshal  Bessieres  and  the 
cavalry  of  the  Guard  drives  the  wreck  of  the 
allied  centre  in  utter  rout  back  on  the  village 
of  Austerlitz. 

The  position  of  their  left  wing  is  now  beyond 
all  hope.  The  messages  to  recall  it  come  too 
late;  the  victorious  French  easily  cut  it  off  from 
the  Pratzenberg  and  edge  it  back  towards  the 
lakes  and  the  marshy  ground  between.  Mar- 
bot's  story  of  thousands  of  Eussians  sinking 


n8  Personality  of  Napoleon 

slowly  beneath  the  ice  is  one  of  the  picturesque 
legends  which  lend  vivacity  to  French  memoirs 
of  this  period;  but  the  reality  was  terrible 
enough.  A  few  men  of  that  devoted  left  wing 
were  drowned,  very  many  more  were  cut  off  in 
the  villages  they  had  captured,  but  most  were 
slain  or  captured  by  the  cavalry.  The  losses  of 
the  Allies  amounted  to  30,000  men  and  186  guns, 
the  outcome  of  a  faulty  conception  which  played 
into  the  hands  of  a  genius. 

A  proof  of  the  unfailing  vivacity  of  Napoleon's 
brain  is  the  variety  and  freshness  of  his  dicta 
on  the  art  of  war.  Here  are  some  of  them : 

"  The  first  quality  of  a  soldier  is  fortitude  in 
enduring  fatigue  and  hardship;  bravery  is  the 
second.  Poverty,  hardship,  and  misery  are  the 
school  of  the  good  soldier.  .  .  ." 

"  Soldiers  must  in  all  ways  be  encouraged  to 
remain  with  the  colours :  this  you  will  attain  by 
showing  great  esteem  for  soldiers." 

"  An  army  is  a  people  that  obeys." 

"  Never  attack  a  position  in  front  which  may 
be  taken  by  turning."  * 

1  It  is  needless  to  say  that  Napoleon  often  broke  this 
rule. 


The  Warrior  119 

"  The  junction  of  different  corps  should  never 
be  effected  in  the  vicinity  of  the  foe." 

"  At  the  commencement  of  a  campaign  thought 
should  be  expended  as  to  whether  an  advance 
should  be  made  or  not ;  but  when  once  the  offen- 
sive has  been  assumed  it  should  be  maintained 
to  the  last  extremity."  * 

"  The  strength  of  an  army,  like  the  amount  of 
momentum  in  mechanics,  is  estimated  by  the 
mass  multiplied  by  the  velocity.  A  swift  march 
enhances  the  morale  of  the  army  and  increases 
its  power  for  victory." 

"  Men  must  be  led  by  an  iron  hand  in  a  velvet 
glove." 

"  Courage  is  like  love :  it  feeds  on  hope." 

"  In  war  all  is  mental ;  and  the  mind  and  opin- 
ion make  up  more  than  the  half  of  the  actual." 

"  The  art  of  war  is  an  immense  study  which 
comprises  all  others." 

As  Napoleon  brought  all  the  powers  of  his 
mind  to  bear  upon  the  problems  of  war,  and  was 
admittedly  the  greatest  warrior  of  all  time,  the 
question  naturally  arises — Why  was  he  ever 

1 1809  is  an  example  of  the  right  use  of  this  principle; 
1812  of  its  abuse. 


120          Personality  of  Napoleon 

beaten?  The  question  would  take  long  to  an- 
swer. It  must  suffice  to  say,  firstly,  that  the 
results  of  war  are  less  permanent  now  than  in 
former  ages,  because  in  the  modern  world  na- 
tions are  awake,  highly  organised,  and  not  mere 
raw  material  for  the  exploits  of  heroes ;  secondly, 
this  awakening  and  organisation  went  on  very 
rapidly  in  Napoleon's  time  owing  to  the  weight 
of  his  blows,  the  marauding  habits  of  his  troops 
during  his  triumphant  rushes,  and  the  skill  with 
which  he  organised  France  and  her  vassal  states. 
Thanks  to  Stein,  Scharnhorst,  and  others,  Cen- 
tral Europe  renewed  its  youth  and  turned  his 
weapons  against  him;  armed  nations  confronted 
la  grande  nation;  and  myriads  of  men,  deter- 
mined to  conquer  or  die,  contested  his  supremacy 
from  Cadiz  to  Moscow.  Their  resolve  became 
the  more  fixed  as  the  enthusiasm  of  the  French 
waned.  In  short,  by  the  year  1812  Napoleon 
had  burnt  up  that  enthusiasm.  He  once  said: 
"  I  have  an  income  of  100,000  men."  During 
ten  years  he  lived  up  to  that  income,  and  in 
1812,  1813  he  far  exceeded  it.  After  the  fright- 
ful waste  of  his  wars  up  to  Wagram  and  Torres 
Vedras  he  had  at  his  disposal  raw  recruits,  not 
veterans.  Even  so  he  accomplished  wonders; 
but  keen-sighted  observers  saw  the  end  approach- 


The  Warrior  121 

ing  unless  he  gave  up  the  impossible  task  of 
dominating  Europe,  and  allowed  weary  France 
to  recuperate.  This  wise  passivity  was  alien  to 
his  nature.  Unlike  Frederick  the  Great,  who 
in  his  later  years  safeguarded  his  conquests  by 
a  policy  of  extreme  moderation,  Napoleon  could 
not  or  would  not  rest.  Here  lay  the  fundamental 
cause  of  his  ruin,  that  both  as  statesman  and 
warrior  he  could  not  see  when  it  was  time  to 
stop. 

The  Peninsular  War  might  have  been  closed 
had  he  recalled  Joseph  Bonaparte  and  sent  back 
Ferdinand  VII.  to  Madrid.  But  he  scorned  to 
do  so,  even  in  1813,  when  he  needed  every  man. 
At  the  close  of  that  campaign,  he  confessed  that 
it  was  a  signal  blunder  to  have  sacrificed  many 
thousands  of  Frenchmen  in  order  to  force  Joseph 
on  the  Spaniards,  and  that  now  he  would  just 
as  soon  see  Ferdinand  at  Madrid  as  Joseph;  for 
Spain  was  a  natural  ally  of  France.1  On  this 
question  wisdom  came  to  him  only  after  he  had 
lost  a  quarter  of  a  million  of  men. 

What,  again,  are  we  to  say  of  his  attempting 
to  subdue  Kussia  while  the  Spanish  war  drained 
away  his  resources?  In  June,  1812,  when  he 
held  his  Court  at  Dresden  before  vassal  kings, 

1  Roederer,  Journal,  p.  323. 


122  Personality  of  Napoleon 

the  French  admiral,  Decres,  remarked  to  Pas- 
quier  that  Napoleon  would  never  again  inhabit 
Paris. — "  What !  "  said  Pasquier,  "  will  he  make 
Moscow  or  St.  Petersburg  his  capital?  " — "  He 
will  not  long  have  any  capital,"  came  the  reply ; 
"  he  will  not  return  from  this  war ;  or  if  he  re- 
turns, it  will  be  without  his  army."  *  This  pro- 
phecy is  all  the  more  significant  because  Decres 
fathomed  Napoleon's  plans  for  the  invasion  of 
England  in  1803-5  and  realised  the  fearful  risks 
of  that  enterprise.  Fortunately  for  France, 
Nelson  intervened,  just  as  Sir  Sidney  Smith  at 
Acre  blotted  out  the  oriental  dreams  of  the  year 
1799.  In  1812  nothing  stopped  Napoleon  until 
he  reached  Moscow. 

Self-confidence  is  a  valuable  gift.  In  April, 
1809,  it  helped  Napoleon  signally  to  turn  the 
tables  on  the  Archduke  Charles.  But  after  1809 
self-confidence  degenerated  into  rashness  and  an 
unmeasured  contempt  of  his  enemies.  Perhaps 
this  defect  was  accentuated  by  the  marriage  with 
Marie  Louise,  which  increased  the  tendency  to- 

1  N.  Senior,  Conversations  with  Thiers,  etc.,  i.,  251.  In 
1854  Thiers  said  that  Napoleon's  ruin  was  certain  from 
the  year  1808  (N.  Senior,  Conversations  with  Thiers,  i., 
250).  I  date  it  from  1812,  because  Napoleon  could  have 
closed  the  Spanish  War  before  he  undertook  the  Russian 
Campaign. 


The  Warrior  123 

wards  megalomania.  Certain  it  is  that  in  the 
campaign  of  1812  he  set  at  defiance  the  dictates 
of  prudence.  To  invade  that  vast  territory  with- 
out having  any  sure  base  of  operations  was  highly 
dangerous.  After  occupying  Smolensk  on  17th 
August,  he  considered,  only  to  reject  it,  the 
alternative  course  of  his  advance  guard  winter- 
ing there,  with  friendly  Lithuania  close  at  hand ; 
then  in  the  spring  of  1813  he  could  resume  the 
march  either  on  Moscow  or  St.  Petersburg  as 
occasion  might  offer.  Such  were  his  projects. 
Now,  what  were  the  facts  of  the  situation?  Al- 
ready in  the  advance  to  Smolensk  he  had  lost 
about  120,000  men,  far  more  by  disease  or  ma- 
rauding than  in  regular  battles ;  and  it  was  clear 
that  Barclay  relied  on  Fabian  tactics  to  wear 
down  the  Grand  Army.  Nevertheless,  so  much 
did  Napoleon  rely  on  prestige  that  he  resolved 
to  press  on,  and,  after  a  decisive  victory,  dic- 
tate peace  at  Moscow.  That  is,  he  argued  as 
though  he  were  in  Austria  or  Prussia,  warring 
against  a  highly  organised  State.1 

In  reality  he  was  fighting  an  amorphous  or 
almost  amoebic  organism,  which  had  not  heart 
and  scarcely  any  ganglia.  Russia  lived  in  her 
myriads  of  villages,  which,  with  their  Mirs 

1  Jomini,  p.  357. 


124          Personality  of  Napoleon 

(village  Communes),  existed  much  as  usual  de- 
spite the  military  wedge  which  he  had  driven 
in  as  far  as  Moscow.  During  his  stay  of  five 
weeks  at  the  old  capital  of  Kussia  the  scales  did 
not  fall  from  his  eyes.  With  an  indomitable 
resolve,  which  would  be  sublime  were  it  not 
tinged  with  madness,  he  occupied  the  middle 
days  of  October  with  working  out  a  plan  to 
march  on  St.  Petersburg  and  there  dictate  the 
peace  which  Alexander  refused  to  concede  to 
him  at  Moscow.  This  delay  was  fatal.  The 
statement  that  the  horrors  of  the  retreat  were 
due  to  the  rigours  of  an  exceptionally  early 
winter  is  no  less  superficial  than  false.  No 
sharp  frost  set  in  until  8th  November,  that  is, 
eighteen  days  after  he  began  his  retreat.  If, 
instead  of  drawing  up  impossible  plans  at  Mos- 
cow, he  had  set  out  early  in  October,  he  would 
have  saved  most  of  his  troops.  His  inability  to 
break  through  the  Eussians  who  barred  the 
south-west  road  at  Malojaloslavitz  compelled 
him  to  retreat  by  his  own  devastated  line  of 
advance,  while  the  grip  of  winter  completed  the 
miseries  of  the  marauding  bands  into  which 
the  Grand  Army  had  now  dissolved.  Shall  we 
blame  the  winter  for  all  this?  Nay,  rather  let 
us  blame  the  man,  formerly  endowed  with  keen 


The  Warrior  125 

foresight,  who  now  omitted  to  take  "General 
Winter  "  into  account. 

Both  in  Russia  and  in  Spain  he  was  waging 
war  not  merely  against  armies  but  against  na- 
tions, nay  more,  against  the  forces  of  nature. 
Strange  to  say,  this  once  diligent  student  of  his- 
tory and  geography  ignored  their  teachings  in 
his  later  wars.  No  invader  has  conquered  the 
Russians  in  the  heart  of  their  empire;  neither 
has  any  Land  Power  long  held  down  Spain. 
True,  the  Carthaginians,  the  Romans,  the  Moors, 
having  command  of  the  Mediterranean,  con- 
quered all,  or  nearly  all,  that  peninsula.  The 
Visigoths  and  the  French,  seeking  to  dominate 
it  from  Toulouse,  failed.  This  lesson  was  lost 
upon  Napoleon,  even  though  the  British  fleet  was 
now  at  hand  to  succour  the  Spanish  and  Portu- 
guese patriots  or  threaten  the  French  flanks. 
Surely,  if  Charlemagne  and  the  kings  of  France 
failed  to  conquer  and  keep  Spain,  when  no  great 
navy  helped  her,  even  Napoleon  could  not  hope 
to  achieve  that  task,  when  he  had  against  him 
nearly  all  the  population,  formed  in  several 
armies  and  numerous  guerilla  bands,  assisted 
also  by  Wellington's  army  and  the  British  navy. 
A  glance  at  the  map  of  Spain,  ridged  by  five 
mountain  chains  and  bristling  with  the  rough 


126          Personality  of  Napoleon 

lands  of  the  north,  shows  the  extreme  difficulty 
of  the  enterprise.  In  such  a  land  victories  over 
the  ill-trained  defenders  did  not  imply  conquest. 
In  fact,  as  Marshal  Jourdan  said,  the  more  the 
French  gained  ground,  the  greater  became  their 
losses,  the  more  dangerous  their  position;  and 
when,  as  in  1810-11,  the  French  held  Welling- 
ton and  the  chief  Spanish  armies  at  the  farther 
edge,  the  difficulties  reached  their  climax.  In 
the  year  1812  Napoleon  should  have  bowed  to 
the  inevitable,  and,  at  most,  have  limited  his  aim 
to  the  occupation  of  the  provinces  north  of  the 
Ebro.  His  pride  forbade  this  salutary  step; 
and  his  overgrown  Empire  snapped  asunder 
under  the  double  strain  to  which  he  subjected 
it  both  in  Spain  and  Russia.1 

Despite  the  disasters  of  1812  he  clung  to  his 
Continental  System;  and  that  implied  the  domi- 
nation of  Germany.  Excess  of  confidence  again 
marred  his  prospects  in  the  latter  part  of  the 
campaign  of  1813.  The  Saxon  colonel,  von  Ode- 
leben,  describes  him  as  brushing  aside  every 
piece  of  advice  contrary  to  his  prepossessions 
and  meeting  every  argument  as  to  the  impos- 
sibility of  any  scheme  with  the  ironical  words: 
"  Ah !  on  ne  peut  pas."  In  fact,  he  clung  to  his 

1  See  Jomini,  p.  77,  on  the  danger  of  a  double  war. 


The  Warrior  127 

resolve  until  impossibility  stared  him  in  the 
face.1 

I  judge  this  campaign  to  be  his  worst,  because, 
after  the  accession  of  Austria  to  the  ranks  of 
Ids  enemies,  concentration  along  some  line,  where 
she  could  not  threaten  his  rear,  was  obviously 
necessary.  Or,  if  he  continued  to  hold  the  long 
line  of  the  Elbe  from  Hamburg  to  Dresden,  en- 
trenched camps  were  needed  to  block  the  chief 
roads  by  which  the  Allies  could  advance  from 
the  mountains  of  Bohemia,  and  threaten  his 
communications  with  France.  He  did  not  even 
draw  in  his  troops  from  Silesia  and  other  out- 
lying positions,  and  thus  left  the  Allies,  acting 
behind  that  mountain  screen,  free  to  threaten 
his  rear.  True,  he  beat  them  off  at  Dresden,  his 
last  great  victory,  but  he  lost  the  fruits  of  that 
triumph  in  a  fit  of  lethargy  afterwards,  which 
perhaps  accounts  for  the  vague  orders  for  the 
pursuit  and  the  consequent  loss  of  Vandamme's 
corps  in  the  defile  of  Kulm.  Three  further  de- 
feats of  strong  French  corps  under  his  lieu- 
tenants failed  to  arouse  him  to  the  danger  of 
his  position  along  the  line  of  the  Elbe.  Now 
and  again  he  even  reverted  to  the  plan  of  seizing 
Berlin  and  rescuing  his  garrisons  on  the  Oder, 

1  Von  Odeleben,  Campaign  in  Saxony  (Eng.  edit.),  p.  41. 


128          Personality  of  Napoleon 

unconscious  of  the  net  that  the  Allies  were  be- 
ginning to  draw  round  him.  At  times,  as  after 
hearing  of  Ney's  defeat  at  Dennewitz,  he  thought 
of  withdrawing  all  his  troops  westward  as  far 
as  Erfurt;  but  during  days  and  weeks  of  vacilla- 
tion or  spasmodic  activity  he  neglected  to  do  so, 
and  finally  had  to  abandon  St.  Cyr's  corps  at 
Dresden,  while  with  his  remaining  forces  he  con- 
centrated on  Leipzig.  There  he  was  beaten,  a 
fact  largely  due  to  his  omission  to  call  up  St. 
Cyr  in  time. 

This  is  not  the  Napoleon  of  the  days  of  Eivoli, 
Ulm,  Jena.  His  pugnacity  and  will-power  are 
undiminished;  but  his  foresight  is  at  fault;  and 
worst  of  all  his  brain  fails  to  weigh  evidence 
aright.  He  regards  as  true  only  that  which 
harmonises  with  his  own  conceptions,  so  Mar- 
mont  observes.1  He  lets  the  vision  of  a  trium- 
phant entry  into  Berlin  warp  his  judgment;  he 
vehemently  upbraids  his  lieutenants  for  their  de- 
feats, failing  to  realise  that  their  ranks  are  full 
of  weary  boys,  and  that  Prussia  has  produced 
a  great  strategist,  Gneisenau,  and  a  fighting 
general,  Blticher.  It  was  the  good  fortune  of 
Napoleon  in  his  early  years  never  to  meet  an 
antagonist  worthy  of  his  steel.  Hence  that  in- 

1  Marmont,  Mems.,  v.,  281. 


The  Warrior  129 

grained  feeling  of  contempt  for  his  enemy,  which 
for  a  time  wrought  wonders  in  Italy,  Swabia,  and 
Moravia,  but  led  to  the  disasters  of  the  later  years. 
Limits  of  time  preclude  an  adequate  examina- 
tion of  the  Waterloo  campaign.  It  must  suffice 
to  say  that  the  Emperor's  plan  was  here  both 
bold  and  sound,  namely,  to  mass  his  troops  on 
a  line  which  would  enable  him  to  drive  Blucher 
and  Wellington  far  apart.  In  essentials,  then, 
it  resembles  the  beginning  of  his  first  Italian 
campaign.  Possibly  the  tenacious  mind  clung 
to  the  memory  of  those  bright  days,  and  believed 
that  the  Allies,  once  severed,  would  not  reunite. 
Certain  it  is  that  after  defeating  the  Prussians 
at  Ligny,  he  believed  he  had  disposed  of  them 
for  fully  a  week.  This  explains  his  tardy  plan 
of  pursuit  and  his  refusal,  during  the  early  part 
of  the  fight  at  Waterloo,  to  believe  that  they 
could  be  marching  in  force  against  his  right 
flank.  At  the  outset  he  did  not  know  that  they 
had  been  strengthened  by  the  arrival  of  Billow's 
corps  of  31,000  men  late  on  the  previous  even- 
ing. But  he  should  have  allowed  some  margin 
for  unforeseen  occurrences  favourable  to  the 
enemy,  seeing  that  their  troops  were  known  to 
be  concentrating.  This  allowance  he  failed  to 
make.  He  believed  that  they  had  lost  at  and 


130          Personality  of  Napoleon 

after  Ligny  as  many  as  45,000  men  in  killed, 
wounded,  and  deserters.  Probably  up  to  about 
4  P.M.  he  deemed  the  Prussian  attack  on  his 
right  flank  to  be  only  that  of  Billow's  corps,  as 
was  stated  by  a  Prussian  prisoner. 

Further,  he  fought  the  battle  against  Well- 
ington carelessly,  assured  that  it  was  the  affair 
of  a  dejeuner.  He  always  despised  the  Duke, 
and  he  did  not  observe  that  hidden  source  of 
strength  of  the  British  position,  that  it  con- 
cealed the  second  line  and  reserves.  He  also 
permitted  far  too  many  troops  to  be  expended 
on  Hougomont;  he  allowed  d'Erlon's  corps  to 
charge  in  a  formation  far  too  dense  for  so  early 
a  period  in  the  fight;  and  finally  he  let  his 
cavalry  be  wasted  in  the  glorious  but  ineffective 
charges  of  4-6  P.M.  At  a  later  period  he  blamed 
2sTey  and  others  for  those  charges;  but  it  is  cer- 
tain that  at  that  time  he  believed  his  cavalry 
had  won  the  British  position  and  only  needed 
a  final  charge  by  Kellermann's  cuirassiers  to 
secure  a  decisive  triumph.  He  therefore  (as  he 
stated  at  St.  Helena)  ordered  Kellermann  to 
advance  "  as  if  for  the  pursuit  of  the  English 
army."  1  The  responsibility  for  the  last  onset 

lNap.  Corresp.,  xxxi.,  194.  See  Rose,  Pitt  and  Napo- 
leon: Essays  and  Letters,  pp.  186-96,  for  further  details. 


The  Warrior  131 

of  the   French   horse  therefore  rests   on   him. 

During  part  of  this  phase  of  the  battle  his 
attention  was  distracted  by  the  Prussian  flank 
attack;  but,  after  beating  it  off,  as  he  believed, 
he  devoted  all  his  strength  to  breaking  Welling- 
ton's right  centre,  when,  in  view  of  the  uncer- 
tainties of  the  situation,  he  should  have  fought 
a  defensive  fight,  or  even  drawn  off  altogether. 
This  step,  however,  was  contrary  to  his  instincts, 
which  always  bade  him  push  on  an  attack  to 
the  utmost.  He  therefore  staked  all  on  the  sup- 
position that  Grouchy  would  arrive  and  take 
the  Prussians  in  the  rear.  Grouchy  was  greatly 
to  blame,  as  Mr.  Ropes  has  abundantly  proved; 
but  for  the  Emperor  to  trust  everything  to  the 
discernment  of  a  cavalry  general,  who  had  never 
before  held  an  independent  command,  was  a 
grave  error  of  judgment.  As  is  well  known, 
Napoleon  sent  in  his  last  reserves  of  the  Guard 
against  Wellington's  right  centre.  That  mag- 
nificent effort  met  with  an  equally  staunch 
resistance;  and  a  final  advance  of  the  allied 
line  swept  all  before  it. 

Thus  ended  Napoleon's  military  career.  I 
have  striven  to  point  out  the  personal  causes 
which  led  to  the  disaster.  They  may  perhaps 
be  described  as  hardening  of  the  brain.  That 


132          Personality  of  Napoleon 

once  splendid  organism,  which  acted  as  a  per- 
fect lens,  a  true  balancer  of  alternatives,  and  a 
swift  framer  of  resolves,  now  retained  the  last 
faculty,  even  in  an  exaggerated  form,  but  it  dis- 
torted events  so  as  to  fit  in  with  desires,  and 
registered  fancies  as  facts.  This  deterioration 
has  happened  to  several  great  warriors.  It 
grew  on  Napoleon  rapidly  after  Tilsit,  still  more 
so  after  the  Austrian  campaign  of  1809.  The 
increase  of  his  Empire  in  the  year  1810  is  a 
sign  of  the  megalomania  which  both  enlarged 
his  responsibilities  and  impaired  his  faculty  for 
meeting  them  aright.  Some  persons  have  as- 
cribed his  fall  to  failing  health.  After  examin- 
ing that  question  with  some  care,  especially  for 
the  year  1815,  I  conclude  that  his  bodily  powers 
were  but  slightly  impaired.  That  is  also  the 
conclusion  of  Thiers  and  Houssaye.1  His  ac- 
tivity both  before  and  after  Waterloo  was  that 
of  a  man  in  good  health.  It  was  the  judgment 
that  had  degenerated ;  and  as  he  himself  had  said : 
"  In  war  all  is  mental." 

A  comparison  between  him  and  Wellington  is 
inevitable,  but  cannot  be  instituted  in  detail. 
The  two  men  moved  on  different  planes,  which 
intersected  only  once.  Napoleon  personified  the 

1  Houssaye,  Waterloo,  p.  482. 


The  Warrior  133 

fire,  the  dash,  the  brilliance  of  the  south.  Well- 
ington, an  Irishman  only  in  the  place  of  his 
birth,  certainly  not  in  character,  embodied  the 
hardness,  caution,  sound  sense,  and  stubbornness 
characteristic  of  the  Anglo-Saxon.  By  tempera- 
ment and  of  necessity  he  waged  a  defensive  war- 
fare. The  puny  land  forces  of  England  having 
to  be  husbanded  at  every  turn,  his  first  thought 
was  to  save  his  army  from  destruction.  That 
was  the  last  thought  of  Napoleon,  who  in  his 
later  years  recked  little  of  losing  100,000  men 
if  he  could  inflict  a  loss  of  120,000  on  his  enemy. 
Inspiring  boundless  enthusiasm  in  his  men,  he 
expected  them  to  perform  prodigies  of  endur- 
ance; and  when  they  fell,  another  host  arose 
at  the  stamp  of  his  foot  to  repeat  the  miracle, 
until  generous  France  was  bled  white  by  her 
adopted  son.  Wellington,  austere  and  uninspir- 
ing, got  far  less  out  of  his  troops  before  and 
after  battles.  On  the  field  they  fought  with  na- 
tive hardihood ;  but  on  no  occasion  did  the  Duke 
Tin  a  campaign  by  continuous  forced  marches 
like  those  of  the  French  before  Ulm;  and  never 
did  he  spur  on  his  army  to  the  extraordinary 
feats  which  in  a  fortnight  after  Jena  laid  Prus- 
sia at  the  invaders'  feet.  Napier  finely  compares 
Wellington's  battle  to  the  shock  of  a  battering- 


134          Personality  of  Napoleon 

ram,  Napoleon's  to  the  swell  and  dash  of  a 
mighty  wave  which  carries  all  before  it  and  then 
floods  the  land  beyond.1 

In  the  nature  of  the  case  Wellington  could 
rarely  plan  the  vast  combinations  which  decided 
the  fate  of  Europe  by  a  few  trenchant  strokes 
at  the  climax.  In  the  year  1813,  the  one  cam- 
paign when  he  had  a  superiority  of  force,  his 
moves  were  as  daring  and  successful  as  those 
of  most  of  Napoleon's  wars;  and  it  is  therefore 
incorrect  to  assert  that  he  always  played  a  safe 
game  and  shone  only  in  defence.  He  was  a 
master  of  defensive  warfare,  perhaps  the  great- 
est the  world  has  ever  seen ;  but  the  series  of  rapid 
outflanking  moves,  which  carried  him  from  Valla- 
dolid  to  Vittoria,  may  challenge  comparison 
with,  say,  the  Marengo  campaign,  while  Vittoria 
itself  was  better  fought  than  Marengo.  The 
Briton  of  course  had  not  the  strategic  imagina- 
tion which  planned  the  Egyptian  and  Russian 
expeditions;  and  his  innate  prudence  no  less 
than  his  lack  of  men  forbade  his  displaying 
the  superhuman  audacity  which  wrested  victory 
from  the  jaws  of  defeat  after  Aspern.  But  in 
the  sphere  of  tactics  he  showed  at  Salamanca 
signal  powrer  in  detecting  the  false  move  of 
1  Napier,  Peninsular  War,  bk.  xxiv.,  ch.  ii. 


The  Warrior  135 

Marshal  Marmont  and  meting  out  prompt  pun- 
ishment. Salamanca  will  bear  comparison  with 
the  highest  example  of  Napoleon's  tactical  skill. 
Napier,  who  admired  both  leaders,  thus  summed 
up  their  chief  characteristics : 

Wellington  possessed  in  a  high  degree  that  daring 
promptness  of  action,  that  faculty  of  inspiration  for 
suddenly  deciding  the  fate  of  whole  campaigns  with 
which  Napoleon  was  endowed  beyond  all  mankind. 
It  is  this  which  especially  constitutes  military 
genius.  For  so  vast,  so  complicated  are  the  com- 
binations of  war,  so  easily  and  by  such  slight  causes 
are  they  affected,  that  the  best  generals  do  but 
grope  in  the  dark,  and  they  acknowledge  the  hu- 
miliating truth.  By  the  number  and  extent  then 
of  their  fine  dispositions,  and  not  by  their  errors, 
the  merit  of  commanders  is  to  be  measured.1 

Napier,  then,  puts  Wellington  not  far  below 
Napoleon.  The  passage  is  ever  memorable  be- 
cause it  disposes,  or  ought  to  dispose,  of  the 
superficial  statement  that  the  greatest  general 
is  he  who  makes  the  fewest  mistakes.  Like  all 
merely  negative  descriptions,  this  does  not  carry 
us  far.  As  well  might  one  say  that  the  finest 
batsman  is  he  who  merely  tires  out  the  bowl- 
ing, never  accepting  a  risk  or  giving  a  chance. 
The  French  sneered  at  Wellington  for  adopting 

1  Napier,  Peninsular  War,  bk.  xxiv.,  ch.  ii. 


136          Personality  of  Napoleon 

safe  tactics.  Salamanca,  Vittoria,  and  Water- 
loo were  his  retort.  Because  they  despised  him, 
he  beat  the  French  marshals  in  turn,  and  finally 
Napoleon.  In  one  respect  he  was  greater  than 
Napoleon.  In  wise  adaptation  of  means  to  ends, 
he  has  had  no  equal.  To  take  two  instances. 
While  Napoleon,  by  clinging  on  to  Moscow  threw 
away  his  best  army,  Wellington  cautiously  re- 
treated from  Madrid  in  face  of  an  overwhelm- 
ing concentration  of  the  French,  and  so  saved 
his  army  for  the  Vittoria  campaign.  Again,  at 
Waterloo  the  Duke  held  back  the  cavalry  bri- 
gades of  Vandeleur  and  Vivian,  and  at  the  crisis 
launched  them  forward  in  a  way  which  Napo- 
leon considered  decisive  of  the  fate  of  the  day.1 
Too  late  Napoleon  must  have  repented  of  his 
rash  assertion  that  Wellington  had  no  mind. 
The  Duke's  judgment,  if  not  always  brilliant, 
was  thoroughly  sound;  and  it  kept  under  stern 
control  the  other  faculties  which,  uncontrolled, 
make  for  ruin. 

Thus,  even  on  that  side  of  Napoleon's  being 
which  soared  beyond  the  comprehension  of  aver- 
age men,  Nature  found  means  to  redress  the 
balance;  for  the  exercise  of  terrifying  and  al- 
most superhuman  powers  binds  mankind  to- 

1  Nap.  Corresp.,  xxviii.,  298;  xxxi.,  198. 


The  Warrior  137 

gether  for  self-preservation;  and  leaders  will 
arise,  able,  if  not  to  vie  with  the  war-lord  at 
all  points,  yet  to  deal  out  swift  vengeance  when 
he  overreaches  himself.  If  the  Emperor  had 
retained  the  power  of  self-analysis  so  strong  in 
his  youth,  he  would  have  perceived  that  con- 
stant success  warps  the  judgment  and  impairs 
the  faculty  of  weighing  evidence  which  is  emi- 
nently needful  for  the  maintenance  of  colossal 
power.  His  overthrow  may  therefore  be  as- 
cribed finally  to  the  Nemesis,  which,  working 
through  character,  dogs  the  steps  of  unending 
triumph. 


IV 

THE  LAWGIVER 

"  S'il  y  avait  un  art  dans  lequel  Napoleon  excellat, 
c'etait  celui  de  combiner  la  mesure  de  satisfaction  qu'il 
fallait  accorder  a  chacun  et  de  balancer  tous  les  interets." 
— PASQUIER,  Memoires,  i.,  150. 

"C QUALITY  on  the  march":  Such  was  a 
Jr*  description  of  the  French  Revolutionary 
armies.  It  was  therefore  natural  that  their 
greatest  general  should  be  the  ablest  guide  of 
the  nation,  when  the  desire  for  peace  and  order 
supervened.  For  indeed  the  gifts  of  command 
and  organisation  are  not  unlike  in  the  two 
spheres.  A  successful  commander  must  possess 
the  faculties  of  foresight  as  to  the  probable 
course  of  events,  of  insight  into  character,  and 
of  sound  sense  in  the  adjustment  of  conflicting 
interests.  Napoleon,  as  we  have  seen,  declared 
that  the  art  of  war  was  an  immense  study  which 
included  all  others.1  Certainly  warriors  have 

1  Roederer,  Journal,  p.  324. 
138 


The  Lawgiver  139 

often  shone  as  lawgivers  and  administrators, 
— witness  the  careers  of  Pericles,  Csesar,  Charle- 
magne, Alfred  the  Great,  William  the  Con- 
queror, Edward  I.,  Cromwell,  Peter  the  Great, 
Frederick  the  Great,  and  Washington. 

Napoleon  also  owed  much  of  his  success  in 
legislation  to  the  arduous  self -culture  of  his  early 
years.  His  copious  notes  on  books  which  de- 
scribed the  history  and  government  of  the  chief 
nations  of  ancient  and  modern  times  reveal  his 
intense  interest  in  their  experiments.  Thus  he 
remarks  that  the  Persians,  in  passing  sentence 
on  the  guilty,  took  into  account  their  former 
conduct,  and  did  not  allow  that  one  crime  should 
overshadow  the  good  conduct  of  a  whole  life. 
In  studying  the  history  of  Sparta,  he  paid  special 
attention  to  the  half-legendary  legislation  of 
Lycurgus,  designed  to  curb  the  royal  power,  and 
to  invigorate  and  moderate  the  energy  of  the 
citizens,  thereby  preserving  them  both  from  des- 
potism and  from  anarchy.  Lycurgus  (he  writes) 
saw  the  need  of  inspiring  the  people  with  pa- 
triotism, and  yet  of  keeping  it  within  due 
bounds;  also  of  safeguarding  democracy  by  its 
necessary  support,  equality;  he  therefore  re- 
solved to  apportion  the  land  equally,  and  for- 
bade the  use  of  gold  and  silver  money.  Public 


140          Personality  of  Napoleon 

meals  also  met  with  Bonaparte's  approval. 
Further,  as  we  saw  in  Lecture  II,  the  young 
Jacobin  held  strongly  to  Rousseau's  dogma  of 
the  unity  of  the  State,  condemning  everything 
which  impaired  political  and  social  unity.  The 
first  article  of  his  creed  was  the  dominance  of 
the  central  authority  representing  the  nation. 

These  fundamental  notions  of  his  Jacobinical 
period  were  soon  to  be  warped  by  the  disillusion- 
ments  of  his  early  life  and  the  stern  realities  of 
warfare.  But  they  remained  at  the  back  of  his 
mind,  suffusing  his  thoughts,  suggesting  paral- 
lels, and  adding  vivacity  to  his  discourses  in  the 
Council  of  State.  For  him,  the  chief  task  of 
government  ever  was  to  unify,  to  break  down 
provincial  barriers,  to  abolish  exceptional  laws 
of  classes  or  of  districts,  to  govern  for  the  peo- 
ple, while  allowing  them  little  more  than  the 
form  of  self-government,  to  mark  out  a  wide 
sphere  for  the  unfettered  exercise  of  the  central 
power,  endowing  it  with  the  intelligence  and 
energy  due  to  a  careful  study  of  the  past,  a 
keen  perception  of  the  needs  of  the  present,  and 
rational  hopes  for  the  future. 

Fortunately  for  him  he  arrived  at  the  centre 
of  the  world's  activities  when  revolutionary  zeal 
had  swept  away  most  of  the  old  barriers  through- 


The  Lawgiver  141 

out  France  and  her  vassal  States.  The  Jacobin- 
ical theory  of  government  here  coincided  with 
the  monarchical  instincts  always  so  powerful  in 
France.  Therefore  the  old  and  the  new  elements 
in  her  life  favoured  the  rise  of  an  intelligent 
despotism;  and  he,  the  representative  alike  of 
autocracy  and  republicanism,  standing  at  the 
point  where  these  formerly  clashing  forces  now 
at  last  converged,  pressed  on  and  was  borne 
along  to  an  unparalleled  destiny.  After  a  de- 
cade of  upheaval,  order  was  earth's  first  law. 
He  became  the  lawgiver,  the  executant  of  order, 
and  proceeded  to  simplify  both  the  legislative 
and  executive  functions  of  the  State  by  identify- 
ing both  with  his  will.  The  French  monarchy 
and  the  French  Revolution1  were  alike  merged 
in  Napoleon. 

His  administrative  genius  took  France  by 
storm  in  the  year  1800.  But  those  who  had 
marked  his  organisation  of  Italy,  Malta,  and 
Egypt  noticed  the  emergence  of  exceptional 
powers.  His  political  apprenticeship  began  in 
North  Italy  in  the  year  1796.  First  of  all  he 
gripped  with  a  firm  hand  the  reins  of  adminis- 
tration in  the  districts  conquered  or  liberated 
by  the  French  arms.  He  forced  the  hands  of 
the  Directors  at  Paris  by  strengthening  the  de- 


142          Personality  of  Napoleon 

sire  of  the  Lombards  and  Modenese  for  inde- 
pendence. As  far  as  possible  be  stopped  tbe 
peculations  of  tbe  French  army  agents  and 
others,  who  both  plundered  the  people  and 
robbed  the  army.  He  instituted  a  commission 
for  the  trial  of  such  crimes,  and  declared  that, 
if  he  could  spare  a  month  to  investigate  the 
charges,  he  would  have  all  the  guilty  shot.1 

Then,  too,  note  how  firmly  he,  a  youth  of 
twenty-seven,  treated  the  Italians.  After  the 
last  decisive  victories  over  Austria  he  announced 
to  the  French  Directory  that,  in  order  to  found 
rational  liberty  in  the  new  Italian  republics,  he 
would  strive  to  lessen  the  influence  of  the  priests, 
who  at  present  were  dictating  the  elections  of 
deputies.  He  therefore  took  upon  himself  to 
suspend  the  activity  of  the  young  government 
at  Milan.  On  8th  May,  1797,  he  wrote  to  the 
Directory  at  Paris :  "  In  four  distinct  com- 
mittees I  am  having  drawn  up  here  all  the  mili- 
tary, civil,  financial,  and  administrative  laws, 
which  must  accompany  the  constitution.  For 
the  first  occasion  I  will  make  all  the  selections, 
and  I  hope  that  in  three  weeks'  time  the  new 
Italian  Republic  will  be  throughout  wholly  and 
perfectly  organised,  and  will  be  able  to  walk 
.  Corresp.,  L,  573;  ii.,  50,  56,  219,  303. 


The  Lawgiver  143 

alone."  Here,  then,  for  the  first  time  were  seen 
the  astounding  energy  and  resourcefulness  of  the 
young  general.  He  also  perceived  that  the  Ital- 
ian Jacobins,  bitterly  hostile  to  religion  and  the 
established  social  order,  needed  a  still  firmer 
hand  than  the  priests.  In  that  same  letter  he 
used  these  words :  "  I  am  chilling  the  hot-heads 
and  heating  the  cold/7  an  excellent  motto  for  the 
reasonable  man,  who  at  all  times  tries  to  keep 
the  political  temperature  between  sixty  and 
seventy  degrees.  In  short,  his  policy  was  one 
of  conciliation.  Hear  his  words  of  advice  to  the 
men  of  the  Cisalpine  Republic  at  Milan  respect- 
ing the  new  constitution : 

To  be  worthy  of  your  destiny,  pass  only  laws  that 
are  wise  and  moderate.  Carry  them  out  with  force 
and  energy.  Encourage  the  spread  of  intelligence 
and  respect  religion.  Form  your  battalions,  not  of 
men  of  straw,  but  of  citizens  attached  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  Republic  and  closely  concerned  in  its 
prosperity.  ...  I  have  made  very  many  State  ap- 
pointments, thereby  running  the  risk  of  overlooking 
the  honest  man  and  preferring  the  intriguer;  but 
there  was  greater  inconvenience  in  letting  you 
make  these  first  nominations.  You  were  not  yet 
sufficiently  organised. 

His  energies  found  a  novel  sphere  in  Egypt. 
Ever  anxious  to  make  the  most  of  every  oppor- 
tunity, he  took  with  him  a  company  of  savants, 


144          Personality  of  Napoleon 

who  were  to  explore  the  buried  treasures  and 
develop  the  stagnant  powers  of  that  land.  Un- 
daunted, nay,  rather  nerved  to  greater  efforts 
by  the  disaster  to  the  French  fleet  at  Aboukir, 
he  planned  the  Institute  of  Egypt,  organised  in 
four  sections — Mathematics,  Physics,  Political 
Economy,  and  the  Arts.  At  the  first  session  he 
suggested  these  questions  for  consideration. 
Could  the  baking-ovens  of  the  army  be  im- 
proved? Was  there  any  substitute  for  hops  in 
the  brewing  of  beer?  How  could  the  waters  of 
the  Nile  be  purified  for  drinking  purposes?  Was 
a  wind-mill  or  a  water-mill  the  more  serviceable? 
Could  gunpowder  be  produced  in  Egypt?  What 
was  the  state  of  law  and  of  education  in  Egypt ; 
and  how  could  they  be  improved  comformably 
to  the  notions  of  the  natives?  I  doubt  whether 
a  learned  society  has  ever  received  a  more  im- 
perious impulse  towards  the  practical. 

As  for  the  civil  administration  of  Egypt, 
Bonaparte  summoned  an  Assembly  of  Notables, 
who  were  to  be  selected  by  the  French  generals 
commanding  in  the  fourteen  provinces.  Obvi- 
ously it  served  merely  as  a  screen,  thinly  hiding 
the  reality  of  military  rule.1  When  the  embodi- 

1  See,  however,  the  instructions  of  3d  September,  1798, 
to  Murat. 


The  Lawgiver  145 

ment  of  Western  energy  meets  the  stern  passivity 
of  the  East,  friction  must  ensue.  Take  the  fol- 
lowing instance  as  typical  of  much.  Bonaparte 
issued  an  order  that  every  Egyptian  must  wear 
a  tricolour  cockade  and  every  Nile  boat  must 
hoist  a  tricolour  flag  (4th  September,  1798).  It 
was  by  fussy  interferences  like  this  that  the 
French  irritated  the  Moslems  and  contributed 
to  bring  about  the  revolt  of  21st  October  at 
Cairo. 

During  the  French  occupation  of  Egypt  com- 
merce suffered  both  from  the  war  and  the  mul- 
titude of  new  regulations  which  confused  and 
vexed  the  natives.1  The  letters  of  Kleber,  Bona- 
parte's successor  in  Egypt,  dwelt  persistently  on 
the  magnitude  of  the  deficit.  The  treasury  was 
absolutely  empty.  The  pay  of  the  army  was 
4,000,000  francs  in  arrear,  and  there  were 
6,000,000  francs  more  of  debt.  It  is  clear,  then, 
that  Bonaparte  soon  exhausted  the  land  by  his 
exactions,  so  that  it  could  not  meet  the  needs 
of  the  army  and  of  an  active  administration  of 
the  Western  type.  Kleber  also  declared  that  the 
manufactures  of  cannon,  muskets,  and  gun- 
powder were  failures,  and  the  troops  were  in 
rags.  The  picture  may  be  too  sombre;  for 

1  Rose,  Napoleonic  Studies,  pp.  119-131. 


146          Personality  of  Napoleon 

Kleber  bitterly  resented  the  sudden  departure 
of  Bonaparte,  which  left  him  to  face  the  prob- 
lems of  bankruptcy  long  since  imminent 1 ;  but 
there  can  be  little  doubt  that  in  Egypt,  as  in 
Malta,  Bonaparte  overshot  the  mark.  He  for- 
got that  Orientals  care  very  much  about  creeds 
and  customs,  and  not  at  all  about  science  and 
prosperity.  In  the  immobile  East  caution  and 
self-restraint  are  the  first  of  political  virtues. 
Now,  great  as  were  Napoleon's  gifts  as  law- 
giver, he  lacked  those  sovereign  qualities.  His 
nature  was  too  fiery,  his  self-confidence  too 
deep-rooted,  his  energies  too  many-sided,  to  keep 
within  the  bounds  of  prudence  needed  in  the 
Orient;  and  thus,  while  at  Paris  he  was  ac- 
claimed as  Conqueror  of  the  East,  in  reality 
he  left  behind  him  a  half-naked  army  and  an 
exhausted  land. 

Probably  the  administrative  collapse  in  Egypt 
helped  to  tone  down  his  youthful  eagerness. 
Certainly  he  showed  far  greater  wisdom  in 
dealing  with  France;  and  it  is  clear  that  his 
many-sided  activities  were  much  better  suited 
to  the  settlement  of  a  wealthy  land  long  in  a 
state  of  turmoil  than  to  the  regulation  of  needy 
Orientals  who  only  wanted  to  be  left  alone. 

i Kleber  et  Menou  (ed.  by  F.  Rousseau),  pp.  26,  76-84. 


The  Lawgiver  147 

Energy  is  as  useful  in  the  former  case  as  it  is 
harmful  in  the  latter.  True,  France  had  suf- 
fered from  an  excess  of  energy,  but  it  was  the 
energy  of  hostile  factions,  which  in  their  brief 
spell  of  power  forced  on  her  decrees,  often  at 
the  rate  of  a  thousand  a  year,  soon  to  be  altered 
by  the  next  group  of  successful  intriguers. 
After  these  St.  Vitus'  dance  antics  France  needed 
a  political  paregoric.  With  admirable  judgment 
Bonaparte  supplied  it. 

The  evils  of  France  before  the  coup  d'etat  of 
Brumaire,  1799,  have,  perhaps,  been  overrated. 
Both  in  the  civil  and  military  spheres  the  worst 
was  past.1  The  Allies  had  been  beaten  back 
from  the  frontiers,  and  at  home  the  extreme 
Jacobins  had  been  crushed.  Affairs  were  be- 
ginning to  right  themselves  under  the  lead  of 
Sieyes;  but  the  influence  of  that  bloodless  crea- 
ture withered  before  that  of  Napoleon.  With 
no  less  wit  than  truth  the  First  Consul  justified 
his  changes  in  Sieyes's  projected  constitution : 
"What  was  I  to  do?  Sieyes  put  shadows  on 
every  side.  It  required  a  substance  somewhere, 
and  I  put  it  there."  That  was  true ;  he  put  him- 
self at  the  central  point  of  that  complicated 
mechanism,  controlling  the  checks  and  balances, 

1  Aulard,  Hist.  Politique  de  la  Rev.  Prang.,  pp.  686-9,  695. 


148          Personality  of  Napoleon 

so  that  what  would  have  been  a  mere  weighing- 
machine  became  a  locomotive.  The  curious 
thing  is  that  Sieves  looked  on  impassively  at 
this  transformation  of  democracy  into  auto- 
cracy. In  fact,  he  said  to  Roederer :  "  After 
long  reflection  I  am  convinced  that  for  the  set- 
tlement of  affairs  one  man  alone  is  needed,  and 
that  man  can  be  none  other  than  Bonaparte."  1 
Or,  as  he  remarked  on  another  occasion,  Bona- 
parte was  the  only  general  who  had  the  faculties 
of  a  civilian.  In  truth,  the  other  generals  were 
either  rough  and  ignorant  soldiers,  or  had  no 
desire  to  meddle  in  civil  affairs.  The  only  ex- 
ceptions were  Bernadotte,  who  was  unpopular, 
and  Moreau,  who,  however  active  and  resource- 
ful in  the  field,  was  in  politics  a  mere  school- 
boy, his  opposition  to  Bonaparte  on  one  occa- 
sion leading  him  to  confer  the  ribbon  of  the 
Legion  of  Honour  on  his  dog. 

The  dearth  of  great  men  told  powerfully  in 
favour  of  Napoleon.  Democracy  can  succeed 
only  where  the  great  mass  of  the  people  is  per- 
petually energised  by  self-confidence,  self-respect, 
and  hope.  The  people  that  falters  is  lost.  ISFow, 
since  the  Eeign  of  Terror,  France  had  often 
faltered  and  wavered.  During  five  years  she 

1  Roederer,  Journal,  p.  14. 


The  Lawgiver  149 

found  no  competent  guide,  only  ingenious  talkers. 
It  is  the  bane  of  democracy  that  persuasive 
speakers  come  to  the  front  too  easily,  leaving 
far  behind  the  sage  administrator,  the  able  man 
of  action.  That  has  been  so  from  the  age  of 
Cleon  onwards.  True,  the  risks  of  this  peculiar 
system  are  lessened  by  the  presence  of  perma- 
nent officials,  the  secret  prompters  of  the  political 
stage.  Nevertheless,  the  fortunes  of  great  peo- 
ples have  been  determined  very  largely  by  men 
whose  first  recommendation  has  been  eloquence; 
and  only  after  sad  experience  has  the  balance 
turned  in  favour  of  the  man  of  action.  Nowhere 
have  the  oscillations  been  so  sharp  as  in  France ; 
for  in  the  year  1789  orators  abounded ;  and  it  took 
some  time  to  work  through  the  rhetorical  stratum 
down  to  the  bed  rock.  Dumont,  the  friend  of 
Mirabeau,  ironically  remarked  that,  whereas  in 
London  nobody  wished  to  manage  the  State,  in 
Paris  everybody  believed  himself  equal  to  the 
task.1 

This  in  part  explains  the  course  of  the  French 
Kevolution  and  the  rise  of  Napoleon.  By  the 
year  1799  the  time  for  the  man  of  action  had 
come.  His  supremacy  was  assured  if  he  com- 
bined the  functions  of  commander-in-chief  and 

1  Dumont,  Souvenirs  sur  Mirabeau,  ch.  x. 


150          Personality  of  Napoleon 

permanent  official.  Napoleon  embodied  them 
perfectly.  In  him  the  old  Roman  gift  of  organ- 
isation on  a  great  scale  was  vivified  by  an  ex- 
alted patriotism,  by  a  historic  sense  which 
weighed  the  aspirations  of  new  France  against 
the  experience  of  old  France,  by  a  resolve  to 
have  done  with  the  revolutionary  jargon  and 
to  see  things  as  they  were.  Too  long  had  the 
National  Assemblies  legislated  for  man  in  the  ab- 
stract. That  legal  figment  was  no  more  like  a 
real  man  than  extract  of  beef  is  like  the  living 
ox.  Napoleon  was  determined  to  legislate,  not 
for  an  abstraction,  but  for  Parisians,  Normans, 
Provengaux.  So  far  back  as  September,  1797, 
he  thus  expressed  his  contempt  for  the  legis- 
lators of  France:  ."This  Legislature,  without 
eyes  or  ears  for  what  surrounds  it,  must  no 
longer  overwhelm  us  with  a  thousand  decrees 
passed  on  the  spur  of  the  moment,  negativing 
one  absurdity  by  another,  and  leaving  us,  amidst 
three  hundred  folios  of  laws,  a  lawless  nation/' 
Napoleon  was  determined  to  decimate  the  laws, 
but  to  have  the  surviving  part  obeyed.  The 
first  essentials  of  legislation  are  to  simplify  and 
to  enforce. 

His  first  important  effort  was  in  the  sphere 
of  local  government   (February,  1800).     Here, 


The  Lawgiver  151 

as  at  so  many  points,  the  Revolutionists  had 
gone  to  ridiculous  excess.  They  had  made  too 
many  local  divisions,  each  with  an  elective  coun- 
cil. Consequently  the  voters  soon  tired  of  going 
to  the  poll,  still  more  of  filling  the  many  posts 
set  up  by  the  Departmental  System.  Judge  of 
its  demands  on  civic  intelligence  and  patriotism 
from  the  fact  that  one  Frenchman  in  thirty  was 
a  local  official  of  some  kind.  The  results  were 
such  as  always  happen  when  legislation  outruns 
the  intelligence  of  those  whom  it  aims  at  bene- 
fiting. The  frequent  elections  tired  out  Jacques 
Bonhomme  and  told  in  favour  of  the  two  classes 
which  never  weary  of  voting,  jobbers  and  fana- 
tics. In  a  short  time  the  whole  system  broke 
down  and  was  replaced  largely  by  control  exer- 
cised from  Paris  through  representans  en  mis- 
sion or  the  local  Jacobin  clubs.  Affairs  were 
in  much  disorder  in  1799 :  and  Bonaparte  did 
well  in  turning  his  attention  first  to  this  press- 
ing problem.  Sieyes  and  his  colleagues  had  al- 
ready pointed  to  the  solution,  namely,  the  nomi- 
nation at  Paris  of  prefects  responsible  for  the 
local  government  of  the  departments.1  But  Bona- 
parte's law  of  17th  February,  1800,  was  more 
drastic  than  any  which  Sieyes  could  have  car- 
1  Vandal,  UAvenement  de  Bonaparte,  ii.,  189. 


152  Personality  of  Napoleon 

ried.  Local  self-government  now  made  way  for 
a  system  in  which  the  initiative  and  control 
belonged  ultimately  to  the  First  Consul.  The 
chief  authority  in  each  department  was  vested 
in  a  prefect  appointed  by  and  responsible  to  the 
chief  of  the  State.  Sub-prefects  controlled  the 
new  and  smaller  areas,  the  arrondissements ; 
while  the  mayors  exercised  executive  functions 
in  the  smallest  areas,  the  communes.  Prefects, 
sub-prefects,  and  the  mayors  of  all  but  the  small 
towns  and  villages  were  appointed  by  the  First 
Consul;  and  prefects  named  the  mayors  in  the 
other  cases.  All  these  officials  were  assisted  by 
local  elective  councils;  but  the  extent  of  their 
assistance  may  be  measured  by  the  duration  of 
their  sessions,  which  were  limited  to  a  fortnight  a 
year.  They  then  apportioned  the  national  taxes 
for  their  districts,  and  voted  the  local  rates. 

Thus,  at  one  stroke  Napoleon  substituted  his 
own  control  for  that  which  had  been  partially 
and  fitfully  exercised  by  the  elective  bodies  of 
the  previous  decade.  The  same  thing  happened 
to  the  juges  de  paix.  Formerly  elected  by  the 
people,  they  were  now  to  be  named  by  the  pre- 
fects. The  most  astounding  fact  remains  to  be 
noticed.  The  law  passed  with  little  opposition 
even  from  the  Tribunate,  the  criticising  organ 


The  Lawgiver  153 

of  the  body  politic.  And  thus,  almost  at  a 
bound,  France  passed  from  local  self-government 
to  an  administrative  autocracy  which  prepared 
the  way  for  a  political  despotism. 

The  transformation  at  Paris  was  helped  on  by 
Sieyes's  inept  arrangements.  His  constitution 
divided  the  Legislature  into  four  bodies — a  Coun- 
cil  of  State  which  prepared  laws;  a  Tribunate, 
which  merely  criticised  but  could  not  amend 
them;^_Corps  Legislatif,  deprived  of  speech  and 
allowed  merely  to  pass  or  reject  them;  and,  as 
a  crown  to  this  singular  system,,  a  Senate,  whose 
chief  duty  was  to  hold  it  together.  An  Ameri- 
can wit  has  described  the  constitution  of  the 
United  States  as  an  ingenious  contrivance  for 
enabling  America  to  talk  herself  hoarse.  Much 
the  same  was  said  about  that  of  Sieyes.  The 
duty  of  the  Tribunate  was  "  to  talk  " ;  that  of  the 
Corps  Legislatif  was  "  not  to  talk."  Or,"  as 
Bonaparte  incisively  remarked :  "  One  hundred 
men  do  nothing  but  talk,  and  three  hundred  do 
nothing  but  vote,  without  speaking  a  word. 
Futile  dream  of  a  mediocre  intelligence."  The 
First  Consul  soon  made  use  of  the  Senate  for 
the  purpose  of  declaring  which  members  of  the 
Tribunate  should  form  the  fifth  portion  retiring 
annually — a  device  which  degraded  the  watch- 


154          Personality  of  Napoleon 

dog  of  the  constitution  into  a  creature  of  the 
First  Consul.  Against  some  of  the  more  inde- 
pendent of  the  Tribunes,  notably  Benjamin  Con- 
stant, Daunou,  and  Chenier,  he  declaimed  in 
vehement  terms  (29th  January,  1801)  as  "  Meta- 
physicians whom  it  were  well  to  duck  in  the  water. 
They  are  vermin  that  I  have  on  my  clothes.  You 
must  not  think  that  I  will  let  myself  be  attacked 
like  Louis  XVI.  I  will  not  allow  it."  * 

Nothing  is  more  surprising  than  the  victory 
of  one  autocratic  spirit  over  the  instinct  for 
liberty  paramount  in  France  since  1789.  That 
weary  people  acquiesced  even  in  the  unjust  pun- 
ishment of  exile  accorded  to  the  Jacobin  chiefs 
after  the  royalist  plot  of  Niv6se,  1800,  with 
which  they  had  not  the  slightest  connection. 
Further,  during  the  years  1800-2,  Bonaparte  not 
only  overthrew  Austria  and  made  a  most  advan- 
tageous peace  with  England,  but  secured  the 
support  of  the  peasants  and  all  devout  Catholics 
by  the  famous  treaty  with  the  Vatican  known 
/  as  the  .Concordat.  As  his  treatment  of  this 
problem  reveals  character  more  clearly  than  any 
number  of  adjectives  and  epithets  can  do,  I 
propose  to  review  it  somewhat  fully. 

1  Thibaudeau,  Bonaparte  and  the  Consulate  (Eng.  edit.), 
p.  31. 


The  Lawgiver  155 

While  in  North  Italy  he  was  much  impressed 
by  the  power  of  religion  and  the  fidelity  of  the 
French  "  orthodox "  priests.  Accordingly,  not 
long  after  the  battle  of  Marengo,  he  informed 
Cardinal  Martiniana  of  his  willingness  to  treat 
with  the  Pope  for  the  restoration  of  public 
worship  in  France,  provided  that  all  French 
Bishops,  whether  "  orthodox "  or  "  constitu- 
tional," resigned  their  sees.  Thereupon  he,  as 
First  Consul,  would  nominate  for  canonical  in- 
vestiture by  the  Pope  eminent  ecclesiastics 
selected  fairly  from  the  two  parties  into  which 
the  Church  of  France  was  then  divided. 

As  is  well  known,  a  law  of  the  year  1790  had 
split  the  Church  of  France  into  two  sections, 
the  "  orthodox,"  who  kept  unimpaired  their  alle- 
giance to  the  Pope,  and  the  "  constitutionals," 
who  impaired  it  by  taking  the  oath  of  obedience 
to  the  new  decree  of  the  National  Assembly. 
Thereafter  the  "  orthodox  "  priests  were  regarded 
as  enemies  of  the  Revolution;  and  at  the  worst 
crises  even  the  "  constitutionals  "  were  forbidden 
to  celebrate  public  worship.  The  atheism  of  the 
Terrorists  and  of  their  would-be  imitators  in 
1797-9  served  to  disgust  France,  while  the 
patient  heroism  of  the  "  orthodox "  priests  in- 
vested the  Church  with  a  moral  grandeur  un- 


156          Personality  of  Napoleon 

known  in  her  days  of  worldly  prosperity.  Affairs 
were  therefore  tending  towards  some  compromise 
when  Bonaparte  became  First  Consul;  and  he 
never  showed  more  discernment  and  activity 
than  in  carrying  through  his  bargain  with  the 
Vatican. 

In  truth  the  opportunity  was  unique.  The 
Revolutionists  had  erred  in  thrusting  upon  the 
clergy  an  oath  contrary  to  the  dogma  of  apos- 
tolical succession.  He  resolved  to  end  their 
fussy  and  needless  intervention  in  the  domain 
of  conscience.  On  the  other  hand,  he  was 
equally  resolved  to  retain  for  the  French  peas- 
antry the  Church  property  seized  or  bought 
during  the  Revolution,  and  to  vindicate  their 
freedom  from  tithe.  Thus,  in  the  material 
sphere  he  pressed  the  Church  hard,  reducing  it 
to  dependence  on  stipends  paid  by  the  State,  a 
plan  which  harmonised  admirably  with  his  po- 
litical aims,  besides  fulfilling  the  promise  made 
by  Mirabeau  in  1789  but  soon  broken  by  the 
Jacobins.  ISTo  part  of  their  conduct  had  been 
so  foolish  and  mean  as  that  by  which,  firstly, 
they  violated  conscience,  and,  secondly,  abro- 
gated the  State  stipends  which  were  a  set-off 
to  an  act  of  State  confiscation.  The  problem 
was  one  which  called  for  the  intervention  of  a 


The  Lawgiver  157 

strong  and  incisive  personality;  and  Bonaparte 
adopted  a  line  of  conduct  calculated  to  ease  the 
apprehensions  of  the  peasantry,  soothe  the  re- 
sentment of  the  clergy,  heal  a  religious  schism, 
and  rally  to  his  side  the  stately  hierarchy  of 
Rome.  In  no  negotiation  of  his  life  did  he 
conciliate  so  many  interests,  appease  so  much 
hatred,  and  gain  over  so  many  opponents.  With 
his  usual  keen  discernment  he  foresaw  these  ad- 
vantages to  the  cause  of  law  and  order;  and  it 
is  therefore  not  surprising  that  he  pushed  on 
the  negotiations  with  the  Vatican  swiftly,  skil- 
fully, secretly,  so  that  even  his  Council  of  State 
knew  little  about  it  until  the  chief  difficulties 
were  adjusted. 

He  let  fall  the  first  hints  of  the  approaching 
bargain  with  Eome  during  a  conversation  with 
Roederer  in  the  garden  at  Malmaison  in  August, 
1800.  Roederer,  a  useful  coadjutor  at  Brumaire, 
was  president  of  that  section  of  the  Council  of 
State  which  dealt  with  the  internal  affairs  of 
France;  and  his  faculty  of  dexterously  trim- 
ming, and  of  expressing  public  opinion,  made 
him  a  valuable  adviser.  On  this  occasion  Bona- 
parte, after  speaking  about  the  peculation  of 
officials,  burst  out  with  the  assertion  that  France 
was  and  always  had  been  corrupt,  and  that  her 


158          Personality  of  Napoleon 

paramount  need  was  morality.  But  how  could 
there  be  morality  without  religion?  When  Roe- 
derer  ventured  to  suggest  that  religion  must  serve 
and  not  dominate  the  State,  Bonaparte  assented, 
adding  these  curious  words :  "  How  can  you 
have  order  in  a  State  without  religion?  Society 
cannot  exist  without  inequality  of  fortunes, 
which  cannot  endure  apart  from  religion.  When 
one  man  is  dying  of  hunger  near  another  who 
is  ill  of  surfeit,  he  cannot  resign  himself  to  this 
difference,  unless  there  is  an  authority  which 
declares — '  God  wills  it  thus :  there  must  be  poor 
and  rich  in  the  world:  but  hereafter  and  during 
all  eternity  the  division  of  things  will  take  place 
differently.' ?  On  several  occasions  Bonaparte 
uttered  the  same  thought.  He  regarded  religion 
as  a  political  emollient,  highly  useful  to  adminis- 
ter in  times  of  excitement,  the  priest  holding  in 
reserve  a  spiritual  sedative  in  case  the  policeman 
alone  could  not  cope  with  starving  Lazarus. 

Another  advantage  would  accrue  to  Napoleon 
from  the  compact  with  the  Vatican.  He  might 
hope  to  gain  over  the  Royalists  if  the  Church 
became  his  ally.  This  motive  appeared  very 
clearly  in  his  words  to  a  Councillor  of  State, 
Thibaudeau,  during  a  conversation  in  the  garden 
at  Malmaison  on  10th  June,  1801. 


The  Lawgiver  159 

Last  Sunday  I  was  walking  here  alone  when  I 
heard  the  church  bells  of  Ruel.  I  felt  quite  moved 
by  the  sound :  so  strong  is  the  power  of  early  associa- 
tion. I  said  to  myself,  "  If  such  a  man  as  I  can  be 
affected  in  this  way,  how  deep  must  be  the  impres- 
sion on  simple  believing  souls?  What  have  your 
philosophers  and  clieologues  to  say  to  that?  A  na- 
tion must  have  a  religion,  and  that  religion  must 
be  under  the  control  of  the  Government.  At  present 
fifty  emigre  bishops,  pensioned  by  England^  control 
the  French  clergy.  Their  influence  must  be  de- 
stroyed, and  nothing  but  the  authority  of  the  Pope 
can  do  that.  He  will  deprive  them  of  their  sees  or 
induce  them  to  send  in  their  resignations.  We  shall 
issue  a  declaration  that  the  Catholic  religion,  being 
that  of  the  majority  of  the  French  nation,  must  be 
recognised  and  organised.  The  First  Consul  will 
nominate  fifty  bishops,  whom  the  Pope  will  institute. 
They  will  appoint  the  cures,  and  the  State  will 
give  them  all  salaries.  All  alike  shall  take  an  oath 
of  fidelity  to  the  Government.  Those  who  refuse 
to  submit  shall  be  banished,  and  those  who  preach 
against  the  Government  shall  be  handed  over  to 
their  ecclesisatical  superiors  for  punishment.  The 
Pope  shall  confirm  the  sale  of  Church  property,  and 
give  his  blessing  to  the  Republic.  We  shall  have 
*  Salvam  fac  rem  Gallicam '  chanted  at  mass.  The 
papal  Bull  is  here :  there  are  only  a  few  expressions 
to  be  changed.  People  may  call  me  a  Papist  if  they 
like.  I  am  nothing.  I  was  a  Mohammedan  in 
Egypt:  I  shall  be  a  Catholic  in  France  for  the 
sake  of  the  people."  1 

1  Thibaudeau,  op.  tit.,  pp.  153-155. 


160          Personality  of  Napoleon 

There  in  brief  is  the  story  of  the  Concordat. 
Bonaparte  pushed  on  the  negotiations,  cheered, 
it  may  be,  by  the  sound  of  the  church  bells  of 
Ruel,  and  certainly  nerved  by  the  resolve  to  re- 
move the  clergy  from  the  control  of  the  fifty 
exiled  bishops  to  that  of  an  equal  number  of 
bishops  instituted  by  the  Pope,  but  taking  their 
marching  orders  from  the  First  Consul.  In  the 
discussions  with  the  Cardinals  at  Paris  Bona- 
parte displayed  the  same  ready  tact  and  re- 
sourcefulness, which  sometimes  dealt  a  rebuff 
to  those  subtle  reasoners  even  on  their  own 
ground  of  Church  history  or  ecclesiastical  law. 
No  ruler  has  ever  displayed  equal  skill  in  rapidly 
"  getting  up  "  a  subject  so  as  to  refute  or  per- 
plex even  an  expert  by  some  adroit  sally.  The 
Concordat  was  proclaimed  with  great  pomp  at 
Notre  Dame  on  Easter  Day,  18th  April,  1802. 
The  Consuls  went  in  state  to  hear  high  mass; 
and  it  was  noted  that  Bonaparte's  household 
now  for  the  first  time  appeared  in  full  livery. 
The  ambassadors  and  high  officials  were  also 
asked  to  come  in  state  and  bring  their  servants 
in  livery.  The  request  seems  to  have  caused 
some  inconvenience  to  those  who  previously  had 
kept  up  a  republican  simplicity;  for  at  the  tail 
of  the  gorgeous  procession  were  seen  several 


The  Lawgiver  161 

hackney-coaches  with  their  numbers  painted  or 
pasted  over. 

The  carrying  through  of  the  Concordat  was 
perhaps  the  most  important  success  of  Bona- 
parte's career;  and  thereafter,  if  he  had  for- 
borne from  pressing  Pius  VII.  too  hard,  the 
Roman  Church  would  have  proved  the  firmest 
stay  of  his  throne.  In  November,  1804,  when 
the  aged  pontiff  was  on  the  way  to  crown  him 
at  Paris,  he  bade  French  officials  treat  him  as 
though  he  had  200,000  troops  at  his  back.  The 
remark  is  characteristic  of  this  keen  observer 
of  human  nature,  who  knew  how  to  derive  added 
strength  from  every  sentiment  and  every  insti- 
tution. As  an  example  of  this  useful  faculty  I 
will  quote  his  words  to  the  Council  of  State  on 
22d  May,  1804,  shortly  after  the  proclamation  of 
the  Empire :  "  It  is  my  wish  to  re-establish  the 
institution  for  foreign  missions ;  for  the  religious 
missionaries  may  be  very  useful  to  me  in  Asia, 
Africa,  and  America,  as  I  shall  make  them  recon- 
noitre all  the  lands  they  visit.  The  sanctity  of 
their  dress  will  not  only  protect  them,  but  serve  to 
conceal  their  political  and  commercial  investiga- 
tions. The  head  of  the  missionary  establishment 
shall  reside  no  longer  at  Rome  but  in  Paris."  1 

i  Pelet,  p.  243. 

IX 


162  Personality  of  Napoleon 

Such  was  to  be  a  Napoleonic  and  up-to-date 
version  of  the  Roman  college  de  propaganda 
fide. 

Having  so  keen  a  perception  of  the  value  of 
clerical  support,  surely  he  acted  unwisely  in 
alienating  it.  But  his  resolve  to  dominate  the 
Church  by  the  Organic  Articles  led  to  long  and 
bitter  strifes,  ending  with  the  deposition  of  the 
Pope  at  Borne  (May,  1809),  his  enforced  so- 
journ at  Savona  and  Fontainebleau,  and  the 
undoing  of  most  of  the  work  of  pacification 
achieved  by  the  Concordat.  This  unworthy 
treatment  of  a  defenceless  old  man  told  against 
the  Napoleonic  Empire  more  seriously  than  any 
one  disaster  in  the  field.  It  is  one  of  the  mys- 
teries of  Napoleon's  character  and  career  that 
he,  who  had  displayed  so  much  tact  and  con- 
ciliation as  First  Consul,  should  finally  have 
treated  the  Pope  with  a  haughty  disdain  which 
culminated  in  downright  persecution. 

The  treaty  with  Rome  proved  to  be  the  start- 
ing point  of  other  enterprises.  The  first  in  point 
of  time  and  of  importance  was  that  of  thej^ejjioji 
of  Honour.  In  order  to  understand  the  signifi- 
cance of  this  new  institution,  one  must  remember 
that  by  the  constitution  of  the  year  1799  there 
were  some  5000  Notables  of  the  Nation,  chosen 


The  Lawgiver  163 

by  successive  winnowings  of  the  adult  males  of 
France.  They  were  the  elect  of  the  people ;  and 
from  among  them  were  to  be  chosen  the  legis- 
lators and  the  chief  executive  officer;;  of  the 
State.  Objections  had  been  raised  as  to  the 
choice  of  the  Notables  of  the  Nation;  but  to 
supersede  them  was  to  strike  at  the  system  of 
popular  government  devised  by  Siey&s.  This, 
however,  is  what  Bonaparte  did.  He  mooted 
the  proposal  of  a  Legion  of  Honour  in  the  middle 
of  April,  1802,  that  is,  soon  after  the  declaration 
of  peace  with  England  and  the  proclamation  of 
the  Concordat.  Early  in  May  he  charged  Roe- 
derer  to  mention  it  to  the  Council  of  State.  In 
his  private  journal  Roederer  made  a  weak  and 
rambling  apology  for  the  First  Consul  and  him- 
self, namely,  that  neither'  of  them  foresaw  the 
result  of  the  new  proposal  to  be  the  replacement 
of  the  Lists  of  Notability  by  a  Legion  appointed 
by  the  First  Consul.  So  far  as  concerned  Bona- 
parte this  is  mere  trifling.  The  raison  d'etre  of 
the  proposal  was  the  substitution  of  personal 
choice  for  popular  election ;  and  this  soon  proved 
to  be  the  chief  outcome  of  it.  Very  skilfully 
Bonaparte  represented  that  the  new  scheme 
would  give  effect  to  Article  87  of  the  constitu- 
tion which  promised  a  system  of  national  re- 


1 64          Personality  of  Napoleon 

wards  for  eminent  military  service.  Obviously 
this  article  referred  to  a  badge  or  decoration 
for  bravery  or  distinguished  service  in  the  field; 
and  when  Eoederer  had  read  out  to  the  Council 
of  State  the  new  proposals,  which  included  re- 
wards for  civilians,  Mathieu  Dumas  maintained 
that  the  article  referred  only  to  military  rewards. 
Thereupon  Bonaparte  broke  forth  into  an 
elaborate  eulogium  of  civil  qualities  as  surpass- 
ing those  of  the  soldier.  He  admitted  that 
courage  and  prowess  were  all-important  in  the 
days  of  feudalism  and  chivalry;  but,  said  he,  in 
the  present  age,  the  qualities  needed  by  a  com- 
mander were  foresight,  power  of  calculation, 
administrative  ability,  ready  wit,  eloquence  such 
as  appeals  to  soldiers,  and  above  all,  knowledge 
of  men.  All  these  were  civil  qualities.  He 
continued  thus: 

The  general  who  is  capable  of  great  things  is  he 
who  possesses  the  finest  civil  qualities.  He  is  obeyed 
and  respected  on  account  of  his  intellectual  ability. 
.  .  .  Take  the  soldier  and  separate  him  from  all 
his  civic  surroundings,  and  you  have  a  man  who 
knows  no  other  law  but  brute  force,  who  judges 
everything  by  that  standard,  and  sees  nothing  be- 
yond it.  The  civilian,  on  the  contrary,  makes  the 
good  of  the  nation  his  standard.  The  method  of  the 
soldier  is  to  act  despotically;  that  of  the  civilian  is 
to  submit  to  discussion,  to  truth,  to  reason. 


The  Lawgiver  165 

Such  are  a  few  outstanding  sentences  of  a 
remarkable  speech,  the  effect  of  which  is  not 
much  lessened  by  the  fact  that  the  opportunity 
which  evoked  it  seems  to  have  been  fully  fore- 
seen. Bonaparte's  words  produced  a  profound 
impression  on  the  councillors,  who,  being  nearly 
all  civilians,  were  delighted  to  hear  the  greatest 
of  soldiers  place  them  above  the  soldiery.  They 
remained  silent  with  admiration,  and  the  First 
Consul  closed  the  session.  Nevertheless,  at  the 
next  sitting  some  of  them  plucked  up  courage 
to  contest  the  proposal  of  a  Legion  of  Honour. 
The  jurist,  Berlier,  said  that  it  would  lead 
straightway  to  aristocracy:  crosses  and  ribbons 
were  the  toys  of  monarchy.  Bonaparte,  after  a 
clever  retort  at  the  expense  of  the  Roman  Re- 
public and  Brutus,  boldly  declared  that  men 
were  governed  by  toys.  Ten  years  of  Revolution 
had  not  changed  the  character  of  the  French, 
who  were  high-spirited  and  light-hearted  like 
the  Gauls,  ready  to  bow  before  the  stars  of 
foreigners,  enamoured  of  glory  and  therefore  of 
distinctions.  These  two  speeches  ensured  the 
success  of  the  measure.  True,  ten  members 
present  out  of  twenty-four  voted  against  it;  but 
all  but  one  of  the  ten  not  long  afterwards  ac- 
cepted either  the  title  of  Count  or  membership 


1 66          Personality  of  Napoleon 

in  the  Legion  of  Honour.1  Other  results  fol- 
lowed, namely,  the  abolition  of  the  Lists  of 
Notables  in  August,  1802,  and  the  institution 
of  an  order  of  Imperial  Nobility  in  1806.  Napo- 
leon almost  certainly  had  these  aims  in  view 
when  he  instituted  the  Legion  of  Honour;  and 
by  contrast  one  must  admire  the  conduct  of 
Washington,  who,  on  becoming  President,  abol- 
ished the  Order  of  Cincinnatus,  founded  in  1783 
as  a  reward  for  distinguished  service  in  the 
field. 

By  the  legislative  achievements  of  the  spring 
and  summer  of  1802  Bonaparte  determined  the 
future  of  France.  She  acquiesced  in  his  su- 
premacy; and  on  2d  August  he  became  First 
Consul  for  life,  with  power  to  nominate  his 
successor.  At  the  same  time  he  struck  down 
the  Tribunate.  Even  the  illegal  action  of  the 
"  conservative  Senate "  had  failed  to  stop  the 
criticisms  of  that  body,  which  greatly  annoyed 
Bonaparte  by  opposing  the  Legion  of  Honour 
and  certain  articles  of  the  Civil  Code.  He  in- 
veighed against  the  Tribunes  as  "  dogs  whom  I 
meet  everywhere " ;  and  again  he  said  "  The 
Tribunate  must  be  divided  into  sections,  and  its 
debates  must  be  secret;  then  they  can  babble  as 

1  Thibaudeau,  p.  146,  note. 


The  Lawgiver  167 

much  as  they  like."  His  wish  became  law  by  a 
Senatus  Consultum  of  4th  August,  1802,  which 
reduced  the  Tribunate  to  fifty  members,  selected 
by  the  Senate,  and  divided  into  five  sections 
debating  secretly.  On  the  other  hand,  he  en- 
hanced the  power  of  that  subservient  body,  the 
Senate,  the  decrees  of  which  soon  took  the 
place  of  laws  passed  by  the__Corps  Le*gislatif. 
The  Council  of  State  also  suffered  by  the  crea- 
tion of  a  Privy  Council  which  usurped  many 
of  its  functions,  and  was  completely  at  his  dis- 
posal. These  modifications  completed  the  re- 
action from  repjaWicanism  to  autocracy,  and  the 
absorption  of  "  the  general  will "  in  the  will  of 
Napoleon. 

As  a  lawgiver,  Bonaparte,  First  Consul,  was 
far  greater  than  Napoleon,  Emperor.  Not  yet 
had  he  set  himself  to  crush  the  least  sign  of 
opposition.  In  the  Council  of  State  he  seemed 
to  court  it.  A  councillor,  Pelet  de  la  Lozere, 
vividly  describes  some  of  its  sessions  which  were 
enlivened  by  the  presence  of  the  chief.  Some- 
times he  announced  his  intention  of  being  pre- 
sent; but  often  the  roll  of  the  drums  on  the 
staircase  of  the  Tuileries  gave  the  first  warn- 
ing of  his  approach.  He  entered,  preceded  by 
his  chamberlain,  followed  by  the  aide-de-camp 


i68          Personality  of  Napoleon 

on  duty,  took  his  seat  on  a  chair  only  slightly 
raised  above  the  level,  and  invited  attention  to 
some  proposal,  or  else  listened  to  the  discus- 
sion on  hand.  If  it  did  not  interest  him,  he 
sank  into  a  deep  reverie,  or  else  threw  in  re- 
marks, not  always  to  the  point,  but  tersely  and 
picturesquely  bodying  forth  his  thoughts,  either 
on  problems  of  the  present  or  projects  of  the 
future.  During  these  discursive  moods,  his  pre- 
sence did  not  expedite  the  discussions.  Often 
they  wandered  into  by-paths,  whence,  however, 
no  one  wished  to  return,  so  vivid  was  the  light 
thrown  on  the  fortunes  of  France.  At  other 
times  he  elucidated  the  subject  by  searching 
questions  that  revealed  his  mental  superiority. 
Of  this  he  was  fully  conscious;  witness  the  fol- 
lowing frank  remark :  "  Do  you  know  why  I 
allow  so  much  discussion  at  the  Council  of 
State?  It  is  because  I  am  the  strongest  debater 
in  the  whole  Council.  I  let  myself  be  attacked, 
because  I  know  how  to  defend  myself."  * 

As  a  result  of  his  eager  inquisitiveness,  the 
sessions  were  often  very  long,  even  lasting  from 
nine  A.M.  to  five  P.M.,  with  only  a  quarter  of  an 
hour  for  lunch.  Towards  the  end,  when  other 
members  showed  signs  of  fatigue,  he  seemed  as 

1  Roederer,  Journal,  p.  133. 


The  Lawgiver  169 

fresh  as  ever,  and  at  the  time  of  closing  would 
jocularly  pronounce  the  prorogation  most  pre- 
mature. Or  again,  during  the  all-night  sessions 
in  which  he  demonstrated  his  inaccessibility  to 
ordinary  human  weakness,  he  rallied  the  nod- 
ding members  with  the  words :  "  Come,  sirs, 
we  have  not  yet  earned  our  stipends."  Some- 
times his  humour  showed  itself  in  a  more  modest 
guise.  During  the  debates  on  the  more  technical 
points  of  the  new  Civil  Code,  he  spoke  with  great 
deference  of  the  aged  and  experienced  jurist, 
Tronchet.  Thus  on  15th  November,  1801,  he 
said :  "  The  words  of  such  a  man  as  Tronchet 
are  authoritative  to  us  all.  As  for  the  rest  of 
us,  men  of  the  sword  or  of  finance,  who  are  not 
lawyers  but  legislators,  our  opinions  are  of  little 
consequence.  In  these  discussions  I  have  some- 
times said  things  which  a  quarter  of  an  hour 
later  I  have  found  were  all  wrong.  I  have  no 
wish  to  pass  for  being  worth  more  than  I  really 
am."  There  Bonaparte  is  at  his  best,  unspoiled 
as  yet  by  domination  and  its  sinister  shadow, 
flattery. 

In  his  greatest  and  most  enduring  work,  the 
codification  of  French  law,  his  dominant  motive 
was  to  harmonise  the  conflicting  ideas  of  the 
times  of  the  Revolution  and  of  the  monarchy. 


170          Personality  of  Napoleon 

At  several  points  he  went  back  to  the  old  cus- 
toms, as  when  he  insisted  on  strengthening  the 
control  of  the  father  over  the  children,  and  of 
the  husband  over  the  wife.  Here  his  Corsican 
notions  clashed  with  those  that  prevailed  during 
the  French  Revolution.  As  wre  saw,  the  cus- 
toms of  Corsica  allowed  a  father  in  extreme  cases 
to  kill  his  son;  and  the  power  of  the  husband 
over  the  wife  was  almost  Oriental.  The  social 
anarchy  of  the  Revolution  favoured  a  reaction 
towards  the  old  Roman  ideals;  and  Bonaparte, 
profiting  by  the  license  of  the  Jacobins,  now  in- 
sisted on  the  complete  supremacy  of  the  hus- 
hand.  These  were  his  words :  "  The  husband 
must  have  absolute  power  to  say  to  his  wife: 
'  Madame,  you  shall  not  go  out ;  you  must  not 
go  to  the  play;  you  must  not  meet  such  and 
such  a  person. ' "  *  The  natural  retort  for  a 
woman  of  spirit  would  be :  "  If  you  speak 
so,  I  will  go  to  the  play,  and  I  will  meet 
him." 

At  this  point,  then,  we  again  notice  Napoleon's 
tendency  to  regulate  and  control.  Surely  he 
should  have  seen  that  love,  or,  failing  it,  con- 
jugal and  personal  honour,  is  the  chief  safe- 
guard of  marriage,  and  that  the  multiplication 

1  Thibaudeau,  p.  195. 


The  Lawgiver  171 

of  rules  tends  to  weaken  those  salutary  feelings. 
But  at  all  points  he  bore  hard  on  women.  In 
pursuance  of  his  Romanesque  notions  a  wife  was 
debarred  from  all  control  of  her  own  and  her 
husband's  property;  she  could  not  even  mort- 
gage it.  In  other  respects  women  were  thrust 
back  into  a  state  of  dependence  as  bad  as  that 
imposed  by  the  ancien  regime.  The  mental 
vacuity  needful  for  the  production  of  a  genera- 
tion of  Griseldas  was  brought  about  by  a  scheme 
of  education  which  he  thus  outlined  to  the 
Council  of  State  on  20th  February,  1806 :  "  I 
do  not  think  we  need  trouble  ourselves  with  any 
plan  of  instruction  for  young  females;  they  can- 
not be  brpught  up  better  than  by  their  mothers. 
Public  education  is  not  suited  for  them,  because 
they  are  never  called  upon  to  act  in  public. 
Manners  are  all  in  all  to  them;  and  marriage 
is  all  they  look  to."  x  In  this  sphere  the  defects 
of  the  Code  are  serious.  The  position  of  woman 
was  altered  for  the  worse,  so  that  even  now  in 
the  countries  affected  by  the  Code  much  must 
be  done  in  order  to  endow  her  with  the  rights 
accorded  by  the  laws  and  customs  of  the  Revo- 
lution. At  other  important  points  of  the  Code 
the  influence  of  Napoleon  was  reactionary,  as  in 
,  p.  202. 


172          Personality  of  Napoleon 

the  imposition  of  unduly  heavy  penalties  or  the 
retention  of  burdensome  statutes. 

Nevertheless,  in  many  ways  the  Code  marked 
a  great  advance.  The  compromise  on  the  sub- 
ject of  divorce  was  suited  to  the  spirit  of  the 
times  and  the  need  of  reconstituting  the  family. 
The  near  approach  to  equality  of  bequest  to  all 
the  children  of  a  family  was  also  a  concession 
to  revolutionary  sentiment,  though  Napoleon 
foresaw  with  regret  its  cramping  effect  on  the 
growth  of  population.  Above  all,  the  Code 
Napoleon,  along  with  the  accompanying  Codes 
of  Civil  and  Criminal  Procedure,  Penal  Law 
and  Commerce,  presented  a  reasoned  and  har- 
monious body  of  statutes,  such  as  had  not 
appeared  since  the  days  of  Justinian.  It  did 
more.  For  the  first  time  in  human  society,  the 
poor  and  unlettered  had  the  chance  of  knowing 
what  the  laws  were;  for  Napoleon  brought  to 
bear  on  legal  phraseology  his  own  habits  of  clear 
thinking,  with  the  result  that  he  who  ran  might 
read  and  understand  nearly  all  the  articles  of 
the  Code — an  ideal  not  yet  fully  attained  by 
any  branch  of  the  practical  English  race.  To 
some  extent  the  striving  after  simplicity  was 
carried  too  far.  He  himself  admitted  that  this 
might  be  the  case;  but  the  danger  was  not 


The  Lawgiver  173 

avoided,  and  clearness  of  expression  was  not 
seldom  attained  at  the  risk  of  completeness  of 
statement  or  of  adaptability  to  probable  con- 
tingencies. But,  when  contrasted  with  the  gloom 
and  chaos  pervading  the  laws  and  feudal  cus- 
toms of  Germany  and  Italy,  the  Code  appeared 
like  a  social  gospel.  Well  might  the  Emperor 
say  at  St.  Helena  that  his  glory  consisted,  not 
in  having  won  forty  battles,  but  in  the  delibera- 
tions of  the  Council  of  State  and  in  the  Code 
Napoleon.  None  of  his  works  bears  so  markedly 
the  imprint  of  his  forceful  personality. 

In  no  sphere  of  activity  was  Bonaparte's 
activity  exercised  more  characteristically  than  « 
in  regard  toJNational  Education.  That  forma- 
tive idea  had  been  promulgated  by  Rousseau  in 
his  suggestive  novel,  Emile;  and  during  the 
Directory  and  Consulate  Pestalozzi  was  begin- 
ning his  quaint  experiments  at  Yverdun,  while 
Robert  Owen  started  an  infant  school  on  equally 
original  lines  at  New  Lanark.  It  is  scarcely 
too  much  to  say  that  the  future  of  the  Euro- 
pean nations  has  been  largely  determined  by 
their  attitude  to  this  great  question.  What  was 
that  of  Napoleon? 

The  Jacobins  had  demolished  the  semi-monastic 


174          Personality  of  Napoleon 

system  of  education  prevalent  up  to  1790.  Bona- 
parte had  been  trained  in  it  at  Brienne,  and 
always  spoke  with  contempt  of  his  teachers,  the 
Minims.  In  place  of  the  old  system  the  French 
Convention  in  1793  outlined  a  grand  scheme  of 
elementary  schools,  and  central  or  secondary 
schools,  which  should  be  free  in  all  their  grades. 
Condorcet,  who  drew  up  the  basic  report  on  this 
subject  defined  the  aim  of  education  to  be  "  the 
cultivation  of  the  physical,  intellectual,  and 
moral  faculties/'  so  as  to  contribute  to  "  the 
general  but  gradual  perfecting  of  the  human 
race,  the  final  end  towards  which  every  social 
institution  should  be  directed."  In  the  case  of 
promising  pupils  access  to  the  University  was 
to  be  facilitated.  No  country  has  yet  fully  at- 
tained to  the  lofty  ideal  set  forth  by  Condorcet 
in  April,  1792.  Owing  to  the  turmoil  of  the 
Revolution  and  lack  of  money  little  could  be 
done  to  give  effect  to  these  generous  plans;  and 
it  seems  that  in  1799  there  were  in  Paris  only 
twenty-four  elementary  schools,  and  very  few  in 
the  departments.  Rather  more  central  schools 
were  to  be  found;  but  in  them  the  training  was 
almost  wholly  scientific  and  utilitarian.  .Thus, 
the  grand  aim  of  developing  the  faculties,  which 
had  been  set  forth  by  Condorcet  and  other  edu- 


The  Lawgiver  175 

cational  reformers,  remained  an  ideal;  but  with 
the  advent  of  peace  and  prosperity  during  the 
Consulate  some  approach  to  it  was  to  be  expected. 
The  performance  fell  far  short  of  the  wishes 
of  the  friends  of  progress.  Bonaparte  did  little 
or  nothing  for  elementary  education,  throwing 
the  responsibility  for  it  on  local  councils,  while 
the  teachers  were  to  be  paid  out  of  the  scholars' 
fees,  a  plan  destructive  of  all  respect  and  dis- 
cipline. As  Thibaudeau  remarked,  it  seemed 
that  the  Government  rather  feared  than  en- 
couraged too  much  enlightenment  among  the 
lower  orders,  especially  in  the  country.  Very 
different  was  Bonaparte's  attitude  towards 
secondary  education.  This  he  furthered,  by  de- 
veloping the  central  schools,  either  as  second- 
ary schools  supported  by  local  funds,  or  as 
lycees  controlled  by  the  Government.  The 
theory  of  State  control  had  been  affirmed  by 
the  law  of  25th  October,  1795;  but  now  it  re- 
ceived a  further  development  suited  to  the  new 
autocratic  regime.  The  curriculum  was  widened 
so  as  to  include  classics  and  modern  languages, 
while  the  discipline  was  almost  military  in  char- 
acter. To  these  lycees  he  attached  as  many  as 
6400  bourses  or  scholarships,  4000  of  which  went 
to  the  most  promising  pupils  of  the  elementary 


176          Personality  of  Napoleon 

schools,  while  the  remainder  were  allotted  to  the 
sons  of  officers  and  officials.  The  lycees,  there- 
fore, had  a  decidedly  governmental  tone,  the 
details  of  the  curriculum  being  prescribed  by 
Napoleon  on  lines  somewhat  less  utilitarian  than 
those  of  the  central  schools,  but  adapted  to  en- 
sure success  in  some  one  calling  rather  than  the 
unfolding  of  all  the  mental  powers.  In  regard 
to  the  College  of  St.  Cyr  and  others  attached  to 
the  Prytaneum,  Bonaparte  enjoined  special  at- 
tention to  the  instruction  which  "  can  make  good 
workmen  and  men  useful  in  the  mechanical  arts 
in  the  public  workshops  whether  of  the  army  or 
of  the  navy."  The  pupils  at  these  schools  were 
by  no  means  restricted  to  government  service, 
but  every  care  was  taken  to  induce  them  to 
enter  it.1 

The  dependence  of  public  instruction  on  the 
Government  was  insured  by  the  University  of 
France,  an  institution  which  exercised  a  general 
control  over  public  instruction.  It  bears  the 
imprint  of  the  organising  instincts  of  the  Em- 
peror. After  revolving  the  matter  for  some  time 
he  mentioned  it  to  the  Council  of  State  on  20th 
February,  1806,  not  long  after  his  return  from 

1  Nap.  Corresp.,  vii.,  169  (Nap.  to  Chaptal,  llth  June, 
1801). 


The  Lawgiver  177 

the   campaign  of  Austerlitz.     These  were   his 
words : 

I  wish  to  create  such  an  establishment  for  public 
instruction  as  may  prove  a  nursery  for  professors, 
rectors,  and  teachers  generally,  and  that  they  shall 
be  stimulated  by  high  motives.  The  young  men 
who  devote  themselves  to  the  cause  of  education 
ought  to  have  clearly  before  them  the  prospect  of 
rising  to  the  highest  offices  in  the  State.  The  base 
of  this  great  system  of  education  will  rest  on  the 
college,  its  superstructure  may  be  found  in  the 
Senate.  But  in  order  to  effect  this,  the  principle 
of  celibacy  must  be  established,  at  least  so  far  as 
to  preclude  marriage  before  the  age  of  25  or  30. 

Again  on  1st  March,  1806,  he  said: 

My  desire  is  to  establish  an  order,  not  of  Jesuits 
whose  head  resides  at  Rome,  but  of  Jesuits  whose 
sole  ambition  shall  be  to  make  themselves  useful 
and  shall  have  no  interest  separated  from  that  of 
the  public.  .  .  .  There  ought  to  be  two  distinct 
classes  of  masters — one  who  should  teach  the  pupils, 
another  who  should  govern  them;  for  these  matters 
require  very  different  talents.  It  is  my  wish  [he 
continued]  to  create  in  France  a  civil  order  in  so- 
ciety. Heretofore  there  have  existed  in  the  world 
only  two  orders,  the  military  and  the  ecclesiastical. 
.  .  .  The  civil  order  will  be  strengthened  by  the 
creation  of  a  body  of  teachers  and  still  more  would 
it  be  fortified  by  a  large  body  of  magistrates.  .  .  . 
After  all,  my  chief  object  in  establishing  a  body  of 
instructors  is  that  I  may  possess  the  means  of 


178          Personality  of  Napoleon 

directing  the  political  and  moral  opinions  of  the 
community. 

And  acrain  on  20th  March :     "  It  occurs  to  me 

O 

that  the  corps  of  instructors  may  consist  of 
about  10,000  persons ;  and  it  seems  essential  that 
the  members  of  the  University — since  that  is  to 
be  its  name — shall  have  the  exclusive  right  of 
teaching,  and  that  they  shall  be  sworn  in."  * 

In  pursuance  of  these  aims,  the  University  of 
France  came  into  existence  in^lSOS,  an  oath  of 
obedience  being  required  from  all  its  members, 
even  from  teachers  in  the  schools.  They  swore 
to  obey  "  the  laws  of  the  teaching  body,  which 
have  as  their  object  the  uniformity  of  instruction, 
and  which  tend  to  form  for  the  State  citizens 
attached  to  their  religion,  their  prince,  their 
country,  and  their  family."  Evidently  this  was 
quite  as  much  a  political  as  an  educational  body. 
It  gave  effect  to  the  earlier  wish  of  Napoleon 
to  secure  fixity  in  politics  by  means  of  instruc- 
tion based  on  established  principles.  "  So  long 
as  the  people"  (these  were  his  words)  "are 
not  taught  from  their  earliest  years,  whether 
they  ought  to  be  Republicans  or  Royalists, 

1  Pelet,  pp.  199-204.  See,  too,  Aulard,  Napoleon  et  le 
Monopole  Universitaire. 


The  Lawgiver  179 

Christians  or  Infidels,  the  State  cannot  prop- 
erly be  called  a  nation;  for  it  must  rest  on  a 
foundation  which  is  vague  and  uncertain;  and 
it  will  be  for  ever  exposed  to  disorders  and 
fluctuations." 

How  pathetic  a  trust  in  the  omnipotence  of 
law  and  the  pliability  of  mankind !  He  regarded 
the  people  as  so  much  molten  steel  to  be  poured 
into  his  moulds,  thereby  assuming  for  ever  the 
imprint  of  his  will.  Energy  like  this  accom- 
plishes wonders  after  a  time  of  upheaval;  for 
mankind  detests  anarchy.  Therefore,  by  retain- 
ing the  best  of  the  old  order  and  adapting  it 
to  the  newer  needs,  the  great  organiser  can 
speedily  form  a  cosmos  out  of  chaos.  But  he 
must  beware  of  excess  of  zeal.  Over-elaboration 
is  a  vice  to  which  vigorous  minds  are  often 
prone;  and  the  subsequent  history  of  France 
emphasises  the  need  of  avoiding  that  pyramidal 
symmetry  of  construction  which  almost  pre- 
cludes change  in  the  future.  This  is  the  chief 
defect  of  the  Code  Napoleon  and  of  the  Uni- 
versity of  France.  The  prefectal  system  and 
the  Concordat  are  open  to  the  same  general  criti- 
cism. For  they  involve  a  system  of  State  control 
which,  with  all  its  clearness  and  efficiency,  is 
neither  easily  adaptable  to  the  changing  condi- 


i8o          Personality  of  Napoleon 

tions  of  modern  life,  nor  calculated  to  develop 
individual  initiative  in  the  executants. 

The  legislative  achievements  of  Napoleon  are 
immense.  They,  not  the  coup  d'etat  of  Bru- 
maire,  closed  the  Revolution;  and  in  this  sense 
his  assertion  at  St.  Helena,  that  he  had  de- 
stroyed the  He  volution,  is  correct.1  He  de- 
stroyed it  by  satisfying  the  human  cravings 
which  started  that  great  movement.  With  his 
wide  knowledge  of  history,  and  the  practical 
good  sense  characteristic  of  his  early  manhood, 
he  brought  about  a  compromise  between  the  past 
and  the  present  which  met  the  needs  of  France 
in  that  generation;  and  after  a  decade  of  tur- 
moil she  hailed  his  work  with  enthusiasm. 

Nevertheless,  it  has  its  defects;  and  in  the 
main  they  correspond  to  those  of  his  own  nature. 
An  excess  of  eagerness  and  forcefulness  appears 
at  many  points  of  his  career,  and  not  least  in 
his  legislation.  It  gripped  France  fast  as  in 
an  administrative  vice.  He  left  nothing  to  the 
judgment  of  posterity;  and  this  is  a  serious  de- 
fect; for  the  efforts  even  of  the  master-builders 
are  feeble  when  compared  with  the  instincts  of 
the  race  and  the  needs  of  succeeding  ages.  The 
model  of  a  lawgiver  should  be  a  tree,  not  a 

1  Lady  Malcolm,  A  Diary  of  St.  Helena,  p.  102. 


The  Lawgiver  181 

pyramid.  Burke,  in  his  Reflections  on  the 
French  Revolution,  uttered  this  sage  warning: 
"The  nature  of  man  is  intricate:  the  objects  of 
society  are  of  the  greatest  possible  complexity; 
and  therefore  no  single  disposition  or  direction 
of  power  can  be  suitable  either  to  man's  nature 
or  to  the  quality  of  his  affairs."  x  Well  would 
it  have  been  for  Napoleon  and  for  France  if  he 
had  realised  the  impossibility  of  meeting  the 
ever-changing  requirements  of  a  great  people. 
His  legislation,  while  losing  in  symmetry,  would 
have  gained  in  beneficence,  had  he  felt  the 
reverence  for  the  verdict  of  posterity  which 
consecrated  the  genius  of  Burke.  As  it  was, 
Napoleon  subjected  the  French  nature,  then 
flaccid  from  perpetual  change,  to  a  too  sudden 
consolidation.  True,  he  imparted  to  that  nation 
a  firmness  which  rendered  possible  magnificent 
exploits  in  the  present,  but  at  the  cost  of  adap- 
tability and  expansion  in  the  future. 

His  self-sufficiency  suffers  by  comparison  with 
the  dignified  self-suppression,  the  hopeful  out- 
look on  the  future,  characteristic  of  the  Athenian 
lawgiver,  Solon.  He,  living  in  a  time  of  tur- 
moil and  faction,  when  Athens  had  not  won  a 
definite  position  in  Greece,  assured  her  future 

1  Burke,  Reflections,  p.  72  (Mr.  Payne's  edit.). 


1 82          Personality  of  Napoleon 

by  just  laws,  which,  so  far  as  we  know,  were 
enacted  solely  by  persuasive  methods.  '  He_les&- 
ened  the  power  of  the  nobles  and  called  the 
people  to  political  responsibility,  "fie  promoted 
education  of  an  enlightened  type,  but  was  care- 
ful to  leave  it  unfettered  by  the  State.  3He  also 
mitigated  the  penal  code  of  Draco,  and  lessened 
the  hitherto  unlimited  authority  of  the  father 
over  his  children.  The  laws  of  Solon  everywhere 
bespeak  a  belief  in  human  nature,  a  resolve  to 
trust  to  its  higher  instincts,  a  reliance  upon 
persuasion  rather  than  force;  and  after  his  year 
of  office  as  archon,  he  is  said  to  have  travelled 
abroad  in  order  that  Athens  might  more  freely 
make  trial  of  his  laws  during  the  ten  years  in 
which  nothing  could  be  changed.  After  that 
time  the  city  was  free  to  modify  them  accord- 
ing to  the  teachings  of  experience.  In  these 
respects,  Solon  stands  forth  as  the  ideal  law- 
giver, trusting  in  the  higher  instincts  of 
mankind,  inducing  the  Athenians  to  enter  an 
ever-broadening  path  of  political  development, 
and  evincing  by  his  own  conduct  a  disinter- 
estedness which  is  the  choicest  flower  of  civic 
virtue. 

Napoleon,  coming  to  the  front  at  a  time  of 
political  reaction,  scoffed  at  those  who  thought 


The  Lawgiver  183 

much  about  succeeding  generations;  and  in  his 
resolve  to  meet  all  the  needs  of  the  present,  he 
stamped  his  personality  too  deeply  on  the  life 
of  France.  He  organised  it  swiftly,  ably,  and 
in  a  way  that  told  for  marvellous  efficiency  at 
the  time,  though  at  the  cost  of  that  flexibility 
which  is  the  pledge  of  continuous  progress.  He 
made  France  the  compact,  self-contained  organ- 
ism which  was  the  envy  of  Europe  in  1812, 
though  she  is  less  able  to  meet  the  varied  needs 
of  1912.  Such  is  the  judgment  of  many  of  her 
most  gifted  sons,  who  feel  somewhat  cramped 
by  the  steel  framework  of  the  Napoleonic  sys- 
tem. But  enough  of  criticism.  It  is  rarely  the 
case  that  a  statesman  can  meet  the  needs  both 
of  the  present  and  of  the  future.  And  we  may 
freely  concur  in  Napoleon's  words  uttered  at 
St.  Helena :  "  I  filled  up  the  gulf  of  anarchy 
and  unravelled  chaos.  I  purified  the  Revolution, 
raised  the  people,  and  strengthened  monarchy." 


THE  EMPEROR 

"  Quand   on   veut   f  ortement,   constamment,   on   reussit 
toujours." — Napoleon  to  Paradisi,  3d  July,  1805. 

NOT  long  after  his  return  from  the  campaign 
of  Marengo  Napoleon  remarked  that  his 
power  rested  on  the  imagination  of  the  French. 
This  was  largely  true.  He  alone  of  all  the 
leaders  of  the  Revolution  since  the  time  of  Mira- 
beau  had  thrilled  the  French  nature.  His  vic- 
tories, the  artistic  trophies  which  he  sent  from 
Italy,  the  proclamations  which  set  tingling  the 
blood  of  civilians  and  soldiers,  the  advantageous 
terms  which  he  extorted  from  Austria  and  Great 
Britain,  the  hopes  held  out  by  him  of  wresting 
from  hated  Albion  the  empire  of  the  sea,  and 
the  golden  prospect  of  a  world-wide  dominion, 
served  to  inflame  the  brain  of  France,  so  that 
within  the  years  1796-1802  it  recurred  to  the 
ideals  of  the  reign  of  Louis  XIV.  At  heart 
the  French  were  no  longer  Republicans;  they 

184 


The  Emperor  185 

were  la  grande  nation.  Bonaparte  alone  had 
brought  about  this  change;  and  therefore  he 
alone  could  be  head  of  the  French  monarchy  of 
the  future. 

Yet  there  was  another  side  to  this  question. 
Pasquier,  Roederer,  and  others  who  recked  little 
of  conquests  far  afield,  provided  that  French- 
men might  gain  peace  at  home,  held  that  his 
rule  rested  on  a  utilitarian  basis. 

You  have  on  your  side  [said  Roederer  in  July, 
1800]  their  reason,  the  feeling  of  their  interests, 
their  needs,  but  no  enthusiasm.  .  .  .  The  cheers  you 
have  heard  are  nothing  in  comparison  with  those 
which  Lafayette  aroused  in  1789  and  1790,  though 
he  had  done  nothing  solid  for  the  public  weal. 
Then  it  was  that  imagination  held  sway.  To-day  it 
is  only  the  intimate  feeling  of  your  usefulness,  of 
your  necessity,  which  acts  upon  the  French.1 

If  this  truth  had  struck  home,  it  would  have 
altered  the  career  of  Napoleon  and  the  his- 
tory of  the  world.  In  that  case  he  would 
have  figured  as  a  greater  Mirabeau,  recon- 
ciling the  instincts  of  old  France  with  the 
aspirations  of  new  France;  and  she,  resting 

1  Roederer,  Journal,  p.  9.  In  1797,  on  Bonaparte  re- 
marking to  Sieyes :  "  J'ai  fait  la  grande  nation"  there 
came  the  retort,  "  C'est  parceque  nous  avions  d'abord  fait 
la  nation." 


1 86          Personality  of  Napoleon 

under  his  aegis,  would  not  have  heard  those 
fateful  names,  Friedland,  Wagram,  and  Boro- 
dino. Perhaps  he  would  have  been  satisfied  to 
remain  First  Consul  for  life  with  power  to 
nominate  his  successor,  taking  as  his  model 
Washington,  rather  than  Alexander  the  Great 
or  Caesar. 

These  remarks  imply  that  Napoleon  could 
have  curbed  his  will  and  his  imagination,  a 
difficult  task,  but  far  from  impossible;  for  in 
early  years  the  objective  cast  of  his  thoughts 
provided  a  serviceable  check  to  his  soaring  fancy. 
The  following  sentences  of  his  letter  of  7th 
October,  1797,  to  Talleyrand  go  far  to  explain 
his  rapid  rise  to  power : 

It  is  only  with  prudence,  wisdom,  and  great  dex- 
terity that  obstacles  are  surmounted  and  important 
ends  attained.  From  triumph  to  a  fall  there  is  only 
one  step.  ...  I  see  no  impossibility  in  attaining  in 
the  course  of  a  few  years  those  splendid  results  of 
which  the  heated  and  enthusiastic  imagination 
catches  a  glimpse,  but  which  the  extremely  cool, 
persevering,  and  accurate  man  alone  can  grasp. 

How  strange  that  the  young  conqueror  of  Italy, 
who  wrote  those  words,  should  fifteen  years 
later  fling  away  his  army  in  the  campaign  of 
Moscow ! 


The  Emperor  187 

The  proclamation  of  the  French  Empire  in 
May,  1804,  which  opened  the  more  grandiose; 
period  of  Napoleon's  career,  came  as  a  shock  to 
very  many  Frenchmen  who  had  believed  in  the 
disinterestedness  of  the  First  Consul.  Carnot 
voted  against  the  change  and  then  retired  into 
exile.  Truguet,  the  admiral  in  command  of  the 
Brest  fleet,  refused  to  sign  the  address  in  favour 
of  the  Imperial  title,  and  was  deprived  of  his 
post.  Among  the  troops  at  Metz  and  Boulogne 
there  was  some  grumbling,  many  officers,  e.  g., 
Macdonald  and  Thiebault,  signing  only  in  order 
to  escape  annoyance.  The  exclusion  of  certain 
famous  names  from  the  list  of  the  new  marshals 
and  the  inclusion  of  Bessieres  proved  that  dis- 
tinguished service  counted  for  little  unless  ac- 
companied by  political  subservience.  At  Metz 
Roederer  found  the  troops  and  the  townsfolk  in 
a  state  of  silent  irritation,  deeming  the  exe- 
cution of  the  Due  d'Enghien  a  political  mur- 
der, and  the  condemnation  of  Moreau  a  piece 
of  personal  malice.  They  refused  to  be  com- 
forted by  the  assurance  that  the  change  to  the 
Empire  was  only  a  change  of  name,  and  made 
reply :  "  Why,  then,  are  we  not  spared  the  need- 
less shame  of  destroying  appearances  and  titles 
which  at  least  preserved  for  us  the  honour  of 


188  Personality  of  Napoleon 

a  kind  of  consistency  and  held  off  the  reproach 
of  a  stupid  contradiction  to  our  past?  "  * 

These  and  other  proofs  which  might  be  cited 
refute  Napoleon's  assertion  at  St.  Helena  that 
it  was  impossible  in  France  to  figure  as  a  Wash- 
ington.2 Every  intelligent  Frenchman  wished 
him  to  assume  that  role,  which  could  have  been 
peaceful  after  the  year  1801.  The  resentment 
of  a  great  part  of  France  at  the  assumption  of 
the  Imperial  title  was  destined  to  strain  her  re- 
lations to  Napoleon.  True,  as  Emperor,  he  had 
the  support  of  the  great  majority  of  Frenchmen, 
because  he  guaranteed  them  against  a  Bourbon 
Restoration,  and  its  sequel,  class  distinctions, 
feudal  dues,  tithes,  and  a  resumption  of  landed 
property  by  the  Church  and  the  nobles.  But 
intelligent  men  could  not  see  why  he  needed  to 
become  Emperor  in  order  to  keep  out  the  Bour- 
bons. Only  those  who  were  utterly  ignorant  of 
his  soaring  ambition  and  inflexible  will  could 
imagine  him  tamely  playing  the  part  of  a  Gen- 
eral Monk  and  recalling  Louis  XVIII.  So  far 
back  as  the  close  of  1799  he  had  made  that  per- 
fectly clear  to  two  Royalists  of  the  West  of 
France,  Hyde  de  Neuville  and  d'Andigne :  "  Take 

1  Roederer,  Journal,  p.  198. 

2  Las  Cases,  Memorial,  i.,  467-469. 


The  Emperor  189 

the  side  of  glory.  Come  under  my  flag,"  he  said 
to  them ;  "  my  government  will  be  the  govern- 
ment of  youth  and  intellect."  Andign6  gave  an 
impatient  shrug  of  the  shoulders  and  replied: 
"  Our  place  is  elsewhere."  Whereupon  the  First 
Consul  remarked :  "  What !  Would  you  blush 
to  wear  the  uniform  of  Bonaparte?  .  .  .  What, 
then,  do  you  want  in  order  to  end  the  civil  war?  " 
"  Two  things,"  answered  Hyde,  "  Louis  XVIII. 
as  legitimate  King  of  France,  and  Bonaparte  to 
cover  her  with  glory."  The  First  Consul  smiled, 
but  assured  them  he  would  never  recall  the 
Bourbons;  and  when  he  failed  to  move  them, 
he  cried  out  in  a  passion :  "  I  will  burn  your 
towns  and  your  cottages." *  This  was  in- 
variably his  tone.  Not  one  sign  did  he  ever 
give  that  he  would  sacrifice  the  Eepublic  to  the 
old  dynasty. 

Accordingly,  Cambaceres  and  others  who  knew 
him  well  deeply  resented  the  sacrifice  of  the  Re- 
public to  his  own  aggrandisement.  The  new 
Emperor  was  aware  of  this  feeling,  and  there- 
fore felt  a  certain  distrust,  which  in  its  turn 
begat  a  haughtiness  of  tone  alien  to  the 
happier  days  of  the  Consulate.  Gorgeous  fetes, 
showers  of  new  dignities,  flamboyant  proclama- 

1  Hyde  de  Neuville,  Mems.,  p.  272. 


190          Personality  of  Napoleon 

tions  against  "  perfidious  Albion,"  the  concen- 
tration of  the  national  energies  on  the  fleet  and 
the  Boulogne  flotilla,  public  works  of  great 
utility  and  splendour,  all  served  to  divert  public 
attention  and  hide  the  distrust;  but  it  was 
never  wholly  stifled.  During  the  campaign  of 
1806  in  Prussia,  Mollien,  Minister  of  the  Public 
Treasure,  sought  to  find  out  the  real  state  of 
mind  of  leading  Frenchmen.  He  noticed  that 
after  the  victory  at  Jena,  many  who  had  pre- 
viously prophesied  disaster  and  called  Frederick 
William  of  Prussia  the  avenger  of  the  world's 
liberty,  afterwards  declared  that  God  himself 
had  strengthened  Napoleon  to  be  the  champion 
of  the  sanctity  of  treaties.  Not  that  those 
would-be  manipulators  of  Providence  desired  the 
return  of  the  Bourbons;  they  merely  looked 
ahead  to  a  time  when  Napoleon  should  have 
fallen,  and  (says  Mollien),  "held  their  devotion 
in  reserve  on  behalf  of  the  next  Government, 
whatever  it  might  be."  *  There  is  a  world  of 
meaning  in  that  phrase.  A  prominent  French- 
man made  the  shrewd  remark  about  Napoleon 
III. :  "  Celui-ci  est  condamne  d'etre  brillant." 
Much  the  same  necessity  was  laid  upon  the  First 
Napoleon;  and  his  vivid  fancy  magnified  the 
i  Mollien,  Mems.,  ii.,  90  (edit,  of  1845). 


The  Emperor  191 

need  until  it  became  the  master  motive  of  his 
life. 

During  several  years  the  experiment  completely 
succeeded;  and  in  the  land  of  the  Revolution 
its  "  heir "  was  able  to  carry  anti-Republican 
measures.  Thus  he  instituted  a  commission  of 
senators,  in  order  to  watch  over  the  liberty  of 
the  Press,  which  succeeded  in  completely  en- 
chaining it.  Another  commission  safeguarded 
individual  liberty,  while  in  the  prisons  were 
many  who  were  detained  solely  at  the  fiat  of 
the  Emperor.  As  Pasquier  well  remarks,  Napo- 
leon upheld  in  its  entirety  only  one  part  of 
revolutionary  law,  that  which  concerned  the 
lands  confiscated  in  and  after  the  year  1789.1 

It  is  the  nature  of  autocracy  to  become  more 
self-centred;  and  a  masterful  character  expands 
with  every  new  conquest.  Napoleon's  Ministers 
and  the  members  of  the  Council  of  State  soon 
had  cause  to  observe  the  influence  of  the  Im- 
perial dignity  on  his  character  and  bearing.  His 
use  of  the  term  "  subjects  "  instead  of  "  citizens  " 
was  significant;  and  in  succeeding  months,  espe- 
cially after  receiving  the  holy  oil  from  the  Pope 
at  the  coronation,  he  introduced  more  elaborate 
ceremonies  at  Court  and  treated  old  counsellors 

1  Pasquier,  Mems.,  i.,  225. 


192          Personality  of  Napoleon 

with  reserve.  While  placing  in  high  stations 
Cambaceres,  Talleyrand,  and  Fouche,  he  kept 
them  in  check  by  fanning  their  mutual  dislikes, 
and  often  dealt  outrageous  rebukes  for  trifling 
indiscretions.  As  for  the  Council  of  State, 
where  formerly  he  discussed  matters  frankly,  it 
became  more  and  more  a  Court  registering  his 
mandates  or  the  Senatus  Consulta  under  which 
they  were  thinly  disguised.  After  his  return 
from  Tilsit  he  evinced  an  especially  dominating 
mood.  Mollien  describes  Napoleon's  methods  of 
overbearing  objections  which  occurred  during  the 
debates  in  the  Council  of  State.  At  such  times 
(says  Mollien) 

he  armed  his  polemic  with  the  most  urgent  argu- 
ments, and  in  some  cases  with  the  bitterest  censure, 
and  almost  always  with  a  flood1  of  objections  impos- 
sible to  foresee,  still  more  so  to  combat,  because 
the  attempt  to  catch  hold  of  the  thread  would  have 
been  as  vain  as  to  break  it.  He  ended  most  of  these 
confabulations  (as  Talleyrand  termed  them)  by  ask- 
ing those  who  had  held  aloof  if  he  was  not  right, 
and  in  this  case  he  always  succeeded  in  finding 
every  reason  submitting  to  his  own.  Sometimes 
also,  after  digressions  of  two  hours  in  which  he 
alone  spoke,  he  would  say,  pointing  to  his  chair 
and  casting  a  look  of  good-natured  irony  on  his 
auditors,  "  Confess  that  it  is  easy  to  be  clever  on 
such  a  seat  as  this." 


The  Emperor  193 

On  the  other  hand  he  rarely  nursed  resentment 
against  those  who  opposed  him ;  and,  on  hearing 
that  a  certain  councillor  was  still  smarting 
under  the  reproaches  levelled  at  him,  remarked : 
"He  is  quite  wrong;  for  I  scarcely  remember 
the  affair."  * 

This  is  characteristic  of  Napoleon.  He  rarely 
displayed  the  personal  animosity  to  which  a 
small  and  peevish  nature  is  prone.  In  the  main 
he  was  so  completely  sure  of  his  own  superiority 
as  to  rise  far  above  the  spitefulness  which  char- 
acterised, say,  the  dealings  of  George  III.  with 
Chatham,  of  Robespierre  with  Danton,  or  of 
Frederick  William  III.  with  Stein.  Napoleon 
had  the  failings  of  an  intense  and  resolute  na- 
ture, but  in  his  best  days  he  was  free  from  the 
pettinesses  of  weaker  men.  It  is  questionable 
whether  he  took  enough  interest  in  men  ever  to 
feel  deeply  about  them.  For  the  most  part  he 
regarded  them  as  the  instruments  of  his  will, 
valuing  them  in  proportion  to  their  efficiency, 
sharpening  their  edge  by  appeals  to  love  of 
France  or  of  glory,  working  them  hard,  but  not 
so  hard  as  he  worked  himself,  and  throwing  them 
aside  on  proof  of  incompetence.  He  did  not 
hate  them,  any  more  than  one  hates  a  blunt 

1  Mollien,  M ems.,  ii.,  221-223. 
13 


194          Personality  of  Napoleon 

knife.  He  sharpened  it,  or  threw  it  away.  On 
one  occasion  he  soundly  rated  his  Minister  Cham- 
pagny  for  not  having  ready  a  report  which 
involved  long  and  arduous  researches  in  the 
Archives.  On  Champagny  explaining  that  the 
chief  archivist,  Hauterive,  was  ill,  Napoleon 
turned  about  sharply  towards  a  councillor  who 
was  suffering  terribly  from  the  gout,  and  said, 
with  an  untranslatable  phrase :  "  Well,  when 
clerks  are  ill,  they  go  to  the  hospital,  and  one 
gets  others."1  In  fact  he  resolved  to  work 
every  one  at  high  pressure  for  the  glory  of  France 
and  the  aggrandisement  of  his  power.  He  re- 
garded public  policy  as  a  magnified  game  of 
chess,  necessitating  keen  foresight,  profound,  cal- 
culation, and  inflexible  resolve.  The  men  were 
pieces ;  the  prize  was  a  world  Empire. 

The  spread  over  Europe  of  the  Napoleonic 
Empire  seems  to  us  now  almost  like  the  rise  of 
the  phantom  city  limned  by  the  genius  of  Milton : 

Anon  out  of  the  earth  a  fabric  huge 
Rose  like  an  exhalation. 

We  can  explain  the  miracle  only  by  the  impetu- 
ous energy  and  many-sided  ability  of  the  master- 
builder  and  his  unequalled  power  of  drawing  the 
1  Chaptal,  Souvenirs,  p.  360. 


The  Emperor  195 

utmost  from  all  his  subordinates.  Working  often 
twelve  to  sixteen  hours  a  day,  gulping  down  his 
dinner  in  twenty  minutes,  and  finding  as  much 
rest  in  an  hour  spent  in  a  hot  bath  as  ordinary 
men  did  in  three  or  four  hours  of  sleep,  he 
toiled  with  the  intense  activity  and  concentrated 
will-power  nowadays  needed  by  the  controller  of 
a  great  system  of  trusts.  He  loved  work.  As 
his  secretary,  Meneval,  remarked :  "  The  de- 
vouring activity  of  his  brain,  which  never  found 
enough  material  on  which  to  work,  and  kept 
growing  in  proportion  to  the  multiplicity  of  busi- 
ness, used  to  suffice  for  everything."  Napoleon 
said  to  Las  Cases  at  St.  Helena : 

Work  is  my  element,  for  which  I  was  born  and 
fitted.  I  have  found  the  limits  of  power  of  my  legs 
and  of  my  eyes:  I  have  never  discovered  those  of 
my  power  of  work.  So  I  was  near  killing  that  poor 
Me"neval.  I  had  to  replace  him  and  send  him  to 
recruit  with  Marie  Louise,  in  whose  service  his 
employment  was  a  mere  sinecure.1 

These  powers,  directed  by  a  keen  and  well- 
trained  mind,  and  propelled  by  a  determined 
will,  enabled  him  to  grapple  with  all  the  details 
of  a  vast  administration;  so  that  he  became 
the  original  of  St.  Simon's  "  crowned  indus- 

1  Meneval,  Herns.,  i.,  405 ;  Las  Cases,  Memorial,  vi.,  272 
(25th  September,  1816). 


196          Personality  of  Napoleon 

trial,"  replacing  feudal  narrowness  and  courtly 
nonchalance  by  a  world-embracing  and  world- 
compelling  intelligence.  Compare  Napoleon's 
government  with  the  distracting  dualism  pre- 
valent at  Berlin  up  to  1807,  or  with  Hapsburg 
pedantries,  or  British  conservatism,  and  the 
marvel  of  the  Napoleonic  supremacy  is  ex- 
plained. It  is  the  supremacy  of  reason  over 
tradition,  of  energy  over  supineness. 

The  motives  on  which  he  relied  for  securing 
enthusiastic  service  were  patriotism,  devotion  to 
his  person,  love  of  glory,  and,  in  the  last  resort, 
fear.  I  need  say  nothing  about  the  patriotism 
of  the  French.  It  was  never  more  ardent  than 
after  the  triumphs  of  the  revolutionary  arms; 
and  Napoleon  became  the  magnet  attracting  this 
errant  enthusiasm.  It  is  the  characteristic  of  a 
powerful  nature  to  call  forth  intense  devotion; 
and  never  has  man  been  so  devotedly  served  as 
Napoleon.  That  sentiment  throbs  in  every  page 
of  the  Memoirs  of  Meneval.  On  one  occasion  the 
Emperor  unjustly  accused  him  of  frequenting 
the  masked  ball  of  the  Opera  and  another  resort 
where  his  opponents  were  to  be  found.  He  chid 
him  harshly  for  this,  but,  seeing  his  secretary 
neither  blench  nor  falter,  again  accorded  his 


The  Emperor  197 

unlimited  confidence,  which  Me"neval  faithfully 
repaid.  Sweet-tempered,  quiet,  and  extremely 
reserved,  he  was  fitted  by  nature  to  be  the  dog- 
like  companion  of  a  man  of  genius;  and  a  con- 
vincing proof  of  the  greatness  of  Napoleon  lies 
in  the  uniformly  favourable  estimate  left  by  his 
secretary.  As  for  the  devotion  of  the  troops,  it 
littered  the  half  of  Europe  with  their  bones,  from 
Cadiz  to  Moscow.  But  there  are  two  incidents 
of  special  pathos  recorded  by  officers  who  took 
part  in  the  Moscow  campaign.  The  Due  de 
Fezensac,  aide-de-camp  to  Berthier,  relates  that, 
while  the  Grand  Army  was  half-starving  at  Mos- 
cow, Napoleon  held  a  review  at  the  Kremlin,  and 
the  men  pulled  themselves  together  so  pluckily 
and  presented  so  fine  an  appearance  as  com- 
pletely to  hide  their  misery.  Indeed,  the  aspect  of 
the  army  was  such  as  to  convince  him  that  with 
such  troops  he  could  go  anywhere  and  do  any- 
thing. The  other  incident  refers  to  the  ghastly 
scenes  of  the  retreat  from  the  Beresina  to  Vilna. 
Sergeant  Bourgogne  relates  that,  when  men  were 
perishing  nightly  by  the  insufficient  camp-fires, 
some  would  hand  sticks  to  Napoleon's  servants, 
with  the  words,  "  Take  them  for  the  Emperor."  x 

1  Fezensac,   Campagne   de   Russie,   ch.   iii. ;   Bourgogne, 
Mems.,  ch.  viii. 


198          Personality  of  Napoleon 

Napoleon's  personality  and  his  phenomenal 
energy  were  a  constant  appeal  for  civic  devotion. 
Take  these  thrilling  words  to  his  young  brother 
Jerome  Bonaparte  at  the  beginning  of  his  naval 
career :  "  You  may  die  young,  but  not  if  you 
have  lived  without  glory,  useless  to  the  father- 
land, and  leaving  no  trace  of  your  existence; 
for  that  is  not  to  have  lived  at  all."  Then  again, 
when  Jerome  left  his  ship  without  permission,  in 
order  to  marry  Miss  Paterson  of  Baltimore, 
Napoleon's  wrath  was  kindled  as  much  by  the 
breach  of  naval  discipline  as  by  the  mesalliance. 
Ordering  that  the  bride  should  at  once  be  sent 
back  to  America,  he  wrote  thus  to  Madame  Mere 
about  the  bridegroom: 

I  shall  treat  this  young  man  severely  if  he  sho^vs 
himself  unworthy  of  the  name  he  bears,  during  the 
only  interview  I  shall  grant  him,  if  he  persists  in 
carrying  on  his  liaison.  If  he  shows  no  inclination 
to  wash  away  the  dishonour  with  which  he  has 
stained  my  name  by  forsaking  his  country's  flag  on 
land  and  sea,  for  the  sake  of  a  wretched  woman,  I 
will  cast  him  off  for  ever.  I  may  make  him  an  ex- 
ample which  will  teach  young  soldiers  the  sacredness 
of  their  duty,  and  the  enormity  of  the  crime  they 
commit  when  they  forsake  their  flag  for  a  woman.1 

We  cannot  but  pity   the   young  bride,   whose 

1  Lecestre,  Lettres  Inedites   de  Nap.,  i.,  48. 


The  Emperor  199 

future  was  thus  cruelly  blighted;  but  much  may 
be  said  in  defence  of  Napoleon's  action  in  up- 
holding the  laws  of  France  and  the  discipline 
of  the  navy,  which  Jerome  had  broken. 

The  standard  and  the  eagle  were  held  up  to 
special  veneration.  The  grant  of  the  colours  to 
the  troops  was  the  occasion  of  a  magnificent  dis- 
play early  in  the  Empire.  It  always  took  place 
with  eclat.  Early  in  the  campaign  of  1813  a 
recruit  felt  the  inspiration  that  thrilled  in  Napo- 
leon's words,  when,  rising  in  his  stirrups,  he 
hurled  at  the  regiment  the  appeal  to  swear  to 
defend  the  colours.  "  I  felt,  as  we  all  felt,  that 
he  snatched  from  our  very  navel  the  cry — '  Yes ; 
we  swear.'  "  Owing  to  this  spirit  of  devotion  to 
the  flag,  regiments  let  themselves  be  cut  up 
rather  than  surrender  the  symbol  of  their  own 
and  their  country's  honour ;  witness  the  splendid 
fight  made  by  the  14th  line  regiment  at  Eylau 
when  cut  off  from  its  supports  and  left  stand- 
ing alone  on  a  hillock  with  swarms  of  Cossacks 
around 1 ;  or  the  even  more  marvellous  defence 
of  a  battalion  of  Breton  National  Guards,  at  la 
Fere  Champenoise  in  1814  against  repeated 

1  Marbot's  Memoires,  ch.  xxix.  I  do  not  credit  Marbot's 
account  of  his  ride  out  to  the  14th  and  back,  when  a 
whole  battalion  of  the  Old  Guard  opened  fire  on  him  and 
failed  to  hit  either  him  or  his  mare! 


2oo          Personality  of  Napoleon 

charges  of  cavalry,  until  they  were  finally  cut 
to  pieces  rather  than  surrender.  Such  exploits 
betoken  superhuman  bravery;  and  it  is  this 
which  in  the  last  resort  wins  battles.  In  No- 
vember, 1806,  the  citizens  of  Berlin  looked  with 
astonishment  at  the  little  fellows  of  Davout's 
corps  who  had  beaten  the  splendid  Prussian 
Guards,  physically  far  their  superior,  not  know- 
ing thatj  apart  from  generalship,  it  is  the  spirit 
pervading  the  army  which  makes  its  fighting 
power.  As  Napoleon  said :  "  In  war  morale 
and  opinion  are  more  than  half  the  battle."  i 

These  considerations  explain  the  fury  of  the 
Emperor  at  a  capitulation.  After  a  naval  en- 
counter little  creditable  to  his  flag,  he  declared 
in  burning  words  that  a  navy  was  mere  timber 
and  hemp  unless  officers  and  men  were  animated 
by  sentiments  of  honour  leading  them  to  die 
rather  than  accept  a  rebuff.  Again,  to  Decres, 
Minister  of  Marine,  he  burst  out  with  the  in- 
vective :  "  Your  Villeneuve  is  not  fit  to  command 
a  frigate,"  because  Villeneuve  after  the  action 
of  22d  July,  1805,  off  Cape  Finisterre  did  not 
struggle  on  towards  Boulogne,  but  put  back  to 
Cadiz.  Still  more  terrible  was  his  rage  at  hear- 
ing of  the  first  great  disaster  to  the  French  arms 

1  Nap.  Corresp.,  xix.,  570. 


The  Emperor  201 

on  land,  the  surrender  of  General  Dupont  with 
22,800  men  to  the  Spaniards  at  Baylen  on  21st 
July,  1808.  He  might  well  be  angry.  Hitherto 
he  had  believed  the  Spanish  rising  of  1808  to 
be  the  work  of  monks,  peasants,  and  a  few 
hot-heads  in  the  towns.  Bessieres's  victory  at 
Medina  da  llio  Seco,  a  week  before,  had  seemed 
to  him  the  end  of  the  rebellion.  "  No  battle," 
so  he  wrote  to  Bessieres,  "  was  ever  gained  in 
more  important  circumstances:  it  decides  mat- 
ters in  Spain."  x  And  now  Baylen  upset  every- 
thing. "Bead  these  documents,"  he  wrote  to 
Clarke,  Minister  of  War,  "  and  you  will  see  that 
from  the  beginning  of  the  world  there  never  was 
anything  so  stupid,  so  silly,  so  cowardly.  This 
justifies  the  Macks,  the  Hohenlohes,  etc.  I  wish 
to  know  what  tribunals  are  to  try  these  generals, 
and  what  punishments  the  laws  inflict  on  such 
a  crime."  In  order  to  exact  punishment  from 
Dupont  and  his  chief  officers,  he  went  to  the 
Council  of  State  with  a  decree  regulating  the 
procedure  of  the  court-martial.  He  spoke  to 
the  Council  vehemently,  with  the  tears  in  his 
eyes,  enumerating  the  resources  open  to  that  un- 
fortunate general  even  in  the  last  desperate 
moments ;  and  then  he  exclaimed :  "  Yes,  the 
1  Ibid.,  xvii.,  401. 


202          Personality  of  Napoleon 

elder  Horace,  in  Corneille's  play,  is  right,  when, 
being  asked  what  his  flying  son  could  have  done 
(in  the  fight  one  against  three)  he  says:  '  He 
might  have  died ' ;  or,  he  adds,  '  he  might  have 
called  a  noble  despair  to  his  rescue.'  Little," 
continued  Napoleon,  "  do  they  know  of  human 
nature  who  find  fault  with  Corneille,  and  pre- 
tend that  he  has  weakened  the  effect  of  the 
first  exclamation  by  that  which  follows." i 
These  examples  of  heroism,  together  with  the 
disgrace  attending  surrender,  produced  the 
soldiery  glorified  by  Heine  in  The  Two  Grena- 
diers. In  real  life  they  stand  forth  on  the 
slope  of  La  Belle  Alliance  on  the  night  of  18th 
June,  1815,  animated  by  Cambronne's  im- 
mortal words :  "  The  Guard  dies  and  does  not 
surrender." 

Where  Napoleon  could  not  inspire  devotion 
he  struck  fear.  He  had  the  poor  opinion  of 
human  nature  which  prevails  among  politicians ; 
and  we  must  remember  that  at  the  close  of  a 
violent  revolution  men  show  their  worst  side. 
The  bullies  and  intriguers  are  apt  to  come  out 
at  the  top,  vaulting  over  their  more  virtuous 
and  consistent  comrades.  Napoleon  had  lived 
through  that  time,  which,  as  we  saw,  sapped 

1  Pelet,  op.  cit.,  p.  9 ;  Corneille,  Horace,  Act  III.,  Sc.  6. 


The  Emperor  203 

the  idealism  of  his  youth  and  imbued  him  with 
hard  and  cynical  notions.  Thenceforth  he  sought 
to  find  out  the  weak  and  bad  points  of  men, 
and  in  general  he  exaggerated  them.  As  a 
Councillor  of  State  observed,  "  Napoleon,  look- 
ing down  from  the  vast  height  which  he  had 
reached,  thought  the  rest  of  mankind  smaller 
than  they  really  were;  and  this  was  the  cause 
of  his  downfall."  There  is  a  deep  truth  in  this. 
A  man  who  despises  the  human  race  will  end 
by  alienating  it. 

There  was  something  in  the  countenance  of 
Napoleon  which  produced  fear,  or  at  least  ap- 
prehension. He  could  be  gracious,  charming; 
but  the  change  to  a  frown  on  that  serene  brow, 
to  a  flash  of  anger  from  those  caressing  eyes, 
came  with  southern  suddenness,  so  that  the  most 
prudent  were  ever  on  their  guard,  and  the  strong- 
est felt  a  presentiment  of  lurking  danger.  One 
of  the  English  travellers  detained  at  Nancy  by 
Napoleon's  orders  described  his  face  as  denoting 
good  sense  and  mildness,  though  accompanied  by 
haughtiness.  The  eyes  expressed  profound  medi- 
tation. But  on  Napoleon's  return  to  Paris  some 
ten  weeks  later,  after  the  campaign  of  Auster- 
litz,  his  look  and  bearing  betokened  arrogance 
so  visibly  as  to  daunt  all  the  bystanders,  the 


204          Personality  of  Napoleon 

victor  being  clearly  resolved  to  keep  tlie  people 
at  arm's  length.1 

A  similar  change  occurred  after  all  his  great 
campaigns :  and  at  the  climax  of  the  Empire  all 
the  ingenuity  of  courtiers  went  to  gratifying  the 
whims  of  the  master.  Alexandre  Duval  has  de- 
scribed how,  during  the  reading  of  a  drama  to 
a  circle  of  the  friends  of  Queen  Hortense  in 
her  salon,  they  were  startled  by  the  entrance 
of  Napoleon,  unannounced.  At  once  the  com- 
pany sprang  up,  and,  forming  a  line,  stood  at 
attention  with  all  the  promptitude  of  a  company 
of  troops.  One  of  the  Marshals  also  confessed 
to  a  feeling  of  terror  at  Court,  so  soon  as  the 
cry  "  L'Empereur "  was  raised.  His  feelings 
were  not  exceptional ;  for  he  knew  several  "  fine 
fellows "  who  trembled  in  all  their  limbs  on 
these  occasions.  General  Vandamme,  a  very 
swashbuckler,  confessed  that  in  the  presence  of 
Napoleon  he  lost  command  of  himself  and  be- 
came a  prey  to  feelings  of  confusion  which  were 
the  nearest  approach  he  knew  to  fear.  Finally, 
note  the  following  incident  as  typical  of  Napo- 
leon's influence  over  the  other  sex.  At  the  Court 
at  Dresden  in  May,  1812,  when  he  marched  be- 
fore the  line  of  bowing  ladies,  the  gentlemen 
1  W.  T.  Williams,  State  of  France  (1802-6),  ii.,  130. 


The  Emperor  205 

who  stood  behind  them  noticed  that,  as  the  great 
man  passed  along,  a  deep  flush  of  agitation 
spread  from  shoulder  to  shoulder,  producing,  so 
we  may  conjecture,  a  picturesque  crescendo  and 
diminuendo  in  carmine.1 

Ultimately  it  proved  to  be  a  misfortune  for 
Napoleon  that  he  inspired  so  general  an  appre- 
hension. A  masterful  nature  is  the  better  for 
intelligent  and  manly  criticism.  Mme.  de  Stael 
early  saw  that  Bonaparte  respected  an  out- 
spoken opponent.  So  far  back  as  the  year  1798 
she  noted  an  instance  in  which  he  was  taken 
aback  by  a  spirited  answer.  Going  up  to  a  lady 
in  the  Salon,  who  was  admired  for  her  beauty 
and  vivacity,  he  said  with  singular  frankness: 
"  Madame,  I  do  not  like  women  meddling  with 
politics."  "  You  are  right,  General,"  she  re- 
plied; "but  in  a  country  where  their  heads  are 
cut  off,  they  naturally  want  to  know  why." 
Bonaparte  made  no  reply.  "  He  is  a  man,"  con- 
tinued Mme.  de  Stael,  "  who  is  quieted  by  real 
resistance :  those  who  have  endured  his  despotism 
are  as  much  to  blame  as  he  himself  is."  2  There 
is  a  deep  truth  in  this.  Firm  opposition  calls 
forth  the  best  qualities  of  a  strong  man.  Fail- 

1  Vandal,  Napoleon  et  Alexandre  /.,  iii.,  418. 

2  Mme.  de  Stael,  La  Rev.  Franfaise,  bk.  iii.,  ch.  xv. 


206          Personality  of  Napoleon 

ing  to  meet  with  opposition,  he  is  apt  to  run  to 
excess.  Now,  as  we  saw  in  Lecture  I,  Napoleon 
could  at  need  display  surprising  self-command 
even  under  great  provocation.  On  such  occa- 
sions probably  astonishment  held  him  spell- 
bound in  the  first  moments,  thus  giving  time 
for  the  play  of  the  sentiment  of  justice  which 
generally  prescribed  his  conduct ;  for,  as  he  once 
said :  "  I  may  be  a  hard  man ;  but  at  bottom 
I  am  a  just  man."  Another  moderating  influ- 
ence was  a  strong  man's  admiration  for  strength 
in  others.  With  his  keen  sense  of  personal 
honour,  he  could  not  but  respect  the  same  senti- 
ment in  those  whom  he  annoyed;  and,  always 
regarding  men  as  instruments  for  his  service,  he 
sought  to  enlist  their  enthusiastic  support.  Well 
would  it  have  been  for  him  and  for  Europe  if  he 
had  met  with  the  same  courageous  opposition  in 
his  Council  Chamber.  But  it  was  the  bane  of 
France  that  the  Revolution  killed  off  the  most 
consistent  and  courageous  leaders,  leaving  behind 
only  men  of  the  second  rank  or  mere  trimmers. 

It  must  not  be  supposed  that  the  Council  of 
State  ever  wholly  acquiesced  in  this  administra- 
tive despotism.  Cormenin,  the  historian  of  that 
body,  thus  describes  its  disapproval,  if  not  its 
resistance : 


The  Emperor  207 

How  often  has  not  tbe  Council  done  good  service 
to  the  people  in  tempering  the  fiery  bursts  of  their 
chief  by  the  wisdom  and  calm  of  their  deliberations? 
What  can  be  imagined  more  impressive,  or  indeed 
more  eloquent,  than  those  long  intervals  of  pro- 
found silence  which  occurred  from  time  to  time  in 
the  Council  ?  And  how  often  did  not  honourable  and 
truly  public-spirited  members  boldly  advocate  the 
cause  of  virtue  and  freedom,  even  in  the  presence 
of  the  monarch  himself,  and  amidst  the  servile  mur- 
murs of  less  generous  spirits?  * 

This  attitude  was  certainly  dignified;  but  the 
outcome  of  it,  so  far  as  concerned  France,  was 
imperceptible.  After  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit,  which 
made  Napoleon  master  of  Europe,  he  dissolved 
the  Tribunate  as  useless.  With  equally  good 
logic  all  the  other  legislative  bodies  might  have 
gone;  for  the  will  of  the  Emperor,  working 
through  the  Privy  Council  and  the  ministerial 
departments,  held  unbridled  sway.  He  cared 
little  whether  officials  were  popular  or  not.  In 
fact  he  often  kept  in  office  an  unpopular  min- 
ister or  prefect  on  the  ground  that  such  an 
one  had  no  other  refuge  than  in  him,  and  there- 
fore would  be  faithful.  The  Argus-eyed  Em- 
peror surveyed  every  action,  every  report  from 
the  standpoint — "Does  it  imply  devotion  to 

1  Cormenin,  Du  Conseil  d'Etat,  p.  33. 


208  Personality  of  Napoleon 

me? "  This  vigilance  was  not  relaxed  even 
during  distant  campaigns.  "  From  the  midst  of 
his  camps,  and  amidst  military  operations,  he 
was  resolved,"  says  Mollien,  "  not  only  to  govern, 
but  to  administer  France;  and  he  succeeded."1 
A  typical  example  of  this  decisive  mastery  of 
civil  affairs  when  in  the  midst  of  war  is  seen 
in  his  varied  work  on  the  eve  of  the  battle  of 
Austerlitz.  After  explaining  his  plan  of  battle 
to  his  leading  officers,  he  turned  aside  to  dictate 
the  organisation  of  the  large  boarding-school  at 
St.  Denis,  which  received  a  number  of  daughters 
of  the  members  of  the  Legion  of  Honour.  Napo- 
leon drew  up  its  rules,  which  guided  that  in- 
stitution for  many  years,  in  an  hour  or  two  that 
he  snatched  from  work  at  the  multifarious  de- 
tails connected  with  the  great  battle  on  the 
following  day.2 

As  a  result  of  these  multiform  activities  there 
was  built  up  the  most  far-reaching  despotism 
that  Europe  has  seen  since  the  days  of  the  Roman 
Empire.  Napoleon  summed  up  his  ideals  of  the 
function  of  government  in  a  simile  which 
grandly  expressed  his  sense  of  the  political 
cosmos  which  he  had  created.  "  Government," 

1  Mollien,  Mems.,  ii.,  75. 

2  Pelet,  ch.  i. 


The  Emperor  209 

he  said  to  Mollien,  "plays  the  part  of  the  sun 
in  the  social  system,  whose  various  bodies  should 
revolve  around  this  central  luminary,  each  keep- 
ing strictly  to  its  own  orbit."  Yes;  he  himself 
was  the  central  orb,  and  his  will  was  the  law 
of  gravitation  which  kept  Ministers,  Marshals, 
Legislature,  Prefects,  rotating  in  their  several 
orbits,  the  slightest  deviation  being  instantly 
checked  by  a  flash  of  wrath  from  the  sun-god. 
To  him  and  him  alone  all  were  answerable. 
The  lesser  authorities  which,  since  the  days  of 
old  Kome,  had  checked  the  absolutism  of  em- 
perors and  kings  were  no  longer  in  existence; 
and  this  raised  him  high  above  his  predecessors. 
Charlemagne,  Charles  V.,  Henry  VIII.  of  Eng- 
land, Peter  the  Great,  Frederick  the  Great,  were 
face  to  face  with  diverse  barriers,  tribal,  local, 
constitutional,  aristocratic,  or  bureaucratic. 
Napoleon  dominated  a  land  whence  the  levelling 
tide  of  equality  had  swept  away  every  barrier 
in  order  to  give  effect  to  the  supremacy  of  the 
general  will;  and  now,  a  decade  later,  the  re- 
action against  the  unnatural  attempt  to  merge 
the  individual  in  an  equalised  mass  helped  to 
raise  aloft  a  great  personality  in  whom  the 
individual  achieved  a  signal  revenge,  an  un- 
challenged triumph. 

14 


210          Personality  of  Napoleon 

He  believed  himself  called  to  further  the  re- 
action towards  order  and  monarchy.  In  the 
spring  of  1814,  when  the  sovereigns  of  Europe 
were  preparing  to  invade  France,  he  said  to 
Chaptal :  "  Wretches !  They  do  not  see  that  I 
have  crushed  revolutions,  and  have  worked 
twenty  years  to  consolidate  monarchy.  They 
will  see  that  after  me  they  will  be  too  weak 
to  stay  the  torrent,  which  in  ten  years  will 
sweep  them  all  away."  At  times  even  in  the 
heyday  of  the  Empire  he  declared  that  it  would 
pass  away  with  him.  "  All  this  will  last  while 
I  hold  out,"  so  he  once  said  to  the  Council  of 
State ;  "  but,  when  I  am  gone,  my  son  may  call 
himself  lucky  if  he  has  a  couple  of  thousand 
a  year."  l 

This  feeling  of  apprehension,  natural  to  an 
eager  and  nervous  temperament,  explains  the 
impetuosity  of  his  onset  against  all  enemies,  in- 
ternal or  foreign,  in  the  hope  of  crushing  all 
opposition  during  his  reign.  Certainly  the  at- 
tempt to  found  monarchy  on  the  basis  of  a 
renovated  society  was  a  great  and  inspiring  idea, 
which  has  had  noteworthy  results.  The  impulse 
imparted  by  his  public  works  to  material  pros- 
perity can  scarcely  be  overestimated.  To  this 

1  Chaptal,  Souvenirs,  p.  320;  Pelet,  xviii. 


The  Emperor  211 

task  he  applied  himself  unceasingly;  and  his 
keen  eye  for  geography  no  less  than  his  dis- 
cernment of  the  elemental  needs  of  mankind 
!  enabled  him  to  mark  out  the  lines  of  develop- 
ment for  the  communications  and  commerce  of 
France  and  a  large  part  of  Europe.  Postponing 
to  Lecture  VII  a  brief  description  of  his  plans 
for  other  lands,  we  may  here  glance  at  the 
chief  of  those  which  furthered  the  prosperity  of 
France. 

His  admiration  of  the  Caesars  naturally  led 
him  to  study  their  methods  of  administration, 
notably  the  system  of  roads  which  assured  direct 
communication  between  Rome  and  the  chief  pro- 
vincial capitals,  thus  binding  together  the  Em- 
pire both  in  war  and  peace.  Napoleon  in  fancy 
saw  himself  the  conqueror  and  pacificator  of  all 
neighbouring  lands;  and  the  road  or  canal  was, 
in  a  material  sense,  the  chief  instrument  of  his 
rule.  He  greatly  improved  the  roads  leading  to 
the  exposed  borders  of  his  Empire,  especially 
those  from  Paris  to  Cologne,  Mainz,  and  Strass- 
burg,  as  also  that  skirting  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine  from  Mainz  to  Cologne.  So,  too,  the  roads 
over  the  Mont  Cenis,  Mont  Genevre,  and  Simplon 
Passes  were  made  practicable  for  armies  with 
cannon,  and  tunnels  were  constructed  where 


212          Personality  of  Napoleon 

there  was  danger  from  avalanches.  After  es- 
tablishing Eugene  as  Viceroy  of  Italy  at  Milan, 
he  informed  him  that  the  roads  and  the  service 
of  couriers  must  be  improved  so  that  a  despatch 
could  go  between  Paris  and  Milan  in  five  days.1 
While  preparing  for  the  invasion  of  England, 
Napoleon  assigned  the  chief  importance  to  the 
roads  from  Paris  to  Boulogne,  Cherbourg,  and 
Brest,  those  leading  from  the  capital  to  Turin, 
Toulon,  and  the  Spanish  frontier  ranking  in  the 
second  place;  while  those  to  Strassburg  and 
Cologne  (via  Brussels)  were  of  small  account. 
Afterwards,  of  course,  this  order  was  altered, 
and  the  roads  to  the  Rhine  and  the  Simplon 
held  the  first  place  in  his  thoughts,  the  annexa- 
tion of  Canton  Valais  in  1810  being  largely  due 
to  his  desire  to  control  the  Simplon  road  (com- 
pleted in  1807)  in  the  valley  of  the  Upper 
Rhone.  All  over  France  the  impulse  of  the 
great  organiser  sufficed  greatly  to  improve  the 
communications.  The  improvement  was  all 
the  more  striking  because  the  Revolution,  after 
sweeping  away  the  patriarchial  system  of  the 
corvee,  had  replaced  it  by  nothing  effective. 

In  the  year  1793  the  Revolutionists  had 
adopted  a  very  important  means  of  sending 

1  Nap.  Corresp.,  xi.,  37. 


The  Emperor  213 

news,  the  semaphore  telegraph,  an  invention  of 
an  engineer,  Claude  Chappe.  Lanterns  were  at- 
tached to  the  arms  by  night,  so  that  both  by 
night  and  day  messages  could  be  sent  from  one 
signal  post  to  another  provided  that  they  were 
not  more  than  7%  miles  apart.  By  these 
means  tidings  came  quickly  along  the  first  line, 
from  Lille  to  Paris.  Napoleon  greatly  extended 
this  useful  device,  connecting  Paris  with  Brest 
on  the  west,  on  the  east  with  Hiiningen,  as  also 
with  Milan  via  Lyons.  Owing  to  the  risk  of 
discovery  of  the  code  of  signals,  Napoleon  seems 
to  have  trusted  to  couriers  for  matters  of  high 
policy.  In  1805  Lavalette,  his  Postmaster- 
General,  organised  a  plan  by  which  postilions 
carried  the  despatches  at  high  speed  from  stage 
to  stage,  registering  the  time  of  arrival  and  de- 
parture in  an  official  book.  This  plan  saved 
both  time  and  money.  Thenceforth  Napoleon 
received  an  answer  back  from  the  Viceroy  at 
Milan  in  eight  days,  and  from  Naples  in  fifteen 
days.  This  excellent  system  largely  contributed 
to  his  successes.1 

The  canal  system  of  France  received  an  im- 
mense development  under  the  Emperor.  Up  to 
his  time  France  had  fallen  behind  England  in 

1  Lavalette,  M6ms.,  ch.  xxiv. 


214          Personality  of  Napoleon 

this  respect.  Brindley's  Bridgwater  Canal  and 
other  ventures  had  been  a  great  success;  and 
early  in  the  nineteenth  century  important  works, 
such  as  the  Caledonian  Canal  and  the  Leeds  and 
Liverpool  Canal,  were  either  planned  or  actually 
begun.  It  has  been  stated  that  few  canals  ex- 
isted in  France  before  Napoleon.1  This  is  un- 
just to  Colbert  and  other  able  Ministers,  who 
not  only  designed  but  carried  out  the  Orleans 
Canal  and  the  Languedoc  Canal,  uniting  the 
upper  Garonne  to  the  Mediterranean.  In  all 
there  were  about  500  miles  of  canals  in  France 
at  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century.  Napoleon 
constructed  about  1200  miles,  thus  uniting  all 
the  chief  river  systems  of  France.  The  most 
important  were  those  connecting  the  Scheldt 
with  the  Oise  via  St.  Quentin,  which  in  1810 
first  brought  the  coal  of  Belgium  cheaply  to 
Paris;  also  that  from  Strassburg  to  the  Eiver 
Saone,  more  than  200  miles  in  length.  Paris, 
Lyons,  and  other  large  towns  were  now  able  to 
export  goods  and  receive  food  more  cheaply  and 
expeditiously  than  before,  a  circumstance  highly 
favourable  to  political  calm.  Both  to  Chaptal 
and  to  Roederei)  Napoleon  confessed  his  dread 
of  riots  brought  about  by  hunger,  and  his  un- 
i  Cambridge  Modern  History,  ix.,  119. 


The  Emperor  215 

concern  about  merely  political  movements.  In 
the  latter  case,  said  lie,  "  I  would  use  grape-shot 
without  pity,  and  with  1200  men  and  four  can- 
non would  drive  all  Paris  back  to  its  shops." 
But  he  feared  the  fierce  moods  of  a  hungry  peo- 
ple, and  used  to  pay  out  considerable  sums  to 
keep  large  firms  employed.  On  more  than  one 
occasion  this  device  succeeded.  Chaptal  also 
held  in  reserve  large  stores  of  corn  at  Paris  to 
sell  at  low  prices  in  case  of  need.1  Several  of 
Napoleon's  letters  bear  on  the  subject  of  bring- 
ing corn  easily  and  cheaply  to  Paris  by  canal 
or  river;  and  on  6th  March,  1805,  he  proposed 
to  utilise  for  small  barges  the  Ourcq  aqueduct, 
which  was  designed  to  bring  drinking  water  to 
Paris  from  the  district  north  of  Meaux. 

The  original  proposal  for  the  Ourcq  aqueduct 
came  about  in  a  characteristic  way.  While  con- 
versing with  Chaptal  in  the  garden  at  Mal- 
maison,  where  so  many  important  matters  were 
discussed,  Napoleon  uttered  these  words :  "  My 
intention  is  to  make  Paris  the  most  beautiful 
capital  in  the  world.  I  wish  that  in  ten  years 
its  population  shall  number  2,000,000."  Whereto 

1  Chaptal,  Souvenirs,  59,  286-291.  These  devices  were 
evidently  borrowed  from  the  late  Roman  Republic  and 
the  Empire. 


216          Personality  of  Napoleon 

Chaptal  replied  that  so  large  a  population  could 
not  be  improvised,  even  by  a  great  sovereign 
who  made  that  city  his  residence  and  the  centre 
of  art,  science,  and  industry.  To  support 
2,000,000  people  there  must  be  plentiful  means 
of  bringing  in  food  and  distributing  the  products 
of  industry,  both  of  which  were  insufficient  at 
Paris.  Louis  XIV.  had  conceived  the  grand  idea 
of  turning  part  of  the  waters  of  the  Loire  into 
the  Seine,  in  order  to  render  it  navigable  for  a 
longer  period,  and  to  bring  to  the  capital  the 
produce  of  the  centre  of  France.  At  present, 
continued  Chaptal,  1,000,000  people  were  fed 
with  difficulty.  It  was  far  better,  then,  to  allow 
population  to  regulate  itself  by  natural  law. 
"  Good,"  said  Napoleon,  "  these  reasons  are 
solid:  but  I  wish  to  do  something  both  great 
and  useful  for  Paris.  What  are  your  ideas  on 
this  subject?  "  "  Give  it  water."  "  Bah !  water ! 
There  are  several  fountains  and  a  great  river 
in  Paris."  In  reply,  Chaptal  pointed  out  that 
drinking-water  was  scarce  and  dear,  each  small 
household  having  to  pay  two  sous  for  the  two 
pails  that  were  needed  every  day.  Further, 
there  were  no  drinking- troughs  and  no  means  of 
watering  the  streets.  When  Napoleon  pressed 
him  for  a  remedy,  he  suggested  two  means,  the 


The  Emperor  217 

latter  being  to  bring  the  water  of  the  River 
Ourcq  by  aqueduct  down  the  valley  of  the  Marne 
to  la  Villette,  whence  it  could  be  spread  over 
Paris.  At  once  Napoleon  replied :  "  I  adopt 
the  latter  project:  when  you  go  home  send  for 
M.  Gauthey,  and  tell  him  to  set  500  men  to 
work  to-morrow  at  la  Villette  to  dig  the  canal."  * 
At  first  sight  the  advantages  of  an  intelligent 
autocracy  over  a  system  of  sub-committees,  com- 
mittees, and  parliamentary  bills,  seem  over- 
whelming ;  but  Chaptal  states  that  even  the  great 
autocrat  could  not  move  at  that  pace.  Gauthey, 
the  engineer,  insisted  on  surveying  the  ground 
before  the  500  men  began  to  cut  the  trench ;  and 
another  delay  happened  owing  to  the  Emperor's 
desire  to  combine  the  supply  of  drinking-water 
to  Paris  with  barge  traffic,2  a  notion  which 
throws  light  on  the  hygienic  notions  prevalent 
a  little  more  than  a  century  ago.  Napoleon's 
interest  in  the  Ourcq  scheme  appears  in  the  fol- 
lowing incident.  While  hunting  in  the  Forest 
of  Bondy,  he  came  across  the  aqueduct,  and 

1  Chaptal,  Souvenirs,  pp.   357-359;   Lanzac  de  Laborie, 
Paris  sous  Napoleon,  pt.  ii.,  p.  303,  quotes  Passy,  Frochot, 
pp.   485-487,   as   claiming  that    Frochot,    Prefect   of   the 
Seine,  first  suggested  the  Ourcq  scheme. 

2  Nap.  Corresp.,  x.,  193.     Lanzac  de  Laborie,  pt.  ii.  (pp. 
311-312),  states  that  in  1810-1811  epidemics  of  fever  were 
due  to  the  impurity  of  the  Ourcq  water. 


2i 8          Personality  of  Napoleon 

found  to  his  great  annoyance  that  the  work  was 
for  the  time  suspended.  At  once  he  stopped  the 
hunt,  returned  to  Paris,  and  ordered  all  those 
who  were  responsible  to  meet  him  on  that  even- 
ing. We  can  imagine  the  reception  which 
awaited  them.1 

On  another  occasion  Napoleon  insisted  on  the 
commencement  of  work  before  the  plans  were 
begun.  Not  long  before  midnight  he  sent  for 
his  architect,  Fontaine,  and  ordered  him  on  the 
next  day  to  take  500  men  to  prepare  for  the 
construction  of  a  triumphal  arch  in  the  Place 
du  Carrousel  in  honour  of  the  army.  In  vain 
did  the  architect  represent  that  he  had  neither 
an  estimate  nor  a  plan  on  which  to  work.  Napo- 
leon insisted  that  he  must  begin  on  the  next 
morning.  Great,  then,  was  the  surprise  of 
Duroc,  Grand  Marshal  of  the  Palace,  to  see  the 
500  men  beginning  excavations.  At  once  he  sent 
to  upbraid  Daru  for  not  warning  him ;  but  Daru 
was  equally  in  the  dark.  They  then  sent  for 
Fontaine,  who  solved  the  riddle,  whereupon  all 
three  set  to  work  with  all  speed  to  design  the 
famous  Carrousel  arch,  the  foundations  of  which 
were  already  being  dug. 

These  are  examples  of  a  nervous  activity  which 
lMems.  de  Savary  (Due  de  Rovigo),  i.,  444. 


The  Emperor  219 

kept  all  Napoleon's  Ministers  and  officials  on  the 
stretch,  and  made  the  political  world  tense  with 
expectation  as  to  what  next  would  happen.  Such 
a  system  had  its  merits  among  a  people  whose 
brain  had  been  over  excited  by  abstract  ideas 
and  faction  fights.  Napoleon  subjected  France 
to  a  mental  rest-cure  and  a  strenuous  training 
for  the  muscles.  The  change  was  not  unlike 
that  which  happens  to  nervous  over-taught 
youths,  fresh  from  the  lycee,  and  perhaps  prone 
to  Anarchism,  when  they  come  under  the  drill- 
sergeant  for  a  year  or  more.  Where  previously 
everything  went  to  feed  the  brain,  now  the  mus- 
cles demand  the  chief  share;  and  the  restless, 
questioning  student  becomes  a  dully  obedient 
recruit.  Doubtless  France  needed  a  change  in 
this  direction ;  but  it  was  so  sudden  as  to  upset 
the  balance  of  her  faculties,  leaving  her  passive 
when  she  should  have  asserted  her  will  betimes. 
The  material  gains  were  very  great.  Jiazis 
was  beautified  and  enriched.  The  Louvre  became 
the  centre  of  the  world's  .art  treasures.  Napo- 
leon planned  and  constructed  four  bridges,  Aus- 
terlitz,  Jena,  the  Arts,  and  Sevres:  he  had 
pavements  or  footways  made  for  very  many 
streets  (only  three  had  them  before  1789),  and 
he  planned  the  streets  named  Kivoli,  Castiglione, 


220          Personality  of  Napoleon 

de  la  Paix,  and  des  Pyramides.  Notre  Dame 
was  also  cleared  of  several  buildings  which  hid 
it,  or  choked  the  approaches.  Baron  Haussmann 
under  Napoleon  III.  said  that  he  found  Paris 
brick  and  left  it  marble;  but  the  change  had 
begun  with  Napoleon  I.  and  Chaptal.  The  latter 
claims  that  he  proposed  all  the  plans  for  the 
beautifying  of  Paris.  That  is  an  exaggeration. 
The  great  impulse  came  from  Napoleon ;  Chaptal 
was  but  his  instrument.1 

The  great  city  of  Lyons  was  much  in  Napo- 
leon's thoughts.  Indeed,  he  is  said  to  have 
preferred  it  to  Paris.2  He  sought  to  stimulate 
its  silk  industry  by  a  rigid  protective  system, 
which  the  traders  of  that  town  highly  appre- 
ciated; and,  as  the  bounds  of  the  French  Empire 
were  widened,  a  far  larger  market  was  opened 
for  the  products  of  the  Lyonnais  in  the  Low 
Countries,  North  Germany,  and  the  great 
part  of  Italy.  In  times  of  dearth  or  of  tempo- 
rary crisis  he  sought  by  purchases  of  goods  to 
foster  the  industries  of  Lyons  and  other  large 
towns,  with  the  result  that  Lyons  accorded  to 
him  a  most  enthusiastic  reception  on  his  return 

1  Chaptal,  p.  59;  Lanzac  de  Laborie,  pt.  ii.,  pp.  113-124, 
131-141. 

2  Lanzac  de  Laborie,  pt.  ii.,  p.  88.     See,  too,  Revue  des 
Deux  Mondes,  15th  May,  1912. 


The  Emperor  221 

from  Elba  in  1815.  The  masses  in  France  have 
always  shown  strongly  protectionist  leanings; 
and  by  furthering  a  "  national "  system  of  com- 
merce he  appealed  to  them  strongly.  In  March, 
1806,  wrhen  there  was  some  prospect  of  a  peace 
with  England  he  said  to  the  Council  of  State: 

Within  forty-eight  hours  after  the  peace  with  Eng- 
land is  concluded,  I  shall  prohibit  the  introduction 
of  all  foreign  produce,  and  promulgate  a  Navigation 
Act,  which  will  exclude  from  our  ports  all  foreign 
vessels :  ships,  besides  being  built  of  French  timber, 
shall  have  two  thirds  of  their  crews  French.  Even 
English  coals  and  English  "  milords  "  shall  not  come 
to  our  shores,  but  under  the  French  flag.  A  great 
outcry  will  be  raised  at  first,  because  a  very  bad 
spirit  pervades  the  French  commercial  world;  but 
in  the  course  of  six  years  afterwards,  we  shall  be 
enjoying  the  greatest  prosperity. 

Shortly  before  that  he  said: 

My  system  of  finance  consists  in  establishing  a  vast 
number  of  indirect  taxes,  the  tariff  or  scale  of  which 
shall  be  extremely  moderate,  and  thus  be  susceptible 
of  being  augmented  in  proportion  to  the  necessities 
of  the  State;  650  million  francs  [£26,000,000]  are 
sufficient  for  me  at  this  moment,  but  I  wish  to  have 
the  power  to  augment  the  revenue  in  an  instant  by 
100,000,000  [£4,000,000]  in  the  event  of  a  war  break- 
ing out.  I  possess  resources,  however,  which  my 


222  Personality  of  Napoleon 

successors  will  not  be  able  to  command,  and  I  must 
think  of  them  as  well  as  myself.1 

His  system  of  indirect  taxation  soon  became 
very  burdensome;  and  he  afterwards  allowed 
that  les  droits  reunis  rendered  him  highly  un- 
popular. It  was,  however,  the  high  rates,  not  the 
principle  of  the  taxes  that  was  odious.  France 
was  never  more  protectionist  at  heart  than  dur- 
ing the  Consulate  and  Empire.  Manufacturers 
welcomed  the  almost  prohibitive  measures  of  the 
Continental  System. 

Certainly  that  System,  especially  in  and  after 
the  year  1810,  imposed  terrible  losses  on  Great 
Britain;  and,  as  the  exchange  was  30  per  cent, 
against  her  in  monetary  transactions,  Napoleon 
expected  a  speedy  collapse  of  credit  at  London. 
By  all  possible  means  he  sought  to  encourage  his 
Allies  to  persevere  in  the  struggle  so  as  to  break 
the  maritime  yoke  of  England;  and  by  harping 
skilfully  on  this  theme  he  succeeded  in  impos- 
ing for  a  time  the  fiscal  decrees  of  the  latter 
part  of  1810,  which  brought  terrible  hardships 
on  the  vassal  States,  especially  those  of  the 
North  of  Europe.  As  Mollien  says,  the  most 
extraordinary  episode  of  Napoleon's  career  is  his 

1  Pelet,  ch.  xxiii.  See,  too,  Mems.  de  Gaudin,  Due  de 
Gaete,  i.,  ch.  ii.-v. 


The  Emperor  223 

persistence  in  carrying  out  this  burdensome 
policy,  so  that  one  knows  not  whether  to  wonder 
most  at  the  audacity  of  the  Emperor's  combina- 
tions, or  the  resignation  and  submission  with 
which  for  a  time  they  were  accepted.  The  ex- 
periment would  of  course  have  been  impossible 
but  for  the  profound  ignorance  of  political 
economy  then  prevalent  in  nearly  all  circles. 
Napoleon  doubtless  expected  that  the  extension 
of  national  commerce  within  the  wide  bounds  of 
the  French  Empire  would  make  up  for  the  loss 
of  oversea  commerce;  but  the  event  signally 
falsified  his  hopes,  and  may  be  considered  the 
fundamental  cause  why  Russia,  Sweden,  and 
most  of  the  Continental  States  successively 
turned  against  him  in  1812-13.1 

To  the  end  of  his  days  Napoleon  remained  a 
"  Mercantilist  " ;  witness  his  declaration  to  Gour- 
gaud  at  St.  Helena  on  19th  September,  1817 : 

The  English  are  stupid.  In  their  place  I  would 
have  stipulated  in  the  last  treaties  that  I  alone 
should  be  able  to  sail  and  trade  in  the  seas  of  China 
and  the  [East]  Indies.  It  is  absurd  to  leave 
Batavia  to  the  Dutch  and  the  Isle  of  Bourbon  to 
the  French.  .  .  .  The  Americans  ought  no  longer 
to  be  allowed  to  sail  in  the  China  Sea.  At  present, 

1  For  further  details  see  my  chapter  on  "  The  Conti- 
nental System  "  in  the  Cambridge  Modern  History,  vol.  ix. 


224  Personality  of  Napoleon 

when  France  no  longer  exists,  the  English  can  with 
30  sail-of-the-line  blockade  all  the  coasts  of  America. 
.  .  .  The  United  States  are  nothing;  at  present 
England  can  give  the  law  to  the  world,  especially 
by  withdrawing  her  troops  from  the  Continent  .  .  . 
and  remaining  solely  a  Sea  Power.  Then  she  would 
do  what  she  liked.1 

We  must  beware  of  taking  this  statement  too 
seriously.  The  native  vehemence  of  Napoleon 
often  drove  him  further  than  he  intended.  As 
Mollien  says :  "  His  elan  used  to  carry  him  be- 
yond the  prescribed  goal."  2  The  prudent  reader 
will  allow  almost  as  wide  a  margin  to  Napoleon 
in  his  headlong  moods  as  to  Carlyle,  when  that 
champion  of  sincerity  and  silence  discoursed  at 
large  upon  Yankee-land,  cant,  Philistines,  and 
respectability  which  kept  its  gig.  Nevertheless, 
it  is  fairly  clear  that  the  Emperor's  economic 
ideals  were  those  of  the  age  of  Louis  XIV.  and 
of  Colbert.  He  sought  to  develop  France  and 
her  vassal  States  by  splendid  enterprises,  the 
aim  being  to  make  his  Empire  a  self -sufficing 
unit,  able  to  do  without  the  sugar  of  the  West 
Indies,  or  the  silks  and  dyes  of  the  East,  and 
thus  give  the  law  to  its  rivals.  So  far  as  human 
energy  and  perseverance  could  achieve  the  task, 

1  Gourgaud,  Journal,  ii.,  315. 

2  Mollien,  Mems.,  iii.,  315. 


The  Emperor  225 

he  succeeded;  and  important  industries,  notably 
that  of  the  sugar  beet-root,  attested  the  resource- 
fulness which  he  evoked.  Never  has  any  man  so 
vigorously  compelled  a  whole  Continent  to  fall 
back  upon  itself  and  develop  its  latent  powers. 
He  failed;  but  the  enterprise  is  invested  with  a 
Titanic  grandeur,  characteristic  of  the  man  and 
of  the  age  on  which  he  set  his  imprint. 

Napoleon  sought  to  regulate  not  only  opjor, 

and  mechanism 


of  a  great  Empire,  but  also  to  dictate  the  course 
of  public  opinion.  The  task  of  guiding  the 
French  intellect  after  it  had  attained  to  pre- 
cocious maturity  at  the  time  of  the  Revolution 
was  perhaps  not  the  least  of  his  Herculean  toils. 
But  we  must  remember  that  the  French  brain, 
jaded  by  the  excitements  of  that  time,  had  sub- 
mitted to  various  regulations  successively  im- 
posed by  the  Convention  and  the  Directory. 
Governmental  control  of  the  Press  was  deemed 
necessary  in  order  to  steer  the  ship  of  State 
safely  between  the  Scylla  of  royalism  and  the 
Charybdis  of  anarchy;  so  that  Napoleon  in- 
herited a  system  highly  favourable  to  the  regime 
of  le  juste  milieu  which  he  at  first  personified. 
From  the  beginning  of  the  Consulate  he  resolved 
is 


226          Personality  of  Napoleon 

strictly  to  control  the  Press.  By  the  decree  of 
17th  January,  1800,  the  three  Consuls  swept 
away  as  many  as  sixty  newspapers  and  allowed 
only  thirteen^  to  survive,  subject  to  a  censor- 
ship. No  new  journal  could  appear  without 
direct  permission;  and  from  that  time  Bona- 
parte ordered  his  librarian  to  keep  a  close  watch 
on  all  books,  pamphlets,  and  placards.1 

His  letters  on  the  Press  often  reveal  his  mania 
for  managing  men  and  affairs.  On  30th  May, 
1805,  he  writes  to  Fouche"  from  Milan,  respect- 
ing the  first  rumours  of  Eussian  resentment  at 
the  changes  in  North  Italy: 

The  newspapers  must  not  be  permitted  to  take  a 
line  favourable  to  Russia,  to  that  corrupt,  weak, 
and  silly  Cabinet.  At  this  moment,  indeed,  it  is 
showing  some  spirit,  but  more  from  a  feeling  that 
it  can  do  nothing,  than  from  any  other.  A  con- 
trast must  be  drawn  with  the  shameful  position  of 
the  English.  They  must  be  compared  to  a  be- 
sieged fortress.  .  .  .  Have  caricatures  made — an 
Englishman,  purse  in  hand,  entreating  the  various 
Powers  to  take  his  money.  This  is  the  real  direc- 
tion to  give  the  whole  business ! 

In  the  following  spring  Napoleon  reduces  the 
few  remaining  newspapers  to  the  position  of 
mouthpiece  of  the  Foreign  Office.  On  6th 

*  Welschinger,  La  Censure,  etc.,  pp.  20  et  seq. 


The  Emperor  227 

March,  1806,  he  writes  to  Talleyrand :  "  My  in- 
tention is  that  the  political  articles  of  the 
Moniteur  shall  be  written  by  the  Foreign  Office. 
And  at  the  end  of  a  month,  after  seeing  how 
they  are  done,  I  will  forbid  the  other  Journals 
to  talk  politics  except  by  copying  the  articles 
of  the  Moniteur." 

Imagine,  then,  the  sensation  in  the  official 
world  when  the  following  passage  from  the  pen 
of  Chateaubriand  appeared  in  the  Mercure  de 
France : 

The  Muse  has  often  depicted  crimes,  but  in  the 
language  of  the  poet  there  is  something  so  fine  that 
even  crimes  are  embellished  by  it.  Only  the  his- 
torian can  describe  them  without  weakening  their 
horror.  When  amidst  abject  silence,  no  sound  is 
heard  but  the  chain  of  the  slave  and  the  voice  of 
the  informer ;  when  all  tremble  before  the  tyrant  and 
it  is  as  dangerous  to  meet  with  his  favour  as  to 
merit  disgrace,  then  appears  the  historian,  charged 
with  the  vengeance  of  the  peoples.  In  vain  does 
Nero  prosper;  for  Tacitus  is  already  born  in  the 
Empire. 

This  daring  passage  appeared  on  4th  July,  1807, 
three  days  before  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit.  Chateau- 
briand states  in  his  Memoirs  that  Napoleon  on 
reading  the  passage  remarked  :  "  Does  Chateau- 
briand think  me  a  fool,  who  does  not  under- 


228          Personality  of  Napoleon 

stand  him?  I  will  have  him  sabred  on  the  steps 
of  the  Tuileries."  For  the  present  the  Emperor 
put  an  extra  censor  to  watch  that  paper;  and 
on  14th  August,  after  his  return  to  France, 
wrote  as  follows :  "  Those  who  have  taken  up 
the  Bourbon  cause,  directly  or  indirectly,  should 
remember  their  Scripture  history  and  what 
David  [Jehu  is  meant]  did  to  the  house  of 
Ahab.  This  observation  applies  also  to  Chateau- 
briand and  his  clique."  1 

On  21st  May,  1808,  after  the  rising  of  the 
men  of  Madrid  against  the  French  army  of 
occupation,  the  Emperor  warns  Fouche  that  the 
Paris  papers  must  not  say  anything  about  that 
event  except  according  to  the  cue  given  by  the 
official  Moniteur;  namely,  that  only  twenty-five 
Frenchmen  perished,  while  the  Spaniards  who 
lost  their  lives  were  "  all  sedition-mongers  or 
rioters  of  the  lower  class."  On  26th  July,  1809, 
while  at  Schonbrunn  he  orders  Fouche  to  depose 
and  imprison  for  one  month  the  editor  of  the 
Gazette  de  France  for  publishing  an  indiscreet 
article.  He  adds  by  way  of  rebuke  to  Fouche: 
"  It  really  is  as  if  the  police  did  not  know  how 
to  read.  They  attend  to  nothing."  As  for  Napo- 
leon, even  while  at  Schonbrunn,  he  attends  to 

1  Lecestre,  Lettres  Inedites   de  Nap.,  i.,  100. 


The  Emperor  229 

everything.  No  leading  article  escapes  his  Argus 
eyes.  On  5th  February,  1810,  he  subjects  the 
French  Press  to  even  stricter  supervision;  and 
in  order  to  keep  printing  under  control  he  limits 
the  number  of  printers  in  Paris  to  sixty,  who 
are  required  to  take  an  oath  of  obedience  and 
good  conduct.  Finally  in  the  autumn  of  1811 
the  last  four  newspapers  in  Paris  are  absorbed 
by  the  Government;  and  during  three  years  the 
French  Press  virtually  ceases  to  exist. 

Very  characteristic  was  his  treatment  of  Mme. 
de  Stael.  There  was  a  natural  antipathy  be- 
tween them.  At  first,  it  is  true,  she  adored 
him;  but  she  soon  swung  round  to  the  opposite 
extreme,  and  in  her  Considerations  declared  that 
she  felt  his  nature  to  be  that  of  cold  cutting 
steel,  which  numbed  the  wound  it  made.  He  on 
his  side  disliked  her  as  embodying  his  two  pet 
aversions,  an  enthusiastic  ideologue  and  an  ap- 
pallingly eloquent  woman.  It  was  inevitable 
that,  even  during  the  Consulate,  he  should  put 
forty  leagues  between  him  and  that  terrible 
tongue.  After  several  vain  efforts  to  effect  a 
truce,  the  gifted  authoress  ventured  to  reside 
about  forty  leagues  from  Paris  in  order  to 
supervise  the  publication  of  de  VAllemagne. 
Having  avoided  the  least  reference  to  politics 


230          Personality  of  Napoleon 

either  in  Prance  or  Germany,  she  hoped  that  the 
book  would  run  the  gauntlet  even  of  the  law 
of  5th  February,  1810.  At  first  Napoleon  was 
inclined  to  let  it  appear,  suppressing  however 
the  passage  about  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  and 
"  three  fourths  of  the  passages  in  which  she  ex- 
alts England." 1  But  on  second  thoughts  he 
condemned  the  whole  work;  and  his  valet,  Con- 
stant, states  that  he  threw  it  in  the  fire.  Certain 
it  is  that  he  himself  ordered  Savary  to  suppress 
the  book,  though  now  in  print.  Savary  there- 
fore informed  her  that  it  was  evident  the  air 
of  France  did  not  at  all  agree  with  her :  "  And 
we  are  not  yet  reduced  to  seek  models  in  the 
people  whom  you  admire.  Your  last  work  is 
not  at  all  French.  I  have  stopped  the  printing 
of  it."  Within  a  week  she  was  to  leave  France. 

This  incident  is  typical  of  Napoleon's  conduct 
towards  writers  who  maintained  an  independent 
attitude.  He  required  not  only  no  opposition 
but  an  active  support,  even  in  times  when  he 
was  suppressing  freedom  of  speech.  Such  a 
claim  was  repugnant  to  all  independent  thinkers. 

1  Lecestre,  Lettres  Inedites  de  Nap.,  ii.,  74,  Napoleon  to 
Savary,  28th  September,  1810.  M.  Paul  Gautier  (Mme. 
de  Stael  et  Napoleon,  p.  256)  has  disproved  the  assertion 
of  Napoleon  at  Elba  that  Savary  was  responsible  for  the 
suppression  of  the  book. 


The  Emperor  231 

No  great  writer  will  write  to  order;  and  thus 
the  Empire  was  adorned  by  no  literary  produc- 
tions of  lasting  merit,  except  those  of  Chateau- 
briand and  Mine,  de  Stael  whom  he  drove  into 
opposition.  Thought  being  stifled,  the  perennial 
energies  of  Frenchmen  expressed  themselves  in 
military  exploits,  architectural  triumphs,  and 
industrial  developments.  Never  has  a  reaction 
towards  the  practical  come  so  swiftly.  In  the 
years  1789-93  France  simmered  with  new 
thoughts  and  heaved  with  political  and  social 
experiments.  The  decade  of  the  Napoleonic 
supremacy  saw  her  thought  cowed,  her  multi- 
form energies  embodied  in  a  constitution,  de- 
crees, codes,  and  military  enterprises  emanating 
from  the  will  of  one  man.1 

The  suppression  of  freedom  in  the  Press  and 
in  literature  took  place  at  a  time  when  Napo- 
leon was  absolute  master  of  France  and  of  Cen- 
tral Europe,  and  when,  to  all  appearance,  his 
dynasty  was  firmly  founded.  On  his  return 

xln  June,  1789,  Arthur  Young  noted  that  every  hour 
there  appeared  a  new  pamphlet  from  the  shops  of  the 
Palais  Royal.  "  Thirteen  came  out  to-day,  sixteen  yester- 
day, and  ninety-two  last  week,  .  .  .  nineteen  twentieths  of 
these  productions  are  in  favour  of  liberty  .  .  .  and  not 
the  least  step  is  taken  by  the  Court  to  restrain  this  ex- 
treme licentiousness  of  production."  A.  Young,  Travels 
in  France,  p.  153  (Bohn  edit.). 


232  Personality  of  Napoleon 

from  the  Wagram  campaign  he  prepared  to 
crown  the  imperial  edifice  by  divorcing  Jose- 
phine. To  put  her  away  for  not  having  borne 
him  a  child  seems  a  callous  proceeding;  but  in 
that  case  State  policy  determined  his  conduct 
and  overpowered  his  private  feelings,  which  were 
still  those  of  affection,  if  not  love,  for  his  con- 
sort. All  things  considered,  I  think  he  deserves 
less  censure  in  this  episode  than  has  often  been 
bestowed  on  him.  A  great  ruler  must  think  first 
of  the  stability  of  his  State  and  the  future  of 
his  dynasty,  which  would  be  more  assured  in 
the  person  of  a  son  than  a  nephew.  Further, 
his  interests  counselled  an  alliance  with  one  of 
the  old  dynasties.  Towards  her  successor,  Marie 
Louise  of  Austria,  he  proved  to  be  a  fond  and 
almost  doting  spouse ;  and  it  is  ever  to  his  credit 
that  at  the  time  of  the  birth  of  the  long-wished- 
for  heir,  when  there  seemed  a  danger  that  either 
the  life  of  the  mother  or  of  the  babe  should  be 
sacrificed,  he  bade  the  physicians  assure  that  of 
the  mother.  Nothing  in  his  career  redounds 
more  to  his  credit  than  that  decision. 

As  happened  at  every  time  of  triumph  (for 
the  coming  of  a  son  crowned  his  career)  Napo- 
leon drew  tighter  the  reins  of  power  at  home, 


The  Emperor  233 

and  at  the  close  of  the  year  1810  extended  his 
Empire  to  the  Baltic  by  annexing  N.  W.  Ger- 
many and  the  free  cities  of  Hamburg  and 
Lubeck.  The  question  now  arises — Could  he 
hold  together  that  overgrown  realm,  comprising 
all  the  lands  between  the  North  Sea  and  the 
Roman  Campagna?  Probably  there  was  only 
one  method,  namely,  by  ruling  with  extreme 
clemency  and  tact.  A  relaxation  of  the  oppres- 
sive decrees  of  the  Continental  System,  of  the 
Press  laws,  and,  if  possible,  of  taxes,  would 
have  made  for  content  and  stability.  France 
and  the  world  at  large  needed  rest  and  recrea- 
tion. But  there  was  something  in  Napoleon's 
nature  which  scorned  the  thought  of  rest.  At 
this  very  time  taxes,  Press  laws,  the  Continental 
System,  became  more  burdensome  than  ever. 
Further,  as  will  appear  in  Lecture  VII.,  Napo- 
leon refused  either  to  pacify  the  Spaniards,  or 
humour  the  Czar,  and  chose  to  treat  the  captive 
Pope  Pius  VII.  with  an  indignity  that  alienated 
the  support  of  devout  Catholics  won  over  by 
the  Concordat. 

This  febrile  restlessness,  this  incapacity  to  let 
well  alone,  has  been  ascribed  to  various  causes. 
Some  persons  refer  it  to  the  epileptic  symptoms 
now  and  again  apparent  in  gasping  breath  and 


234          Personality  of  Napoleon 

nervous  collapse;  others  allege  a  secret  and  in- 
sidious malady  that  affected  the  whole  organ- 
ism and  impaired  the  judgment.  On  this  subject 
we  can  only  conjecture.  Certain  it  is  that  at 
the  time  when  the  sun-god  should  have  un- 
strung his  bow,  he  kept  it  tense,  threatening 
alike  London,  Cadiz,  Moscow.  He  lacked  that 
easy  aloofness,  which  now  and  again  has  led 
great  sovereigns  to  shrug  their  shoulders  and 
let  the  world  go  its  way.  To  his  soldiers  he 
would  unbend,  for  at  heart  he  was  always  one 
of  them;  and  therefore  they  loved  him  to  the 
end.  But  civilians  wanted  repose,  relaxation; 
and  these  boons  his  unrelenting  earnestness 
denied. 

The  gay  nonchalance  of  the  French  nature  was 
alien  to  him.  He  had  not  that  unfailing  humour 
which  led  Charles  II.,  on  his  death-bed,  to  apol- 
ogise to  his  courtiers  for  being  so  unconscionably 
long  in  dying.  Still  less  would  the  Emperor 
have  laughed  at  caricatures  aimed  at  him,  as 
Frederick  the  Great  once  did  when  riding  down 
Unter  den  Linden.  Approaching  the  daub,  he 
called  out  to  his  groom :  "  Hang  it  lower  so 
that  they  need  not  crane  their  necks  to  see  it." 
And  he  rode  away  amidst  shouts  of  "  Der  Konig 
soil  leben."  Napoleon  would  probably  have  had 


The  Emperor  235 

the  caricaturist  imprisoned  and  made  a  hero  of 
him.  For,  with  all  his  fine  qualities,  he  could 
not  treat  little  episodes  with  the  airy  grace  of 
a  humourist.  On  one  occasion  he  threatened 
Talleyrand  that  if  he  (Napoleon)  died  first, 
Talleyrand  should  not  survive.  To  which  the 
Minister  replied :  "  Sire,  the  warning  was  not 
needed  to  make  me  pray  for  long  life  for  your 
Majesty."  Here  was  Napoleon's  weak  point. 
He  had  not  that  sense  of  ironical  detachment 
which  bids  a  man  pause,  smile,  jest,  and  relax 
his  grip.  In  the  heyday  of  his  power  he  insisted 
on  giving  the  mot  d'ordre  to  the  universe. 
Britons  and  Spaniards,  Russians  and  Germans, 
authors,  newspaper  editors,  and  printers,  Pope 
and  cardinals,  had  to  fall  in  line.  Finally,  tie 
world  grew  weary  of  this  regimentation,  as  the 
world  will  always  weary  of  those  who  take  it 
too  seriously.  There  is  truth  in  Victor  Hugo's 
verdict,  "  II  genait  Dieu." 


VI 

THE  THINKER 

"  Sa  Majeste  ne  croit  que  ce  qui  est." — GouRGAUD,  Jour- 
nal, i.,  p.  228. 

TN  venturing  to  discuss  this  difficult  topic,  I 
may  remind  you  of  the  suggestive  remark  of 
Aristotle  at  the  beginning  of  the  Ethics,  that 
the  statement  of  a  subject  is  adequate  if  it  is 
made  clear  so  far  as  the  subject-matter  permits.1 
Some  such  reservation  is  especially  needed  when 
we  seek  to  probe  the  thoughts  of  a  man  of  affairs. 
In  such  a  case  we  must  not  expect  the  clearness 
of  outline  which  is  possible  in  delineating  the 
thoughts  of  one  who  deals  with  the  exact  sci- 
ences. Inquiries  in  those  fields  of  knowledge 
are  free  from  the  predilections  or  prejudices 
that  cloud  the  ideas  of  a  man  of  affairs,  for 
whom  life  is  action  and  speculative  thought  a 
by-product. 

It  is  also  far  from  easy  to  dissociate  Napoleon 

1  Aristotle,  Nicom.  Ethics,  i.,  ch.  iii.,  §  1. 
236 


The  Thinker  237 

from  the  events  of  which  he  was  so  large  a  part. 
His  imagination  often  soared  aloft,  but  in  his 
best  days,  say  down  to  1806,  he  kept  it  under 
the  control  of  reason.  His  bent  was  towards 
the  practical;  and  it  has  been  well  said  of  him 
that  he  thought  facts,  not  words.  Phrases  and 
catchwords,  which  had  been  the  meat  and  drink 
of  France  during  the  Revolution,  were  nought 
to  him;  and  by  this  determined  objectivity,  this 
resolve  to  see  things  as  they  were,  he  speedily 
dominated  her;  for  he  came  to  the  front  at  a 
time  when  her  sons  were  wearying  of  revolution- 
ary notions.  At  midsummer,  1795,  Gouverneur 
Morris  describes  them  as  so  tired  of  the  cease- 
less confusion  that  monarchy  in  some  form  was 
certain  to  ensue.1  Thus,  popular  feeling  trended 
strongly  in  the  line  of  Bonaparte's  mental  de- 
velopment; and  the  coincidence  explains  the 
course  of  subsequent  events. 

After  the  spring  of  youth  was  past,  he  barred 
out  sentiment  from  his  thoughts.  His  style  of 
speech  and  of  writing  is  clear,  precise,  vigorous, 
but  nearly  always  curt  and  formless.  His 
statements  follow  one  another  in  wonderful 
profusion.  His  letters  rain  facts ;  and  the  letters 
bespeak  the  man.  He  never  allowed  fine  speeches 

1Dropmore  Papers,  iii.,  88. 


238          Personality  of  Napoleon 

in  the  Council  of  State.  What  he  wanted  was 
practical  statements.  In  January,  1810,  he  thus 
censured  a  report  of  Champagny,  his  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs :  "  The  style  is  not  sufficiently 
business-like.  What  I  want  is  hard  reasoning, 
not  picturesqueness." x  A  fit  motto  for  the 
guidance  of  his  officials  would  have  been — "  No 
flowers — by  command."  Enamoured  of  clear- 
ness and  precision,  he  always  expected  concise 
and  definite  answers  from  his  aides-de-camp; 
and  woe  betide  any  one  who  could  not  give  them. 
In  such  a  case  it  was  best  to  manufacture  facts, 
and  trust  to  luck  to  conceal  the  imposture.  This 
impatience  of  anything  like  vagueness  is  often 
obvious  in  Napoleon's  words  and  actions.  To 
take  an  instance  from  his  letters.  On  27th 
March,  1808,  he  suddenly  offered  the  crown  of 
Spain  to  his  brother  Louis,  King  of  Holland. 
After  setting  forth  the  advantages,  he  said: 
"  Reply  to  me  categorically.  If  I  name  you 
King  of  Spain,  do  you  agree?  Can  I  count  on 
you?  Answer  solely  in  these  two  phrases — '  I 
have  received  your  letter  of  such  a  day.  I  reply 
yes  ...  or  no.7 "  2  So,  too,  during  the  Water- 
loo campaign,  on  the  occasion  of  the  desertion 

1  Lecestre,  Lettres  Inedites  de  Nap.,  ii.,  4. 

2  Nap.  Corresp.,  xvi.,  501. 


The  Thinker  239 

of  General  Bourmont,  Marshal  Ney,  who  had 
guaranteed  the  fidelity  of  that  officer,  ventured 
to  state  that  he  had  indeed  thought  Bourmont 
most  devoted  to  Napoleon.  The  Emperor  cut 
him  short  with  the  words :  "  Allez,  M.  le  Mare"- 
chal:  ceux  qui  sont  bleus  sont  bleus:  ceux  qui 
sont  blancs  sont  blancs."  1 

No  less  precise  was  his  view  of  men  and 
women.  In  an  age  which  had  eagerly  sought 
to  level  up  the  race  at  large  and  to  engrave  the 
Rights  of  Man  on  every  heart,  he  suddenly  ap- 
peared, regarding  men,  not  as  representatives  of 
a  perfectible  Humanity,  but  as  creatures  pos- 
sessed of  certain  aptitudes,  customs,  prejudices, 
vices.  Coming  to  the  front  at  a  time  when  the 
heedless  and  convulsive  forward  moves  of  the 
human  brain  had  led  to  a  fall  of  the  inert  trunk, 
he  saw  the  mistake,  soothed  the  brain,  set  the 
body  upright,  and  made  it  walk  at  a  reasonable 
pace.  He  believed  the  French  people  and  the 
human  race  to  be  incapable  of  progressing  alone 
by  their  own  powers;  and  he  always  postulated 
control  by  the  ablest  man  of  the  age.  Napo- 
leon III.,  who  had  closely  studied  the  career 
of  his  uncle,  raised  this  postulate  to  the  level 

1  Gourgaud,  Campagne  de  1815,  p.  37.  See,  too,  Rev. 
des  Deux  Mondes,  15th  May,  1912,  for  similar  expressions. 


240          Personality  of  Napoleon 

of  a  universal  truth  when  he  wrote :  "  The 
nature  of  democracy  is  to  personify  itself  in  a 
man."  * 

From  Napoleon,  then,  we  must  expect  no  in- 
spiring thoughts  as  to  the  future  of  the  human 
race.  His  main  achievement  was  to  clip  the 
wings  of  idealism  and  to  give  effect  to  the  utili- 
tarian impulse  set  in  motion  by  Bentham.  In 
regard  to  the  internal  policy  of  France  the  Em- 
peror may  be  termed  a  crowned  Benthamite. 
In  his  legislation  he  strikes  the  happy  mean 
between  old  French  customs  and  new  French 
impulses.  His  policy  in  its  better  days  embodies 
the  spirit  of  compromise  and  gives  it  fixed  and 
abiding  expression.  His  thoughts  on  men  and 
politics  therefore  take  a  middle  flight,  strong 
and  unwavering,  near  the  earth,  and  rarely  soar- 
ing aloft.  But  they  possess,  what  is  rare  among  the 
champions  of  compromise,  unfailing  vigour.  Too 
often  the  spirit  of  compromise  embodies  itself 
in  flabby  creatures  like  Mr.  Brooke  in  Middle- 
march,  who  always  found  that  much  was  to  be 
said  for  both  sides.  In  Napoleon  the  genius  of 
compromise  shone  forth  radiant,  forceful,  trium- 
phant. As  a  political  thinker  he  is  the  lineal 
descendant  of  Henry  IV.  and  Mirabeau.  Take 

1  L.  Napoleon,  Les  Idees  Napoleoniennes,  p.  27. 


The  Thinker  241 

these  words,  uttered  in  August,  1800,  as  a  clear 
statement  of  reasonable  opportunism: 

My  policy  consists  in  governing  men  as  the  great- 
est number  wish  to  be  governed.  That,  I  think,  is  the 
way  of  recognising  the  sovereignty  of  the  people. 
By  becoming  a  Catholic  I  have  ended  the  Vend6an 
War;  by  becoming  a  Moslem  I  gained  a  footing  in 
Egypt ;  by  becoming  Ultramontane  I  won  over  public 
opinion  in  Italy.  If  I  governed  Jews,  I  would  re- 
build the  temple  of  Solomon.  So,  too,  I  will  talk 
of  liberty  in  the  free  part  of  San  Domingo;  I  will 
retain  slavery  in  the  Isle  of  France  [Mauritius], 
even  in  the  unfree  part  of  San  Domingo,  always 
with  the  intention  of  limiting  and  softening  slavery 
where  I  retain  it,  and  of  restoring  order  and  intro- 
ducing discipline  where  I  maintain  liberty.1 

The  passage  is  remarkable  on  several  counts. 
Bonaparte  saw  as  clearly  as  Bentham  the  mo- 
tives that  would  determine  a  rational  policy  in 
the  nineteenth  century.  In  place  of  royalism 
that  relied  on  the  privileged  classes,  in  place  of 
Jacobinism  upheld  by  fanatics,  he  proposed  to 
establish  a  government  grounded  on  the  needs 
of  the  masses.  Equally  noteworthy  is  the  frank- 
ness of  the  statement.  Bonaparte  does  not  hide 
the  egotism  which  underlies  his  policy;  he  is 
strong  enough,  and  frank  enough,  to  confess  it 

1  Roederer,  Journal,  p.  16. 
16 


242  Personality  of  Napoleon 

with  almost  cynical  candour.  He  knows  that 
only  he  can  guide  the  masses  wisely  or  control 
them  firmly,  and  he  does  not  fear  to  say  so. 

As  an  example  of  keen  insight  into  a  political 
problem  and  of  an  illuminating  solution,  take 
the  following  utterance  to  the  leaders  of  the 
Swiss  Confederation  in  September,  1802 : 

Switzerland  differs  from  all  other  countries  in  the 
series  of  catastrophes  which  have  befallen  her  of 
late  years,  in  her  geographical  position,  her  dif- 
ferent languages,  her  different  religions,  and  the 
extreme  divergence  of  customs  in  her  different  Can- 
tons. Nature  herself  has  made  your  country  a 
Federation,  and  no  wise  man  would  wish  to  change 
it.  Circumstances  and  the  spirit  of  past  ages 
divided  you  into  sovereign  and  subject  peoples; 
more  recent  circumstances  and  the  spirit  of  the 
present  age,  more  in  accord  with  justice  and  rea- 
son, have  established  legal  equality  throughout  your 
land.  Many  of  your  Cantons  have  for  centuries 
been  absolutely  democratic.  In  others,  certain  fam- 
ilies have  obtained  an  ascendancy,  and  divided  the 
inhabitants  into  rulers  and  subjects.  The  influence 
and  spirit  of  surrounding  countries,  Italy,  Savoy, 
France,  and  Alsace,  have  essentially  contributed  to 
this  state  of  things  in  these  last-named  portions  of 
your  land.  The  renunciation  of  all  privileges  is  at 
once  the  desire  and  the  interest  of  your  people.  .  .  . 

In  your  country  nothing  can  be  uniform;  neither 
your  finances,  nor  your  army,  nor  your  administra- 
tion. You  have  never  supported  a  regular,  paid 


The  Thinker  243 

army;  you  cannot  afford  a  financial  system  on  a 
large  scale:  you  have  never  had  permanent  diplo- 
matic agents  at  foreign  Courts.  Situated  on  the 
height  of  the  mountain  ranges  which  separate 
France,  Germany,  and  Italy,  you  share  some  of  the 
spirit  of  each  of  these  nations.  The  neutrality  of 
your  country,  the  prosperity  of  your  commerce,  and 
a  homely  system  of  administration  are  your  only 
requisites.  Such  is  the  language  which  I  have  con- 
sistently held  to  your  countrymen  when  they  have 
consulted  me  on  their  affairs.  It  seems  to  me  so 
reasonable,  that  I  hope  it  will  require  no  extra- 
ordinary effort  to  convince  you  of  the  good  sense 
of  my  words.1 

Yet  this  practical  sense  was  winged  by  im- 
agination. An  illustration  occurs  in  his  treat- 
ment of  the  science  of  history.  To  it,  as  we  saw 
in  Lecture  II,  he  assigned  a  very  high  place  in 
education;  but  he  was  dissatisfied  with  the  man- 
ner in  which  it  was  written.  Probably  he  dis- 
liked the  ambling  style  of  the  literary  historians, 
whose  exasperating  vagueness  induced  Dr.  John- 
son to  class  history  as  an  inferior  branch  of 
literature.  The  Emperor,  ever  keenly  alive  to 
unreality,  wanted  to  know  facts  and  the  sources 
whence  they  were  obtained.  At  St.  Helena  he 
declared  his  aims  to  have  been  the  revision  of 

1  Thibaudeau,  Bonaparte  and  the  Consulate,  pp.  277-278 
(Eng.  edit.). 


244          Personality  of  Napoleon 

the  annals  of  France  from  the  best  authorities, 
especially  those  of  the  Foreign  Office,  and  the 
publication  of  the  best  manuscripts  in  the  Im- 
perial Library,  as  a  means  of  laying  a  solid 
groundwork  for  the  historical  writings  of  the 
future.  So  far  as  I  know,  this  was  one  of  the 
first  proposals  of  the  kind;  and  it  places  him 
among  the  pioneers  of  historical  science.  But 
this  was  not  all.  He  saw  that  the  historian 
must  have  imagination.  These  are  his  words: 

It  is  accepted  that  a  historian  is  a  judge,  who  is 
to  be  the  organ  of  posterity;  and  so  many  qualities, 
so  many  perfections,  are  expected  of  him  that  it  is 
difficult  to  believe  that  a  good  history  can  be  written 
to  order.  What  can  be  obtained  to  order  from  men 
of  well-balanced  mind  and  a  certain  measure  of 
talent  are  historical  monographs,  the  results  of 
laborious  research,  containing  authentic  documents 
along  with  critical  observations  tending  to  throw 
light  on  events.  If  these  researches,  documents,  and 
materials  are  framed  in  a  good  narrative,  a  piece 
of  work  of  this  sort  will  bear  a  considerable  resem- 
blance to  history;  and  yet  its  author  would  not  be 
a  historian  in  the  sense  that  we  attach  to  the  word.1 

Napoleon,  then,  was  fully  alive  to  the  limita- 
tions of  mere  editors  of  historical  documents. 
He  saw  the  need  of  documentary  groundwork, 

''•Nap.  Corresp.,  xv.,  97. 


The  Thinker  245 

but  also  of  the  gift  of  imagination  which  alone 
can  endow  the  narrative  with  life. 

A  man  who  sees  quickly  into  the  heart  of  a 
problem  is  often  endowed  with  the  power  of 
trenchant  statement.  Napoleon  rarely  made 
long  speeches,  unless  we  include  his  longer  con- 
versations in  the  Council  of  State,  which  were  too 
familiar  and  discursive  to  be  termed  speeches  x ; 
but  when  he  sought  to  sum  up  a  question  he  did 
so  with  terseness  and  power.  We  all  know  the 
incident,  reported  in  the  Bourrienne  Memoirs,  of 
Napoleon's  conversation  on  religion  with  the  sa- 
vants on  board  ly  Orient  when  bound  for  Egypt; 
how,  after  exhausting  their  armory  of  atheis- 
tical arguments,  he  pointed  to  the  starry  sky 
and  said :  "  Very  ingenious,  Messieurs ;  but  who 
made  all  that?"  Coming  from  Bourrienne  alone, 
the  story  would  be  suspect;  but  Boederer  gives 
it  again,  though  in  a  different  setting.  Equally 
incisive  was  Napoleon's  interposition  during  a 
discussion  of  Boederer  as  to  the  need  of  the  First 
Consul  having  an  heir,  whether  a  son  of  his  own 
or  by  adoption.  Napoleon  cut  him  short  by  the 


1  The  Due  de  Broglie  (Mews.,  L,  62)  terms  them  in- 
coherent, trivial,  and  full  of  repetitions,  utterly  different 
in  style  from  the  St.  Helena  dictees,  the  authenticity  of 
which  he  calls  in  question. 


246  Personality  of  Napoleon 

words :  "  My  natural  heir  is  the  French  people. 
It  is  my  child.  I  have  worked  only  for  it."  1  A 
man  who  on  the  spur  of  the  moment  utters  so 
noble  and  inspiring  a  thought  is  born  to  rule, 
especially  in  a  land  which  is  governed  by  phrases. 
Contrast  Napoleon  with  Louis  XVI.,  who  never 
by  any  chance  stumbled  on  a  happy  phrase ;  with 
Robespierre,  tedious  in  speech  and  timorous  in 
action;  with  Sieyes,  clever  only  in  print;  and 
you  will  see  why  he  became  supreme  over  the 
uncultured  soldiers  and  inefficient  talkers  who 
appealed  to  separate  parts  of  the  brain  of  France. 
He  dominated  the  whole  of  it. 

The  most  interesting  mental  problem  of  Napo- 
leon's career  is  his  attitude  towards  destiny.  If 
we  may  judge  by  his  frequent  appeals  to  fate  or 
to  his  star,  he  was  a  fatalist;  and  his  habit  of 
crossing  himself  on  hearing  exciting  news  seems 
to  strengthen  the  supposition.  But  we  must  be- 
ware of  superficial  judgments  in  the  case  of  so 
complex  a  nature  and  so  intricate  a  problem. 
The  habit  just  referred  to  may  have  been  no 
more  than  a  recurrence  to  the  ways  of  child- 
hood; and  there  is  little  or  nothing  in  his  acts 
and  words  that  implies  an  absolute  trust  in 

1  Roederer,  Journal,  p.  14. 


The  Thinker  247 

destiny.  Indeed,  it  is  questionable  whether  any 
man,  except  perhaps  a  few  fakirs,  has  ever  al- 
lowed himself  to  drift  solely  according  to  the 
decrees  of  fate;  and  even  fakirs  take  care  to 
perform  their  austerities  where  they  will  be  seen 
and  will  get  bread. 

Now,  much  as  Napoleon  indulged  in  talk  about 
his  star,  he  refuted  it  by  avowals  made  in  times 
of  self-revelation;  witness  these  striking  words 
to  General  Gourgaud  at  St.  Helena :  "  Bah ! 
Man  is  always  free:  always  master  of  himself."  1 
Again,  consider  this  fact,  that  during  the  days 
of  his  power  he  frequently  declared  that  he  did 
everything  from  calculation.  Thus,  on  6th  June, 
1806,  he  wrote  to  Joseph  Bonaparte :  "  In  war 
one  gains  nothing  except  by  calculation.  Only 
that  which  is  profoundly  thought  out  in  all  its 
details  produces  any  result."  2  And  in  Novem- 
ber, 1813,  he  thus  analysed  the  motives  of  his 
conduct :  "  I  leave  one  place,  I  go  to  another, 
I  leave  St.  Cloud,  I  go  to  Moscow,  not  for  my 
inclination,  or  for  my  friends,  but  by  mere  dry 
calculation."  3  But  he  who  relies  solely  on  rea- 

1  Gourgaud,  ii.,  128,     See,  too,  Napoleon's  long  argument 
against  fatalism  in  Las  Cases    (Memorial,  vi.,  302-304) 
which  seems  to  me  decisive  as  to  his  disbelief. 

2  Nap.  Corresp.,  xii.,  442. 

3  Roederer,  Journal,  p.  323. 


248          Personality  of  Napoleon 

son  and  calculation  cannot  be  a  thorough  fatal- 
ist, at  least  not  in  the  Eastern  sense;  for  he 
believes  in  the  sufficiency  of  his  own  mind,  not 
in  the  supremacy  of  some  controlling  power 
outside  him.  Further,  if  he  acts  in  full  con- 
fidence in  the  correctness  of  his  reasoning,  his 
belief  is  not  a  mere  philosophical  tenet,  it  is 
his  inmost  conviction,  the  guiding  principle  of 
his  life. 

That,  as  it  seems  to  me,  was  the  case  with 
Napoleon.  From  the  time  of  his  first  military 
achievement  at  Toulon  in  1793  confidence  in 
himself  is  the  chief  trait  of  his  character. 
Nothing  daunts  him,  not  even  adversity  such  as 
befalls  him  a  few  months  later.  You  will  re- 
member the  remarkable  words  written  to  Jose- 
phine in  April,  1796,  quoted  in  Lecture  I. 
"  Sometimes,  when  casting  my  eyes  on  the  ills 
which  men  might  do  me,  on  the  fate  which  des- 
tiny might  have  in  store  for  me,  I  have  gazed 
steadfastly  on  the  most  incredible  misfortunes 
without  a  wrinkle  on  my  brow,  or  a  vestige  of 
surprise."  He  wrote  those  words  shortly  be- 
fore his  first  battle,  at  Montenotte.  By  degrees 
he  discovered  his  strength ;  and  at  St.  Helena  he 
confessed  that  the  success  at  Lodi  strengthened 
his  confidence  and  his  ambition.  True,  a  month 


The  Thinker  249 

after  Lodi  we  find  him  in  a  moment  of  despon- 
dency writing:  "Poor  human  beings  that  we 
are,  we  can  only  observe  Nature,  not  conquer 
her."  *  But  no  such  sentence  occurs  in  the  later 
letters  of  the  man  who  defied  Nature  in  Egypt, 
Spain,  and  Russia.  In  truth,  the  Italian  cam- 
paign made  him  master  of  himself  and  therefore 
"  master  of  destiny." 

Thenceforth  he  resolves  to  shape  circum- 
stances, not  to  be  shaped  by  them.  He  believes 
that  boldness,  energy,  prestige,  determine  events. 
During  the  long  negotiations  for  peace  with 
Austria  in  1797  he  writes  from  Milan  to  Mas- 
s6na  at  the  front :  "  You  must  not  give  way 
to  the  Austrians  in  anything.  Be  the  strongest 
at  all  points,  so  that  if  there  is  the  least  quarrel 
or  scuffle,  they  shall  be  beaten.  Were  it  only  a 
matter  of  fisticuffs,  the  Austrian  soldier  must 
always  get  the  worst  of  it."  2  This  phrase  ex- 
plains much.  It  is  the  early  version  of  that 
later  dictum — "  Providence  is  on  the  side  of  the 
big  battalions." 

In  the  East,  naturally  enough,  he  talked  much 
about  destiny.  But  his  world-compelling,  na- 
ture-defying energy  has  nothing  in  common  with 

1  Nap.  Corresp.,  i.,  378. 

2  Ibid.,  iii.,  146. 


250          Personality  of  Napoleon 

the  fatalism  of  the  Oriental,  who  smokes  and 
meditates  on  nothing  in  particular.  The  hero 
who  looked  on  the  British  victory  at  the  Nile 
as  merely  a  temporary  check,  compelling  the 
French  to  do  greater  things  than  they  had  in- 
tended, was  no  fatalist.  He  might  rail  at  For- 
tune, as  he  did  at  Boulogne  in  August,  1805, 
when  waiting  for  Villeneuve  to  appear;  but  he 
reserved  his  most  exuberant  epithets  for  the  Ad- 
miral. If  he  had  really  believed  that  Fortune 
was  the  sole  arbitress  of  events,  would  he  not 
have  exhausted  his  rage  against  her,  and  left 
Villeneuve  alone?  In  truth,  no  great  com- 
mander is  absolutely  a  fatalist.  If  he  were,  his 
army  would  fall  to  pieces.  The  effort  of  Tolstoi 
to  prove  that  the  Russian  campaign  of  1812  was 
throughout  determined  by  destiny,  in  whose 
hands  the  commanders  were  mere  puppets,  is 
highly  interesting  as  a  tour  de  force,  and  as  a 
revelation  of  that  great  thinker's  philosophy; 
but  it  can  deceive  no  one  who  has  thoroughly 
studied  Napoleon's  character  and  career.  The 
disaster  to  the  Grand  Army  was  due  in  the  last 
resort  to  the  Emperor's  resolve  to  hold  on  to 
Moscow  and  intimidate  the  Czar  Alexander  at 
all  costs,  even  at  the  risk  of  a  winter  campaign 
or  of  what  he  termed  a  strategic  movement  to 


The  Thinker  251 

winter  quarters  near  Smolensk.1  In  a  very 
limited  sense,  that  awful  episode  is  a  drama  of 
destiny.  But  the  determining  force  is  the  de- 
termination of  the  chief  actor,  who  acted  then 
as  always  from  "  mere  dry  calculation."  He  had 
braved  similar  risks  in  Egypt,  and  in  1805  he 
longed  to  brave  them  on  the  Boulogne  flotilla. 
In  those  two  cases  Nelson  and  Villeneuve  foiled 
his  efforts.  At  Moscow  he  had  his  way,  until 
winter  was  close  upon  him  and  claimed  her  due. 

In  speaking  so  much  about  destiny  and  for- 
tune, what  was  Napoleon's  aim?  He  did  every- 
thing from  reasoning.  What  was  the  reasoning 
in  this  case?  Perhaps  here,  as  at  so  many 
points,  his  early  studies  will  give  us  a  clue.  I 
think  it  highly  probable  that  he  was  influenced 
by  the  Greek  notions  of  fortune  and  destiny. 
He  had  read  with  deep  interest  Plutarch's  Lives; 
and  many  events  there  recorded  showed  the  in- 
fluence of  the  idea  of  fortune  upon  the  Greeks 
and  Romans.  The  career  of  Timoleon,  as  de- 
scribed by  Plutarch,  is  perhaps  the  most  re- 
markable instance  of  unchequered  success  ever 
recorded.  Though  unskilled  in  strategy,  he  un- 
dertook to  lead  a  small  Corinthian  force  for  the 
liberation  of  Sicily  from  the  tyrant  Dionysius 

i-Nap.  Corresp.,  xxiv.,  265. 


252          Personality  of  Napoleon 

and  the  Carthaginians.  In  respect  to  material 
force  the  enterprise  seemed  desperate;  but  the 
omens  were  highly  favourable.  During  the  cere- 
monies at  Corinth  which  preceded  his  departure, 
a  crown  of  victory,  detached  from  some  decora- 
tions, fell  down  upon  his  head;  and  a  light  as 
from  heaven  guided  his  ships  towards  Rhegium. 
By  skill  and  address  he  slipped  across  the 
strait,  evading  the  Carthaginian  galleys.  Vic- 
tory crowned  his  daring  rush  against  their 
troops,  whom  he  took  unawares.  The  Greek 
cities,  startled  by  these  signs  of  divine  favour, 
espoused  his  cause;  and  he  succeeded  in  cap- 
turing the  citadel  of  Syracuse  and  Dionysius 
himself.  A  plot  to  murder  Timoleon  was  foiled 
by  an  avenger  of  blood  striking  down  the  very 
man  who  was  about  to  take  the  hero's  life.  All 
these  events  (says  Plutarch)  "made  the  people 
reverence  and  protect  Timoleon  as  a  sacred  per- 
son sent  by  heaven  to  revenge  and  redeem  Sicily." 
He  himself  before  the  crowning  battle  against 
the  Carthaginians  gave  a  happy  turn  to  what 
seemed  an  evil  omen  with  a  skill  like  that  dis- 
played by  William  the  Conqueror  at  the  landing 
in  Pevensey  Bay.  Finally,  after  giving  liberty 
and  just  government  to  Sicily,  Timoleon  thanked 
the  gods  for  the  favour  which  they  had  vouch- 


The  Thinker  253 

safed,  and  erected  a  shrine  in  his  house  to  Good 
Fortune,  ascribing  all  his  successes  to  her. 
Clearly  these  uninterrupted  triumphs  were  in 
large  measure  the  outcome  of  the  belief  in  the 
special  favour  accorded  to  him  by  the  gods. 

Now,  this  story  was  well  known  to  Napoleon. 
Further,  he,  a  child  of  the  Mediterranean,  brought 
up  among  a  primitive  people,  half  hunters,  half 
fishermen,  realised  the  force  of  superstition. 
Perhaps  at  one  time  he  was  imbued  by  it;  for, 
as  we  have  seen,  he  retained  the  custom  of  cross- 
ing himself  on  the  receipt  of  good  news.  He 
early  rejected  revealed  religion,  but  he  retained 
his  belief  in  good  luck,  much  as  Frederick  the 
Great  did.1  He  knew  that  soldiers,  peasants, 
and  many  of  a  higher  station  as  well,  wor- 
shipped good  fortune,  the  shadow  of  all  primi- 
tive cults.  It  is  therefore  highly  probable  that 
his  appeals  to  his  star,  or  fortune,  or  destiny 
were  designed  to  enlist  on  his  side  the  crude  but 
potent  conceptions  which  have  always  counted 
for  so  much  among  the  Mediterranean  peoples, 
nerving  the  Greeks  to  do  more  than  their  best 
for  Alexander  the  Great,  Epaminondas,  and 
Timoleon.  Some  generals  are  lucky,  others  un- 
lucky. Napoleon  determined  to  be  among  the 

1  Malmesbury  Diaries,  i.,  124. 


254          Personality  of  Napoleon 

lucky  ones,  and  set  himself  to  conquer  Fortune 
by  claiming  that  she  was  already  on  his  side. 
The  device  completely  succeeded,  so  completely 
indeed  that  this  cool  calculator,  this  embodi- 
ment of  hard  dry  reason,  has  been  called  the 
Man  of  Destiny,  as  though  he  sat  up  at  night 
viewing  the  stars  and  casting  horoscopes.  He 
never  did  anything  so  foolish.  If  he  sat  up  very 
late  it  was  in  order  to  transact  business,  or  to 
procure  the  latest  possible  reports  from  his 
officers  before  ordering  the  movements  for  the 
morrow.1 

I  can  find  no  well-authenticated  incident  of 
his  career  which  convicts  him  of  downright 
superstition.  The  most  plausible  story  to  that 
effect  is  one  recorded  by  Chaptal.  It  refers  to 
the  summons  issued  by  Napoleon  for  the  meeting 
of  the  Jews  in  a  Sanhedrin  at  Paris.  While 
Napoleon,  Chaptal,  and  others  were  at  dinner, 
the  Emperor's  uncle,  Cardinal  Fesch,  entered  in 
consternation,  and,  in  reply  to  Napoleon's  in- 
quiries, made  answer :  "  Do  you  want  the  end 
of  the  world  to  come?  "  "  Why?  "  retorted  the 
Emperor.  "  Do  you  not  know  that  the  Bible 
foretells  the  end  of  the  world  when  the  Jews  are 

1Yorck  von  Wartenburg,  Napoleon  as  General,  i.,  283 
(Eng.  edit.). 


The  Thinker  255 

recognised  as  constituting  a  nation?"  Chaptal 
and  the  guests  were  inclined  to  laugh;  but  the 
Emperor  became  serious,  and  went  out  with 
Fesch  to  an  ante-room,  where  he  remained  con- 
versing for  an  hour.  Next  day  the  Sanhedrin 
was  dissolved.1 

Now,  assuming  the  story  to  be  true  (and 
Chaptal  is  a  French  memoir- writer),  it  does  not 
necessarily  imply  that  Napoleon  believed  the 
end  of  the  world  to  depend  on  the  assembly  of 
the  Jews  in  a  Sanhedrin.  It  may  mean  no  more 
than  this :  that  he,  as  being  responsible  for  public 
opinion  and  public  credit,  foresaw  grave  incon- 
venience if  the  Royalist  frondeurs  of  the  Boule- 
vard St.  Germain  or  the  "  bears  "  on  the  Bourse 
spread  the  rumour  that  the  end  of  all  things 
was  at  hand.  For  one  thing,  it  would  stop  the 
payment  of  taxes  and  might  cause  a  headlong 
fall  in  stocks.  We  do  not  know  the  workings 
of  the  Emperor's  mind  on  this  question;  but  I 
suspect  that  Fesch's  silly  story  caused  him  very 
little  concern  about  the  end  of  the  world  and 
very  much  concern  about  a  general  repudiation 
of  debt.2 

1  Chaptal,  Souvenirs,  p.  243. 

2  At  St.  Helena  he  once  remarked  to  Gourgaud  that  he 
believed  the   terrible   fire   at  the    Schwarzenberg  ball   in 
Paris,  in  which  several  persons  perished,  was  of  sinister 


256          Personality  of  Napoleon 

The  cleverest  man  about  Napoleon  was  Talley- 
rand; and  I  think  that  he  detected  the  unreality 
of  the  references  to  the  star.  The  great  diplo- 
matist let  fall  a  suggestive  remark  to  Hyde  de 
Neuville  before  his  interview  with  Bonaparte  in 
1799.  Speaking  of  the  First  Consul,  Talley- 
rand said :  "  If  he  lasts  one  year,  he  will  go 
far.  He  is  a  man  who  believes  that  he  is  the 
master  of  Fortune,  a  man  whose  astonishing 
confidence  in  his  star  inspires  in  his  partisans 
an  equally  astonishing  sense  of  security." * 
"  Master  of  Fortune ! "  The  two  words  are  in 
direct  contradiction.  Destiny  is  no  longer  de- 
stiny if  you  are  master  of  it.  Fortune,  if  you 
control  her,  ceases  to  be  a  goddess  dispensing 
her  favours  from  on  high ;  she  becomes  a  Brocken- 
spectre,  the  projection  of  your  own  figure  upon 
fog. 

For  the  most  part  Napoleon  thought  so  clearly 

augury  for  him,  and  he  was  therefore  well  pleased  when 
at  the  battle  of  Dresden  Schwarzenberg  was  killed;  for 
he  said  to  himself,  "  Then  the  fatality  was  for  him,  not 
for  me."  Now,  the  curious  thing  is  that  Schwarzenberg 
did  not  perish  at  Dresden  but  lived  on  to  invade  France 
in  1814.  It  was  Moreau  who  was  killed.  Gourgaud  re- 
lates the  story  and  adds  the  needed  correction,  but  with- 
out commenting  on  the  strange  lapse  of  memory  which 
prompted  this  artificial  outburst  of  fatalism.  (Gourgaud, 
Journal,  i.,  519.) 

1  Hyde  de  Neuville,  Mems.,  i.,  273. 


The  Thinker  257 

and  incisively  that  it  is  hard  to  think  of  him 
as  a  blind  devotee  of  Fortune,  or  as  deceived  by 
the  vague  and  silly  talk  about  her.  On  one 
occasion  he  shore  it  asunder  by  asserting  that 
in  the  long  run  men  meet  with  their  deserts,  a 
statement  which  implies  that  character  de- 
termines events.  As  the  Emperor  often  spoke 
about  controlling  Fortune,1  it  is  clear  that  he 
saw  through  the  fable  which  imposed  on  the 
multitude.  Why,  then,  did  he  use  the  language 
of  the  multitude?  Obviously,  in  order  to  im- 
press it  the  more.  The  belief  that  he  was  the 
favourite  of  Fortune  was  an  asset  of  priceless 
worth.  In  the  field  it  was  worth  an  army. 
Wellington  estimated  the  presence  of  Napoleon 
on  a  battlefield  as  equalling  a  force  of  40,000 
men,  because  "  he  suited  a  French  army  so  ex- 
actly." 2  One  might  add  that  the  troops  re- 
doubled their  energy,  because  they  saw  the  star 
of  victory  going  before  them  when  the  Emperor 
was  at  hand.3 

1  See  instances  ante,  pp.  26,  72. 

2  Stanhope,  Conversations  with  Wellington,  p.  9. 

8  The  appeals  to  the  star  were  not  to  be  effective  for 
ever.  General  Mathieu  Dumas  mentioned  to  de  Broglie  a 
curious  incident  which  happened  on  a  parade  ground  at 
Dresden  during  the  armistice  of  June-July,  1813.  Some 
French  conscripts  were  being  severely  rated  by  drill  ser- 
geants for  their  clumsiness,  when  the  Emperor  came  on 
the  scene.  In  liis  annoyance  at  the  severity  of  a  drill 
17 


258          Personality  of  Napoleon 

Turning  to  the  domain  of  literature,  we  note 
that  Napoleon's  favourite  poem  was  Ossian, 
which  he  read  in  the  Italian  translation  of 
Cesarotti.  At  that  time  Macpherson's  poem  had 
a  considerable  vogue,  which  was  perhaps  due 
to  the  dispute  whether  it  was  a  Celtic  legend  or 
the  poet's  invention.  Napoleon  took  some  in- 
terest in  that  question;  and  his  nature  thrilled 
at  the  adventures  and  exploits  of  the  Irish  hero, 
which  lost  none  of  their  force  and  grandiosity 
in  the  Italian  translation.  He  often  mentioned 
to  Englishmen  his  admiration  of  Ossian.  At 
Fontainebleau  in  1814  he  declared  that  there 
was  something  very  warlike  about  that  poetry. 
On  EL  M.  S.  Northumberland,  when  bound  for 
St.  Helena,  he  showed  Glover,  the  secretary,  a 
copy  of  the  poem  and  asked  him  whether  he  had 
ever  read  it,  remarking  that  it  was  very  fine  in 
French.  To  Lady  Malcolm  at  St.  Helena  he 
said  that  the  Italian  version  was  far  better.1 

sergeant,  he  took  a  musket  and  sought  to  drill  the  poor 
boys,  but  with  no  better  result.  At  last,  turning  to  Dumas, 
who  was  looking  on  with  dejected  mien,  he  said:  "You 
do  not  believe  in  miracles?  "  "  Yes  I  do,"  replied  Dumas, 
"  provided  that  I  have  time  to  make  the  sign  of  the  cross." 
Whereupon  Napoleon  at  once  broke  off  the  conversation 
and  returned  to  his  headquarters.  De  Broglie,  Mems.,  i., 
218  (Eng.  edit.). 

1  Sir  N.  Campbell,  Journal,  p.  158.  Lady  Malcolm,  A 
Diary  of  St.  Helena,  p.  21. 


The  Thinker  259 

We  now  deem  those  poems  mere  bombast;  but 
an  inflated  style  is  not  inappropriate  to  the  sub- 
ject, and  it  certainly  pleased  Napoleon.  This 
reveals  his  predilection  in  literature.  He  appre- 
ciated rhetorical  poetry ;  and  elevated  sentiments, 
whether  in  verse  or  prose,  appealed  to  him.  But 
he  lacked  the  inmost  poetic  sense.  M.  Guillois, 
a  diligent  and  sympathetic  student  of  his  writ- 
ings, says  he  has  discovered  in  them  only  one 
sentence  that  can  be  called  poetical.  It  runs 
thus :  "  The  spring  is  at  last  appearing,  and 
the  leaves  are  beginning  to  sprout,"  1  I  think 
this  verdict  one-sided  and  unfair.  The  passage 
in  which  he  described  to  Las  Cases  his  early 
love  for  Mile.  Colombier  at  Valence,  when  they 
met  at  dawn  and  ate  cherries  together  in  her 
mother's  orchard,  is  a  sweet  little  idyll.  Then, 
too,  his  early  letters  to  Josephine  also  rise 
to  heights  of  passion  which  dwarf  mere  ques- 
tions of  literary  form.  When  deeply  moved, 
he  gave  forth  to  the  world  letters,  speeches, 
proclamations  vibrating  with  feeling,  instinct 
with  a  fiery  eloquence.  There  is  at  times  a 
poetry  in  prose  which  surpasses  that  of  verse; 
and  Napoleon  sometimes  rose  to  the  heights 

1  Nap.  Corresp.,  xx.,  221;  quoted  by  A.  Guillois,  Napo- 
leon (1889). 


260          Personality  of  Napoleon 

in  which  both  poetry  and  prose  find  their 
source. 

An  intense  nature  cannot  be  intense  at  all 
points;  and  Napoleon  had  his  blind  sides, 
namely,  in  regard  to  music  and  the  arts.  His 
liking  for  music  was  limited  to  simple  little 
songs,  such  as  those  of  Rousseau,  which  in 
youth  he  so  much  praised.  As  regards  paint- 
ing and  sculpture,  Chaptal  declared  that  Napo- 
leon's sole  test  of  merit  was  accuracy.  On  his 
visit  to  David's  studio  to  inspect  the  great  paint- 
ing of  the  Coronation,  he  viewed  it  closely,  but 
solely  in  regard  to  the  fidelity  of  the  portraits. 
Further,  he  showed  little  interest  in  the  works 
of  the  great  masters  at  the  Louvre;  and  when 
he  stopped  in  front  of  one  of  them  it  was  merely 
in  order  to  ask,  "  Whose  is  that?  "  Similarly, 
at  Dresden  in  July,  1807,  he  hurried  through 
the  galleries  at  a  pace  obviously  painful  to  the 
King  of  Saxony,  who  could  scarcely  keep  up 
with  his  preoccupied  visitor.1  In  architecture 
it  was  the  gigantic  which  most  appealed  to  Napo- 
leon. He  said  more  than  once  that  the  things 
which  astonished  him  most  were  the  Pyramids 
and  the  stature  of  a  giant  named  Freon.  To 
this  peculiarity  of  the  Emperor  we  may  ascribe 

1  Chaptal,  269-272;  Lettres  de  Mme.  Reinhard,  p.  340. 


The  Thinker  261 

the  grandiosity  of  his  chief  monuments  in  Paris 
— the  Arc  de  Triomphe  and  the  Vendftme  column 
— obviously  inspired  by  the  Arch  of  Constantine 
and  Trajan's  column  at  Rome. 

He  who  spends  his  time  mainly  in  affairs  of 
government  will  fascinate  a  thinker,  who  views 
the  world  mainly  from  the  study.  In  fact,  in 
many  ways  the  man  of  the  study  will  gladly 
hail  the  man  of  action  as  his  superior.  Cer- 
tainly Goethe  deemed  it  one  of  the  events  of  his 
life  to  converse  with  Napoleon,  and  in  1831 
passed  judgment  on  him  to  Eckermann  as  a 
born  ruler  of  the  world,  one  of  those  who  find 
happiness  only  in  command,  one  who,  always 
himself  a  match  for  every  situation,  rested 
steadfast  and  secure  on  his  clear  fixed  will.  It 
was  natural  that  the  great  poet  should  admire 
one  who  had  helped  to  call  a  new  world  into  being. 
The  author  of  Faust  (Part  I.),  who  had  looked 
on,  half  in  weariness,  half  in  irony,  at  the  limita- 
tions that  beset  a  German  savant,  must  have 
gazed  with  rapture  at  the  transformation  which 
came  over  Western  and  Southern  Germany  at 
the  behests  of  her  conqueror  and  organiser.  The 
spread  of  equal  laws,  religious  toleration,  and 
an  enlightened  polity  to  States  formerly  penned 


262          Personality  of  Napoleon 

UP  DJ  jealous  rulers  and  graded  in  the  old 
feudal  strata,  was  an  event  of  high  significance; 
and  it  is  scarcely  too  much  to  compare  the 
dreary  negations  and  futile  subtleties  of  the  old 
life  of  Faust  with  the  twilight  of  the  pre-Revolu- 
tionary  times,  and  the  many-sided  activities  of 
his  second  life  with  the  larger  day  then  dawn- 
ing upon  the  Teutonic  realm  of  the  new 
Charlemagne. 

There  are  two  accounts  of  the  Emperor's  in- 
terviews with  Goethe.  One  is  by  Talleyrand,1 
the  other  by  the  poet  himself.  They  differ  hope- 
lessly in  nearly  every  particular,  so  that  destruc- 
tive critics  could  well  maintain  that  Napoleon 
and  Goethe  never  met.  But  they  did  meet;  and 
the  discrepancies  of  the  two  narratives  are  easily 
accounted  for.  Talleyrand  described  the  more 
personal  and  political  details;  while  Goethe 
recorded  what  interested  him.  Especially  note- 
worthy in  the  poet's  account  is  Napoleon's  criti- 
cism of  Voltaire's  Mahomet,  which  Goethe  had 
translated.  Napoleon  censured  it  for  giving  an 
unworthy  portrait  of  the  conqueror  of  the  then 
known  world.  He  also  expressed  his  disap- 
proval of  all  dramas  in  which  fate  played  a 
part,  summing  up  his  censure  in  these  self- 

1  Talleyrand,  Mems.,  i.,  432. 


The  Thinker  263 

revealing  words :    "  What  do  they  mean  by  their 
fatalism?    Politics  is  fatalism."  1 

Napoleon's  admiration  for  conciseness  of 
thought  and  style  was  so  marked  that  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  account  for  his  approval  of  Goethe's 
Sorrows  of  Werther,  which,  it  appears,  he  had 
read  seven  times.  He  pointed  out  an  artistic 
blemish  in  the  work,  namely,  that  Werther's 
suicidal  mania  proceeded  not  solely  from  disap- 
pointed love  but  also  from  frustrated  ambition. 
Always  enamoured  of  clearness  and  precision, 
he  found  the  mixture  of  motives  untrue  to 
nature,  and  Goethe  agreed  with  him.  The  criti- 
cism of  the  Emperor  and  the  acquiescence  of 
the  author  are  equally  curious;  for,  as  Lewes 
has  pointed  out,  the  original  of  Werther  (i.  e., 
Jerusalem)  committed  suicide  owing  to  the 
double  cause — a  fact  which  Goethe  must  have 
forgotten  when  he  agreed  with  Napoleon,  not 
to  mention  the  fact  that,  when  revising  the 
work,  he  had  simplified  the  cause  of  suicide  in 

1  Strange  to  say  Mahomet  was  played  at  Erfurt  a  few 
days  later,  doubtless  because  of  the  many  references  which 
were  applicable  to  Napoleon's  own  career,  especially  the 
lines  (Act  I.,  Sc.  4) : 

"  Au  nom  de  conquerant  et  de  triomphateur 

II  veut  joindre  le  nom  de  pacificateur." 
At  this  couplet  Napoleon  displayed  visible  signs  of  emotion, 
and  a  sympathetic  thrill  went  round  the  theatre. 


264          Personality  of  Napoleon 

deference  to  a  somewhat  similar  criticism  from 
Herder.  It  is  a  signal  triumph  for  Lewes  that 
on  this  topic  he  could  set  right  Napoleon,  Herder, 
and  Goethe,  by  a  triumphant  appeal  to  fact. 

During  a  conversation  with  Goethe  at  Weimar 
a  few  days  later  the  Emperor  referred  to  Shake- 
speare in  the  depreciatory  terms  that  might  be 
expected  from  the  admirer  of  Voltaire  and 
Ossian.  In  this  connection,  too,  he  expressed 
his  surprise  that  Goethe,  with  his  great  intellect, 
did  not  like  les  genres  tranches.  To  this  Goethe 
made  no  reply.  Thereupon  the  Emperor  dis- 
coursed suggestively  on  tragedy,  and  finally 
urged  Goethe  to  write  a  Death  of  Ccesar,  but 
in  a  grander  style  than  that  of  Voltaire,  so  as 
to  show  what  vast  schemes  Caesar  would  have 
carried  out  had  his  life  been  spared.  Next  came 
the  suggestion  that  the  poet  should  leave  Wei- 
mar and  reside  at  Paris.  The  invitation  threw 
an  illuminating  light  on  the  former;  but  the 
advancing  years  of  the  poet  furnished  a  suffi- 
cient reason  for  not  proceeding  to  the  French 
capital,  where  assuredly  he  would  have  sunk  to 
the  level  of  an  imperial  Poet  Laureate. 

During  a  ball  held  at  Weimar  Napoleon  had 
an  animated  discussion  on  Tacitus  with  the 
famous  litterateur,  Wieland,  leading  up  to  it  by 


The  Thinker  265 

the  statement  that  tragedy  is  a  school  for  en- 
lightened men,  and  in  some  respects  is  superior 
to  history.  By  this  time  a  group  of  thinking 
men  had  assembled  in  the  corner  of  the  salon, 
and  the  Emperor  proceeded  as  follows : 

I  assure  you  that  the  historian  whom  you  are 
always  quoting,  Tacitus,  has  never  taught  me  any- 
thing. Do  you  know  any  greater,  yet  often  more 
unjust,  detractor  of  mankind?  To  the  simplest 
actions  he  assigns  criminal  motives.  He  represents 
all  the  [Roman]  Emperors  as  profound  villains,  in 
order  to  win  admiration  for  the  genius  which  has 
unmasked  them.  His  Annals  may  justly  be  called 
an  abstract  of  the  imperial  records  rather  than  a 
history  of  the  Empire.  They  tell  of  nothing  but 
accusations,  accused  persons,  and  people  opening 
their  veins  in  the  bath.  He,  who  is  ever  speaking 
of  informers,  is  himself  the  greatest  of  them.  And 
what  a  style!  What  unrelieved  obscurity!  I  am 
not  a  great  Latinist;  but  the  obscurity  of  Tacitus 
is  apparent  in  ten  or  a  dozen  French  or  Italian 
translations  that  I  have  read.  Hence  I  conclude  it 
is  innate  in  him,  a  result  of  his  genius,  as  it  is 
termed,  as  much  as  of  his  style,  a  trait  inseparable 
from  his  mode  of  expression  only  because  it  resides 
in  his  mode  of  thinking.  I  have  heard  him  praised 
for  the  fear  that  he  inspires  in  tyrants.  He  makes 
them  fear  the  people;  and  that  is  a  misfortune  for 
the  people  themselves. 

Half  apologetically  Napoleon  here  broke  off 
his  remarks  and  called  attention  to  the  ex- 


266          Personality  of  Napoleon 

cellence  of  the  Czar's  dancing.  The  company 
was  much  more  interested  in  the  intellectual 
duel  which  was  evidently  at  hand.  Encouraged 
by  Napoleon's  frankness,  Wieland  deferentially 
took  up  the  challenge  and  began  by  pointing 
out  that  Tacitus  denounced  the  Roman  Em- 
perors, not  to  their  degraded  subjects  alone,  but 
to  mankind  in  all  generations.  Finally  he  ex- 
pressed a  hope  that  men  would  probably  be 
governed  by  reason  instead  of  by  passion  as 
heretofore.  To  this  the  Emperor  made  answer: 
"  That  is  what  all  our  philosophers  say.  But 
though  I  look  for  this  strength  of  reason,  I 
nowhere  see  it."  Wieland  then  boldly  observed 
that  a  sign  of  its  growth  was  the  increased  at- 
tention given  to  Tacitus,  the  greatest  colourist 
of  antiquity,  as  Racine  called  him.  The  Roman 
Empire  was  at  that  time  ruled  by  monsters, 
whom  Tacitus  chastised.  Of  necessity  he  had 
to  confine  himself  to  the  records  of  Rome,  while 
Livy  ranged  at  large  with  her  armies.1  In 
Tacitus  one  sees  the  unhappy  age  in  which 
princes  and  peoples  stood  opposed,  each  trem- 
bling in  fear  of  the  other.  But  when  he  comes 
to  describe  the  reigns  in  which  the  Empire  and 

1  Tacitus    himself   bewailed   the   narrow    range   of   his 
themes   (Annals,  bk.  iv.,  ch.  xxxii.). 


The  Thinker  267 

Liberty  were  reconciled,  clearly  he  regards  that 
as  the  greatest  of  man's  discoveries. 

Here  there  was  a  general  buzz  of  applause. 
Napoleon  thereupon  graciously  remarked  that 
the  odds  were  against  him ;  but  he  deftly  turned 
his  enemy's  flank  by  the  inquiry  whether  Wie- 
land  had  not  been  in  correspondence  with  Johann 
von  Miiller,  the  historian  at  Berlin,  who  doubt- 
less warned  him  of  Napoleon's  hostility  to 
Tacitus.  To  his  own  confusion  and  to  the 
amusement  of  the  company,  Wieland  confessed 
that  this  was  so.  Having  thus  regained  the  ad- 
vantage, Napoleon  ended  the  discussion,  affirm- 
ing that  Tacitus  did  not  reveal  the  inner  causes 
of  events,  and  left  unexplained  their  mysterious 
connections.  In  fine,  governments  ought  to  be 
judged  only  according  to  their  environment,1 
Thus  the  great  man  drew  off,  dividing  the 
honours  of  the  debate  with  his  courageous  an- 
tagonist. As  usual,  he  respected  and  admired  a 
man  who  knew  his  own  mind,  and  spoke  it  forth 
clearly  and  strongly.  To  the  end  of  his  days 
he  retained  his  dislike  of  Tacitus.  At  St.  Helena 
he  reaffirmed  his  thesis,  first  maintained  before 
the  Institute,  that  Tacitus,  though  a  fine  colour- 
ist,  did  not  explain  the  motives  influencing  men's 

1  Talleyrand,  Mems.,  i.,  442-446. 


268          Personality  of  Napoleon 

actions.  His  stories  against  Tiberius  were  ab- 
surd. And  why  should  Nero  burn  Rome,  when 
he  loved  her  so  much?  i  No  reason  was  given 
for  that  act.  The  exile  then  laughed  at  the 
notion  that  he  disliked  Tacitus  for  his  opposition 
to  tyranny.2 

At  this  point  I  gladly  acknowledge  the  debt  of 
gratitude  of  all  historical  students  to  Napoleon 
for  first  raising  doubt  as  to  the  lifelikeness  of 
the  portrait  of  Tiberius  painted  by  Tacitus. 
Scholars  now  generally  admit  that  the  gloom 
and  horror  of  that  picture  are  overcharged ;  and 
it  is  a  signal  proof  of  the  acumen  of  Napoleon 
that  he  was  among  the  first  to  detect  the 
exaggeration. 

The  Emperor's  religious  beliefs  form  an  en- 
trancing though  diffcult  subject  of  inquiry.  In 

1  See,  too,  Gourgaud,  Journal,  i.,  165;  ii.,  341.  It  is 
worth  noting  that  Tacitus  leaves  the  question  open  whether 
the  fire  was  due  to  Nero  or  to  chance.  The  story  of 
Nero  harping  is  not  in  Tacitus,  but  in  the  far  less  reputa- 
ble writer,  Suetonius. 

2 1  cannot  but  think  that  this  motive  weighed  with 
Napoleon.  He  must  have  disliked  the  early  chapters  of 
the  Annals,  describing  the  abrogation  of  the  old  Republi- 
can safeguards  and  customs.  See,  too,  the  protest  of 
Tacitus  (Annals,  bk.  iv.,  ch.  xxxv.)  against  the  folly  of 
seeking  to  stifle  truth  by  the  arbitrary  proscription  of  a 
history. 


The  Thinker  269 

the  days  of  his  power,  as  behoved  the  author  of 
the  Concordat,  he  was  extremely  reticent  on 
this  topic.  Thus,  Chaptal,  who  knew  him  well, 
believed  that  he  detected  in  him  the  beginnings 
of  unbelief;  and  others  deemed  him  a  good 
Catholic  because  he  occasionally  went  to  mass, 
and,  while  there,  behaved  with  more  decorum 
than  Louis  XVI.  and  Marie  Antoinette  dis- 
played in  their  days  of  prosperity.  This  con- 
duct is  certainly  to  his  credit,  and  gained  him 
the  reputation  of  devoutness.  I  confess  I  can 
find  in  his  early  writings,  his  letters,  and  his 
more  intimate  confessions,  few  if  any  signs  of 
genuine  religious  feeling,  still  less  of  conviction. 
To  refer  to  his  early  works. — The  reply  to  the 
Genevese  pastor  who  had  reproached  Eousseau 
for  his  attacks  on  religion  is  a  warm,  almost 
fierce,  defence  of  the  philosopher.  Bonaparte 
took  it  for  granted  that  Catholicism  is  an- 
tagonistic to  the  ideal  polity  of  the  future;  and 
he  had  not  a  good  word  to  say  on  behalf  of 
Protestantism,  because  it  impaired  the  unity  of 
the  general  will.  He  at  that  time  deemed  re- 
ligion an  anti-social  force,  diverting  men  from 
the  pursuit  of  liberty  in  this  world  by  holding 
out  the  prospect  of  compensation  in  the  life  to 
come.  At  a  later  period  he  valued  religion  for 


270          Personality  of  Napoleon 

the  very  reason  for  which  he  declaimed  against 
it  in  his  Jacobinical  days. 

During  his  campaign  in  Italy,  Bonaparte  for 
a  time  desired  to  overthrow  the  temporal  power 
of  the  Papacy1;  but  he  finally  came  to  respect 
religion  as  an  immense  power  in  the  wrorld;  and, 
as  we  saw  in  Lecture  III,  in  reviewing  the  policy 
of  the  Concordat,  he  regarded  it  as  of  the  ut- 
most importance  to  utilise  that  force  on  behalf 
of  morality  and  order.  He  continued  to  lay 
great  stress  upon  the  value  of  religion  as  a 
political  sedative.  Not  long  after  Austerlitz  he 
sent  to  Paris  a  stern  reprimand  to  a  learned 
man,  Lalande  by  name,  who  had  spoken  against 
religion  at  the  Institute  of  France.  The  Em- 
peror declared  that  he  must  be  in  his  second 
childhood  to  utter  opinions  so  absurd  and  dan- 
gerous; or  else  he  was  actuated  by  vanity  and 
the  wish  to  be  talked  about;  for  atheism  was 
"  a  principle  destructive  of  all  social  organisa- 
tion, as  it  takes  from  man  all  his  consolations 
and  hopes."  2  Then  again  at  Erfurt  in  1808  he 
thus  bade  farewell  to  the  literary  men  assembled 
to  do  him  honour.  "  Sirs,"  he  said,  "  philo- 
sophers torment  themselves  by  creating  systems. 

*Nap.  Corresp.,  iii.,  No.  1828  (26th  May,  1797). 
2  Ibid.,  xi.,  472. 


The  Thinker  271 

In  vain  will  they  find  a  better  than  that  of 
Christianity,  which,  by  reconciling  man  to  him- 
self, assures  both  public  order  and  the  quiet  of 
States.  Your  ideologues  destroy  the  age  of 
illusions;  and  for  peoples,  as  for  individuals, 
the  age  of  illusions  is  that  of  happiness."  * 

Deferring  to  the  next  lecture  the  topic  of 
Napoleon's  unworthy  treatment  of  the  Pope  in 
the  years  1807-14,  I  ask  your  attention  to  a  few 
of  his  statements  at  St.  Helena.  By  that  time 
the  cloak  of  policy  and  reserve  had  fallen  away 
from  him,  and  we  detect  his  real  sentiments  on 
religion.  To  General  Gourgaud  he  often  un- 
burdened himself  with  singular  frankness.  Pos- 
sibly at  times  he  exaggerated  his  assertions, 
either  from  native  impetuosity  or  from  a  desire 
to  tease  the  young  man,  for  instance,  by  the 
proposal  to  write  a  history  of  the  campaigns  of 
Moses.  Gourgaud  seems  to  have  been  a  good 
Catholic,  upholding  the  cause  of  religion  against 
the  almost  sceptical  Bertrand,  Las  Cases,  and 
Montholon.  To  him,  then,  on  more  than  one 
occasion  Napoleon  declared  that  man  was  solely 
of  the  earth;  he  was  earthy  matter,  warmed  by 
the  sun  and  combined  with  electric  fluids.  An 
ox,  of  course,  was  nothing  more  than  that;  and 

1  Talleyrand,  M ems,  i.,  452. 


272          Personality  of  Napoleon 

man  was  only  a  superior  kind  of  ox,  consisting 
of  better  organised  materials.  Possibly  in  the 
future  there  would  be  on  this  earth  beings 
superior  to  us.  "  Where  [adds  Napoleon]  is 
the  soul  of  an  infant  or  of  a  lunatic?  The  soul 
follows  the  body.  It  grows  in  the  child  and  decays 
in  the  old  man.  .  .  .  Nevertheless  [he  concludes] 
the  idea  of  a  God  is  the  simplest.  Who  has 
made  all  that?  "  * 

On  several  occasions  he  declared  that  the 
morality  of  the  Christian  religion  was  merely 
that  of  Socrates  and  Plato.  Sometimes  he 
expressed  doubts  whether  Jesus  Christ  ever  ex- 
isted; and  he  declared  emphatically  his  prefer- 
ence of  Mohammedanism  to  Christianity  for  the 
Eastern  peoples.  In  Egypt  the  sheikhs  had  em- 
barrassed him  much  by  asking  him  about  the 
Trinity,  and  insisting  that  we  worshipped  three 
Gods  and  therefore  were  pagans.  Besides,  he 
continued,  Mohammed  conquered  half  the  known 
world  in  ten  years,  a  task  which  Christianity 
accomplished  in  three  centuries.  Or,  again,  he 
declared  his  admiration  for  Mohammed  in  de- 
claring a  holy  war.2  Clearly  this  preference 
was  founded  largely  on  military  motives.  He 

1  Gourgaud,  Journal,  i.,  297,  440;  ii.,  311,  409. 
-Ibid.,  i.,  454;  ii.,  78,  152,  272. 


The  Thinker  273 

seems  to  have  considered  that  Christianity  made 
men  afraid  of  death;  and  he  once  said  to  Gour- 
gaud  that  if  he  had  believed  in  a  God  who  dealt 
out  retribution,  he  would  have  been  afraid  in 
war.1  Mohammedanism,  on  the  contrary,  was  a 
fine  fighting  creed. 

At  bottom,  then,  Napoleon  viewed  religion  as 
a  political  force,  capable  of  rousing  men  to 
fiercely  aggressive  activity,  or  of  consolidating 
order  after  a  time  of  chaos,  and  at  all  times 
serving  to  console  the  poor  for  the  hardships 
of  their  lot.  It  mattered  not  whether  they  un- 
derstood religious  services.  On  one  occasion  he 
declared  that  Roman  Catholicism  was  better 
than  Anglicanism,  because  in  the  former  the 
people  did  not  understand  what  was  sung  at 
Vespers  and  only  looked  on.  It  was  better  not 
to  throw  light  upon  those  things.2 

What,  then,  are  we  to  say  of  the  beautiful 
monologue,  first  published  in  the  year  1840,  in 

1  Gourgaud,  Journal,  ii.,  409. 

2  Ibid.,  i.,  441.     It  is  doubtful  whether  even  in  youth  he 
was  devout.     Madame  Mere  at  the  time  of  the  conclusion 
of  the  Concordat  mentioned  to  Roederer  a  curious  little 
incident.     Shortly   before   the   first   great   religious   cere- 
mony, at  Easter,  1802,  she  jokingly  said  to  her  son:    "  Ah! 
it  will  not  be  necessary  for  me  now  to  box  your  ears  to 
make  you   go  to   high   mass."     "  No,"   replied   Napoleon, 
"  now  it  is  for  me  to  give  you  one  " ;  and  he  gave  her  a 
slight  slap  (Roederer,  Journal,  p.  112). 

18 


274          Personality  of  Napoleon 

which  Napoleon  is  made  to  contrast  the  evan- 
escence of  his  Empire  with  that  of  Christ? 
After  long  and  learned  arguments  against  pagan- 
ism and  the  systems  of  Lycurgus  and  Confucius, 
the  Emperor  is  reported  as  saying : 

It  is  not  the  same  with  Christ.  Everything  in  him 
astonishes  me;  his  spirit  soars  above  mine,  and  his 
will  confounds  me.  Between  him  and  every  other 
person  in  the  world  no  comparison  is  possible.  He 
is  truly  a  being  apart  from  all.  His  ideas  and  his 
sentiments,  the  truth  that  he  announces,  his  man- 
ner of  convincing  one,  are  not  to  be  explained  either 
by  human  organisation  or  by  the  nature  of  things. 
His  birth  and  the  history  of  his  life,  the  profundity 
of  his  dogma,  which  touches  the  height  of  all  diffi- 
culties and  yet  is  their  most  admirable  solution,  his 
Gospel,  the  singularity  of  this  mysterious  being,  his 
apparition,  his  Empire,  his  march  across  centuries 
and  realms— all  is  to  me  a  prodigy,  an  unfathomable 
mystery  that  plunges  me  in  a  reverie  from  which 
I  cannot  escape,  a  mystery  that  is  under  my  eyes 
and  endures,  which  I  can  neither  deny  nor  explain. 
I  see  nothing  of  the  human  in  this.  .  .  .  What  an 
abyss  of  distance  between  my  misery  and  the  eternal 
reign  of  Christ — preached,  incensed,  loved,  adored, 
living  through  all  the  world.  Is  that  death?  Is  it 
not  rather  life?  Such  is  the  death  of  Christ.  It  is 
that  of  God.1 

The  evidence  supporting  the  authenticity  of 

1  De  Beauterne,  Sentiment  de  Napoleon  sur  le  Christian- 
isme,  ch.  v. 


The  Thinker  275 

this  noble  passage  is  of  the  slightest.  The  words 
appeared  in  a  work  which  was  obviously  de- 
signed to  help  on  the  Bonapartist  revival  of  the 
year  1840.  It  was  issued  by  the  Chevalier  de 
Beauterne,  who  is  said  to  have  been  inspired 
by  Count  Montholon,  Napoleon's  companion  at 
St.  Helena.  But  Montholon,  during  the  exile, 
showed  no  attachment  to  religion  any  more  than 
Bertrand.  Judging  from  suspicious  facts  con- 
cerning the  publication  of  de  Beauterne's  vol- 
ume, the  opposition  of  the  views  there  expressed 
to  the  opinions  undoubtedly  uttered  by  Napo- 
leon during  his  last  exile,  and  the  striking  dif- 
ferences of  style,  we  may  pronounce  this  eloquent 
rhapsody  a  later  invention.1 

The  following  passage  rests  on  better  evidence, 
and  is  altogether  more  lifelike  (8th  June,  1816)  : 

Everything  proclaims  the  existence  of  a  God :  that 
is  beyond  a  doubt;  but  all  our  religions  are  clearly 
the  outcome  of  men.  A  man  can  swear  to  nothing 
that  he  will  do  in  his  last  moments ;  yet  undoubtedly 
my  belief  is  that  I  shall  die  without  a  confessor; 
nevertheless  there  is  one  [pointing  to  one  of  us] 
who  perhaps  will  confess  me.  Assuredly  I  am  far 
from  being  an  atheist;  yet  I  cannot  believe  all  that 
is  taught  contrary  to  reason,  without  being  dis- 

1  For  other  proofs  see  Rose,  Napoleonic  Studies,  pp.  104- 
106. 


276          Personality  of  Napoleon 

honest  and  a  hypocrite.  Under  the  Empire,  and 
particularly  after  the  marriage  with  Marie  Louise, 
very  great  efforts  were  made  to  induce  me  to  go 
to  Notre  Dame  in  full  state  to  receive  the  com- 
munion after  the  manner  of  our  kings.  I  refused 
absolutely.  My  faith  was  not  strong  enough  for  it 
to  be  a  benefit  to  me,  and  yet  was  too  great  to 
commit  a  sacrilege  in  cold  blood.  ...  To  know 
whence  I  come,  what  I  am,  whither  I  go,  is  beyond 
me;  and  yet  all  that  is  a  reality.  I  am  the  watch 
that  exists  but  does  not  understand  itself.  ...  I 
can  appear  before  God's  tribunal;  I  can  await  His 
judgment  without  fear.  He  will  not  detect  in  me 
the  idea  of  murder,  poisoning,  unjust  or  premedi- 
tated death  so  common  in  careers  like  mine.  I 
willed  only  the  glory,  the  power,  the  splendour  of 
France.  To  that  all  my  faculties,  my  efforts,  my 
time  were  given.  That  could  not  be  a  crime.  To 
me  those  efforts  appeared  a  virtue.1 

Here  we  notice  a  difference  between  this  man 
of  action  and  others  who  allow  the  mysteries 
of  life  to  stunt  their  activity — backboneless 
creatures,  for  whom  the  riddles  of  philosophy 
furnish  an  excuse  to  herd  with  the  most  de- 
graded followers  of  Epicurus.  That  state  of 
mind  is  seductively  portrayed  in  the  following 
lines : 

Into  this  universe,  and  why  not  knowing, 
Nor  whence,  like  water  willy-nilly  flowing; 

1  Las  Cases,  Memorial,  iv.,  160-163. 


The  Thinker  277 

And  out  of  it  as  wind  along  the  waste, 
I  know  not  whither,  willy-nilly,  blowing. 

Yesterday  this  day's  madness  did  prepare; 
To-morrow's  silence,  triumph  or  despair: 

Drink!  for  you  know  not  whence  you  came,  nor 

why: 
Drink!  for  you  know  not  why  you  go,  nor  where. 

No!  Napoleon  rarely  strayed  for  long  into 
the  land  of  listless  enchantment  limned  by 
Omar  Khayyam.  He  never  made  it  his  abode. 
His  unfailing  energy  saved  him  from  that.  Like 
Carlyle  a  generation  later,  he  found  that  the 
best  cure  for  baffling  problems  was,  not  to  drift 
and  drink,  but  to  play  the  man  and  work. 
Whatever  we  may  think  of  his  creed,  or  lack  of 
creed,  assuredly  we  admire  the  frankness  and 
fearlessness  with  which  he  confronted  the  deep 
things  of  life;  and  our  sympathies  go  out  to 
him,  as,  by  the  help  of  reason  alone,  he  struggles 
up  the  world's  great  altar-stairs,  uttering  the 
questions  that  echo  down  the  ages :  "  What  am 
I?"  "Why  am  I  here?"  "Who  made  all 
that? " 


VII 

THE  WORLD-RULER 

"  Nous  sommes  maitres  •  du  monde." — Napoleon  to 
Roederer,  1st  December,  1800. 

FjROMINENT  among  the  characteristics  of 
the  ancient  Romans  was  their  love  of  the 
gigantic.  It  informs  alike  their  architecture  and 
state  policy,  their  public  works  and  games.  The 
traveller  who  comes  from  lands  where  labour  is 
so  dear  as  to  necessitate  economy  of  effort  gazes 
with  wonder  at  the  huge  amphitheatre  of  a  com- 
paratively small  city  like  Verona,1  at  the  enor- 
mous baths  and  aqueducts  of  Rome,  and  the 
"  Villa "  of  Hadrian  near  Tivoli,  containing 
enough  materials  to  build  a  town  of  average 
size.  To  the  Greeks  beauty  and  symmetry  were 
everything;  to  the  Romans  they  counted  for 
little  unless  combined  with  vastness.  That  char- 

1  Napoleon  wrote  of  it  on  3d  June,  1796 :  "  Je  viens  de 
voir  1'amphitheatre :  ce  reste  du  peuple  Remain  est  digne 
de  lui.  .  .  .  Ici  cent  mille  spectateurs  sont  assis." 

278 


The  World-Ruler  279 

acteristic  lived  on  in  mediaeval  Italy,  and  is  re- 
sponsible for  the  huge  palaces,  the  solid  and 
lofty  towers  which  made  a  city  a  collection  of 
fortresses,  and  the  colossal  churches  out  of  all 
proportion  to  the  needs  of  the  population.  The 
Roman  ritual,  literature,  and  drama  in  their 
several  spheres  testify  to  the  Italian  love  of 
grandiosity. 

The  youthful  studies  of  Napoleon,  as  we  have 
seen,  turned  largely  on  the  triumphs  of  ancient 
Rome.  That  theme  wrought  itself  into  the  fibre 
of  his  being.  Judge  of  his  enthusiasm  by  the 
fact  that  he  loved  to  pore  over  Caesar 's  Gallic 
War.  A  youth  who  finds  unfailing  delight  in 
that  work  must  be  a  Roman  at  heart;  and  he 
who  early  made  Caesar  his  hero  set  himself  to 
be  a  greater  than  he.  The  glories  of  ancient 
Rome  were  a  constant  challenge  to  his  activity. 
He  sought  to  raise  the  Latin  peoples  from  their 
lethargy,  and  on  their  basis  rear  a  fabric  which 
would  equal,  if  not  surpass,  that  of  the  Caesars. 

The  Roman  strain  in  his  nature  impelled  him 
in  1798  to  the  conquest  of  the  Levant.  In  some 
respects  this  is  the  most  venturesome  enterprise 
of  his  career.  While  Central  Europe  and  Italy 
chafed  at  the  French  yoke,  and  the  Union  Jack 
waved  triumphant  at  sea,  he  proposed  to  seize 


280  Personality  of  Napoleon 

Egypt  and  use  it  as  a  base  for  that  grander 
enterprise,  the  conquest  of  India.  In  one  im- 
portant matter  Bonaparte  was  far  more  daring 
than  Alexander  the  Great,  who,  before  setting 
out  for  Asia  Minor,  assured  his  communications 
with  Europe  by  coming  to  an  understanding 
with  Athens,  thus  averting  all  risk  of  being  cut 
off  from  his  base  of  supplies.  But  Bonaparte 
could  not  answer  for  the  British  fleet.  Doubt- 
less it  was  this  consideration  which  led  the 
historian,  Thiers,  to  pronounce  the  Egyptian 
enterprise  of  1798  "  the  rashest  attempt  that  his- 
tory records :  rasher  even  than  Moscow.  It  con- 
tained the  germ  of  Napoleon's  subsequent  life. 
It  showed  his  marvellous  powers  of  combination 
and  execution,  and  the  wildness  with  which 
his  imagination  led  him  to  despise  moral  and 
physical  obstacles."  1 

Such  are  the  words  of  an  admirer.  They  are 
none  too  severe.  After  the  battles  of  Cape  St. 
Vincent  and  Camperdown  the  British  fleet  ruled 
the  seas.  Its  withdrawal  from  the  Mediterra- 
nean at  the  close  of  1796  was  a  needed  act  of 
concentration  which  made  those  victories  pos- 
sible. Afterwards  the  British  coasts  were  fairly 
safe,  at  least  for  a  time;  and  it  was  the  height 

1  N.  Senior,  Conversations  with  Thiers,  etc.,  i.,  198. 


The  World-Ruler  281 

of  rashness  for  the  young  Corsican  to  assume 
that  the  Union  Jack  would  not  again  wave  in 
the  Mediterranean.  The  miscalculation  ruined 
his  enterprise.  After  Nelson's  victory  at  the 
Nile  it  wras  vain  to  attempt  the  larger  scheme 
of  a  march  to  the  Indus  or  to  the  Bosphorus. 
With  his  army  cut  off  from  France,  he  might 
hold  on  to  Egypt;  he  could  not  possibly  con- 
quer the  East.  Yet  still  the  dream  haunted 
him.  Possibly  he  had  not  fully  realised  the 
constricting  effect  of  sea-power,  which  has  been 
so  ably  explained  by  Captain  Mahan;  but,  after 
all,  that  effect  was  well  known  by  the  rulers 
and  generals  of  the  eighteenth  century;  and  ex- 
amples of  it  can  scarcely  have  escaped  the  ken 
of  so  diligent  a  student  of  war  as  Bonaparte. 
Certainly  after  the  siege  of  Acre,  when  Sidney 
Smith  captured  his  siege  artillery  at  sea  and 
turned  it  against  the  French,  its  efficacy  in 
warfare  could  not  be  denied. 

Nevertheless,  he  persisted  down  to  his  closing 
days  in  saying  that  the  mud  walls  of  Acre  came 
between  him  and  his  destiny,  the  conquest  of 
the  East.  Yet  he  must  have  known  that  the 
battle  of  the  Nile,  not  the  repulse  at  Acre,  was 
the  turning-point  of  the  whole  enterprise.  Acre 
was  one  result  of  the  naval  triumph;  but  there 


282          Personality  of  Napoleon 

were  other  results — the  non-arrival  of  reinforce- 
ments from  France,  the  rising  courage  of  the 
Moslems,  the  revolt  of  the  Maltese,  the  dis- 
couragement of  his  own  little  force,  and  the 
resolve  of  the  Sublime  Porte  to  reconquer  Egypt. 
His  army,  now  hard  stricken  by  the  plague,  was 
utterly  inadequate  to  conquer  the  East.  Why, 
then,  did  he  continue  to  harp  on  Acre  as  the 
turning-point  of  his  career?  Two  explanations 
may  be  suggested.  Possibly  he  fastened  his  gaze 
too  closely  on  what  was,  after  all,  only  one  of 
the  manifestations  of  sea-power,  the  defence  of 
Acre.  Thus,  several  times  at  St.  Helena  he  told 
his  companions  that  Acre  was  a  great  mis- 
fortune. Once  he  blamed  Kleber  for  cowardice 
in  refusing  to  make  an  assault;  and  again  he 
asserted  that,  if  he  had  had  four  more  twelve- 
pounders,  he  would  have  taken  the  place;  or 
again,  that  if  he  could  have  moved  with  a 
picked  body  of  French  on  India,  he  would  have 
chased  the  British  from  it.1 

The  other  explanation  is  this:  that,  while 
fully  realising  the  cogency  of  sea-power,  and 
the  impossibility  of  carrying  out  his  wider 
schemes,  he  deemed  it  advisable  to  fire  the  im- 
agination of  the  Celts,  both  then  and  at  a  later 

1  Gourgaud,  Journal,  i.,  52;  ii.,  185,  315. 


The  World-Ruler  283 

time,  by  holding  forth  to  their  gaze  the  golden 
vision  of  the  Empire  of  the  East.  True,  it  was 
lost,  but  by  a  mere  accident,  at  Acre.  There- 
fore one  day,  under  happier  auspices,  it  could 
be  realised.  The  latter  explanation  I  think  the 
more  reasonable.  It  consorts  with  his  keen  in- 
telligence and  his  knowledge  of  the  hidden 
springs  of  human  action.  Make  men,  especially 
Frenchmen,  believe  that  they  are  on  the  point 
of  achieving  the  greatest  exploit  since  the  times 
of  Alexander,  and  you  double  their  energy. 
Refer  the  temporary  failure  to  a  picturesque  in- 
cident like  that  of  Acre,  or  to  the  plague,  and 
you  whet  their  appetite  for  a  greater  effort. 
Man  is  an  imaginative  being;  and  Napoleon, 
the  great  manipulator  of  men,  knew  well  that 
the  crown  of  the  Moguls,  which  he  held  up  be- 
fore the  French,  would  obliterate  all  memory 
of  loss,  and  be  a  perpetual  challenge  to  further 
crusades. 

His  good  fortune  in  eluding  Nelson's  cruisers 
off  Sicily  and  in  reaching  France  at  that  crisis 
of  her  destinies,  the  autumn  of  1799,  hid  from 
the  gaze  of  Frenchmen  the  ruinous  failure  of 
the  Egyptian  expedition;  and  events  during  the 
next  few  years  precluded  him  from  a  policy  of 
adventure,  and  impelled  him  to  the  most  solid 


284         Personality  of  Napoleon 

and  enduring  of  his  works,  the  reorganisation 
of  France.  But  all  this  time  vast  schemes  crowd 
his  brain.  By  skilful  exchanges  in  Italian  do- 
mains he  secures  from  Spain  the  reversion  to 
Louisiana,  and  hopes,  from  San  Domingo  as 
base,  to  exploit  that  vast  territory  stretching 
as  far  as  the  Spanish  claims  in  California.1  He 
also  projects  a  French  settlement  of  Central 
Australia  2 ;  and  it  is  probable  that  the  tighten- 
ing of  his  grip  on  the  Dutch  Kepublic  in  1801-2 
preluded  an  occupation  of  its  colonies,  especially 
the  Cape  of  Good  Hope. 

After  becoming  First  Consul  for  life,  in 
August,  1802,  his  prospects  of  gaining  a  world- 
empire  were  very  brilliant.  In  France  and 
neighbouring  States  his  will  was  law.  He  an- 
nexed Piedmont  and  Elba.  Parma  and  Etruria 
were  in  effect  under  his  control.  French  media- 
tion in  Switzerland  assured  the  subjection  of 
that  land;  and  in  Germany  the  series  of  rob- 
beries of  Church  lands,  known  as  the  Secularisa- 
tions, furnished  Napoleon  with  an  effective 
means  of  enriching  his  henchmen  and  aggrandis- 
ing Bavaria  and  Prussia  at  the  expense  of  Aus- 

1  E.  L.  Andrews,  Napoleon  and  America,  21-28. 

2  For  the  Napoleonic  map  of  Australia,  issued  in  1807, 
see  Rose,  Life  of  Napoleon,  i.,  382. 


The  World-Ruler  285 

tria.  Thus  was  fulfilled  his  prophecy  expressed 
at  Mombello  in  May,  1797,  that  if  the  Germanic 
System  did  not  exist,  it  would  be  necessary  to 
create  it  expressly  for  the  convenience  of 
France.1  Of  the  other  Powers,  Kussia  was 
quiescent  during  the  flirtation  of  the  young 
Czar  with  Liberalism;  while  Great  Britain, 
under  the  somnolent  sway  of  George  III.  and 
Addington,  declined  in  strength  and  prestige. 
The  United  States  were  deeply  agitated  by  the 
rumour  of  his  expected  acquisition  of  Louisiana ; 
but  as  yet  they  could  take  no  action  against 
him.  In  a  short  time  it  even  appeared  that  by 
a  further  shuffle  of  the  cards  in  Italy  he  had 
the  prospect  of  acquiring  the  Floridas.  Further, 
at  the  Peace  of  Amiens,  he  had  recovered  all 
the  French  Colonies  lost  during  the  previous 
war.  The  Dutch  possessions  were  virtually 
under  his  sway.  Spain  was  his  obedient  vassal, 
and  as  yet  showed  little  or  no  resentment  at 
changes  which  portended  the  loss  of  Louisiana 
and  Florida  in  return  for  paltry  and  insecure 
gains  to  a  Spanish  Infanta  in  Italy.  India 
seemed  likely  to  fall  to  him;  for  his  dealings 
with  the  Mahrattas  promised  to  range  that  for- 
midable confederacy  under  the  French  tricolour 
1  Nap.  Corresp.,  iii.,  74. 


286          Personality  of  Napoleon 

and  expel  the  Union  Jack.  The  reconquest  of 
Egypt  presented  no  difficulty.  Sebastiani's  Re- 
port  on  the  Levant,  published  by  Napoleon's 
order  in  the  Moniteur  of  30th  January,  1803, 
asserted  that  6000  French  troops  would  easily 
overrun  that  land.  As  for  the  Ionian  Isles,  they 
longed  to  hoist  the  French  tricolour. 

It  is  well  to  remember  these  facts.  In  the 
year  1802,  Napoleon  had  the  world  at  his  feet. 
As  the  Russian  Government  was  soon  to  point 
out,  the  French  in  the  last  war  lost  as  many 
battles  as  they  gained;  but  in  the  interval  of 
peace  they  succeeded  in  extending  their  domi- 
nation enormously.1  This  was  so.  Napoleon 
won  as  much  by  diplomacy  as  by  war.  The  con- 
clusion of  the  Peace  of  Amiens  by  England  and 
her  acquiescence  in  subsequent  events  were  cal- 
culated to  endanger  her  existence,  as  that  keen 
observer,  Gouverneur  Morris,  clearly  saw.2  To 
resume:  in  1802  Napoleon  had  the  prospect  of 
acquiring  Louisiana,  the  Floridas,  Egypt,  and 
parts  of  India  and  Australia,  together  with  the 
reversion  to  the  Dutch  Colonial  Empire,  and 
possibly  to  that  of  Spain.  His  position  after 

1  Garden,  Traites,  ix.,  341. 

2  Diary  and  Letters  of  G.  Morris  (New  York,  1888),  vol. 
ii.,  p.  445. 


The  World-Ruler  287 

Tilsit  in  1807  was  splendid.  But  in  my  judg- 
ment the  situation  in  the  year  1802  offered  the 
best  chance  of  securing  an  almost  universal 
dominion. 

Probably  he  would  have  succeeded  for  a  time, 
provided  that  he  remained  quiet  until  the  French 
navy  was  ready  for  action.  Having  at  his  dis- 
posal nearly  all  the  shipyards  from  Amster- 
dam to  Genoa,  he  might  hope  before  long  to 
challenge  the  naval  supremacy  of  England. 
Meanwhile  prudence  counselled  reserve  and  de- 
lay. She  counselled  in  vain.  The  southern 
impetuosity  of  Napoleon's  nature  brooked  no 
delay.  Sebastiani's  Report,  followed  six  weeks 
later  by  the  despatch  of  General  Decaen's  ex- 
pedition to  India,  alarmed  the  British  Govern- 
ment.1 As  a  compensation  to  the  gains  of 
France  in  the  Mediterranean,  it  insisted  on  re- 
taining Malta.  This  Napoleon  refused;  and  the 
outcome  was  war  (18th  May,  1803). 

A  duel  with  England  for  the  empire  of  the 
world  was  perhaps  inevitable;  for  the  domina- 
tion of  the  East  lay  very  near  his  heart;  and 
that  alone  involved  a  life-and-death  struggle 
with  the  British  Empire.  But  the  outbreak  of 
war  came  about  two  years  too  soon  for  him. 

1  Mr.  0.  Browning,  England  and  Napoleon,  p.  137. 


288  Personality  of  Napoleon 

The  secret  instructions  which  he  drew  up  in 
the  middle  of  January,  1803,  for  the  guidance 
of  General  Decaen  bade  him  enter  into  friendly 
relations  with  all  who  sought  to  throw  off  the 
yoke  of  the  English,  "the  tyrants  of  India." 
The  outbreak  of  war  in  India  by  September, 
1804,  is  named  as  probable,  and  as  likely  to  in- 
volve the  Dutch  Republic.  If  outnumbered  at 
the  outset,  Decaen  is  to  retire  to  Mauritius  or 
the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  If  he  plays  his  part 
skilfully,  he  is  led  to  hope  for  "the  supreme 
glory  which  hands  down  the  memory  of  men 
beyond  the  lapse  of  centuries."  * 

That  might  have  been  the  result  had  Napo- 
leon been  content  to  play  a  waiting  game  until 
his  navy  was  strong.  But  this  is  the  weak  side 
of  his  character.  He  could  not  play  a  waiting 
game.  He  was  too  eager  and  self-willed.  We 
can  now,  I  think,  see  what  would  have  been  his 
best  policy.  He  should  have  played  with  Eng- 
land for  a  couple  of  years,  until  the  superior 
ship-building  resources  of  France,  Holland, 
North  Italy,  and  probably  Spain,  would  tilt  the 
balance  against  her  at  sea.  Diplomatic  dal- 
liance respecting  Malta,  Larnpedusa,  and  other 

1  M.  Dumas,  Precis  des  Evenements,  xi.,  189 ;  Mems.  et 
Journaux  du  Gen.  Decaen,  vol.  ii.,  pp.  250  et  seq. 


The  World-Ruler  289 

questions  was  possible;  for  the  timid  Adding- 
ton  Cabinet  did  not  want  war,  except  as  ending 
a  situation  in  which  peace  was  more  dangerous 
than  war.  That  you  will  see  by  carefully  perus- 
ing the  despatches  which  passed  between  Lon- 
don and  Paris  before  the  rupture.1  In  the  long 
run,  as  I  have  said,  a  conflict  was  perhaps  in- 
evitable; but  it  was  bad  policy  for  Napoleon 
not  to  patch  matters  up  for  the  present  in  order 
that  he  might  strike  with  greater  effect  in  the 
near  future.  By  holding  to  all  his  demands, 
and  rejecting  England's  claim  for  territorial 
compensation,  he  led  her  to  take  the  path  which 
proved  to  be  the  only  path  of  safety,  immediate 
war. 

Even  before  matters  came  to  a  crisis  he  saw 
the  impossibility  of  retaining  Louisiana.  His 
decision  to  sell  that  vast  territory  to  the  United 
States  is  of  abiding  interest  and  importance.  It 
ended  the  plans  of  France  to  gain  the  upper 
hand  in  North  America;  and  it  enabled  the 
United  States  for  a  ludicrously  small  sum 
(60,000,000  francs)  to  stretch  their  borders  as 
far  as  the  Spanish  territory  in  California.  It 
further  brought  about  a  strong  fellow-feeling 
between  the  United  States  and  Napoleon.  View- 

1  Mr.  O.  Browning,  op.  tit.,  passim. 
19 


290          Personality  of  Napoleon 

ing  the  affair  from  his  standpoint,  which  alone 
concerns  us  here,  we  may  say  that  he  gained 
considerably  by  securing  the  good  will  of  the 
United  States  for  the  near  future.  Whether, 
in  the  interests  of  the  French  race,  he  should 
not  have  held  on  to  Louisiana,  is  another  ques- 
tion. He  would  have  had  trouble  with  the 
United  States,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  France 
might  perhaps  have  retained  her  former  pos- 
session; and,  if  peace  had  soon  been  restored 
in  Europe,  she  might  even  have  colonised  parts 
of  that  great  territory  by  her  sons  who  were  to 
perish  almost  uselessly  in  Napoleon's  campaigns. 
All  this  is  bound  up  with  the  question  of  peace 
or  war.  By  the  close  of  1802  Napoleon  had  to 
decide,  firstly,  whether  he  would  proceed  with 
his  oriental  plans,  which  involved  war  with 
England  and,  incidentally,  the  sale  of  Louisiana ; 
or,  secondly,  whether  he  would  compromise  mat- 
ters with  England  in  the  East,  thereby  assuring 
peace  at  least  for  a  time,  and  keeping  his  hold 
on  the  prairies  of  the  West.  He  made  his  choice ; 
and,  as  we  can  now  see,  that  choice  tended  to 
war  in  the  Old  World  and  to  the  peaceful  pro- 
gress of  the  United  States.  One  word  more 
on  this  topic.  Whatever  we  may  think  of 
the  wisdom  or  unwisdom  of  his  choice,  he  did 


The  World-Ruler  291 

well  not  to  hold  on  at  all  points;  I  mean 
both  in  regard  to  Louisiana  and  his  oriental 
schemes.  In  the  year  1802  his  intellect  was 
keen  enough,  his  judgment  sound  enough,  to 
foresee  the  consequences  of  offending  both  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States.  We  shall  soon 
have  occasion  to  notice  the  hardening  of  his  re- 
solve by  the  year  1812  to  persist  in  his  demands 
at  all  quarters  of  the  political  compass. 

The  consequences  of  the  rupture  with  England 
before  his  navy  was  ready  became  apparent  at 
Trafalgar.  Meanwhile  on  land  his  annexation 
of  Genoa  in  June,  1805,  brought  to  birth  a  new 
Coalition  which  diverted  his  energies  from  the 
Boulogne  flotilla  to  the  armies  of  Austria  and 
Russia.  Hence  Ulm  and  Austerlitz.  The  au- 
tumn which  saw  the  Union  Jack  successful  at 
sea  witnessed  the  equally  decisive  triumphs  of 
the  tricolour  in  Central  Europe.  He  made  little 
of  Trafalgar,  and  ordered  that  all  the  French 
cruisers  destined  for  a  war  against  British 
commerce  should  sail  as  formerly  arranged.1 
Probably  he  longed  far  more  for  the  humili- 
ation of  England  than  of  Austria  and  Russia. 
On  the  eve  of  Austerlitz  he  uttered  the 
memorable  words :  "  This  old  Europe  wearies 

i  Nap.  Corresp.,  xi.,  214-217,  374,  424. 


292          Personality  of  Napoleon 

me."      His   chief   aim    was    ships,    colonies,    a 
World-Empire.1 

Trafalgar  and  Austerlitz  altered  the  course  of 
his  career.  Trafalgar  made  impossible  the  role 
of  Alexander  the  Great;  but  Austerlitz  placed 
in  his  hands  the  sceptre  of  Charlemagne.  Here 
was  a  glorious  sphere,  and  one  for  which  his 
own  character  and  the  tendency  of  the  times 
uniquely  fitted  him.  Had  he  been  content  to 
give  up  the  wider  vision,  the  mastery  of  the 
Orient,  and  to  be  satisfied  with  the  organisation 
of  the  lands  between  the  Elbe  and  the  Pyrenees, 
success  would  probably  have  crowned  his  efforts. 
Western  and  Southern  Germany  were  in  a  state 
of  chaos.  Goethe  and  many  other  Germans 
looked  on  Napoleon  as  the  man  predestined  to 
summon  their  long-divided  countrymen  to  a 
larger  unity,  a  more  beneficent  activity.  As  the 
new  Charlemagne,  Napoleon  appealed  to  the  his- 
toric imagination  of  that  people,  calling  them 
away  from  the  petty  particularism  of  their  two 
hundred  States  and  Free  Cities  to  a  cosmo- 


1  The  many-sidedness  of  his  schemes  and  the  restlessness 
of  the  man  are  illustrated  by  a  curious  fact.  It  appears 
that  during  nearly  ten  years  which  elapsed  from  1805  to 
1814  Napoleon  was  absent  from  Paris  or  its  neighbour- 
hood more  than  seven  years  in  all  (Bondoi's  Napoleon 
et  la  Societe  de  son  Temps,  p.  185). 


The  World-Ruler  293 

politan  life  centring  at  Paris.  In  the  years 
1806-11  he  swept  away  imperial  villages  and 
knightly  domains,  and  in  other  ways  remodelled 
the  map  of  South  and  West  Germany.  For  all 
important  purposes  the  Rhenish  Confederation 
formed  one  realm,  in  which  Napoleon's  will  was 
supreme.  Feudalism  went  by  the  board,  and 
civic  equality  and  religious  toleration  formed 
the  basis  of  a  new  polity  in  which  peasants, 
burghers,  and  Jews  saw  the  dawn  of  a  brighter 
day.  The  working  of  the  new  system  showed 
some  curious  inequalities 1 ;  but  on  the  whole 
Germany  gained  enormously  in  respect  of 
equality  and  facilities  for  extended  trade. 

Napoleon  used  every  possible  effort  to  con- 
ciliate public  opinion  in  Germany :  witness  these 
words  to  a  deputation  of  leading  men  from  the 
new  Kingdom  of  Westphalia  in  August,  1807: 

Religion  is  an  affair  of  conscience,  not  of  the  State. 
Small  States  are  no  good.  You  will  have  a  great 
Kingdom,  reaching  perhaps  to  Hamburg.  The 
soldiers  are  to  protect,  not  to  quell  you.  The 
nobility  is  not  to  count.  He  who  distinguishes  him- 
self and  shows  merit  is  to  be  promoted.  Kings 
exist,  not  for  themselves,  but  for  the  happiness  of 
their  people. 

1  Fisher,  Napoleonic  Statesmanship :  Germany,  pp.  264- 
267,  313,  329,  361,  368. 


294          Personality  of  Napoleon 

By  all  possible  means  he  sought  to  turn  away 
the  thoughts  of  Germans  from  Vienna  and  Ber- 
lin towards  Paris.  To  us  that  now  seems  a 
chimerical  enterprise.  But  in  those  years,  when 
German  sentiment  had  scarcely  awakened  at  the 
trumpet  calls  of  Fichte  and  Arndt,  success  was 
possible.  Cosmopolitan  sentiment  held  sway  at 
the  universities  and  in  literature,  as  appears 
in  the  earlier  writings  of  Fichte  and  Schiller. 
Not  until  after  1806,  and  then  only  by  slow  de- 
grees, did  German  feeling  turn  away  from  Paris 
and  towards  Berlin.  Meanwhile  Napoleon  did 
much  to  conciliate  public  opinion  beyond  the 
Rhine.  The  Code  Napoleon  acted  as  a  Galli- 
cising  influence;  and  its  author  sought  to  popu- 
larise the  use  of  the  French  language.  On  one 
occasion  he  visited  the  lycee  of  Mainz,  walked 
into  one  of  the  upper  classes,  and  examined  the 
boys  in  Latin  and  mathematics.1 

In  regard  to  commerce  he  opened  up  a  new 
future  both  for  Germany  and  Italy.  As  we  saw, 
he  planned  the  canal  joining  the  Rhine  and 
Rhone;  and  at  Elba,  early  in  1815,  he  told 
Major  Vivian  that  he  had  intended  to  make 
one  between  the  Rhine  basin  and  the  Upper 

1  Fisher,  Napoleonic  Statesmanship:  Germany,  pp.  229, 
364. 


The  World-Ruler  295 

Danube;  it  would  cost  only  20,000,000  francs. 
In  the  same  interview  he  showed  keen  interest 
in  the  roads  leading  over  the  passes  between 
France  and  Italy.  When  Vivian  remarked  that 
the  road  over  the  Col  di  Tenda  was  bad,  the 
Emperor  at  once  replied  it  was  not  his  making. 
He  asked  whether  his  bridge  over  the  Rhone  at 
Avignon  was  yet  finished,  and  remarked  on  the 
expense  of  a  fine  road  which  he  had  begun  from 
Wesel  to  Hamburg.  He  also  inquired  as  to  the 
state  of  the  road  over  the  Simplon,  an  engi- 
neering feat  of  which  he  was  very  proud.1  In- 
deed, one  of  the  finest  monuments  to  his  memory 
is  the  great  tunnel  or  gallery  of  Gondo,  with  its 
commemorative  tablet,  "  Via  Napoleone,  1807- 
1812." 

Popular  imagination  always  magnifies  the  ex- 
ploits of  great  men.  It  ascribes  to  Alfred  the 
Great  the  University  of  Oxford  and  trial  by 
jury.  As  the  French  proverb  says,  "on  ne 
donne  qu'aux  riches"  Therefore  I  was  not  sur- 
prised to  hear  from  an  hotel-keeper  on  Lake 

1  Rose,  Pitt  and  Napoleon:  Essays  and  Letters,  p.  169. 
Dr.  Guyot,  Le  Directoire  et  la  Paix  d'Europe  (ch.  xiv.), 
has  shown  that  Bonaparte's  resolve  to  control  the  Simplon 
Road  largely  accounts  for  the  French  invasion  of  Switzer- 
land in  1798.  It  determined  the  annexation  of  Valais  in 
1810. 


296          Personality  of  Napoleon 

Maggiore,  before  whose  door  ran  the  Simplon- 
Milan  road,  that  Napoleon  made  that  road  all 
the  way  from  Paris  to  Milan.  This  curious  ex- 
aggeration is  not  without  significance.  It  is  an 
unconscious  tribute  to  the  greatness  of  Napoleon. 
His  personality  stirred  the  popular  imagination 
as  no  one  had  stirred  it ;  and  therefore  men  take 
pleasure  in  assigning  everything  to  him.  Legend 
never  showered  garlands  of  bays  haphazard  on 
George  III.  or  Louis  XVIII. 

Among  the  uncompleted  plans  of  Napoleon  for 
the  benefit  of  neighbouring  peoples  those  respect- 
ing Rome  have  a  special  interest.  He  loved 
Rome  intensely.  In  the  year  1802,  when  Canova 
was  making  his  bust  he  talked  incessantly  about 
Rome,  walking  to  and  fro  the  while,  pouring 
forth  his  thoughts  about  the  heroes  described 
by  Livy,  and  then,  anon,  speaking  bitterly  about 
the  Rome  of  the  Popes  and  enthusiastically 
about  the  Rome  of  the  Caesars.  When  the 
sculptor  mentioned  Titus,  Trajan,  Marcus  Aure- 
lius,  he  exclaimed,  "  Yes !  They  were  all  great." 
Even  the  gladiatorial  games  pleased  him.  At 
St.  Helena  he  said  that  they  were  the  only  form 
of  tragedy  fit  for  the  robust  frames  and  steel- 
like  nerves  of  the  Romans.  He  desired  to  re- 
store Rome:  to  build  new  palaces,  new  colleges, 


The  World-Ruler  297 

new  canals,  new  roads.  But,  as  was  his  rule,  he 
postponed  these  public  works  until  he  could 
visit  the  Eternal  City  as  its  Emperor,  and  show 
to  it  the  little  King  of  Rome.  That  dream 
haunted  him  through  the  year  1811.  He  planned 
the  visit  for  1812,  the  year  of  Moscow. 

Why  did  this  intelligent  cosmopolitanism  break 
down?  Partly,  no  doubt,  because  it  was  ahead 
of  its  time.  The  peoples,  so  it  seems,  have  to 
work  their  way  to  it  through  the  intermediate 
stage  in  which  we  now  are,  namely,  national- 
ism. As  Mazzini  has  well  said,  nationality  is 
the  ladder  reaching  to  the  higher  level  of  cos- 
mopolitanism. To  leap  from  the  crude  and 
chaotic  conditions  prevalent  in  Central  Europe 
a  century  ago  to  the  state  of  universal  brother- 
hood was  far  too  great  an  effort.  Possibly 
nationalism  will  have  to  exhaust  itself  by  arma- 
ments before  the  higher  ideal  attracts  mankind 
with  irresistible  force.  Certainly  Europe  in 
1806-11  was  not  ready  for  the  formation  of  a 
cosmopolitan  Empire  stretching  from  the  Baltic 
to  the  Mediterranean.  Germans,  Dutch,  Swiss, 
French,  Italians,  and  Spaniards  could  with 
difficulty  be  brought  together  into  a  loose  kind 
of  federation,  still  less  into  a  system  in  which 


298          Personality  of  Napoleon 

Napoleonic  France  figured  as  predominant 
partner.  So  soon  as  we  formulate  our  ideas 
clearly  on  this  topic,  we  see  its  immense  com- 
plexity. The  only  condition  on  which  the  United 
States  of  Europe  could  be  formed  was  the  en- 
tire passivity  of  the  federating  peoples.  But  in 
1806  those  peoples  were  not  passive;  they  were 
beginning  to  awake  to  a  conscious  national  life. 
The  formation  of  a  great  composite  Empire,  or 
even  of  a  federation  of  States,  is  the  most  diffi- 
cult task,  as  you  know  from  the  early  history 
of  the  American  Union.  In  America  the  condi- 
tions favoured  federation — community  of  race, 
language,  sentiment,  and  to  some  extent  of  in- 
terests. Yet  for  several  years  the  question  of 
the  Union  wavered  in  the  balance;  and,  but  for 
the  tact  and  moderation  of  your  early  statesmen, 
that  Union  would  perhaps  never  have  come  to 
pass.  A  comparison  of  Napoleon  with  Jefferson, 
Hamilton,  or  Washington,  goes  far  towards  ex- 
plaining his  failure  to  keep  very  diverse  peoples 
under  his  sway. 

The  first  of  political  virtues  in  a  federal  ruler 
ire  tact,  forbearance,  patience.  Napoleon's  na- 
ture was  not  rich  in  these  qualities.  It  was 
Remarkable  rather  for  impetuosity.  By  the  year 
1806,  he  had  become  accustomed  to  have  his  way 


The  World-Ruler  299 

everywhere.  Good  fortune  had  spoiled  him.  As 
he  sorrowfully  said  at  St.  Helena — "  I  must 
admit  that  I  was  spoiled :  I  always  gave  orders ; 
from  my  birth  power  was  mine;  I  rejected  a 
master  or  a  law."  *  That  is  not  the  man  who 
will  conciliate  diverse  peoples.  Further,  the 
Continental  System,  by  which  he  sought  to 
assure  the  commercial  ruin  of  England,  imposed 
very  heavy  burdens  on  North  Germany,  Hol- 
land, Italy,  and  other  vassal  States,  so  that 
what  they  gained  by  his  Code  and  his  engineer- 
ing feats  they  lost  by  that  great  fiscal  experi- 
ment and  the  resulting  wars.  By  the  year  1815 
he  had  learnt  wisdom.  At  that  time  he  sin- 
cerely desired  to  arrive  at  a  compromise  between 
the  interests  of  France  and  those  of  neighbouring 
States.  But  in  the  intervening  time  he  had 
aroused  so  much  distrust  and  hatred  as  to  vitiate 
all  such  attempts.  At  St.  Helena,  amidst  the 
sobering  influences  of  adversity,  he  discerned  the 
weak  points  of  his  career,  and  laboured  to  slur 
them  over  by  asserting  that  at  no  point  of  his 
career  could  he  have  acted  otherwise,  and  that 
in  Europe  it  was  impossible  to  be  a  Washing- 
ton. True,  but  he  might  have  been  a  peaceful 
First  Consul,  content  with  the  splendid  position 
1  Las  Cases,  Memorial,  vii.,  45. 


300          Personality  of  Napoleon 

attained  by  the  Peace  of  Amiens,  and  refraining 
from  the  restless  eastern  policy  and  the  annexa- 
tion of  Genoa  which  opened  out  new  vistas  of 
war  in  1803  and  1805  respectively.  Moreover 
his  claim  to  have  been  working  for  a  European 
federation  is  vitiated  by  his  assertion  that  he 
could  attain  it  only  by  a  universal  dictatorship, 
above  all,  by  triumphing  at  Moscow  in  1812.1 
Not  by  those  methods  could  Europe  gain  peace, 
fraternity,  and  federation. 

For,  as  we  have  seen,  in  the  days  of  his  power 
he  relied  mainly  on  external  control,  and  in  the 
last  resort  on  force.  If  he  could  not  convince 
the  Germans  of  the  excellence  of  his  rule,  he 
would  coerce  them.  Hence  such  abominable 
acts  as  the  summary  execution  of  Palm,  the 
Nuremberg  bookseller,  for  the  crime  of  selling 
a  patriotic  pamphlet.  This  episode  does  not 
stand  alone.  Writing  at  Warsaw  early  in  1807 
respecting  a  rising  near  Cassel,  he  orders  that 
the  village  where  it  started  should  be  burned, 
and  thirty  ringleaders  shot,  200  or  300  others 
being  sent  as  prisoners  to  France.  A  little  later 
he  orders  the  execution  of  sixty  men.2  Again 
and  again  one  finds  similar  mathematical  cal- 

1  Las  Cases,  Memorial,  i.,  467-469. 

2  Nap.  Corresp.,  xiv.,  171,  213. 


The  World-Ruler  301 

culations  as  to  the  numbers  who  must  be  shot, 
in  order  to  repress  local  riots.  On  3d  July, 
1809,  he  commands  the  execution  of  six  men  at 
Nuremberg;  and  on  28th  January,  1813,  of  the 
same  number  at  a  place  near  Elberfeld.1  On 
5th  March,  1813,  he  orders  Eugene,  command- 
ing the  French  troops  at  Berlin,  to  burn  down 
that  city,  if  necessary,  so  as  to  make  an 
example.2 

These  rigorous  customs  were  also  enforced  in 
Italy.  In  consequence  his  rule,  which  that  op- 
pressed and  divided  people  had  formerly  hailed 
as  the  guarantee  of  freedom  and  unity,  now 
aroused  general  antipathy.  The  enthusiastic 
Italian  patriot,  d'Azeglio,  has  described  in  glow- 
ing terms  the  excitement  of  the  men  of  Turin 
at  the  news  of  Napoleon's  disaster  in  Russia, 
their  astonishment  that  he  could  fail  at  any 
point,  and  their  infinite  joy  at  the  fall  of  "  the 
vastest  and  most  invincible  of  tyrannies."  True, 
that  joy  was  soon  to  vanish  on  the  substitution 
of  the  weak  yet  exasperating  rule  of  Victor 
Emmanuel  I. — "Napoleon  clad  as  a  Jesuit:  the 
lance  of  Achilles  in  the  hand  of  Thersites."  For 
it  is  the  lot  of  mankind  to  stumble  from  one 

iLecestre,  Lettres  Inedites  de  Nap.,  i.,  322;  ii.,  212. 
2  Nap.  Corresp.,  xxv.,  31. 


302          Personality  of  Napoleon 

blunder  to  another.  But  the  testimony  of 
d'Azeglio  and  other  Italian  Liberals  shows  that 
the  Napoleonic  regime  had  become  insupportable 
even  in  the  land  where  formerly  it  was  most 
beneficent.1 

The  new  Charlemagne  further  committed  the 
very  serious  mistake  of  treating  the  Pope  with 
unmerited  harshness.  The  First  Consul,  who 
in  1801-2  arranged  with  the  Vatican  that  salu- 
tary compact,  the  Concordat,  was  a  very  different 
man  from  the  Emperor  Napoleon,  who  in  and 
after  1807  sought  to  overbear  the  conscientious 
scruples  of  the  Pontiff.  It  is  not  easy  to  account 
for  the  change;  for  surely  the  successor  of 
Ctesar  should  have  sought  to  retain  the  support 
of  the  successor  of  Peter.  But  after  the  Treaty 
of  Tilsit  (July,  1807),  which  laid  Europe  at  his 
feet,  pride  dictated  his  policy.  A  fortnight  after 
that  compact  he  fired  off  at  Pius  VII.  an  extra- 
ordinary letter.  As  afterwards  appeared  on 
more  than  one  occasion,  he  was  never  more  in 
his  element  than  when  preaching  to  the  head 
of  the  Church  on  the  virtue  of  unworldliness. 
Taking  as  his  text  the  words  of  Christ,  "  My 
kingdom  is  not  of  this  world,"  he  bids  the  Pope 
ponder  on  them.  He  declares  that  the  Pontiff 

1  M.  d'Azeglio,  /  miei  Ricordi,  ch.  viii. 


The  World-Ruler  303 

cannot  surely  believe  that  God  considers  the 
rights  of  the  throne  as  less  sacred  than  those 
of  the  papal  tiara;  for  kings  existed  long 
before  Popes.1  If  Pius  denounces  Napoleon  to 
Christendom,  the  latter  will  treat  him  as  Anti- 
christ sent  to  turn  the  world  upside  down,  and 
will  withdraw  his  peoples  from  the  Roman 
Communion.  For  ten  years  the  Vatican  has 
been  preaching  rebellion.  Does  the  Pope  mean 
to  excommunicate  him?  —  "  Does  he  think  that 
the  weapons  will  drop  from  the  hands  of  the 
French  troops?  Will  he  put  daggers  in  the 
hands  of  my  peoples  to  assassinate  me?  "... 
"  Does  he  take  me  for  Louis  le  Debonnaire?  " 
..."  The  present  Pope  is  too  powerful.  Priests 
are  not  made  to  govern.  Let  them  imitate  St. 
Peter,  St.  Paul,  and  the  holy  apostles,  who  are 
worth  more  than  the  Juliuses,  the  Bonifaces, 
the  Gregories,  the  Leos.  Jesus  Christ  declared 
that  His  Kingdom  is  not  of  this  world.  Why 
will  not  the  Pope  render  to  Caesar  what  is  due 
to  Caesar?  Is  he  greater  on  earth  than  Jesus 
Christ  was?  "  —  And  so  on.  The  succession  of 
short,  sharp,  imperious  sentences  is  truly 


1Nap.  Corresp.,  xv.,  442-445.  With  Italian  finesse  he 
sends  the  letter  to  Eugene  to  forward  to  the  Vatican  with 
a  covering  letter,  stating  that  the  letter  was  really  private 
and  not  meant  to  be  shown  to  the  Pope! 


304          Personality  of  Napoleon 

leonic.  They  recall  the  orders  of  the  parade 
ground.  Or  again  they  remind  us  of  the  epithet 
applied  to  his  style  by  one  of  his  early  teachers, 
volcanic.  Finally,  be  it  remembered  that  these 
were  not  empty  threats.  When  the  differences 
between  them  became  irreconcilable,  Napoleon 
gave  a  practical  application  to  his  homily  on 
unworldliness  by  dethroning  the  Pope  and  de- 
taining him  at  Savona.  There  early  in  the  year 
1811,  because  Pius  VII.  forbade  the  chapter  of 
Florence  to  recognise  Napoleon's  nominee  to 
that  archbishopric,  Napoleon  wrote  a  furious 
letter  to  Prince  Borghese,  Governor  of  the 
Transalpine  Province,  ordering  him  to  press 
severely  on  the  Pontiff. 

...  As  I  desire  to  protect  my  subjects  from  the 
rage  and  fury  of  this  ignorant  and  peevish  old  man, 
I  hereby  order  you  to  notify  him,  that  he  is  for- 
bidden to  communicate  with  any  Church  of  mine, 
or  any  of  my  subjects,  on  pain  of  the  punishment 
consequent  on  his  disobedience,  and  theirs.  You 
will  remove  all  suspicious  persons  from  the  Pope's 
household.  You  will  leave  only  the  number  of  per- 
sons necessary  to  wait  on  him,  and  you  will  not 
permit  any  one  of  any  kind  to  visit  him.  You  will 
take  steps  to  increase  the  garrison  of  Savona.  You 
will  take  care  to  have  all  the  Pope's  papers,  books, 
and  documents  taken  from  him,  and  you  will  have 
them  sent  to  Paris.  If  the  Pope  should  indulge  in 


The  World-Ruler  305 

any  extravagant  behaviour,  you  will  have  him  shut 
up  in  the  citadel  of  Savona,  which  you  will  have 
taken  care  to  provision,  and  furnish  with  all  neces- 
saries beforehand.  .  .  .  The  examination  of  the 
Pope's  papers  must  be  skilfully  done.  You  will 
leave  him  no  paper,  nor  pens,  nor  ink,  nor  any 
means  of  writing.  You  will  give  him  a  few  French 
servants,  and  you  will  remove  the  unsatisfactory 
ones.  Besides  this,  the  people  of  his  household  can 
be  forbidden  to  go  out.1 

Thereafter  the  Pope  was  removed  to  Fontaine- 
bleau  and  treated  with  rigour. 

During  these  years  the  new  Charlemagne 
plunged  into  enterprises  which  proved  to  be 
beyond  even  his  strength.  Though  it  was  surely 
enough  to  try  to  control  the  Continent,  he  in 
1807  set  on  foot  plans  of  alliance  with  Persia 
with  a  view  to  an  eventual  march  of  a  Franco- 
Kussian  army  from  the  Persian  Gulf  towards 
the  Indus  and  Delhi.  He  sent  General  Gardane 
on  a  mission  to  Teheran  for  that  purpose.2 
After  Tilsit  he  concerted  with  the  Czar  Alex- 
ander a  scheme  for  the  partition  of  Turkey, 
leading  up  to  further  immense  changes  in  the 
Orient.  He  writes  to  Alexander  on  2d  February, 

1  Lecestre,  Lettres  Inedites  de  Nap.,  ii.,  102. 

2  Gardane,  La  Mission  du  General  Gardane,  passim;  E. 
Driault,  La  Politique  Orientate  de  Nap.,  pp.  58-72. 


3o6          Personality  of  Napoleon 

that  within  a  month  after  framing  their  com- 
pact their  united  forces  can  be  on  the  Bosphorus. 
This  will  be  but  the  beginning.  If  England  does 
not  then  submit — and  she  has  shown  no  sign 
of  submission — the  two  Empires  will  march  on 
the  East.  He  adds  these  characteristic  words : 

On  the  1st  May  our  troops  can  be  in  Asia,  and 
at  the  same  time  those  of  Your  Majesty  can  be  at 
Stockholm.  Then  the  English,  threatened  in  the 
East,  chased  from  the  Levant,  will  be  crushed  under 
the  weight  of  events  with  which  the  atmosphere  will 
be  charged.  Your  Majesty  and  I  would  have  pre- 
ferred the  sweets  of  peace  and  to  pass  our  lives  in 
the  midst  of  our  vast  Empires,  occupied  in  invigor- 
ating them  and  making  them  happy  by  the  arts  and 
the  benefits  of  our  administration.  The  enemies  of 
the  world  (the  English)  will  otherwise.  We  must 
be  greater,  in  spite  of  ourselves.  It  is  a  sign  of 
wisdom  and  of  policy  to  do  what  Fate  orders,  and 
to  go  where  the  irresistible  march  of  events  con- 
ducts us.  Then  this  crowd  of  pygmies  who  refuse 
to  see  that  present  events  are  such  that  we  must 
seek  their  parallel  in  history,  not  in  eighteenth- 
century  gazettes,  will  give  way  and  will  follow  the 
movement  ordered  by  Your  Majesty  and  myself :  and 
the  Russian  peoples  will  be  happy  with  the  glory, 
wealth,  and  fortune  resulting  from  these  great 
events.  In  these  few  lines  I  express  to  Your 
Majesty  my  entire  soul.  The  work  of  Tilsit  will 
regulate  the  destinies  of  the  world. 

Is  this  the  language  of  fatalism?    Or  is  it 


The  World-Ruler  307 

the  outpouring  of  a  mighty  soul,  which  sees  in 
fatalism  a  lever  for  moving  the  world?  Note 
the  words  "  to  do  what  Fate  orders,"  followed 
by  the  phrase  "  the  movement  ordered  by  your 
Majesty  and  myself."  The  latter  surely  inter- 
prets the  former.  But,  however  we  interpret 
this  appeal  to  Fate,  we  cannot  but  admire  the 
soaring  imagination  which  outlines  these  vast 
projects,  the  Ossianic  touches  which  commend 
them  to  the  Czar,  and  the  Herculean  force 
which  bends  the  European  fabric  eastwards  for 
their  accomplishment. 

Nevertheless,  it  was  an  error  of  judgment  to 
set  about  these  mighty  schemes  while  Europe 
still  heaved  with  war.  The  realm  of  the  modern 
Charlemagne  needed  time  for  consolidation.  The 
most  successful  rulers  of  the  eighteenth  century, 
Frederick  the  Great  and  Catharine  II.  of  Russia, 
knew  when  it  was  time  to  rest  on  their  laurels ; 
and  by  the  cautious  conservatism  of  later  life 
they  succeeded  in  retaining  the  conquests  of 
their  earlier  days.  Napoleon  could  not  rest. 
At  that  time  (February,  1808)  his  troops  and 
those  of  his  ally,  Spain,  had  occupied  Portugal ; 
and  already  the  alluring  thought  was  taking 
shape  that  he  would  dethrone  the  Spanish  Bour- 
bons. As  we  saw  in  Lecture  I.,  he  owed  them 


308          Personality  of  Napoleon 

a  grudge  for  their  conduct  during  the  Jena  cam- 
paign; and  he  cherished  the  hope  that,  as  lord 
of  Central  and  South  America  (then  mainly 
Spanish)  and  the  wielder  of  the  armed  forces 
of  Spain,  he  would  throw  his  sword  decisively 
into  the  balance,  whether  in  the  West  or  the 
East.  For  the  present,  as  his  letters  show, 
the  East  was  his  goal.  But  he  intended  to  use 
Spain  and  the  bullion  which  she  drained  from 
the  West  so  as  to  help  on  the  Oriental  adven- 
ture. This,  as  it  seems  to  me,  is  the  crowning 
reason  for  his  virtual  annexation  of  Spain. 
Adapting  Canning's  famous  phrase,  we  may  say 
that  he  called  in  Spain  and  the  New  World  to 
help  him  overturn  the  Old  World. 

Five  years  of  continual  triumph  have  left 
their  mark  on  his  character.  At  the  close  of 
1802,  as  we  saw,  he  judged  it  imprudent  to  per- 
severe with  a  forward  policy  both  in  the  West- 
ern and  Eastern  hemispheres,  and  therefore  sold 
Louisiana  to  the  United  States  in  order  to  be 
free  for  the  Eastern  crusade.  Now,  in  the 
spring  of  1808,  he  faces  the  consequences  of 
both  enterprises.  Master  of  Central  and  South- 
ern America,  he  must  sooner  or  later  arouse 
fears  at  Washington.  Ruler  of  most  of  the 
Orient,  he  must  awaken  jealousy  at  St.  Peters- 


The  World-Ruler  309 

burg.  But  he  recks  not  of  either.  Still  less 
does  he  foresee  any  resistance  in  Spain  itself. 
Read  his  letters  of  the  spring  of  1808.  They 
are  of  deep  interest.  While  pensioning  off 
Charles  IV.  and  his  recalcitrant  son,  he  bids 
Murat  and  Junot,  then  at  Madrid  and  Lisbon, 
to  prepare  all  the  available  Spanish  and  Portu- 
guese inen-of-war.  General  Dupont  is  to  hurry 
southward  to  Cadiz  to  secure  the  five  French 
rnen-of-war  which  had  sought  refuge  there  after 
Trafalgar.  At  all  the  dockyards  the  Spanish 
navy  is  to  be  resuscitated,  the  aim  being  to  use 
at  least  28  sail-of-the-line  for  an  Oriental  ex- 
pedition. He  intends  that  his  Toulon  armada 
shall  embark  20,000  men  in  South  Italy  and  sail 
to  Egypt.  As  for  the  Spaniards,  they  will  re- 
joice at  the  activity  in  their  dockyards.  Eng- 
land is  too  much  harassed  by  these  threatened 
attacks  to  be  able  to  send  troops  to  help  Portu- 
gal; and  he,  Napoleon,  will  strike  heavy  blows 
at  the  end  of  the  season,1  obviously  at  Turkey 
and  Egypt.  Such  are  his  thoughts  in  the  mid- 
dle of  May,  1808,  even  after  hearing  full  par- 
ticulars of  the  desperate  rising  of  the  men  of 
Madrid  against  the  French  troops.  He  calls 

1  Nap.  Corresp.,  xvii.,  76,  80,  83,  85,  109,  113,  116,  119, 
122,  135,  143,  150,  159,  163. 


310          Personality  of  Napoleon 

that  an  "  alerte."  In  the  genuine  letters  of 
Napoleon  there  is  not  a  sign  that  he  foresaw 
the  Spanish  national  rising  of  May-June.  True, 
in  the  letter  of  29th  March,  1808,  which  finds 
a  place  in  the  official  Correspondence,  he  speaks 
as  a  cautious  philosopher,  advising  Murat  to  be 
very  careful  how  he  treats  the  Spaniards,  who 
are  a  young  people,  full  of  enthusiasm  and 
courage,  unexhausted  by  political  passions.  But 
that  letter  is  almost  certainly  a  forgery  con- 
cocted by  Las  Cases  at  St.  Helena.1  The 
genuine  letters  of  that  period  breathe  an  entirely 
different  spirit. 

A  few  days  before  the  rising  in  Madrid  he 
writes  to  Murat  at  that  city,  upbraiding  him 
thus: 

Your  order  of  the  day  to  the  troops  about  the 
Burgos  riot  is  a  wretched  thing.  Good  God !  where 
should  we  be  if  I  were  to  write  four  pages  to 
the  soldiers,  to  tell  them  not  to  allow  themselves 
to  be  disarmed,  and  to  quote  the  fact  that  a  guard 
of  fifteen  men  fired  on  the  mob  as  a  trait  of  hero- 
ism? Frenchmen  are  too  clever  not  to  laugh  at 
such  proclamations.  You  never  learnt  that  in  my 
school. 

lfThe  original  is  in  Las  Cases,  Memorial,  iv.,  246-254. 
See  proofs  of  the  forgery  given  by  Comte  Murat  in  Murat, 
Lieutenant  de  I'Empereur  en  Espagne,  pp.  145  et  seq. 


The  World-Ruler  311 

And  he  continues :  "  To  bring  order  into  the 
city  of  Madrid  3000  troops  and  10  cannon 
are  needed.  Three  orders  of  the  day  like  yours 
would  demoralise  an  army."  *  Place  this  un- 
doubtedly genuine  letter  over  against  the  St. 
Helena  effusion,  and  the  non-authenticity  of  the 
latter  is  evident.  It  was  concocted  in  order  to 
screen  Napoleon  and  blame  Murat  for  the  Span- 
ish rising.  In  all  the  other  letters  of  that  time 
Napoleon  treats  the  Spaniards  as  a  negligible 
quantity.  After  their  effervescence  has  died 
down,  they  will  send  valued  help  to  the  expedi- 
tions destined  to  effect  the  partition  of  the 
Turkish  Empire  and  the  overthrow  of  the  British 
power  in  India.  "  England,"  so  he  writes  on 
17th  May,  "  is  in  great  penury  there,  and  the 
arrival  of  an  expedition  would  ruin  the  colony 
from  top  to  bottom."  As  for  the  columns  of 
General  Dupont,  now  on  the  march  towards 
Cadiz,  they  are  strong  enough  to  go  anywhere 
in  Spain.2 

As  a  revelation  of  character  and  of  the  causes 
that  go  to  make  history,  Napoleon's  letters  of 
April  and  May,  1808,  are  of  unequalled  interest. 
Their  length,  minuteness,  and  eagerness  enable 

1  Lecestre,  Lettres  Inedites  de  Nap.,  L,  185. 

2  Nap.  Corresp.,  xvii.,  122,  149. 


Personality  of  Napoleon 


us  to  look  right  into  his  brain.  In  those  eighty- 
three  closely  printed  pages  may  be  seen  the  de- 
velopment of  the  most  grandiose  designs  known 
to  authentic  history  and  the  reasons  for  their 
ultimate  collapse.  The  great  man  planned  the 
acquisition  of  Spain  as  a  prelude  to  the  con- 
quest of  Sicily  which,  in  its  turn,  would  help 
on  the  partition  of  the  Turkish  Empire  and  the 
conquest  of  Egypt.  And  this  was  not  all.  A 
powerful  expedition  was  to  sail  for  India  ;  while 
light  squadrons  harried  British  commerce  on 
every  sea.  In  the  accomplishment  of  these  de- 
signs the  Spanish  navy  held  a  prominent  place. 
It  was  to  furnish  at  least  28  sail-of-the-line,  be- 
sides frigates  and  smaller  vessels  ;  and  Napoleon 
intended  that  the  naval  resources  of  the  coasts 
between  the  Texel  and  Genoa  should  reverse  the 
verdict  of  Trafalgar,  make  the  Mediterranean  a 
French  lake,  and  ensure  the  conquest  of  the 
East. 

All  rested  on  the  assumption  of  continued 
support  from  Spain.  And  if  that  land  wrere 
judged  from  its  decadent  Court  and  spiritless 
grandees,  the  conclusion  seemed  inevitable.  But 
Napoleon,  who  in  his  youth  thought  solely  of 
nations  and  nothing  of  courts,  had  now  swung 
to  the  opposite  extreme.  He  judged  the  Span- 


The  World-Ruler  313 

ish  nation  by  its  despicable  monarch.  Events 
soon  showed  the  mistake.  Madrid  defied  Murat's 
whole  force  in  hours  of  desperate  fighting.  Du- 
pont  did  not  march  anywhere  at  will,  he  did 
not  free  the  five  French  warships  at  Cadiz,  but 
was  cooped  up  and  compelled  to  surrender  with 
22,800  men  at  Baylen  in  Andalusia  (22d  July). 
That  was  by  far  the  heaviest  blow  yet  dealt  to 
Napoleon.  For  the  present  it  ended  his  dreams 
of  a  World-Empire  and  compelled  him  to  turn 
against  Spain  the  forces  destined  for  the  con- 
quest of  the  Orient.  He  had  hoped  soon  to 
partition  the  Turkish  Empire,  overturn  Britain's 
rule  in  the  East,  and  assure  her  surrender.  But 
now  he  had  to  spend  six  campaigns  in  fighting 
Spain  and  Wellington.  In  a  military  sense  he 
at  first  seemed  sure  of  success.  In  1809  he 
crushed  Austria,  and  the  years  1810-11  saw  him 
undisputed  master,  except  in  Portugal  and  the 
corners  of  Spain.  But  so  long  as  the  Pen- 
insular War  dragged  on,  he  could  not  turn  his 
undivided  energies  to  the  East.  During  the 
meeting  at  Erfurt  in  September,  1808,  he  failed 
to  remove  the  suspicions  or  fears  of  the  Czar 
Alexander;  and  the  continuance  of  the  Pen- 
insular War  encouraged  that  potentate  to  with- 
draw from  the  Continental  System  at  the  close 


314          Personality  of  Napoleon 

of  1811,  a  step  which  brought  on  the  campaign 
of  1812. 

There  again  the  rigidity  of  Napoleon's  policy 
provoked  a  conflict,  the  magnitude  of  which  was 
out  of  all  proportion  to  its  ostensible  causes. 
Apart  from  the  fiscal  question  just  stated,  there 
was  no  very  serious  dispute  between  the  two 
Emperors.  The  partition  of  the  Turkish  Em- 
pire had  of  course  been  postponed.  The  Polish 
Question  was  susceptible  of  arrangement;  and 
a  German  principality  might  have  been  found 
for  the  Czar's  brother-in-law,  the  Grand  Duke 
of  Oldenburg,  whom  Napoleon  had  brusquely 
dethroned  at  the  close  of  1810.  Moreover  it 
was  surely  better  to  allow  a  compromise  on  the 
Continental  System  rather  than  risk  all  on  a 
campaign  in  Russia  while  a  quarter  of  a  mil- 
lion of  French  troops  were  warring  in  Spain. 
But  Napoleon  would  not  give  way  at  any  point. 
Rather  than  do  so,  he  marshalled  an  army  of 
more  than  600,000  for  the  overthrow  of  Russia; 
and  it  is  a  sign  of  his  power  that  of  this  im- 
mense host  France  furnished  scarcely  the  half; 
1812  is  Napoleon's  crusade.  A  young  German 
Jew  described  in  words  of  fire  the  impression  left 
on  his  mind  by  the  sight  of  the  Emperor  looking 
on  at  his  Guards  as  they  filed  out  eastwards : 


The  World-Ruler  315 

For  ever  I  see  him  high  on  horseback,  the  eternal 
eyes  set  in  the  marble  of  that  imperial  visage,  look- 
ing on  with  the  calm  of  destiny  at  his  Guards  as 
they  march  past.  He  was  sending  them  then  to 
Russia,  and  the  old  Grenadiers  glanced  up  at  him 
with  so  awesome  a  devotion,  so  sympathetic  an 
earnestness,  with  the  pride  of  death: 

"  Te,  Caesar,  morituri  salutant." 1 

Those  words  of  Heine  help  to  explain  the 
riddle  of  a  century  ago.  For  it  was  a  riddle 
even  then;  and  it  is  doubly  so  to-day  now  that 
we  know  all  the  facts.  Not  one  of  the  many 
thousands  of  Germans,  Italians,  Swiss,  and 
Dutch  who  crossed  the  Niemen  could  have  said 
why  they  did  so,  except  that  Napoleon  had  given 
the  command.  Some  of  them  perhaps  hoped  to 
re-establish  the  Continental  System  in  order 
to  break  down  what  was  called  England's 
maritime  tyranny.  But  by  that  time  the  Con- 
tinental System  was  far  more  burdensome  than 
the  British  naval  decrees  which  were  designed 
to  defeat  it.  Every  North  German  knew  that. 
Did  they  march  to  Moscow  to  compel  Russia 
once  more  to  exclude  British  goods?  That  was 
a  futile  effort,  as  many  of  them  knew;  for  no 
small  part  of  the  overcoats  worn  by  the  Grand 
Army  came  from  Yorkshire. 

1  Heine,  Englische  Fragmente  (Wellington) . 


316          Personality  of  Napoleon 

A  curious  incident  illustrative  of  character  is 
told  by  Count  de  Narbonne,  Napoleon's  envoy 
bearing  the  ultimatum  to  the  Czar.  Alexander 
finally  said  to  Narbonne : 

What  does  the  Emperor  want?  Would  he  force 
me  to  adopt  measures  that  would  ruin  my  people? 
And,  because  I  refuse,  does  he  threaten  me  with 
war,  because  he  imagines  that,  after  two  or  three 
battles,  and  the  occupation  of  a  few  provinces  or 
a  capital  city,  he  will  succeed  in  making  me  sue 
for  a  peace,  of  which  he  will  dictate  the  terms? 
He  is  mistaken. 

Then,  taking  a  large  map  of  his  States  he  slowly 
unfolded  it  upon  the  table  and  continued: 

M.  le  Comte,  I  believe  that  Napoleon  is  the  greatest 
general  in  Europe,  that  his  armies  are  the  most 
warlike,  his  lieutenants  the  most  valiant  and  experi- 
enced. But  space  is  a  barrier.  If,  after  several 
defeats,  I  retire,  sweeping  the  inhabitants  with  me 
—if  I  abandon  the  care  of  my  defence  to  time,  to 
the  climate,  to  the  desert,  perhaps  I  may  have  the 
last  word  to  say  on  the  fate  of  the  most  formidable 
army  of  modern  times.1 

^Mems.  of  Comte  de  Rambuteau  (Eng.  edit.),  pp.  67,  68. 
All  who  knew  Napoleon  well  foresaw  utter  ruin  as  the 
end  of  that  astonishing  career.  The  Councillors  of  State 
must  have  seen  the  handwriting  on  the  wall,  when  he 
uttered  to  them  these  fateful  words :  "  I  have  achieved 
the  greatest  success  known  to  history.  Well!  In  order 
that  I  may  leave  the  throne  to  my  children,  I  must  be 
master  of  all  the  capitals  of  Europe  "  (ibid.,  p.  55) . 


The  World-Ruler  31? 

Nar  bonne  on  his  return  reported  these  words 
faithfully  to  Napoleon.  Nevertheless,  the  Em- 
peror marched  to  Moscow. 

The  dream  of  a  World-Empire  vanished  at 
that  city:  but  even  after  losing  nearly  half  a 
million  of  men  in  Russia,  he  refused  to  come 
to  terms  with  Austria  during  the  armistice  in 
the  middle  of  the  Saxon  Campaign  of  1813.  Her 
demands  were  not  exorbitant.  Napoleon  would 
retain  the  Rhine  frontier  and  his  possessions  in 
Italy,  but  surrender  the  Illyrian  Provinces  and 
his  control  over  Germany.  These  terms  were 
not  excessive,  in  view  of  the  French  disaster  at 
Vittoria.  Napoleon  would  still  rule  over  a  far 
larger  realm  than  Louis  XIV.  Again  it  fell  to 
Count  Narbonne  at  Dresden  to  advise  the  Em- 
peror to  take  the  prudent  course  and  thereby 
secure  the  neutrality  of  Austria. 

Sire  [he  said],  France  has  given  you  her  last  man 
and  her  last  crown.  You  have  30,000  men  on  horse- 
back; but  they  do  not  form  a  body  of  real  cavalry; 
your  regiments  are  filled  with  conscripts,  brave  but 
not  inured  to  war,  who  may  win  a  battle,  but  can- 
not stand  a  reverse  or  a  retreat.  The  first  check 
we  experience  will  mean  ruin  for  France  and  for 
you;  for  now  we  have  the  whole  of  Europe  against 
us.  A  peace,  though  it  were  only  a  truce,  would 
save  us.  Conclude  one,  even  if  only  for  two  years. 


318          Personality  of  Napoleon 

During  that  time  you  can  consolidate  all  the  ele- 
ments of  your  power:  we  shall  be  able  to  sow  dis- 
union among  our  enemies,  and  you  will  try  your 
fortune  anew.  .  .  .  Peace  is  necessary;  and  it  is 
my  devotion,  my  loyalty  to  your  person,  that  makes 
me  ask  it  on  my  knees.1 

Caulaincourt  and  other  devoted  servants  urged 
the  same  arguments,  but  all  to  no  effect.  As 
the  young  de  Broglie  said  of  the  Emperor — "  The 
devil  was  in  him:  he  spared  neither  entreaties, 
promises,  nor  threats  [to  Austria]  even  at  the 
risk  of  hastening  the  denouement."  2  It  came 
speedily.  Austria  joined  the  Allies;  and  the 
result  was  Leipzig  and  the  loss  of  another  great 
army,  uselessly  engulfed  in  Germany. 

As  if  the  campaign  in  Germany  were  not 
enough,  Napoleon  clung  on  to  Spain,  or  as  much 
of  it  as  his  troops  could  hold.  At  a  later  time 
he  admitted  his  folly  in  not  recalling  his  troops 
from  Spain  at  the  end  of  1812,  a  step  which 
would  have  released  about  200,000  troops  for 
service  in  Germany.  Yet,  even  at  the  close  of 
1813  he  did  not  definitely  take  that  step;  and 
Marshal  Suchet  held  on  to  Catalonia  while 
Napoleon  was  fighting  for  France  herself  in  the 
plains  of  Champagne. 

1  Rambuteau,  Mems.,  pp.  92,  93. 

2  Broglie,  Mems.  (Eng.  edit.),  i.,  209. 


The  World-Ruler  319 

There  must  have  been  something  in  Napoleon's 
nature  which  defied  all  thought  of  surrender  or 
of  compromise.  An  example  of  this  inflexible 
tenacity  appeared  in  November,  1813,  after  his 
return  from  the  German  campaign.  Joseph 
Bonaparte,  driven  from  Spain  after  the  disaster 
of  Vittoria,  was  living  in  disgrace,  almost  as  a 
prisoner,  at  Mortfontaine.  Napoleon  employed 
Roederer  as  a  go-between,  and  expressed  to  him 
his  disgust  at  the  apathy  and  incompetence  of 
Joseph,  which  had  helped  to  ruin  his  fortunes 
in  the  Peninsula,  declaring  (as  was  largely  true) 
that  if  he  himself  had  governed  Spain,  things 
would  have  gone  very  differently;  for  Joseph 
was  always  thinking  about  women,  or  his  houses, 
or  his  furniture. 

As  for  me  [blazed  forth  Napoleon]  I  care  little 
about  St.  Cloud  or  the  Tuileries.  I  should  care 
little  if  they  were  burnt.  I  count  my  houses  as 
nothing,  women  as  nothing,  my  son  as — a  little.  I 
leave  one  place,  I  go  to  another.  I  leave  St.  Cloud, 
I  go  to  Moscow,  not  for  my  own  wish,  or  for  my 
friends,  but  merely  by  hard,  dry  calculation.  I 
have  sacrificed  thousands,  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
men  to  make  Joseph  King  of  Spain.  It  is  one  of 
my  faults  to  have  believed  my  brothers  necessary  to 
assure  my  dynasty.  My  dynasty  is  assured  without 
them.  It  will  have  been  founded  amidst  storms  by 
the  force  of  events.  The  Empress  is  enough  to 


320         Personality  of  Napoleon 

assure  it.  She  has  more  wisdom  and  more  policy 
than  all  of  them.  Jerome  has  ruined  my  affairs 
in  Germany.  To-day  I  would  not  give  a  hair  to 
have  Joseph  in  Spain  rather  than  Ferdinand.  The 
Spaniards  will  always  be  united  to  France  for  their 
interest.  Ferdinand  will  no  more  oppose  me  than 
Joseph  would.1 

This  glorifying  of  hard,  dry  reasoning  is  very 
curious;  for  in  this  passage  Napoleon  bounds 
from  one  assumption  to  another.  Never,  as- 
suredly, has  calculation  been  more  fertile  in 
miscalculations. 

It  is  extraordinary  that  so  keen  an  historical 
student  as  Napoleon  should  not  have  seen  that 
he  could  not  figure  both  as  Alexander  the  Great 
and  Charlemagne.  The  domination  of  Europe 
and  the  conquest  of  the  East  were  absolutely 
incompatible  tasks.  That  was  the  outstanding 
lesson  of  the  reign  of  Louis  XV.  To  war 
against  the  British  in  Bengal  and  Ohio  while 
combating  Frederick  the  Great  in  Germany  was 
far  beyond  the  capacity  of  Louis  XV.  Napo- 
leon could  well  attempt  far  more;  but  it  was 
madness  for  him  to  seek  to  hold  down  Madrid, 
Naples,  Berlin,  and  to  cow  Austria  and  Russia, 
while  also  arranging  for  the  partition  of  Turkey 

1  Roederer,  Journal,  p.  323. 


The  World-Ruler  321 

and  the  conquest  of  India.  His  policy  could 
not  be  both  European  and  Oriental.  The  great 
colonising  peoples,  from  the  time  of  Crete,  Tyre, 
Carthage,  and  Athens,  down  to  the  days  of 
Venice,  Portugal,  Holland,  and  Great  Britain, 
have  mainly  been  content  to  play  a  secondary 
part  on  land  provided  that  they  could  be  great 
at  sea.1  Islanders  have  often  achieved  success 
as  colonisers  because  nature  herself  forbade  any 
serious  distraction  of  aim  in  continental  wars. 
When  Henry  VIII.  seemed  likely  to  drag  Eng- 
land again  into  profitless  wars  in  France,  that 
clear-sighted  historian,  Lord  Herbert  of  Cher- 
bury,  uttered  this  warning: 

Let  us,  in  God's  name,  leave  off  our  attempts  against 
the  terra  firma.  The  natural  situation  of  islands 
seems  not  to  consort  with  conquests  in  that  kind. 
England  alone  is  a  just  Empire.  Or,  when  we 
would1  enlarge  ourselves,  let  it  be  that  way  which, 
it  seems,  the  eternal  Providence  hath  destined  us, 
which  is  by  sea.  The  Indies  are  discovered,  and 
vast  treasure  brought  from  thence  every  day.  Let 
us  therefore  bend  our  endeavours  thitherward,  and 
if  the  Spaniards  and  Portuguese  suffer  us  not  to 
join  with  them,  there  will  yet  be  region  enough  for 
all  to  enjoy. 

That  wise  economy  of  effort  has  made  the  for- 

1  Herodotus  (iii.,  122)  attributes  first  to  Minos  and 
Polycrates  in  Crete  the  design  to  command  the  sea. 

21 


322          Personality  of  Napoleon 

tune  of  the  British  race.  Whereas  Powers  like 
France  and  Spain,  whose  position  embroiled 
them  in  European  affairs,  have  been  exhausted 
by  the  double  effort  of  dominating  the  Continent 
and  developing  the  new  lands. 

Napoleon  had  the  most  brilliant  opportunity 
to  make  France  the  chief  World-Power;  for  the 
French  race  was  then  at  the  height  of  its 
faculties  and  prestige,  while  other  peoples  were 
inert  or  badly  organised.  Even  so  he  failed. 
His  failure  resulted  ultimately  from  defects  of 
character.  "  Character  is  destiny,"  said  No- 
valis;  and  the  career  of  Napoleon  proves  the 
truth  of  the  saying.  In  his  early  years  the 
great  man  generally  kept  his  impetuous  nature 
under  the  control  of  reason.  But,  either  because 
long  years  of  overwork  dulled  his  foresight,  or 
from  some  physical  cause  hard  to  specify,  or 
from  the  pride  that  grows  with  triumph,  he  gave 
the  rein  to  his  forceful  impulses  in  and  after 
1807,  with  the  results  that  we  have  seen.  The 
passion  for  the  grandiose  became  his  besetting 
sin.  He  neglected  favourable  opportunities  of 
coming  to  terms  with  the  least  bitter  of  his 
foes.  He  hoped  by  force  and  ability  to  shiver 
their  Coalition ;  and  his  blows  only  hardened  it. 
For  by  1814  the  Allies  had  cause  to  distrust  his 


The  World-Ruler  323 

word;  and  their  experience  in  the  two  previous 
years  bade  them  war  to  the  death  against  a  man 
who  flung  to  the  void  a  million  of  men  in  the 
vain  attempt  to  control  all  Europe. 


VIII 

THE  EXILE 

"  Je  crois  beaucoup  aux  pressentiments,  moi;  et  j'ai 
pour  pressentiment  que  je  finirai  completement  mon  entre- 
prise,  et  que  je  laisserai  la  France  puissante  et  prospere." 
— Napoleon  to  Roederer. 

THERE  is  a  considerable  difference  between 
Napoleon  at  Elba  and  at  St.  Helena.  At 
Elba  in  1814  lie  still  had  a  good  chance  of  re- 
gaining part  of  Italy,  or  even  France.  It  is 
true  that  he  denied  this,  and  described  himself 
as  a  dead  man,  occupied  solely  with  his  house, 
his  cows,  and  his  mules.1  But  his  conduct  was 
not  exactly  that  of  a  placid  farmer;  and  there 
are  other  sayings  which  show  him  in  a  very 
different  light.  At  St.  Helena  he  told  Gour- 
gaud  that,  on  leaving  Fontainebleau  for  Elba, 
he  had  no  great  hope  of  ever  returning.  "  But," 
he  added,  "  the  first  hope  came  to  me  when  I 
saw  in  the  newspapers  that  at  the  banquet  in 

1  Neil  Campbell,  Journal,  p.  299. 
324 


The  Exile  325 

the  Hotel  de  Ville  (at  Paris)  there  were  present 
only  the  wives  of  nobles,  and  no  officers  of  the 
army."  "  Louis  XVIII,"  he  continued,  "  should 
have  behaved  reasonably,  as  the  founder  of  the 
fifth  dynasty.  Then  he  could  say — '  I  replace 
Napoleon  because  he  wanted  to  do  too  much.' 
And  that  is  true,  because  I  have  taken  up  too 
many  things."  1 

In  this  brief  and  incisive  way  did  the  Em- 
peror explain  his  overthrow  in  the  spring  of 
1814  and  the  ridiculous  collapse  of  the  Bour- 
bons a  year  later.  Their  tactlessness  in  small 
things  wounded  French  pride;  Napoleon  argued 
acutely  in  counting  on  the  resentment  of  the 
uninvited  Parisiennes.  France  had  poured  forth 
her  best  blood  for  a  hero:  she  now  scorned  the 
antique  pedantries  of  the  gouty  and  unwarlike 
old  exile  brought  back  by  foreigners. 

Then  again  Napoleon  must  have  remembered 
the  advice  of  Narbonne  at  Dresden  in  1813,  to 
make  peace  betimes,  even  were  it  only  for  a  year 
or  two.  The  advantages  of  such  a  step  were 
still  more  obvious  after  two  more  disastrous 
campaigns.  In  the  spring  of  1814  as  many  as 
180,000  French  prisoners  came  back  from  Eus- 
sia,  Germany,  Spain,  England.  They  came  back 

1  Gourgaud,  Journal,  ii.,  302. 


326          Personality  of  Napoleon 

to  a  small  France.  The  Bourbons,  not  Napo- 
leon, signed  away  the  Rhine  Provinces,  Italy, 
Holland,  Belgium.  After  his  abdication  at 
Fontainebleau  he  remarked  to  Bausset  on  this 
subject — "  I  abdicate  and  I  yield  nothing."  He 
uttered  these  words  with  imperial  serenity,  and 
Bausset  thought  him  singularly  "  calm,  tranquil, 
and  decided."  He  spoke  quite  naturally  about 
Elba  and  took  up  a  book  descriptive  of  the 
island,  with  the  words :  "  The  air  there  is 
healthy,  and  the  inhabitants  are  excellent:  I 
shall  not  be  badly  off."  x  Bausset  was  astonished 
at  this  preternatural  calmness.  I  confess  that 
I  think  it  was  partly  founded  on  hope  in  the 
future.  He  knew  the  nullity  of  the  Bourbons; 
he  foresaw  their  unpopularity  in  ceding  about 
one  third  of  the  French  Empire;  and  he  must 
have  seen  in  the  return  of  a  host  of  veterans 
a  means  of  restoring  France  to  her  former 
position.  Later  on  he  declared  that  he  had  left 
Elba  too  soon  owing  to  a  rumour  that  the  Con- 
gress of  Vienna  was  dissolved.2  But,  if  any- 
thing, he  came  back  a  little  too  late,  namely, 
after  the  Powers  had  settled  their  disputes. 
This  element  of  hope  invests  his  sojourn  at 

1  Bausset,  Cour  de  Napoleon,  ch.  xxxviii. 

2  Gourgaud,  Journal,  p.  323. 


The  Exile  327 

Elba  with  unique  interest.  The  wounded  lion 
soon  begins  to  prepare  to  spring  at  the  over- 
confident captors.  At  St.  Helena  he  soon  ceases 
to  hope,  unless  there  is  a  revolution  in  Eng- 
land or  throughout  Europe.  Elba  is  a  piquant 
comedy ;  St.  Helena  is  a  long-drawn-out  tragedy. 
During  the  voyage  to  Elba  he  is  by  no  means 
depressed;  he  compliments  Captain  Ussher,  of 
H.  M.  S.  Undaunted,  on  his  ship  and  crew,  takes 
the  keenest  interest  in  all  occurrences,  remarking 
on  one  occasion  that  if  he  had  been  a  Minister 
of  England,  he  would  have  tried  to  make  her 
the  greatest  Power  of  the  world.  Similarly 
at  Fontainebleau  he  told  Sir  Neil  Campbell 
that  he  admired  the  British  more  than  any 
nation.1 

During  the  voyage  he  spoke  at  length  of  his 
preparations  to  invade  England,  estimating  that 
from  the  time  of  landing  on  British  soil  he  would 
have  been  in  London  in  three  days.  When 
asked  what  he  would  have  done  next,  he  said 
it  was  a  difficult  thing  to  answer,  for  so  spirited 
a  people  as  the  British  would  not  have  suc- 
cumbed even  then.  But  he  counted  on  separat- 
ing Ireland  from  England,  and  hoped  that  the 
collapse  of  British  commerce  and  credit  would 

1 N.  Campbell,  Journal,  p.  159. 


328          Personality  of  Napoleon 

compel  a  surrender.1  At  other  times  he  said 
he  relied  on  insurrections  of  Scottish  and  Eng- 
lish Jacobins.  In  this  connection  it  is  of  in- 
terest to  note  that  Major  Vivian,  who  visited 
Elba  early  in  1815,  found  the  officers  of  the 
Imperial  Guard  decidedly  of  opinion  that  the 
expedition  must  have  failed.2  As  usual,  Napo- 
leon cherished  hopes  far  beyond  those  of  his 
followers. 

At  Elba  Napoleon  was  generally  in  high 
spirits.  Colonel  Sir  Neil  Campbell,  who  accom- 
panied him  to  the  island  as  British  commis- 
sioner, gives  the  following  lifelike  details: 

Napoleon  certainly  regrets  that  he  gave  up  the 
contest,  and  has  almost  declared  to  me  that,  had  he 
known  the  spirit  and  power  of  Augereau's  army, 
and  that  its  exertions  were  only  paralysed  by  the 
defection  of  that  Marshal,  he  would  have  joined  it, 
and  carried  the  war  into  Italy.  However,  his  ties 
of  esteem  towards  all  his  Marshals  appear  to  have 
diminished.  A  few  days  ago  he  described  to  me 
their  respective  good  and  bad  qualities.  St.  Cyr 
and  Massena  ranked  highest  in  his  list.  He  re- 
gretted that  he  had  not  left  his  marshals  unemployed 
(for  they  were  tired  of  war),  and  had  not  sought 
for  younger  chiefs  among  his  other  generals  and 
colonels:  this,  he  said,  was  his  ruin.  I  have  never 
seen  a  man  in  any  situation  of  life  with  so  much 

1  Napoleon's  Last  Voyages  (edit,  of  1906),  pp.  88-90,  100. 

2  Rose,  Pitt  and  Napoleon:  Essays  and  Letters,  p.  176. 


The  Exile  329 

personal  activity  and  restless  perseverance.  He  ap- 
pears to  take  so  much  pleasure  in  perpetual  move- 
ment, and  in  seeing  those  who  accompany  him  sink 
under  fatigue,  as  has  been  the  case  on  several  occa- 
sions when  I  have  accompanied  him.  I  do  not  think 
it  possible  for  him  to  sit  down  to  study,  on  any 
pursuits  of  retirement,  as  proclaimed  by  him  to  be 
his  intention,  so  long  as  his  state  of  health  permits 
corporeal  exercise.  After  being  yesterday  on  foot 
in  the  heat  of  the  sun,  from  5  A.M.  to  3  P.M.,  visiting 
the  frigates  and  transports,  and  even  going  down  to 
the  hold  among  his  horses,  he  rode  on  horseback  for 
three  hours,  as  he  told  me  afterwards,  pour  se  de- 
fatiguer!  These  details  show  that  if  opportunities 
for  warfare  upon  a  great  scale  and  for  important 
objects  do  not  present  themselves,  he  is  likely  to 
avail  himself  of  any  others,  in  order  to  indulge  this 
passion  from  mere  recklessness.  His  thoughts  seem 
to  dwell  perpetually  upon  the  operations  of  war.1 

Yet  the  activity  of  the  Emperor  found  expres- 
sion in  many  ways.  He  planned  roads,  vine- 
yards, and  new  buildings,  also  a  lazaretto  in 
the  harbour  of  Porto  Ferrajo,  alleging  that 
vessels  would  come  there  for  quarantine  in 
preference  to  Leghorn,  and  so  bring  money  to 
the  island.  On  the  contrary  all  neighbouring 
States  refused  to  recognise  the  new  institution 
and  prohibited  intercourse  with  Elba.  This  he 
ascribed  to  jealousy,  but  found  it  desirable  to 

1  Neil  Campbell,  Journal,  pp.  243,  244. 


330         Personality  of  Napoleon 

give  way.  He  soon  annexed  the  neighbouring 
islet,  Pianosa,  an  act  which  caused  some  con- 
cern. The  new  taxes  which  he  imposed  pro- 
voked almost  a  rising;  whereupon  he  ordered 
100  of  his  Guards  to  live  on  his  recalcitrant 
subjects  until  they  paid  in  full.1  On  the  other 
hand  Baron  Peyrusse  declares  that  Elba  now 
experienced  a  time  of  wholly  beneficent  activity, 
and  that  all  who  saw  Napoleon  were  charmed 
with  his  kindliness.2  He  was  rightly  indignant 
at  the  non-payment  by  Louis  XVIII.  of  the  sum 
stipulated  by  the  Allies  at  Fontainebleau,  an 
act  of  meanness  and  folly;  for  it  gave  Napoleon 
a  good  excuse  for  ending  the  Elba  experiment. 
He  cut  down  the  pay  of  his  officials  and  soldiers, 
and  seemed  greatly  annoyed  at  having  to  take 
these  steps.  It  must  not  be  supposed,  however, 
that  he  was  ever  reduced  to  severe  straits. 
Peyrusse,  who  supervised  the  exchequer,  shows 
clearly  that  Napoleon  took  awray  to  France  a 
large  sum  of  money,  leaving  a  little  behind  for 
the  few  troops  who  remained.3  From  those 
who  paid  visits  to  the  Tuscan  coast  the  Em- 
peror inquired  eagerly  as  to  the  state  of  public 

1  Neil  Campbell,  Journal,  pp.  246-249. 

2  Peyrusse,  Memorial,  p.  253. 

3  Ibid.,  pp.  370,  371. 


The  Exile  331 

opinion  in  Italy  and  France;  and  to  Campbell 
on  10th  September  he  said  it  was  absurd  for 
Louis  XVIII.  to  imitate  the  British  Constitu- 
tion, as  there  were  not  the  materials  in  France 
for  working  it.  He  then  declaimed  against  the 
territorial  sacrifices  demanded  from  France, 
especially  those  of  the  Netherlands  and  Luxem- 
burg, which  left  her  without  defence  on  the 
north.  These  are  Napoleon's  words: 

While  Prussia,  Holland,  Austria,  and  Russia  were 
aggrandised  beyond  all  proportion  on  the  Continent, 
and  England  in  the  East  and  West  Indies,  France 
had  lost  all,  even  to  the  pitiful  island  of  St.  Lucia.1 
He  spoke  as  a  spectator,  without  any  future  hopes 
or  present  interest;  for  he  had  neither,  again  in- 
sisting on  his  own  nonentity;  but  it  showed  utter 
ignorance  of  the  French  character  and  temper  of 
the  present  time.  Their  chief  failings  were  pride 
and  the  love  of  glory,  and  it  was  impossible  for 
them  to  look  forward  with  satisfaction  and  feelings 
of  tranquillity,  as  was  stated  to  be  the  sincere  wish 
of  all  the  Allies,  under  such  sacrifices.  They  were 
conquered  only  by  a  great  superiority  of  numbers 
but  not  humiliated.  The  population  of  France  had 
not  suffered  to  the  extent  that  might  be  supposed, 
for  he  always  spared  their  lives,  and  exposed  the 
Italians,  and  other  foreigners.  These  observations 
gradually  led  him  to  speak  of  his  own  feats  in  war 

1  This  was  incorrect,  for  she  regained  nearly  all  her 
colonies  except  Mauritius. 


332          Personality  of  Napoleon 

and  the  last  campaign.  He  entered  into  the  de- 
tails of  many  operations,  in  which  he  had  repulsed 
the  enemy  and  gained  advantages  with  numbers  in- 
ferior beyond  comparison,  and  then  went  on  to  abuse 
Marshal  Marmont,  to  whose  defection  alone  he  as- 
cribed his  being  obliged  to  give  up  the  contest.1 

The  tender  side  of  the  Emperor's  nature 
showed  itself  to  his  mistress,  the  Polish  countess, 
Walewska.  The  blond  beauty  had  reluctantly 
given  herself  to  him  at  Warsaw  in  1807,  and 
had  borne  him  a  son.  Now,  when  Marie  Louise 
so  tamely  forsook  him,  in  obedience  to  the  com- 
mands of  her  father  and  the  enticements  of 
Count  Neipperg,  Walewska  came  in  triumph, 
bringing  their  son,  the  future  Minister  of  Napo- 
leon III.  It  having  been  rumoured  that  Marie 
Louise  was  about  to  arrive,  the  sailors  received 
the  newcomer  in  state.  Napoleon  chafed  at 
her  imprudence  in  accepting  these  honours — for 
he  still  hoped  to  attract  Marie  Louise  to  his 
side;  but  he  speedily  succumbed  to  Walewrska's 
charms.2  The  visit  lasted  only  two  days,  but 
it  became  known,  and  not  unnaturally  increased 
the  reluctance  of  Marie  Louise  to  proceed  to 
Elba.  Thus  the  mistress  triumphed.  It  was 

1  Neil  Campbell,  Journal,  pp.  300,  301. 

2  P.  Gruyer,  Napoleon,  Roi  de  Vile  d'Elbe,  pp.  147-157; 
N.  Campbell,  Journal,  p.  303. 


The  Exile  333 

she,  perhaps,  almost  as  much  as  the  Austrian 
Emperor,  who  completed  the  disunion  of  Napo- 
leon and  Marie  Louise.  Nothing,  however,  can 
excuse  the  withholding  from  the  Emperor  of  his 
son,  the  King  of  Kome.  Madame  Mere  and 
Pauline  were  at  Elba  and  could  have  brought 
him  up.  Napoleon  rightly  felt  indignant  at  his 
detention.  Of  Marie  Louise  herself  he  always 
spoke  with  warm  consideration,  even  after  her 
connection  with  Neipperg  became  notorious. 

During  the  winter  of  1814-15  Napoleon  be- 
came more  and  more  restless.  On  one  occasion 
he  recounted  to  Campbell  in  glowing  terms  the 
feats  which  the  French  performed  under  his 
leadership.  These  he  ascribed  to  his  speeches, 
still  more  to  his  emphatic  delivery.  Raising 
himself  on  tip-toe  and  stretching  forth  his  right 
hand  he  shouted :  "  Deployez  les  aigles " — 
"  Deployez  les  aigles."  At  Marengo,  he  said, 
during  the  rout  he  rallied  his  forty  remaining 
horsemen  by  calling  out :  "  Allons  done ;  en 
avant."  Throughout  the  whole  interview  Camp- 
bell noticed  a  certain  wildness  in  his  air;  and 
it  is  clear  that,  whatever  he  might  say  about  his 
political  death,  he  was  very  much  alive.  Jaunty 
hopefulness  appeared  in  his  treatment  of  a  dis- 
consolate guardsman  at  Elba.  Meeting  him 


334          Personality  of  Napoleon 

early  in  1815  the  Emperor  jovially  remarked: 
"  Well,  grumbler,  you  're  sick  to  death  of  this?  " 
"  No,  Sire ;  but  I  'm  not  over  fond  of  it." 
"  You  're  wrong,"  came  the  reply,  "  you  must 
take  the  weather  as  it  comes."  He  gave  him 
a  Napoleon  and  went  off  jingling  the  money  in 
his  fob  and  humming  the  air: 

£a  ne  durera  pas  toujours, 
Ca  ne  durera  pas  toujours.1 

The  restless  symptoms  became  very  marked 
during  the  months  of  December  and  January, 
the  very  period  when  disputes  at  the  Congress 
of  Vienna  nearly  led  to  war  between  the  Allies. 
A  mysterious  stranger  arrives;  and  after  his 
interview  with  Napoleon  the  excitement  in- 
creases. Eumours  fly  about  concerning  plots 
to  assassinate  the  Emperor,  or  to  seize  him  and 
deport  him  to  St.  Helena.  The  Emperor  is 
hard  up  for  money,  and  reduces  the  pay  of  the 

1  Peyrusse,  Memorial,  p.  254.  Owing  to  his  restlessness, 
Campbell,  during  a  visit  to  Florence,  warned  a  French 
royalist,  Hyde  de  Neuville,  of  the  danger  of  his  escape 
in  order  to  join  the  malcontents  of  Italy  or  France.  Camp- 
bell alone  had  no  means  of  preventing  his  escape;  and  the 
blame  afterwards  showered  on  him  was  perhaps  exces- 
sive; though  certainly  he  was  too  often  absent  from  Elba 
to  keep  any  effective  watch.  A  couple  of  French  frigates 
were  sent  as  a  result  of  his  warning. 


The  Exile  335 

Guards;  yet  he  has  the  means  to  buy  corn  and 
clothing  at  the  Italian  ports.1 

At  last  he  slips  away,  and  we  know  the  result. 
The  personality  of  the  great  man  overbears  all 
opposition  in  royalist  Provence  and  conquers  all 
hearts  farther  north.  The  tricolour  flies  from 
steeple  to  steeple,  and  Napoleon,  without  firing 
a  shot,  enters  the  Tuileries. 

The  events  of  the  Hundred  Days  do  not  con- 
cern us  here.  But  it  is  of  interest  to  recall 
Napoleon's  later  declarations  that,  after  his  first 
disputes  with  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  at  Paris, 
he  should  have  dissolved  it.  Many  times  he  re- 
ferred to  this  topic  in  terms  which  show  the 
impossibility  of  his  accepting  constitutional  rule. 
To  take  two  of  many  instances.  He  said  to 
Gourgaud :  "  Deliberative  Assemblies  are  a 
terrible  thing  for  a  sovereign."  And  again: 
"  I  ought  not  to  have  formed  the  Chambers.  I 
should  have  declared  myself  Dictator.  But 
there  was  the  hope  that  the  Allies,  seeing  me 
summon  the  Chambers,  would  feel  confidence  in 
me.  If  I  had  been  the  conqueror,  I  should  have 
laughed  at  the  Chambers."  2  His  remarks  about 

iPeyrusse,  pp.  262-268;  Gruyer,  pp.  176-179;  Nap. 
Corresp.,  xxxi.,  32,  et  seq. 

2  Gourgaud,  Journal,  i.,  82;  ii.,  323;  so  too,  i.,  93,  103, 135, 
149.  Napoleon's  irritation  against  the  Liberals  in  the 


336          Personality  of  Napoleon 

the  need  of  the  Khine  frontier  and  Belgium  for 
France  also  prove  that,  even  after  Waterloo,  he 
was  determined  not  to  give  up  provinces  which 
he  deemed  necessary  for  her  security.1  Hold- 
ing these  views,  he  could  not  possibly  make  good 
his  promises  of  the  spring  of  1815  to  adopt  a 
peaceful  policy.  In  March,  1814,  the  European 
Powers  had  bound  themselves  by  the  Treaty  of 
Ohaumont  to  reduce  France  to  her  old  territories 
as  a  guarantee  of  peace.  Now,  Napoleon  had 
always  stood  for  a  greater  France.  Indeed,  his 
nature  bade  him  reject  the  boundaries  accepted 
by  the  Bourbons.  They  might  reign  over  a 
diminished  realm.  He  would  not  do  so.  War 
with  the  Powers  was  therefore  inevitable  in  1815. 
His  abdication,  his  retirement  to  Eochefort, 


Chambers  led  to  his  losing  valuable  time  on  the  morning 
after  Ligny,  declaiming  against  their  opposition.  It  was 
this  which  made  Grouchy  too  late  in  beginning  the  pursuit 
of  the  Prussians  (Houssaye,  Waterloo,  p.  223). 

1  Napoleon  hoped  by  1st  October,  1815,  to  have  had 
100,000  French  troops  ready,  if  peace  lasted  till  then 
(Nap.  Corresp.,  xxxi.,  144).  Another  regret  which  haunted 
him  at  St.  Helena  was  that,  after  Waterloo,  he  had 
acquiesced  too  soon  in  defeat.  He  declared  that,  even 
after  his  second  abdication,  when  all  others  deemed  his 
prospects  hopeless,  he  might  have  put  himself  at  the  head 
of  the  troops  south  of  the  Loire  and  have  battled  for  his 
son,  Napoleon  II.  He  uttered  these  remarkable  words: 
"  History,  perhaps,  will  reproach  me  with  going  off  the 
scene  too  easily."  (Gourgaud,  Journal,  ii.,  322.) 


The  Exile  337 

and  surrender  to  Captain  Maitland  of  H.  M.  S. 
lleUerophon,  off  that  port,  followed  in  quick 
succession.  He  had  desired  to  make  his  way 
to  the  United  States,  but  that  was  refused,  be- 
cause in  March,  1815,  the  Congress  of  the 
Powers  at  Vienna  had  unanimously  declared 
him  an  outlaw;  and  they  could  not  allow  him 
to  depart  to  a  country  from  which  he  could 
easily  return  to  Europe.  To  watch  him  in  Elba 
was  at  least  a  possibility.  To  restrain  his  actions 
in  the  United  States  would  have  involved  con- 
stant friction,  perhaps  war.  Imagination  falters 
at  the  thought  of  what  would  have  happened 
had  he  come  to  America.  His  scintillating 
genius  would  have  captured  all  hearts  in  a 
week.  Probably  he  would  have  advised,  and 
even  headed  an  expedition  for  the  conquest  of 
Canada;  for  in  an  interview  with  Major  Vivian 
at  Elba  in  the  previous  January  he  prophesied 
that  Canada  would  soon  fall  to  the  United 
States 1 ;  and  he  had  a  tendency  to  fulfil  his 
own  prophecies.  Fancy  pictures  him  installed 
as  President  at  Washington,  in  which  position 
he  doubtless  would  have  imparted  to  the  con- 
stitution the  needful  degree  of  fluidity. 

At  Itochefort  there  was  another  alternative — 
1  Rose,  Pitt  and  Napoleon:  Essays  and  Letters,  p.  174. 


Personality  of  Napoleon 


that  he  should  settle  down  in  England  as  a 
country  gentleman.  That,  you  remember,  was 
implied  in  his  request  to  the  Prince  Regent  in 
the  famous  "  Themistocles  "  letter.  Its  rejec- 
tion has  ever  since  been  hotly  censured.  If  we 
take  the  standpoint  of  sentiment,  unmitigated 
censure  must  fall  on  the  Liverpool  Ministry  for 
the  decision  respecting  St.  Helena.  The  stand- 
point of  expediency  is  somewhat  different.  Per- 
haps we  may  personify  those  feelings  and  oppose 
them  in  a  short  dialogue  : 

Sentiment.  Napoleon,  the  greatest  man  of  the 
age,  came  as  a  guest,  and  you  treated  him  as  a 
prisoner. 

Expediency.  When  he  went  on  board  the  Belle- 
rophon  at  Rochefort,  he  knew  perfectly  well  that 
England  had  concurred  in  the  declaration  of  the 
Congress  of  Vienna,  that  he  was  an  outlaw. 

Sent.  Nevertheless,  he  had  won  the  heart  of 
France,  and  all  the  world  sympathised  with  him. 
For  your  own  credit  you  should  have  accorded  to 
him  generous  hospitality. 

Exp.  A  year  earlier  the  Allies  tried  that  plan 
at  Elba,  and  it  failed. 

Sent.  Yes:  because  the  stipulated  stipend  was 
not  paid. 

Exp.  True:  but  that  was  the  fault  of  Louis 
XVIII.  and  his  Ministers  alone. 

Sent.  Well  !  why  could  you  not  behave  generously 
to  him  as  your  guest? 


The  Exile  339 

Exp.  He  was  not  a  guest;  in  reality  he  was  a 
prisoner.  At  Rochefort  he  was  between  the  devil 
and  the  deep  sea ;  and  he  and  we  knew  it. 

Sent.  But  he  could  have  escaped  on  the  chasse- 
i a  <irce,  or  else  have  fought  his  way  out  on  the  two 
French  corvettes. 

Exp.  No:  he  and  his  companions  carefully  ex- 
amined the  chances  of  escape  seawards,  and  decided 
that  they  were  too  risky.  He  had  to  surrender 
either  to  the  French  Royalists  or  to  the  British 
warships ;  and  he  chose  the  latter  course. 

Sent.  As  he  came  to  you,  you  should  have  acted 
chivalrously.  His  life  was  done,  and  he  wanted 
merely  to  settle  down  as  a  country  gentleman  in 
England. 

Exp.  No:  he  was  only  forty-six,  and  his  conduct 
after  Waterloo  and  down  to  the  end  of  June  showed 
his  desire  to  fight  to  the  very  end. 

Sent.  In  capturing  him  in  that  shabby  way  you 
covered  yourself  with  disgrace. 

Exp.  We  did  not  capture  him.  His  coming  on 
board  was  at  his  own  discretion,  and  it  was  accom- 
panied by  no  conditions  binding  for  the  future. 

Sent.  Better  another  war  than  your  ungenerous 
resolve  to  shut  him  up  in  St.  Helena.  Generosity 
is  on  such  an  occasion  the  highest  prudence. 

Exp.  Be  just  to  your  own  people  before  you  are 
generous  to  an  enemy.  After  wars  costing  nearly 
£1,000,000,000  we  had  to  prevent  the  recurrence  of 
war  at  all  costs. 

Sent .  But  what  cruelty  to  confine  so  great  a  man 
on  that  detestable  islet! 

Exp.  His  greatness  and  his  restlessness  were  the 
source  of  danger.  We  hoped  that  at  St.  Helena  he 


34°          Personality  of  Napoleon 

could  be  detained  with  less  personal  restraint  than 
elsewhere. 

And  so  the  discussion  might  go  on,  as  it  will 
go  on,  doubtless  for  ever,  at  the  rate  of  about 
four  books  a  year. 

It  is  indeed  difficult  to  think  of  Napoleon 
settling  down  quietly  anywhere.  His  nature 
was  too  great,  his  activity  too  strenuous,  not 
to  chafe  at  his  entire  exclusion  from  political 
life.  But  the  situation  at  St.  Helena  soon  be- 
came most  irksome.  His  wife  and  son  were  at 
Vienna.  Few  companions  were  allowed  to  come 
with  him;  and  of  these  only  Las  Cases  had 
intellectual  gifts.  Worst  of  all,  the  Governor 
who  was  finally  sent  out,  Sir  Hudson  Lowe,  was 
a  somewhat  narrow-minded  and  pedantic  man, 
who  had  not  the  tact  to  mitigate  a  hard,  situa- 
tion. In  himself  Lowe  was  kindly  enough; 
there  is  conclusive  evidence  to  that  effect;  but 
obviously  he  was  oppressed  by  the  weight  of 
responsibility  attaching  to  his  office,  which  was 
not  made  easier  by  the  presence  of  representa- 
tives of  France,  Russia,  and  Austria,  to  see  that 
he  guarded  Napoleon  effectively.  Napoleon  was 
a  prisoner  of  all  the  Powers,  not  of  England 
alone;  and  those  representatives  were  there  to 
testify  to  the  fact. 


The  Exile  341 

The  expression  of  Lowe's  face  was  intelligent 
and  kindly;  but  the  features  were  thin,  and  the 
compressed  lips  bespoke  a  firm  will  and  a  quick 
temper.  The  eyes  were  keen  and  restless.  In 
fact,  the  countenance  was  that  of  a  Cassius. 
Moreover,  he  had  commanded  a  battalion  of 
Corsican  Royalists,  itself  a  cause  of  offence  to 
Napoleon,  who  therefore  came  with  unfavour- 
able impressions  to  their  first  interview.  He 
afterwards  said  to  Admiral  Malcolm :  "  He 
[Lowe]  has  not  the  character  of  an  English- 
man. He  is  a  Prussian  soldier.  He  is  clever 
and  cunning.  He  writes  well,  and  will  make  good 
statements  to  the  Government.  His  manners 
are  so  displeasing  to  me  that  if  he  were  to 
come  to  tell  me  that  a  frigate  was  ready  to 
take  me  to  France,  and  I  was  at  liberty  to  go 
where  I  pleased,  he  could  not  give  me  pleasure." 
Thereupon  Malcolm  spoke  up  in  defence  of 
Lowe,  and  mentioned  some  of  his  civilities  to 
the  Longwood  household.  To  this  Napoleon  re- 
plied :  "  He  cannot  please  me.  Call  it  enfan- 
tillage,  or  what  you  will — so  it  is;  I  can  see 
that  he  is  no  general;  indeed  he  never  com- 
manded anything  but  Corsican  deserters."  1 
This  personal  antipathy  complicated  a  situa- 
1  Lady  Malcolm,  A  Diary  of  St.  Helena,  pp.  37-39. 


342          Personality  of  Napoleon 

tion  which  must  in  any  case  have  been  difficult. 
The  British  Government,  with  more  logicality 
than  tact,  refused  to  accord  to  Napoleon  the 
title  of  Emperor.  True  it  had  denied  to  him 
that  title;  but  after  his  fall  generosity  de- 
manded that  this  punctilio  should  cease.  Such, 
however,  was  not  the  decision  of  the  Liverpool 
Ministry ;  and  the  instructions  of  Earl  Bathurst, 
Secretary  at  War  and  for  the  Colonies,  com- 
pelled Lowe  to  refuse  it  to  the  illustrious  exile. 
Perhaps  a  man  of  higher  connections  and  more 
tact  than  Lowe  would  quietly  have  ignored  the 
order.  At  any  rate  he  would  not  have  with- 
held from  Napoleon  a  book  merely  because  it 
was  addressed  to  the  Emperor,  or  have  dis- 
suaded the  officers  of  the  20th  Regiment  from 
accepting  books  presented  by  the  Emperor  with 
that  title  inscribed.  Such  actions  bespeak  a 
pedantic  nature;  but  we  must  remember  that 
in  so  responsible  a  position  a  man's  nerves  are 
apt  to  wear  thin  in  the  tropics.  Malcolm  after- 
wards pointed  out  to  Napoleon  that  Lowe's 
temper  was  too  quick  to  be  compatible  with 
cunning.  On  the  whole  the  Governor  restrained 
his  feelings  fairly  well  during  the  few  and 
trying  interviews  with  the  great  exile. 

The  chief  quarrel  between  Napoleon  and  Sir 


The  Exile  ,      343 

Hudson  Lowe  was  due  to  an  act  of  Mme.  Ber- 
trand. She  had  sent  a  sealed  letter  to  the  Mar- 
quis de  Montchenu,  the  French  commissioner  at 
St.  Helena.  This  was  against  the  rules,  as 
Lowe  pointed  out  to  General  Bertrand.  He  in 
his  turn  fired  up  and  sent  a  violent  answer, 
which  drew  on  him  an  official  rebuke.  It  is  a 
signal  instance  of  Lowe's  tactlessness  that,  in 
company  with  Admiral  Malcolm,  he  called  on 
Napoleon  to  complain  of  Bertrand's  expressions. 
The  complaint,  though  made  in  guarded  and 
courteous  terms,  at  once  kindled  Napoleon's 
anger;  he  accused  Lowe  of  treating  Bertrand 
like  a  corporal,  of  doing  his  duty  like  a  sentry, 
and  of  worrying  all  of  them  with  restrictions 
and  vexations  as  if  they  were  Botany  Bay  con- 
victs. Malcolm,  generally  in  favour  with  Napo- 
leon, tried  to  intervene,  but  the  tide  of  wrath 
flowed  on.  Lowe  kept  his  temper  well  under  con- 
trol; but  he  who  had  come  to  make  a  mild 
remonstrance,  was  now  the  culprit.  At  last  he 
told  Napoleon  that  he  pitied  him  for  so  mis- 
understanding his  (Lowe's)  character,  and  for 
the  rudeness  of  his  manners,  and  wished  him 
good  morning.  Admiral  Malcolm  also  retired.1 
Had  Lowe  been  a  man  of  ordinary  discernment, 
1  Lady  Malcolm,  Diary,  pp.  55-65,  which  corrects  Gour- 


344          Personality  of  Napoleon 

lie  would  have  seen  the  folly  of  going  in  person 
to  request  Napoleon  to  put  a  check  on  Bertrand. 
A  letter  would  have  caused  far  less  offence, 
especially  as  the  Emperor  had  taken  a  personal 
dislike  to  LowTe.  This  is  a  type  of  the  disputes 
that  went  on  at  St.  Helena.  Arising  out  of 
petty  causes,  they  were  embittered  by  liverish- 
ness  or  ennui.  Gourgaud  admits  that  the  Gov- 
ernor sought  to  lessen  the  discomforts  of  their 
lots.  He  gave  to  Las  Cases  a  cordial  recep- 
tion, and  put  his  library  at  the  disposal  of  the 
Longwood  household;  but  Napoleon  himself  in- 
tervened to  stop  all  intercourse  of  this  kind.1 
Whether  from  dislike  of  Lowe  or  from  policy, 
he  kept  his  followers  entirely  aloof  and  in  his 
own  society.  To  their  credit  they  complied. 
It  is  a  signal  proof  of  his  magnetic  power  that 
he  swayed  their  being  as  absolutely  as  at  the 
Tuileries. 

On  one  occasion  Napoleon's  restlessness  got 
the  better  of  his  prudence.  It  was  during  a 
ride  with  Gourgaud,  early  in  January,  1816. 
He  called  out  that  Captain  Poppleton,  their 
escort,  was  too  near,  and  charged  Bertrand  to 

gaud,  Journal,  i.,  237.     Gourgaud  was  in  bed  at  the  time 
(18th  August,  1816). 
1  Gourgaud,  Journal,  i.,  167,  168,  180,  184,  247. 


The  Exile  345 

order  him  farther  back.  Then  on  getting  out 
of  sight  of  the  British  officer,  he  exclaimed: 
"  Gourgaud,  gallop."  They  galloped  wildly  and 
gave  Poppleton  the  slip.  Coming  to  a  house 
inhabited  by  Mrs.  Pritchard,  they  dismounted 
and  found  a  place  commanding  a  view  of  two 
valleys  leading  to  the  sea.  Napoleon  told  Gour- 
gaud to  give  the  gardener  and  the  slave  in  the 
garden  a  Napoleon  apiece;  and  in  the  evening 
the  two  returned  to  Longwood,  the  Emperor 
declaring  himself  delighted  by  the  ride,  and  re- 
solved to  do  the  same  again.  As  Malcolm 
rightly  said,  it  was  only  a  freak  of  fancy,  a 
proof  that  Napoleon's  high  spirits  were  far 
from  spent.  Nevertheless,  it  must  have  alarmed 
the  officials,  who  kept  closer  watch  for  the 
future. 

In  the  summer  of  1816  the  British  Govern- 
ment heard  rumours  of  a  rescue  expedition  pre- 
paring at  Baltimore  at  the  instance  of  a  French 
officer  named  Fournier;  and  this  probably  ac- 
counts for  the  stricter  regulations  respecting  the 
sentries  near  Longwood  whicli  were  enforced  by 
Lowe  in  the  month  of  October  following.1  This 

1  Rose,  Napoleonic  Studies,  pp.  327,  328.  For  the  report 
of  a  plan  of  rescue  by  a  steamboat  from  Pernambuco  see 
Gourgaud,  Journal,  ii.,  454. 


346          Personality  of  Napoleon 

change  completed  the  annoyance  of  Napoleon, 
who  thereafter  remained  almost  entirely  at 
Longwood.  Thenceforth  his  exile  became  very 
irksome;  but,  as  he  remarked  to  Gourgaud,  by 
staying  indoors  he  preserved  his  dignity,  and 
perhaps  in  a  year  he  would  be  dead.  In  1817 
the  British  Government  received  news  of  the 
preparation  of  two  expeditions  for  rescuing 
Napoleon,  the  former  at  Philadelphia  in  July 
consisting  of  about  1000  men;  the  latter,  of 
November,  1817,  of  small,  swift  sailing-vessels, 
or  possibly  steamers.  Nothing  came  of  these 
enterprises,  except  that  the  reports  of  them 
made  the  British  Government  and  Lowe  more 
suspicious. 

The  time  of  exile  was  unspeakably  dreary. 
Politics,  administration,  war,  were  the  breath 
of  life  to  Napoleon ;  he  who  had  made  and  un- 
made kings  now  regulated  the  affairs  of  one 
household.1  That  powerful  brain,  "  which  never 
found  enough  materials  on  which  to  work,"  2  now 
surveyed  the  jealousies  of  four  very  mediocre 
Frenchmen.  Ordinary  men  could  have  lived 

1 "  His  house  now  is  very  good,  having  been  very  much 
added  to,  as  there  are  about  46  rooms  in  it "  (Captain 
Ross,  in  Napoleon  and  his  Fellow-Travellers,  p.  63,  by  Mr. 
Clement  Shorter). 

2  Meneval,  Mems.,  i.,  405. 


The  Exile  347 

there  without  much  discomfort;  but  ordinary 
men  have  tastes  or  hobbies  which  brighten  the 
evening  of  life.  Art,  music,  literature,  or,  on 
a  lower  plane,  sport,  the  collection  of  curios, 
farming,  gardening,  the  care  of  animals — these 
open  out  a  placid  vista;  and  he  who  sees  it  not 
fares  ill.  For  him  rest  is  mental  friction,  and 
retirement  mere  boredom.  Now,  to  Napoleon, 
fighting  through  the  jungle  was  the  chief  joy 
of  life.  He  confessed  to  Jomini  that  he  loved 
the  excitement  of  battles;  and,  after  a  dozen 
campaigns,  a  man  such  as  he  rarely  settles  down 
to  Boeotian  calm.  His  spirit  ranged  restlessly 
over  France  and  Europe.  He  cared  neither  for 
art  nor  music,  nor  the  trifling  pursuits  of  the 
countryside.  Discussions  with  Gourgaud  on 
Waterloo,  dictees  to  Montholon  on  the  events 
of  his  career,  studies  on  the  art  of  war  or  more 
general  topics,  occupied  much  of  his  time;  but 
these  subjects  often  aroused  poignant  regrets. 
On  the  whole,  then,  reading  of  the  French 
classics  became  his  chief  recreation.  As  we 
have  seen,  he  admired  les  genres  tranches.  Vol- 
taire's tragedy,  Zaire,  was  his  favourite,  as  was 
the  case  in  his  youth.  He  mentioned  it  with 
ecstacy  in  the  Discours  de  Lyon  (1791) ;  and  at 
Longwood  he  read  it  aloud  so  frequently  as  to 


348          Personality  of  Napoleon 

need  often  to  pause  and  exclaim :  "  Mme.  de 
Montholon,  vous  dormez." 1  Finally  she  and 
Gourgaud  resorted  to  the  device  of  hiding  the 
book  as  the  only  means  of  thwarting  this  im- 
portunate preference. 

Fixity  of  purpose  is  no  less  remarkable  in 
Napoleon's  tastes  than  in  his  resolves.  True, 
both  the  sentirnentalism  and  the  levelling  ten- 
dencies of  Kousseau  now  repelled  him;  and  he 
seems  at  St.  Helena  never  to  have  read  any  of 
his  works,  except  La  Nouvelle  Eelo'ise.  The 
charm  of  style  and  of  expression  pleased  him 
greatly,  but  he  objected  to  the  excess  of  the 
power  of  love  there  depicted,  apparently  for- 
getting the  frenzy  of  his  first  passion  for  Jos6- 
phine.  "  Love,"  said  the  Emperor,  "  ought  to  be 
a  pleasure  and  not  a  torment."  According  to 
Las  Cases,  he  finally  pronounced  that  "  love  must 
be  the  occupation  of  the  idle  man,  the  temporary 
distraction  of  the  warrior,  and  the  chief  peril 
of  the  sovereign."  2 

This  conclusion  may  be  that  of  Las  Cases; 

1  Lord  Holland,  Foreign  Reminiscences,  p.  305. 

2  Las  Cases,  Memorial,  ii.,  24.     The  occasion  is  different 
from  that  described,  very  curtly,  by  Gourgaud   (Journal, 
ii.,  66).     The  two  accounts  are  of  interest  as  showing  the 
inability  of  Gourgaud,  and  the  ability  of  Las  Cases,  to 
handle  and  adorn  literary  themes. 


The  Exile  349 

for  it  is  stated  with  an  art  to  which  Napoleon 
rarely  had  recourse;  but  this  and  similar  pro- 
nouncements enable  us  to  realise  his  standpoint 
with  regard  to  literature.  Style,  apart  from  the 
qualities  of  force  and  directness,  appealed  little 
to  him;  but  he  took  pleasure  in  branching  off 
from  strictly  literary  topics  to  a  discussion  of 
the  human  emotions  and  interests  involved  in 
the  plot.  There  is  a  spice  of  truth  in  Goethe's 
cruel  phrase,  that  Napoleon  had  studied  the 
tragic  drama  "with  the  attention  of  a  criminal 
judge  " ;  but  even  Goethe  admitted  that  his  criti- 
cisms were  keen  and  original,  and  we  could  wish 
that  we  had  more  of  them.  A  survey  of  the  chief 
works  of  the  French  stage  by  the  exile  would 
be  of  priceless  interest.  Unfortunately  we  have 
only  fragmentary  criticisms,  chiefly  from  the 
pen  of  Las  Cases,  who  often  dressed  them  up 
in  the  fashion  most  acceptable  to  Frenchmen. 
For  instance,  though  Zaire  is  known  to  have 
been  Napoleon's  favourite  drama,  Las  Cases  does 
not  once  mention  it.  On  the  other  hand,  he  de- 
scribes Napoleon's  rapture  at  the  noble  qualities 
of  Corneille  and  Racine;  he  also  descants  on 
his  depreciation  of  Voltaire  as  full  of  bombast 
and  tinsel,  always  false,  ignorant  alike  of  men 
and  affairs,  and  of  the  truth  and  grandeur  of 


35°          Personality  of  Napoleon 

the  passions.1  It  is  impossible  to  reconcile  this 
with  the  Emperor's  fondness  for  Zaire,  the 
Othello  of  the  French  drama.  Elsewhere  Las 
Cases  describes  Napoleon's  critiques  on  Vol- 
taire's Mahomet  and  Brutus,  and  mentions  the 
surprise  of  the  Longwood  household  when  he  pro- 
nounced the  recognition  scene  in  the  CEdipe  as 
the  finest  in  the  French  theatre.  In  the  Greek 
drama  he  admired  most  of  all  the  Agamemnon 
of  JEschylus,  and  next  the  CEdipus  Rex  of  Soph- 
ocles.2 The  choice  bespeaks  his  love  for  the 
grand  and  terrible. 

The  extent  and  variety  of  Napoleon's  writings 
at  St.  Helena  are  very  remarkable,  and  suf- 
ficiently disprove  the  assertion  that  his  mind 
had  decayed  by  the  year  1815.  His  political 
judgment  and  tact  had  declined;  not  the  mental 
faculties.  I  can  notice  only  one  or  two  of  the 
St.  Helena  writings.  One  of  the  most  curious 
of  them  is  a  critique  on  Book  II.  of  Vergil's 
dUneid.  Napoleon  remarks  that,  fine  as  is  the 
style,  the  facts  are  far  otherwise;  and  he  pro- 
ceeds to  criticise  them  in  the  most  matter-of- 
fact  wray.  The  episode  of  the  wooden  horse 
offends  him.  Why  should  the  Trojans  send  a 

1  Las  Cases,  Memorial,  ii.,  304. 

2  Ibid.,  iii.,  102,  391;  vii.,  147. 


The  Exile  35 1 

vessel  to  see  whether  the  Greeks  really  had 
sailed  away,  when  they  could  see  the  roadstead 
from  the  towers  of  Troy?  How  could  so  clever 
a  man  as  Ulysses,  together  with  other  chiefs, 
shut  themselves  up  in  a  wooden  horse,  thus 
placing  themselves  entirely  at  the  mercy  of  their 
foes  in  Troy?  And  even  if  the  horse  held  only 
a  hundred  warriors,  its  weight  would  be  so  great 
as  to  prevent  it  being  dragged  from  the  sea- 
shore, over  two  rivers,  and  a  passage  in  the 
walls,  in  one  day.  Then,  again  (says  Napoleon), 
the  episode  of  Sinon  is  absurd,  though  artfully 
described,  and  is  not  relieved  by  the  beautiful 
incident  of  Laocoon.  Further,  the  horse  cannot 
have  been  opened  until  1  A.M.,  and  the  destruc- 
tion of  Troy  takes  place  before  sunrise,  i.  e.,  in 
three  or  four  hours,  which  is  monstrous;  for 
Troy  could  not  be  destroyed  in  less  than  a  fort- 
night.1 And  so  on.  The  whole  critique  is  ex- 
cellent reading,  as  an  application  of  modern 
tactics  and  geometrical  reasoning  to  an  epic 
founded  on  legend.  Incidentally,  it  affords  ad- 
ditional proof  of  what  I  have  termed  the  hard- 
ening of  Napoleon's  brain.  In  youth  he  gave 
free  rein  to  sentiment  and  imgaination.  But  in- 
tense absorption  in  public  affairs  had  stunted 
1  Nap.  Corresp.,  xxxi.,  491. 


352          Personality  of  Napoleon 

these  gifts ;  so  that  even  in  the  perusal  of  novels 
the  chief  point  of  interest  is  the  expenditure  of 
the  hero,  and  how  he  manages  to  live  on  so 
much  a  year.  Napoleon  delights  when  he  can 
convict  the  novelist  of  unreasonable  optimism 
on  money  affairs. 

Another  proof  of  this  "  bronzing  over  "  of  the 
heart  (to  use  his  own  expressive  phrase)  appears 
in  a  little  essay  on  suicide  written  in  August, 
1820.  You  remember  his  sentimental  effusion 
on  that  subject,  written  in  1787  (see  Lecture  I.), 
in  which  he  lets  his  brooding  melancholy  draw 
him  on  to  thoughts  of  self-destruction.  Poor, 
solitary,  an  alien  at  heart  to  France,  and  yet 
despising  the  Corsicans  for  their  subjection  to 
France,  he  dallies  with  the  notion  of  self- 
murder,  and  yet  breaks  away  from  it,  we  know 
not  why.  Now,  thirty  years  later,  he  examines 
the  topic  coolly,  critically,  as  appears  in  the 
following  sentences: 

.  .  .  Has  a  man  the  right  to  kill  himself?  Yes,  if 
his  death  does  no  harm  to  any  one,  and  his  life  is 
an  evil  for  himself.  When  is  life  an  evil  for  man? 
When  it  offers  him  only  sufferings  and  pains.  But, 
as  sufferings  and  pains  are  changing  every  moment, 
there  is  no  moment  in  life  when  a  man  has  the 
right  to  kill  himself.  The  moment  would  only  be 
at  hand  at  the  time  of  death,  since  then  alone  would 


The  Exile  353 

it  be  proved  that  his  life  was  only  a  tissue  of  evils 
and  sufferings.  .  .  -1 

The  essay  probably  belongs  to  a  time  previous 
to  the  first  signs  of  cancer,  which  carried 
him  off  nine  months  later.  But,  even  when 
the  stabbing  pains  came  fast,  the  illustrious 
sufferer  never  sought  to  quicken  his  end.  At 
an  earlier  time  he  said  to  G  our  gaud  that 
suicide  was  the  act  of  a  coward  2  ;  and  by 
his  consistent  courage  and  resolve  to  live 
out  his  life  to  the  end  he  set  his  seal  to  the 
bravery  which  had  battled  through  a  hundred 
fights. 

A  subject  in  which  his  keen  intellect  worked 
with  sympathetic  insight  was  the  future  of 
Italy.  His  experience  of  the  renewed  energy  of 
that  people  and  the  shrewd  geographical  in- 
stincts which  nearly  always  guided  him  found 
expression  in  these  remarkable  statements  : 
"  Italy,  isolated  in  its  natural  limits,  separated 
by  the  sea  and  by  very  high  mountains  from  the 
rest  of  Europe,  seems  called  to  form  a  great 
and  powerful  nation."  Then,  after  naming  the 
sources  of  weakness  of  Italy  and  the  difficulty 
of  choosing  any  one  site  which  satisfies  every 


.  Corresp.,  xxxi.,  485. 
2  Gourgaud,  Journal,  ii.,  66. 


23 


354          Personality  of  Napoleon 

requisite  of  a  capital,  he  sums  up  decisively  in 
the  words :  "  Thus,  although  Rome  does  not 
possess  all  the  desirable  characteristics,  she  is, 
undoubtedly,  the  capital  which  the  Italians  will 
one  day  choose."  x  This  is  the  most  remarkable 
prophecy  of  his  life. 

The  time  spent  at  St.  Helena  was  by  no  means 
one  of  bodily  privation.  In  accordance  with  the 
proposal  of  the  Governor,  Sir  Hudson  Lowe,  the 
British  Government  granted  the  yearly  sum  of 
£10,000,  not  £8000  as  was  at  first  suggested;  and 
that  sum  sufficed  to  maintain  the  household  in 
comfort,  if  not  in  luxury.  Napoleon  was  never 
a  gourmand;  and  in  the  lifelike  and  convincing 
notes  left  by  Gourgaud  there  is  not  a  word  as 
to  any  deficiency  of  food  or  wine.  Further,  a 
recently  published  letter  of  Lowe  to  the  pur- 
veyor, Ibbetson,  shows  the  extreme  care  taken 
by  both  of  them  to  provide  a  good  menu  at 
Longwood.2  In  the  productions  of  Las  Cases, 
O'Meara,  and  Montholon,  written  with  the  pur- 
pose of  arousing  a  Bonapartist  feeling  in  Europe, 
much  stress  is  laid  on  actual  privations;  but 

1  Nap.  Corresp.,  xxix.,  75,  77. 

2  See  the  article  by  Mr.  A.  M.  Broadley  in  the  Century 
Magazine  for  April,  1912.     It  seems  certain  that  the  re- 
straints put  on  Napoleon  were  less  rigorous  than  those 
which  he  inflicted  on  the  Pope  in  1811-13. 


The  Exile  355 

their   statements    are    false.     The    discomforts 
were  of  a  mental  order. 

The  world  still  hangs  with  intense  interest 
on  the  details  of  the  exile  at  St.  Helena;  for 
greatness  reduced  to  narrow  limits  is  a  moving 
spectacle ;  and  the  tragedy  at  times  is  chequered 
by  almost  comic  interludes,  especially  when  the 
disputes  between  Mesdames  Bertrand  and  Mon- 
tholon,  or  Gourgaud  and  Las  Cases  become 
acute.  The  career  of  Napoleon,  formerly  so 
boundless  as  almost  to  defy  presentment,  now 
becomes  intensely  human.  Perhaps  the  quarrels 
amused  him.  Certainly  they  broke  the  mono- 
tony of  life  at  Longwood  in  a  way  not  wholly 
disagreeable  to  that  wearied  group.  In  any 
case  the  scenes  were  inevitable.  All  the  jeal- 
ousies which  make  a  Court  a  veritable  cockpit 
were  there  pent  up  in  one  or  two  houses, 
and  become  food  for  laughter,  sometimes  for 
tears. 

Naturally  enough,  the  two  ladies  are  the  cause 
of  the  first  rounds.  Mme.  Bertrand,  wife  of  the 
Grand  Marshal,  was  daughter  of  an  Irish  general, 
Dillon  by  name,  who  perished  in  the  Revolution. 
She  was  also  in  part  of  Creole  extraction;  and 
her  attractive,  pleasure-loving  character  made 


356          Personality  of  Napoleon 

her  the  centre  of  a  gay  set  in  Paris.1  She  had 
sought  to  prevent  General  Bertrand  from  com- 
ing, and  for  this  purpose  made  a  show  of 
throwing  herself  overboard  in  Plymouth  Sound. 
During  the  voyage  she  oscillated  sharply  between 
deep  dejection  and  shrill  complaints.  Neither 
mood  made  much  impression  on  Napoleon,  who 
regarded  these  occasions  as  natural  to  her,  and 
as  calling  for  the  exercise  of  conjugal  authority. 
Bertrand  did  not  play  the  man  enough  to  please 
Napoleon.  He  was  a  melancholy-looking  man, 
but  a  kind  husband  and  father,  inclined  to 
humour  his  wife.  At  St.  Helena  he  defended  her 
occasional  visits  to  Jamestown  for  the  mild  dis- 
sipation of  shopping,  even  when  they  involved 
absence  from  the  Emperor's  dinner-table.  This 
annoyed  Napoleon,  who  declared  that  his  house 
was  not  to  be  treated  like  an  inn,  and  that  the 
Bertrands  must  either  come  always  or  not  at 
all.  At  this  and  similar  remarks  they  took 
offence  and  for  a  time  absented  themselves.2 
Bertrand  complained  bitterly  to  Gourgaud  of 
Napoleon's  treatment  of  them,  adding  that  at 
Elba  they  found  out  his  egotism.  He  on  his  side 
disliked  Mme.  Bertrand's  wayward  whims  and 

1  Lady  Malcolm,  A  Diary  of  St.  Helena  (1899),  p.  18. 

2  Gourgaud,  Journal,  i.,  109,  152. 


The  Exile  357 

moods,  unredeemed  by  any  appreciable  gifts 
of  intellect.  Hence,  though  there  were  times 
when  he  showed  them  favour  and  benignity,  the 
thought  of  past  friction  never  quite  vanished. 
On  one  occasion  they  remarked  to  Gourgaud 
that  the  Emperor's  selfishness  was  the  cause  of 
his  lack  of  friends,  indeed,  of  his  exile.1 

The  quarrels  with  the  Bertrands  gave  to  the 
Montholons  the  chance  of  asserting  themselves 
with  effect.  Montholon  was  inferior  to  Ber- 
trand  in  military  rank,  but  he  excelled  him  in 
social  and  mental  gifts.  His  wife  also  surpassed 
Mme.  Bertrand  in  tact  and  culture.  Both  of 
them  were  assiduous  courtiers;  and  Montholon 
will  always  be  remembered  for  his  devotion  in 
spreading  the  Napoleonic  cult  in  France.  At 
St.  Helena  he  did  not  always  please  his  master. 
On  the  plea  that  ghosts  (that  is,  possible  mur- 
derers) stole  around  Longwood  at  night,  he 
requested  the  British  sentries  to  come  in  nearer 
to  guard  the  house.  Gourgaud,  waking  up  per- 
chance, thought  he  heard  a  ghost.  He  arose 
quickly,  looked  out  of  the  window,  and  discov- 
ered a  sentry.  He  went  to  the  door  and  found 
another  there.  The  story,  whether  true  or  not, 
is  too  good  not  to  be  told  to  the  Emperor,  who 

1  Gourgaud  Journal,  i.,  223. 


358  Personality  of  Napoleon 

fires  up  against  Montholon.  "  He  must  have  a 
base  soul  [says  Napoleon]  to  desire  to  become 
our  gaoler.  If  this  goes  on,  there  will  be  sen- 
tries in  my  bedroom.  Why  pretend  that  there 
is  danger?  If  there  is,  one  of  the  French  officers 
will  lie  at  the  door;  but  for  God's  sake  don't 
defend  me  by  British  sentries."  Montholon 
then  loses  his  temper,  and  there  is  a  scene,  which 
Napoleon  ends  by  telling  him  to  be  off  and  leave 
him  quiet. 

The  Montholons  are  not  always  at  peace.  On 
one  occasion  they  fall  out  owing  to  Montholon's 
chastisement  of  their  little  girl.  The  mother 
fires  up,  calls  him  an  executioner,  and  rushes 
to  lay  her  complaint  before  Napoleon.  He  jokes 
at  her,  and  she  returns  baffled.1  How  singular 
that  even  a  family  quarrel  must  be  referred  to 
the  Emperor! 

For  a  brief  space  Gourgaud's  star  is  in  the 
ascendant,  while  that  of  the  Montholons  wanes. 
But  Gourgaud  has  not  the  brains  to  keep  in 
favour  long.  A  glance  at  his  physiognomy  ex- 
plains the  man.  The  narrow,  low  forehead  is 
almost  that  of  a  sparrow.  He  is  puffed  up  with 
the  recollection  of  saving  Napoleon's  life  early 
in  the  campaign  of  1814,  and  sometimes  ven- 

1  Gourgaud,  Journal,  ii.,  66. 


The  Exile  359 

tures  to  harp  on  this  theme,  even  adding  ex- 
pressions of  surprise  that  the  Emperor  prefers 
"that  little  Jesuit,"  Las  Cases.  This  is  too 
much  for  Napoleon,  who  on  such  occasions 
snubs  Gourgaud,  or  else  tells  him  he  has  a  good 
heart  but  a  very  poor  head;  it  is  natural  that 
a  man  of  Las  Cases7  age  should  suit  him  better. 
This  Gourgaud  cannot  understand.  In  his  view, 
Las  Cases  lacks  both  brains  and  knowledge;  he 
is  by  nature  an  intriguer,  and  has  come  with 
Napoleon  to  St.  Helena  merely  in  order  to  write 
anecdotes  about  him.  Worst  of  all,  he  has  never 
fought  a  battle.1  Sometimes  Napoleon  ends  these 
discussions  by  giving  Gourgaud  ("Gorgotto" 
he  playfully  calls  him)  a  friendly  slap  on  the 
cheek  or  a  pinch  of  the  ear.  Or  else  he  con- 
cludes by  saying  that  they  are  all  equal,  and 
ought  to  live  as  brothers.  That  is  Napoleon  at 
his  best,  and,  as  Bertrand  reminds  the  pining, 
peevish  youth,2  Napoleon  always  returns  to  a 
kindly  mood.  A  man  who,  even  in  exile,  can  be 
the  cause  of  these  frantic  jealousies,  and  can 
allay  them  by  an  appeal  to  the  better  feelings 
of  his  followers,  must  have  been  a  king  of  men. 

1  Gourgaud,  Journal,  i.,  223,  316.     Gourgaud    (i.,  530) 
ascribed  "  Warden's  Letters  "  to  Las  Cases. 

2  Ibid.,  i.,  227,  234. 


360          Personality  of  Napoleon 

The  tedium  of  exile  was  not  relieved  by  the 
mental  gifts  of  these  ill-assorted  companions. 
With  the  exception  of  Las  Cases,  none  of  them 
had  either  intellectual  or  conversational  powers. 
A  Polish  soldier,  Piontowski  by  name,  who  had 
been  at  Elba  and  now  came  on  to  St.  Helena 
as  equerry,  saw  something  of  the  Longwood 
circle,  and  was  depressed  by  its  dulness.  The 
courtiers  for  their  part  thought  him  a  spy,  and 
Gourgaud  claimed  to  have  exposed  his  inaccurate 
account  of  himself.1  Nevertheless  the  following 
letter,  written  by  Piontowski  at  Paris  to  M. 
Aime  Martin  on  22d  December,  1828,  deserves 
quotation.  It  is  in  reply  to  a  request  to  publish 
his  Memoirs.  Piontowski  refuses,  in  terms 
highly  creditable  to  him : 

What  I  could  say  is  too  odious;  for  his  [Napo- 
leon's] true  position  could  not  be  described  without 
entering  into  details  too  scandalous  as  to  all  the 
annoyances  he  had  to  undergo  and  which  made 
him  more  impracticable  than  during  the  Empire. 
I  should  have  to  unveil  the  persons  who  formed 
his  household  at  Longwood.  Either  I  should  be 
thought  a  calumniator,  or  a  false  idea  would  be 
formed  of  Napoleon  and  of  his  choice  of  men.  Per- 
haps it  would  be  believed  that  he  was  fallen  so  far 

i  See  Mr.  G.  L.  de  St.  M.  Watson's  work,  A  Polish  Exile 
with  Napoleon  (1912),  for  new  and  interesting  material 
on  Piontowski,  and  an  exposure  of  the  attacks  of  Gourgaud. 


The  Exile  361 

as  to  be  unable  to  find  men  of  merit  devoted  enough 
to  share  his  fate,  and  this  would  be  a  mistake  in 
every  respect.  For  it  ought  to  be  known  that  he 
counted  surely  on  going  to  America  to  live  as  a 
private  person,  and  there,  after  the  storm,  surround 
himself  with  true  friends,  of  whom  he  could  not  at 
that  time  deprive  the  party  of  his  son.  The  poison 
of  the  most  refined  flattery  had  spoilt  him;  and 
courtiers  had  become  a  kind  of  necessity  in  his  posi- 
tion. He  also  needed  men  who  belonged  to  a  family 
with  a  distinguished  name,  which  had  influence  in 
France.  Montholon  is  an  adopted  son,  and  it  is 
said,  a  natural  son,  of  Semonville.1  The  Emperor 
therefore  had  to  take  him  despite  his  personal 
nullity. 

In  writing  frankly  I  should  have  to  disclose  in  all 
its  nudity  the  imperial  family,  which  has  done  him 
more  harm  than  all  his  enemies.  .  .  .  Having,  then, 
little  or  nothing  that  is  good  to  say,  it  is  better  to 
be  silent:  but,  as  I  much  count  on  rescuing  from 
errors  and  unjust  prepossessions  a  man  of  your  ex- 
cellent heart  and  brilliant  intellect,  to  whom  I  am 
attached  by  friendship  and  gratitude,  I  will  from 
time  to  time  write  to  you  notes  which  will  depict 
for  you  that  great  man  in  his  private  life,  and  by 
traits  which  will  be  suited  to  reveal  the  man,  his 
heart,  his  justice,  his  constant  desire  to  do  good, 
and  to  redress  the  wrongs  which  he  had  unwillingly 
committed;  that  all  this  mass  of  Memoirs,  largely 
false,  where  one  sees  only  the  author  of  the  work, 
his  false  judgments  and  the  desire  to  make  them 
interesting,  so  as  to  make  the  utmost  possible  out 

1  Napoleon  said  so  (Las  Cases,  Memorial,  iv.,  255). 


362  Personality  of  Napoleon 

of  them;  often  also  [with]  the  design  of  harming 
others  or  at  least  of  raising  himself  at  their  ex- 
pense. I  have  never  had  any  other  motive  than 
admiration,  or  any  other  ambition  than  that  of 
serving  him  to  the  utmost.  .  .  .* 

In  regard  to  the  future,  Napoleon's  exile  was 
by  no  means  fruitless.  There  it  was  that  lie 
uttered  words  still  treasured  for  their  grandeur : 

Our  situation  here  may  have  its  attractions.  The 
Universe  is  looking  at  us.  We  remain  the  martyrs 
of  an  eternal  cause.  Millions  of  men  weep  for  us; 
the  Fatherland  sighs;  and  Glory  is  in  mourning. 
We  struggle  here  against  the  oppression  of  the  gods, 
and  the  longings  of  the  nations  are  for  us.  My  real 
sufferings  are  not  here.  If  I  considered  only  my- 
self, perhaps  I  should  have  cause  for  gladness. 
Misfortune  also  is  marked  by  heroism  and  glory. 
Adversity  was  wanting  to  my  career.  If  I  had  died 
on  the  throne  amidst  the  clouds  of  my  own  omni- 
potence, I  should  have  remained  a  problem  for  many 
men.  To-day,  thanks  to  my"  misfortune,  they  can 
judge  of  me  naked  as  I  am.2 

Las  Cases  often  dresses  up  Napoleon's  thoughts, 
concealing  their  strength  under  pretty  arts.  But 
those  words  ring  true.  Las  Cases  could  not  have 
expressed  them  with  that  superb  incisiveness 
which  is  the  charm  of  Napoleon's  oratory.  The 

1  From  Mr.  A.  M.  Broadley's  MSS. 

2  Las  Cases,  Memorial,  i.,  ad  fin. 


The  Exile  363 

appeal  struck  home.  Napoleon  the  exile  reigned 
more  potently  in  the  thoughts  of  men  than  he  did 
when  lord  of  50,000,000  subjects.  Like  Mary 
Queen  of  Scots  after  her  downfall,  the  van- 
quished conquered;  for  he  now  appealed  to  the 
emotions  of  pity  and  sympathy,  which  on  the 
whole  are  of  more  lasting  potency  than  fear. 

The  personality  of  Napoleon  abounds  in  con- 
tradictions. Dowered  with  the  passions  of  the 
south,  he  yet  had  the  cool  and  calculating  in- 
stincts characteristic  of  the  northern  peoples. 
By  turns  he  was  mild  and  stern,  placable  and 
unforgiving,  generous  but  egotistical,  far-seeing 
yet  short-sighted.  On  every  event  and  problem 
he  concentrated  a  bewildering  variety  of  powers, 
so  that  in  every  case  we  must  ask  what  set  of 
faculties  led  him  to  this  and  not  that  conclu- 
sion. Moreover,  at  the  end  of  the  inquiry  we 
are  baffled  by  the  crowning  paradox,  that  he,  the 
greatest  warrior  and  organiser  of  all  time,  left 
France  weaker  and  his  enemies  stronger  than 
before  his  appearance  in  the  arena. 

It  is  easier  to  explain  his  rise  than  his  fall. 
Alike  by  genius  and  self-culture  he  inevitably 
became  the  leader  of  the  Latin  peoples,  who 
then  supremely  needed  a  great  organiser.  He 


364          Personality  of  Napoleon 

summed  up  in  liis  own  person  much  that  was 
best  in  their  past.  Love  of  order,  a  veritable 
passion  for  organisation,  and  deep  respect  for 
the  glories  of  Rome  and  the  traditions  of  France, 
constituted  him  the  champion  of  experience 
against  Jacobinical  innovators,  who,  as  Catha- 
rine IT.  wittily  said,  worked  on  the  human  skin 
as  if  it  were  parchment.  Yet  his  training  in 
France  and  Corsica,  his  espousal  of  the  most 
practical  tenets  of  the  revolutionary  creed, 
brought  him  abreast  of  the  times;  so  that  the 
union  of  past  and  present  in  his  nature  enabled 
him  to  end  the  Revolution  and  re-establish  mon- 
archy on  a  new  and  firmer  basis.  Having 
brought  about  a  beneficent  compromise  in 
France,  he  proposed  to  call  the  other  Latin 
peoples  to  a  more  active  existence;  and,  but  for 
the  fateful  blunder  in  Spain,  he  might  have 
opened  a  startling  chapter  in  European  history. 
At  that  point,  however,  he  parted  company  with 
fair  play  and  justice ;  and  the  rest  of  his  career 
was  but  a  portentous  display  of  activity  mis- 
applied. One  nation  after  another  found  his 
sway  intolerable;  and  his  resolve  to  maintain 
it  at  all  points  was  undoubtedly  the  main  cause 
of  his  overthrow.  The  assertion  that  his  fall 
was  due  to  the  jealousy  of  old  dynasties  for  a 


The  Exile  365 

parvenu  is  too  superficial  to  call  for  notice.  He 
had  several  opportunities  for  coming  to  a  com- 
promise with  the  Powers  satisfactory  both  to 
France  and  himself;  but  he  let  them  slip. 

In  the  domain  of  fact  all  this  is  fairly  clear. 
But  from  our  standpoint,  that  of  character,  it 
is  difficult  to  explain  how  a  man  of  his  mental 
acuteness  lost  those  opportunities.  At  St.  Helena 
he  admitted  that  the  failure  to  make  peace  dur- 
ing the  Congress  of  Chatillon  (March,  1814) 
was  une  lourde  sottise.  Yet  along  with  that 
confession  he  expressed  a  fervent  wish  that  he 
was  once  more  in  France;  for  with  the  levies  of 
1816,  1817,  to  hand  he  would  have  100  regi- 
ments of  infantry,  and  with  them  he  would  do 
much.1  That  the  wish  should  come  side  by  side 
with  the  confession  argues  a  nature  in  which 
impulse  bears  sway  over  the  judgment. 

By  degrees  the  passion  for  the  grandiose  had 
overmastered  the  calculating  faculties  which  in 
early  life  generally  held  ambition  in  leash. 
After  the  campaigns  of  Austerlitz,  Jena,  and 
Friedland,  he  seems  to  have  lost  his  mental 
balance.  The  same  powers  were  there,  even  to 
excess,  but  the  sound  judgment  which  co-ordi- 
nated them  no  longer  exercised  a  sovereign  con- 

1  Gourgaud,  Journal,  ii,,  346. 


366          Personality  of  Napoleon 

trol.  His  work  of  orderly  reconstruction  during 
the  Consulate  was  the  outcome  of  statesmanlike 
qualities  of  the  highest  order;  but  most  of  his 
later  enterprises  betray  a  disordered  imagina- 
tion, a  will  on  which  reason  has  little  hold,  a 
persistence  worthy  of  the  heroic  age,  but  useless 
in  awakened  Europe.  The  civic  work  will  en- 
dure; the  military  quests  came  to  naught  even 
in  his  own  day.  Nevertheless  as  the  elemental 
in  man  appeals  to  our  love  of  romance,  the  per- 
sonality of  Napoleon  will  ever  be  a  challenge 
to  more  strenuous  activity,  to  greater  concen- 
tration of  purpose,  to  a  defiance  of  the  impos- 
sible. Mankind  moves  along  lines  far  other 
than  those  which  he  finally  laid  down;  but  it 
will  not  cease  to  acclaim  the  hero  who  broke 
up  the  old  world,  enlarged  the  bounds  of  activity, 
and  set  a  high  standard  of  achievement  for 
future  ages. 

It  is  futile  to  attempt  to  sum  up  Napoleon  in 
any  one  category.  Attempts  have  been  made  to 
do  so,  but  with  indifferent  success.  Passing 
over  the  panegyric  of  the  amiable  Abbott,  we 
may  glance  at  four  of  them.  Emerson,  in  an 
essay  more  acute  than  convincing,  points  out 
that  Napoleon  is  an  embodiment  of  the  middle- 
class  qualities  then  coming  to  the  fore.  But, 


The  Exile  367 

half-way  through  the  thesis,  he  seems  to  feel 
that  the  great  Corsican  does  not  well  fit  into 
the  niche  of  a  Stock  Exchange,  and  thereafter 
represents  him  as  a  villain  of  melodrama.  More 
elaborate  and  artful,  but  scarcely  more  satis- 
factory, is  Taine's  embroidery  on  the  theme  that 
Napoleon  is  a  revival  of  the  Italian  condottiere. 
Sorel,  with  wonderful  ability  and  thoroughness, 
sought  to  exhibit  him  as  the  champion  of  a 
great  France,  the  protagonist  of  her  demand  for 
the  "  natural  boundaries."  Even  this  sums  up 
only  one  aspect  of  his  statecraft,  and  in  my 
judgment  fails  to  account  for  his  fall.  M.  Levy 
has  striven  to  depict  his  hero  as  an  exemplary 
bourgeois,  always  intent  on  the  preservation  of 
peace,  but  driven  to  war  by  the  successive  pro- 
vocations of  all  the  Powers.  The  theme  is  at 
best  very  one-sided;  and  it  often  conflicts  with 
the  written  and  spoken  statements  of  Napoleon 
himself.  I  think  that  he  would  have  been  the 
first  to  reject  the  portrait  as  a  prosaic  caricature. 
Surely  there  is  only  one  man  of  faculties  suf- 
ficiently varied  and  forceful  to  challenge  com- 
parison with  Napoleon.  The  figure  of  Julius 
Caesar  dominates  the  Koman  world  as  that  of  the 
great  Corsican  overshadows  the  age  of  the 
French  Eevolution.  Both  men  lived  in  cata- 


368          Personality  of  Napoleon 

cljsmic  periods,  when  the  old  order  was  passing 
away  and  new  ideas  called  for  recognition.  In 
their  several  ways  they  succeeded  in  linking  on 
the  new  to  the  old,  and  in  perpetuating  the 
principle  of  monarchy;  for  in  both  of  them 
the  longing  for  a  wider  and  more  intelligent 
polity  was  tempered  by  respect  for  all  that  bore 
the  stamp  of  ancient  use  and  sage  tradition. 
Therefore,  though  innovators  in  youth,  they  be- 
came more  and  more  conservative  in  manhood. 
Ambition  doubtless  played  its  part  in  the 
transformation  of  character  which  led  up  to  auto- 
cracy. Wars  of  adventure  further  strengthened 
that  trend;  but  each  of  them  made  good  the 
claim  of  the  foremost  man  to  guide  the  drifting 
masses,  and  ably  adapted  imperial  rule  to  the 
needs  of  the  time.  In  some  respects,  I  think, 
Caesar  is  a  greater  man  than  Napoleon.  He 
began  the  serious  part  of  life  full  late;  yet  both 
in  war  and  statecraft  he  easily  established  an 
unquestioned  supremacy  which  nothing  but  mur- 
der could  end.  He  led  the  way  both  by  develop- 
ing new  and  trenchant  principles  of  strategy, 
and  by  adapting  the  almost  stereotyped  polity 
of  Rome  to  the  needs  of  a  fast-growing  Empire. 
Further,  his  clemency  and  tact  won  the  affection 
of  the  conquered  peoples  whom  he  brought 


The  Exile  369 

under  the  Roman  sway;  and  he  left  behind  him 
a  State  both  greater  and  stronger  than  be- 
fore his  accession  to  office.  Finally,  his  un- 
paralleled triumphs  both  at  home  and  abroad 
neither  blinded  his  vision  nor  hardened  his 
temper.  These  imperial  powers  were  harmon- 
ised and  humanised  by  an  almost  unfailing 
clemency;  and,  had  he  lived  out  his  life,  he 
would  assuredly  have  continued  to  grace  a 
stupendous  career  with  the  flowers  of  courtesy 
and  kindliness. 

In  this  respect  Napoleon  suffers  by  compari- 
son. There  is  something  portentous,  almost 
terrifying,  about  the  Corsican.  His  temper  is 
often  more  Ossianic  than  Csesarean.  After 
gaining  the  imperial  title,  he  adopted  more  and 
more  a  forceful  policy,  which  alienated  the  vassal 
States.  By  "  the  Spanish  blunder  "  of  1808  he 
lost  that  peninsula,  and  thereafter  the  North 
Germans  were  held  down  chiefly  by  fear.  Dur- 
ing the  time  of  exile  he  saw  the  mistake.  There 
is  an  undertone  of  self-reproach  in  his  panegyric 
on  Alexander  the  Great :  "  What  I  like  in 
Alexander  is,  not  his  campaigns,  which  we  can- 
not understand,  but  his  political  methods.  At 
thirty-three  years  of  age  he  leaves  a  well- 
established  Empire,  which  his  generals  parti- 
24 


37°          Personality  of  Napoleon 

tion.  He  had  the  art  of  making  himself  beloved 
by  the  peoples  he  conquered."  1  Yes,  this  was 
the  sign  of  the  highest  statesmanship.  Napo- 
leon felt  that  he  lacked  that  supreme  gift.  Be- 
yond the  Pyrenees  and  the  Rhine  he  had  aroused 
more  hatred  than  love. 

Not  that  he  was  deficient  in  lovable  qualities; 
far  from  it.  He  showed  them  to  his  family  and 
his  nearest  friends.  But  his  conception  of  state- 
craft became  increasingly  hard;  and,  while  he 
scouted  public  opinion,  his  self-confidence  grew 
until  it  obsessed  his  whole  being.  It  is  no  para- 
dox to  assert  that  the  excess  of  his  good  fortune 
during  the  time  of  ripening  manhood  was  his 
greatest  misfortune.  If  both  at  Paris  and  in 
his  early  campaigns  he  had  met  with  firm  and 
able  opposition,  he  might  have  eluded  that  curse 
of  uninterrupted  triumph — infatuation.  Little 
by  little  he  came  under  its  spell,  until,  after 
the  Austrian  marriage,  he  steeled  himself  against 
counsel,  and  pushed  every  enterprise  to  the 
bitter  end.  Then  came  the  blows  of  adversity; 
but  they  fell  on  a  nature  too  hardened  to  profit 
by  them.  In  a  world  which  his  energies  had 
awakened  to  full  consciousness  such  a  career 
could  not  achieve  lasting  success.  Providence 

1  Gourgaud,  Journal,  ii.,  435. 


The  Exile  371 

uses  such  men  while  they  serve  its  mysterious 
designs  for  the  uplifting  of  the  race.  It  casts 
them  aside  when  their  renovating  work  is  ac- 
complished. Napoleon  saw  not  when  that  time 
had  come.  He  struggled  on  towards  the  Indies, 
Cadiz,  and  Moscow  as  though  the  new  age  of 
nationality  had  not  dawned;  and  therefore  he 
ended  his  days  at  St.  Helena. 


INDEX 


Aboukir,  defeat  at,  144 
Abrantes,  Duchesse  d'  [Ma- 
dame   Junot] ,    Memoirs, 

8  TO. 

Acre,  repulse  at,  281-82 
Addington,  285,  289 
.^schylus,  Agamemnon,  350 
Ajaccio,  7,  54 
Alexander,    Czar,    42,    113, 

250,  305,  313-16 
Alexander    the    Great,    15, 

253,  280,  283 
Alexandria,  91 
Alsace,  242 

Amiens,  Peace  of,  285,  300 
Amsterdam,  287 
Ancona,  78 
Andalusia,  313 
Andigne,  d',  188-89 
Andrews,    E.    L.,   Napoleon 

and  America,  284  TO. 
Antommarchi,  83 
Arc  de  Triomphe,  261 
Aristotle,  Nicomachean 

Ethics,  236 
Arndt,  294 
Arnold,  Matthew,  78 
Aspern,   battle    of,    92,    93, 

134 

Athens,  18,  182,  280 
Augsburg,  109 
Aulard,  Prof.,  30-1  TO.,  147  n. 
Austerlitz,    battle    of,    113, 

177,    203,    208,    291,    292, 

365 
Australia,   Napoleonic  map 

of,  284 


Austria,  65,  75,  96,  98,  100, 
104,  108,  123,  127,  142, 
154,  184,  232,  249,  284- 
85,  291,  313,  317,  318,  320, 
331,  340 

Auxonne,  17,  48,  53,  56,  57 

Avignon,  64,  295 

Azeglio,  d',  302 


B 


Bagration,  117 
Barclay,  General,  123 
Bastia  (capital  of  Corsica) , 

54 

Bathurst,  Earl,  342 
Bausset,  Cour  de  Napoleon, 

12  n.,  326  n. 

Bavaria,  100,  101,  108,  284 
Baylen,  defeat  at,  38,  201, 

313 
Beauharnais,  Josephine  de, 

wife  of  Napoleon,  25   et 

seq.,  248,  259 
Beauterne,  de,  Sentiment  de 

Napoleon    sur    le    Chris- 

tianisme,  274  TO. 
Belgium,  214,  326,  336 
Bentham,  240,  241 
Berlier  (The  Jurist),  165 
Berlin,     127-28,    196,    267, 

294,  301 
Bernadotte,    Marshal,    103, 

115,  117,  148 
Berthier,  Marshal,  108,  109, 

112,  197 

Bertrand,  General  and  Ma- 
dame, 271,  343,  355,  358, 

359 


373 


374 


Index 


Bessieres,  Marshal,  117, 
187,  201 

Bliicher,  Marshal,  87,  95, 
128,  129 

Bohemia,  110,  112,  127 

Bonaparte,  Caroline,  12,  35 

Bonaparte,  Charles  Marie 
de,  9 

Bonaparte,  Elisa,  12,  85 

Bonaparte,  Jerome,  12,  33, 
198,  320 

Bonaparte,  Joseph,  11,  33, 
34,  121,  247,  319,  320 

Bonaparte,  Josephine.  See 
Beauharnais,  Josephine 
de. 

Bonaparte,  Louis,  33,  71, 
238 

Bonaparte,  Lucien,  12 

Bonaparte,  Marie  Louise. 
See  Marie  Louise  of 
Austria. 

Bonaparte,  Napoleon,  Cor- 
sican  influence  on,  2  et 
seq.;  birth,  6-7;  family 
character,  7  et  seq.; 
Greek  ancestry,  10  n.; 
education :  (a)  Brienne 
monks,  16;  (6)  ficole 
Militaire,  Paris,  16;  stu- 
dent of  history,  18  et 
seq.;  constitution  of  La 
Calotte  Club,  18;  melan- 
choly of,  19;  first  love 
affair,  21;  love  affairs, 
21-28;  flight  from  Cor- 
sica, 23;  in  prison,  23; 
incident  with  Madame 
Thurreau,  24;  Josephine 
de  Beauharnais,  25;  on 
falling  in  love,  27;  Count- 
ess Walewska,  29;  cheats 
at  cards,  32-3;  family 
affairs,  34 ;  impetuosity 
and  treachery,  36-7  know- 
ledge of  mathematics,  42; 
proposed  book  on  Corsica, 
46;  adventure  tales,  47; 
Discours  de  Lyon,  47; 
Essay  of  1786,  49;  a 


Jacobin,  52;  at  Valence, 
51;  at  Auxonne,  53; 
Summary  of  Report  on 
French  Finance,  53;  life 
in  Corsica,  54-7;  thesis 
on  Happiness,  57;  Re- 
public or  Monarchy,  59; 
arrival  at  Provence,  63; 
Le  Souper  de  Beaucaire, 
64 ;  Brigadier-general,  67 ; 

?rison  at  (1),  Fort  Carre, 
0;  (2)  Antibes,  70;  chase 
of  the  Chouans,  71;  Paris, 
73-4;  seizure  of  Egypt, 
78;  character  of,  22-3, 
38,  79-82;  First  Consul, 
81;  Rousseau  and  Napo- 
leon, influence  on  France, 
81-2;  Notes  on  the  Art  of 
War,  83;  defeat  at  As- 
pern-Essling,  92;  vari- 
ous triumphs,  92-3;  stra- 
tegy, 94-114;  tactics,  108- 
16;  dicta  on  war,  116- 
20;  Peninsular  War,  121; 
marriage  with  Marie 
Louise,  122;  end  of  mili- 
tary career,  131-35;  com- 
parison with  Wellington, 
131-36;  intelligent  des- 
potism, 138  et  seq.;  gov- 
ernment of  Milan,  142; 
Egypt,  143-47;  Local 
Government  in  France, 
150-51;  and  the  Church, 
154-62;  Legion  of 
Honour,  163;  treaty  with 
Rome,  162;  speech  on 
Civilians,  164;  First  Con- 
sul for  Life,  166;  Codes, 
169-73;  education,  172; 
Emperor,  187 ;  N  a  p  o- 
leonic  Empire,  194;  de- 
votion to,  196-97;  Pub- 
lic Works,  211-19;  fear  of 
hungry  people,  214;  finan- 
cier, 221-24;  mercantilist, 
223;  public  opinion,  225; 
divorce  of  Josephine,  232 ; 
Marie  Louise,  232;  an- 


Index 


375 


Bonaparte — Continued 
nexes  N.  W.  Germany, 
Hamburg,  and  Liibeck, 
233;  excitability,  233-35; 
and  Bentham,  241 ;  speech 
to  Swiss  Confederation, 
242-43;  history,  243-44; 
attitude  to  destiny,  246- 
57;  and  Jews,  255;  litera- 
ture, 258-60;  music  and 
arts,  260;  Monologue  on 
Christianity,  274;  Roman 
characteristics,  278  et 
seq.;  conquest  of  Levant, 
279;  conquest  of  India, 
280;  examples  of  cruelty, 
300;  alliance  with  Persia, 
305;  sojourn  at  Elba,  324; 
St.  Helena,  327;  Napo- 
leon's Last  Voyages,  328 
?i.;  to  go  to  St.  Helena, 
338-41 ;  literary  tastes, 
347-348;  grant  from  Brit- 
ish Government,  354; 
final  summing  up,  363-71. 
See  also  Destiny,  History, 
Public  Works,  Religion, 
Strategy,  Suicide,  Tactics 

Bonaparte,  Pauline,  12,  33, 
35,  333 

Bondois,  Napoleon  et  la  So- 
ciete  de  son  Temps,  292  n. 

Bonnal,  General,  112 

Bordeaux,  64 

Borghese,  Prince,  304 

Boswell,  James,  Account  of 
Corsica,  5,  6,  30  n.;  on 
Paoli,  55 

Boulogne,  38,  43,  100,  101, 
102,  187,  190,  200,  212, 
250,  251,  291 

Bourgogne,  Sergeant,  197 

Bourmont,  General,  239 

Bourrienne,  Memoirs,  245 

Brest,  212,  213 

Brienne,  16,  46,  174 

Broadley,  A.  M.,  Napoleon 
MSS.,  354  n.,  362  n. 

Broglie,  Due  de,  Memoires, 
245  n.,  258  n. 


Broglie,  de,  jun.,  318 
Browning,    Oscar,    287    n., 

289  n. 

Bruix,  Admiral,  38 
Brumaire,  a  town,  157 
Briinn,  114 
Brunswick-Oels,    Duke    of, 

93 

Bulow,  130 

Burke,  Edmund,  45,  181 
Buttafoco,  Count,  57 


Cadiz,    120,    197,   200,   234, 

309,  311,  313 
Caen,  64 

Caesar,  Augustus,  15 
Caesar,   Julius,   15,   16,   32, 

280,  367 

Cairo,  revolt  at,  145 
Calotte,  La,  a  club,  consti- 
tution for,  18 
Cambaceres,  189,  192 
Cambronne,  General,  202 
Campbell,  Sir  Neil,  Journalt 

258    n.,    324    n.,    327    n., 

332  n. 

Camperdown,  battle  of,  280 
Canning,  308 
Canoya,  296 

Cantillon,  French  officer,  13 
Cape  St.  Vincent,  battle  of, 

280 

Carlyle,  224 
Carnot,  62,  187 
Carrousel  Arch,  218 
Carteaux,  67 
Cassel,  300 
Castiglione,  manoBuvres  at, 

11 

Catalonia,  318 
Catharine     II.     of     Russia, 

307,  364 

Caulaincourt,  36,  318 
Champagny,  194,  238 
Chappe,  Claude,  inventor  of. 

semaphore  telegraph,  218 
Chaptal,  73  n.,  194  n.,  210- 

n.,  214-15,  260  n.,  269 


376 


Index 


Charles,   Archduke,  87,   92, 

93,  100,  101,  109-10,  111, 

112,  122 

Charles  IV.,  309 
Chateaubriand,  227 
Chatham,  Earl  of,  44 
Chatillon,  72 
Chatillon,   Congress   of,  37 

n.,  365 

Chaumont,  Treaty  of,  336 
Chenier,  154 
Cherbourg,  212 
Clarke,    Minister    of    War, 

201 
Code    of    Civil    Procedure, 

172 

Code  Civile,  169  et  seq. 
Code  of  Criminal  Procedure, 

172 
Code  Napoleon,  170 ;  women, 

170-72;  divorce,  172;  be- 
quest, 172,  294 
Colbert,  214,  224 
Colin,  L'Education  Militaire 

de  Napoleon,  67  n.t  71  n.t 

88  n. 

Cologne,  211 
Colombier,  Mile.,  21,  259 
Colonies  of  France,  283-92, 

325 
Concordat,  The,  154-63,  270, 

302 

Condorcet,  174-75 
Confucius,  274 
Coni,  98 

Constant,  Benjamin,  154 
Constantine,    Grand    Duke, 

117 

Constantinople,  37 
Contrat  Social,  Le,  46,  48, 

49,  50,  51,  60,  61,  63,  64, 

80,  81 

Corday,  Charlotte,  30 
Corfu,  78 
Cormenin,     Du     C  o  n  s  eil 

d'fitat,  206 
Corneille,  202 
Corps  Legislatif,  153 
Corsica,  2-8,  46,  47,  54,  62, 

63,  65,  70,  80,  170 


Corsicans,   character   of,   2 

et  seq. 

Council  of  State,  153,  206 
Cromwell,  Oliver,  45-6 


Danton,  44 

Daru,  218 

Daunou,  154 

David,  the  Painter,  260 

Davout,  110,  112,  114,  115, 

116,  200 

Decaen,  General,  287,  288 
Decres,  Admiral,  122,  200 
Dego,  battle  of,  96 
Dennewitz,  battle  of,  128 
Destiny    or    Fate     (Napo- 
leon) ,  72,  246-57 
Dietfurt,  103 
Dillon,  General,  355 
Dionysius,  251 
Donauworth,  109 
Draco,  182 
Dresden,  121,  127,  128,  204, 

n.,  257,  260,  317,  325 
Dresden,  battle  of,  256  n. 
Driault,    G.,    La    Politique 

Orientale     de     Napoleon, 

305  n. 

Droits  reunis,  222 
Dumas,     General     Mathieu, 

164,  257  n.,  288  n. 
Dumont,  149 
Dupont,  General,  200,  201, 

309,  311,  313 

Duroc,  Grand-Marshal,  218 
Duval,  Alexandre,  204 


E 


Eckermann,  261 

Eckmuhl,  battle  of,  107 

Education,  172-80 

Egypt,  28,  37,  78,  79,  90, 
141,  144-45,  159,  241, 
245,  249,  251,  272,  280, 
282,  286,  309,  312;  Insti- 
tute of,  144 


Index 


377 


Elba,  35,  70,  221,  284,  294, 

324,    326,   328,   329,   332, 

333,  337,  356,  360 
Elberfeld,  301 
Elchingen,  battle  of,  105 
Emerson,        Representative 

Men  (Napoleon),  29  n. 
Enghien,  Due  d',  13,  187 
England.  See  Great  Britain. 
Epaminondas,  253 
Epicurus,  276 
Erfurt,  42,  128,  263  n.,  270, 

313 

Erlon,  d',  130 
Ermenonville,  81 
Etruria,  284 
Eugene,  Prince,  212,  301 
Exmouth,  Lord,  4 
Eylau,  battle  of,  199 


Feraud,  72 

Ferdinand,  Archduke,  100, 
101,  121,  320 

Fesch,  Cardinal,  56,  254 

Fezensac,  Due  de,  197 

Fichte,  294 

Fisher,  Napoleonic  States- 
manship— Germany,  293 
n.,  294  n. 

Florence,  334  n. 

Fontaine,  an  architect,  218 

Fouche,  Minister  of  Police, 
192,  226,  228 

Fournier,  an  officer,  345 

France,  13-14,  31,  43,  53, 
85,  86,  120,  121-22,  125- 
26,  133,  141,  147,  149-50, 
153,  155,  157,  159,  163, 
166,  168,176-81,  183,185, 
188,  193-94,  199,  205-08, 
224-33,  237,  240-46,  250, 
n.,  270,  281-90,  295,  297- 
300,  317,  318,  324,  325, 
326,  330,  331,  335-42,  347, 
352,  357,  361,  363-71 

Frate,  Nicola,  13 

Frederick  William  of  Prus- 
sia, 41,  121,  307 


Freon,  a  giant,  260 
Freron,  67 

Friedland,     campaign      of, 
365 


Ganteaume,  Admiral,  91 

Gardane,  General,  La  Mis- 
sion du  General  Gardanet 
305  n. 

Garden,  Traites,  286  n. 

Gaudin,  de,  Due  de  Gaete, 
Mems,  222  n. 

Gauthey,  a  contractor,  217 

Gazette  de  France,  228 

Genoa,  10,  69,  100,  287,  291, 
300,  312;  decrees  of,  4-5 

George  III.,  285 

Germany,  34,  126,  173,  220, 
230,  233,  243,  284,  292, 
293,  294,  299,  317,  318, 
319,  320,  325 

Girardin,  Journal,  33  n.,  81 

Glover,  J.  R.,  Napoleon 
Correspondence,  258 

Gneisenau,  a  strategist,  128 

Goethe,  42,  261,  262,  292; 
Sorrows  of  Werther,  263 

Gourgaud,  General,  15,  27, 
42,  223,  236,  247,  255  n., 
268  n.,  271,  282  n.,  324 
326  n.,  335,  344,  347,  348, 
353,  354,  356,  357,  358, 
359,  365  n. 

Great  Britain,  38,  53,  84,  98, 
105,  122,  143,  154,  159, 
163,  184,  212,  221-24,  230, 
250,  285,  287-91,  299,  306, 
309,  311,  313,  325-31, 
338-40 

Greece,  3,  18,  45,  182 

Grenoble,  64 

Grognards,  Les,  86 

Grouchy,  Marshal,  131 

Gruyer,  P.,  Napoleon,  Roi 
de  Vile  d'Elbe,  332  n., 
335  n. 

Guillois,  259  n. 

Guyot,  Dr.,  295  n. 


378 


Index 


Hamburg,  127,  233,  293 
Haussmann,  Baron,  220 
Hauterive,  the  Archivist, 

194 

Heine,  315  n. 
Herbert  of  Cherbury,  Lord, 

321 

Herder,  264 
Herodotus,  321  n. 
History,    Napoleon    on,    16, 

57,  59,  138-39,  243-44 
Hofer,  92 
Hohenlohe,  201 
Holland,  238,  288,  299,  326, 

331 
Holland,      Lord,      Foreign 

Reminiscences,  348  n. 
Hood,  Admiral,  64  n.,  67 
Hortense,  Queen,  204 
Houssaye,  Waterloo,  132  n. 
Hiiningen,  213 
Hyde  de  Neuville,  188,  256, 

334  n. 


Imperial  Nobility,  order  of, 
166 

India,  37,  280,  286,  287-88, 
311  321 

Ingolstadt,  103,  109,  173 

Isle  of  France  (Mauritius), 
241 

Italy,  3,  28,  29,  34,  45,  46,  67, 
69,  71,  76,  85,  93,  96,  98, 
100,  104,  129,  141,  142, 
155,  173,  186,  212,  220, 
228,  241,  242,  270,  278, 
279,  285,  294,  299,  309, 
317,  324,  326,  328,  331, 
334  n.,  353 


Jena,  campaign  of,  14,  128, 

133,  190,  308,  365 
Jews,  the,  254 


Jomini,  Precis  de  I' Art  de 
Guerre,  94  n.,  109,  116, 
126  n.,  347 

Jourdan,  Marshal,  126 

Juges  de  Paix,  152 

Junot,  12,  70,  309 

Junot,  Madame  (Duchesse 
d'Abrantes) ,  10  n.,  57-8 


Kellermann,  Marshal,  130 
Klattau,  114 
Kleber,  145-46,  282 
Krieg,  General,  89 
Kutusoff,  General,  116,  117 


Lafayette,  44, 185 

Lalande,  270 

Lampedusa,  288 

Landshut,  109,  112 

Lannes,  Marshal,  92,  103, 
117 

Lanzac  de  Laborie,  220  n. 

Las  Cases,  Memorial,  21, 
24  n.,  195  n.,  259,  271, 
276  n.,  299  n.,  300  n.t  310 
n.,  340,  344,  348  n.t  350  n., 
354,  359,  360,  362  n. 

Lauriston,  General,  86 

Lavalette,  Postmaster-Gen- 
eral, 43  n.;  Mems.,  213 

Lecestre  and  Brotonne, 
Correspondence  de  Napo- 
leon (with  additions),  1, 
5  n.,  21  n.,  38  n.,  77  n., 
142,  176  n.,  228  n.,  320  n., 
328  n.,  244  n.,  247  n.,  249 
n.,  251  n.,  259  n.,  285  n., 
291  n.,  300  n.,  303,  305 
n.,  309  n.,  311  n.,  335  n., 
353  w., 

Leghorn,  329 

Legion  of  Honour,  162-63 

Legislature,  divisions  of 
French,  153 

Leipzig,  128,  318 

Lejeune,  109 


Index 


379 


Levant,  conquest  of,  279 

Lewes,  George  Henry,  263 

Liechtenstein,  116 

Ligny,  129-30 

Lille,  213 

Lisbon,  309 

Liverpool  Ministry,  338,  342 

Livy,  266 

Lobau  Island,  92 

London,  149,  222,  234,  289, 

327 
Louis    XVIII.    of    France, 

325,  330-31 
Lowe,   Sir  Hudson,   340   et 

sea. 

Liibeck,  233 
Luxembourg,  331 
Lycurgus,  139,  274 
Lyon,  Discours  de,  47 
Lyons,  64,  213,  214,  220 

M 

Macdonald,  Marshal,  187 
Mack,    General,    100,    103, 

104,  105,  201 
Macpherson,  Ossian,  258 
Madrid,   34,   121,  136,   309, 

310,  313,  320 
Magon,  39 
Mahan,  Captain,  281 
Maillebois,  Marshal  de,  98 
Mainz,  211,  294 
Maitland,  Captain,  337 
Malcolm,  Admiral,  341 
Malcolm,  Lady,  A  Diary  of 

St.  Helena,  180  n.,  258  n., 

356%. 

Malmaison,  157,  158,  215 
Malmesbury,  Diaries,  253  n. 
Malojaloslavitz,  124 
Malta,  141,  146,  287,  288 
Mantua,  96,  98 
Marbot,  117 
Marcus  Aurelius,  296 
Marengo,    battle     of,     134, 

155,  184,  333 
Marie    Louise    of    Austria, 

195,  232,  332 
Marmont,  Marshal,  71,  106, 

128,  135,  332 


Marseilles,  64,  65,  67 
Martiniana,  Cardinal,  155 
Massena,  Marshal,  110,  249, 

328 
Masson,  Napoleon  Inconnu, 

9  n.,  18,  20  n.,  47  n.,  57  n., 

62,  67  n. 
Mauritius  (Isle  of  France). 

241,  288 

Mazzini,  20,  297 
Meaux,  215 
Medina  da  Rio  Seco,  battle 

of,  201 
Melzi,  60 

Memmingen,  100,  105 
Meneval,  195  n.,  196-97 
Menou,  General,  146  n. 
Mercure  de  France,  227 
Metternich,  Memoirs,  14  n., 

15  n.,  34  n. 
Metz,  187 
Milan,    96,    142,    143,    212, 

213,  226,  249,  296 
Milton,  194 
Minims,  the,  174 
Miot  de  Melito,  60 
Mirabeau,  44,  149,  156,  184 
Modena,  27 
Mohammed,  272 
Mollien,    190    n.,    192,    208, 

222,  224  n. 

Moniteur,  227,  228,  286 
Montbrun,  General,  39-40 
Montchenu,  Marquis  de,  343 
Montenotte,  battle  of,  248 
Montholon,  271,  357,  358 
Montholon,  Madame  de,  348, 

355 

Montmirail,  battle  of,  111 
Montpellier,  65,  66,  67 
Moravia,  129 
Moreau,  148,  187 
Morris,   Gouverneur,   Drop- 
more  Papers,  237  n. ;  Diary 

and  Letters  of,  286  n. 
Mortfontaine,  319 
Moscow,  120,  122,  123,  124, 

136,    196,    197,    234,    247, 

250,    280,    297,    300,    315, 

317,  319,  371 


380 


Index 


Miiller,  Johann  von,  267 
Munich,  102  n.,  109 
Murat,  Marshal,  39-40,  104, 
144  w.,  309,  310,  313 


N 


Nancy,  203 

Napier,     Peninsular     War, 

133,  135 
Naples,  213 

Napoleon  III.,  220,  239 
Narbonne,    Count    de,    316, 

317,  325 

Navigation  Act,  221 
Necker,  53 
Neipperg,  Count,  332 
Nelson,  Horatio,  91,  98,  122, 

251,  281,  283 
Nero,  268 
Neuburg,  103 
Ney,  Marshal,  95,  103,  104, 

128,  130,  239 
Nice,  67-8 

Nile,  battle  of,  90,  281 
Nimes,  66,  67 
Nivose,  affair  of,  154 
Noerdlingen,  106 
Notables  of  the  Nation,  162 

166 

Novalis,  322 
Nuremberg,  300 


O 


Odeleben,  Colonel  von,   99, 

126 
Oldenburg,  Grand  Duke  of, 

314 

Omar  Khayyam  276-77 
O'Meara,  354 
Organic  Articles,  162 
Orleans,  214 
Owen,  Robert,  173 


Palm,   a   Nuremberg  book- 
seller, 300 
Palma,  284 


Paoli,  5,  6,  9,  20,  46,  55,  56, 
64,  68 

Papacy,  270 

Paradisi,  184 

Paris,  23,  26,  28,  34,  43,  46, 
54,  62,  63,  69,  71,  73,  74, 
97,  101,  108,  122,  141-42, 
146,  149,  151,  153,  160, 
161,  174,  203,  211,  213, 
214,  215,  217-18,  219,  228, 
229,  254,  255  n.,  261,  264, 
270,  293,  294,  296,  304, 
325,  335,  356,  370 

Pasquier,  Prefect  of  Police, 
122,  138,  185,  191 

Paterson,  Miss,  198 

Paul  I.,  of  Russia,  40 

Pelet,  de  la  Lozere,  Napo- 
leon in  Council,  36,  161  n.. 
167,  171,  177,  222 

Peninsular  War,  121 

Perman,  Mme.,  72 

Pestalozzi,  173 

Peyrusse,  Baron,  330,  334  n. 

Pezay,  97 

Piedmont,  96 

Pierron  on  Napoleon's  Stra- 
tegy, 97  n. 

Pietra  Santa  Family,  84 

Piontowski,  a  Polish  soldier. 
360 

Pitt,  the  elder,  44 

Pius  VII.,  Pope,  155-62, 
270,  302  et  seq. 

Plato,  18,  58,  272 

Plutarch,  Lives,  251 

Poppleton,  Captain,  344 

Porto  Ferrajo,  329 

Portugal,  307,  309,  313 

Pritchard,  Mrs.,  345 

Privy  Council,  167,  207 

Prussia,  86,  123,  128,  133, 
190,  284,  331 

Public  opinion,  225 

Public  works:  roads,  211; 
canals,  213-14  aqueducts, 
215;  Triumphal  Arch, 
219;  beautification  of 
Paris,  220;  bridges,  219- 
20 


Index 


R 


Racine,  266 

Rambuteau,  Comte  de, 
Mems.,  316  n. 

Ramolina,  Letizia,  mother 
of  Napoleon,  10,  32 

Ratisbon,  107,  109,  110,  111, 
112,  114 

Raynal,  on  The  Two  Indies, 
18,  57 

Religion,  Napoleon's,  48-52, 
58,  158,  159,  241,  245,  253, 
268-77 

Rhegium,  252 

Rivoli,  128 

Robespierre,  62,  80,  246 

Robespierre,  Augustin,  68- 
9 

Rochefort,  336,  337,  339 

Roederer,  Journal,  138,  148, 
157,  163,  170  n.,  185,  187, 
214,  241  n.,  245,  247  n.t 
278,  319,  324 

Roland,  Madame,  30 

Rome,  15,  35,  73,  157,  161, 
162,  177  209,  211,  261, 
266,  268,  278,  279,  296, 
354,  364,  367 

Ropes,  John  Codman,  29, 
131 

Rose,  J.  Holland:  Napo- 
leonic Studies,  145  n.,  345 
n. ;  Pitt  and  Napoleon, 
130  n.,  295,  328  n.;  Life 
of  Napoleon,  284  n. 

Rousseau,  on  Corsica,  3-4; 
defence  of  Napoleon,  47, 
49,  81-82;  Le  Devin  du 
Village,  47;  £mile,  173; 
songs  of,  260;  La  Nou- 
velle  Heloise,  348.  See 
also  Contrat  Social,  Le. 

Rousseau,  F.,  Kleber  et 
Menou,  146  n. 

Roustan,  49 

Ruel,  159,  160 

Russia,  40,  100,  121,  123, 
124,  125,  126,  223,  226, 


249,  285,  291,  301,  314, 
315,  317,  320,  325,  331, 
340 


St.  Cloud,  103,  247,  319 

St.  Cyr,  Marshal,  128,  328 

St.  Cyr,  College  of,  176 

St.  Helena,  2,  15,  21,  27,  29, 
42,  83,  99,  130,  173,  180, 
183,  188,  195,  223,  243, 
245  n.,  247,  248,  255  n., 
259,  267,  271,  275,  282, 
296,  299,  310,  338-71 

St.  Just,  62 

St.  Petersburg,  122,  123, 
124 

Salamanca,  battle  of,  134- 
36 

Saliceti,  68,  72 

Saone,  river,  53 

Sardinia,  98 

Savary,  230 

Savona,  96,  98-9,  162,  304, 
305 

Savoy,  242 

Saxony,  King  of,  260 

Scharnhorst,  120 

Schill,  93 

Schiller,  294 

Schonbrunn,  228 

School  at  St.  Denis,  208 

Sebastiani,  Report  on  the 
Levant,  286,  287 

Secularisations,  284 

Segur,  Histoires  et  Me- 
moir es,  111  n. 

Semaphore  telegraph,  101, 
213 

Senate,  153 

Senior,  W.,  Conversations 
with  Thiers,  122  n.,  280  n. 

Seurre,  53 

Shakespeare,  264 

Shorter,  Clement,  Napoleon 
and  his  Fellow-Travellers, 
346  n. 

Sicily,  201,  251,  252,  312 


382 


Index 


Sieyes,  Abbe,  constitution 
of,  147,  148-152,  153,  163, 
246 

Silesia,  127 

Smith,  Sir  Sidney,  122,  251 

Smolensk,  123,  251 

Socrates,  272 

Sokelnitz,  116 

Solon,  182 

Sophocles,  (Edipus  Rex,  350 

Soult,  Marshal,  105,  115, 
117 

Spain,  37,  65,  86,  121,  125, 
126,  201,  238,  249,  284, 
286,  288,  307,  309,  311, 
312,  314,  318,  320,  325, 
364 

Sparta,  18 

Stael,  Madame  de,  30,  205, 
205  n.,  231 

Stein,  120 

Stockholm,  306 

Strassburg,  212,  214 

Strategy,  Napoleon's  88-9, 
94-114;  first  campaign, 
95-100;  at  Ulm,  100,  106 

Suchet,  Marshal,  318 

Suicide,  monologue  on,  19- 
20,  352 

Swabia,  97,  103,  104,  129 

Sweden,  179 

Switzerland,  242,  284 

Syria,  37,  79 


Tacitus,  42,  73  n.,  264 

Tactics,  Napoleon's,  84,  94- 
5;  use  of  cavalry,  104, 
108-19;  near  Ratisbon, 
108-9;  Austerlitz,  114 

Talleyrand,  186,  192,  227, 
256;  Napoleon's  interview 
with  Goethe,  262,  267  n., 
271  n. 

Tallien,  91 

Telnitz,  116 

Thibaudeau,  Bonaparte  and 
the  Consulate,  152  n.t  158, 
170  n.,  175,  243  n. 


Thiebault,  86,  90  n.,  187 
Thiers,  102,  280  n. 
Thurreau,  Madame,  24 
Tiberius,  73,  268 
Tilsit,  Treaty  of,  132,  142, 

207,  227,  287,  305,  306 
Timoleon,  251,  253 
Titus,  296 
Tivoli,  278 
Tolstoi,  L.,  250 
Torres  Vedras,  120 
Tortona,  26 
Toulon,   64   n.,   67,   71,   88, 

212,  309 
Trafalgar,    battle    of,    291, 

292,  309,  312 
Trajan,  296 

Tribunate,  153,  166,  207 
Tronchet,  the  Jurist,  169 
Truguet,  Admiral,  187 
Turin,  212,  301 
Turkey,  78,  305,  309,  320 
Tuscany,  10  n.,  86 
Tyrol,  104,  106 


U 


Ulm,  99,  102,  104,  106,  128, 

133,  291 

University  of  France,  176 
Ussher       (Captain),       Sir 
Thomas,  327 


Valence,  17,  19,  21,  48,  51, 
56,  259 

Valladolid,  134 

Vandal,  L'Avenement  de 
Bonaparte,  151  n.;  Napo- 
leon et  Alexandre,  205  n. 

Vandamme,  General,  127, 
204 

Vendean  campaign,  23 

Vendetta,  5 

Vendome  Column,  261 

Venice,  18,  77 

Vergil,  JEneid,  i.,  350 

Verona,  278 

Victor  Emmanuel  I.,  301 


Index 


383 


Vienna,    86,    92,    112,    113, 

114,  294,  340 
Vienna,    Congress    of,    326, 

334,  337,  338 
Villeneuve,  Admiral,  84,  91, 

200,  250,  251 
Vilna,  39,  197 
Vittoria,  136,  317,  318 
Vivian,  Major,  294,  328,  337 
Voltaire :      Mahomet,     262, 

349;  Zaire,  347,  349-50; 

Brutus,  350;  CEdipe,  350 

W 

Wagram,  battle  of  93,  120, 

186,  232 
Walewska,     Countess,     29, 

332 

Warsaw,  300 
Waterloo    campaign,    84-5, 

129-32,  339 


Watson,  G.  L.  de  St.  M., 
A  Polish  Exile  with  Na- 
poleon, 360  n. 

Weimar,  264 

Wellington,  Duke  of,  13,  86, 
87,  125,  129,  131-36,  313 

Welschinger,  La  Censure, 
etc.,  226  n. 

Westphalia,  293 

Weyrother,  115 

Whitworth,  Lord,  and 
Napoleon,  40 

Wieland,  42,  264 

Williams,  W.  T.,  State  of 
France,  204  n. 


Yorck  von  Wartenburg, 
Napoleon  as  General,  254 
n. 

Young,  Arthur,  231  n. 

Yverdun,  173 


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